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This thesis analyses media-elite interactions in post-authoritarian Indonesia. The 
introduction of legally guaranteed press freedom and democracy following 
President Suharto’s fall in 1998 changed the relationship between the media on the 
one hand and the political and business elite on the other. But what has been the 
significance of press freedom for elite politics? 
The argument of this thesis is that the politico-business elites have, to 
differing degrees, harnessed the concept of press freedom by incorporating the 
media as a political weapon in their power struggles over key positions in political 
institutions and over political resources. Crucially, the heterogeneous and mostly 
privately owned media companies positioned themselves as actors in the intra-elite 
contestations.  
Through a set of case studies on intra-elite power struggles that escalated 
into scandals, this thesis examines the ways in which the elite has integrated the 
media into those struggles, and analyses the vested interests of the owners and 
practitioners of the media in those struggles. Ultimately, it establishes two key 
points. First, the elite has employed scandal as a an opportunity to change the 
composition of a democratically elected government; and second, during those 
political scandals the owners or prominent editors of particular media 
organisations, either consciously or otherwise, have formed temporary coalitions 
with particular elite factions based on shared interests defined by structural 
conditions and personal relations. 
iv 
The dissertation’s focus on media-elite interactions is prompted by the 
lingering dominance of elites within Indonesia’s political economy, the domination 
of the media landscape by a small number of media conglomerates whose owners 
are either members of the politico-business elite themselves or linked to the latter in 
various forms, and, further, that the media have become important sites for intra-
elite contestation over political power.  
By placing its analytical focus explicitly on the nature of the relationship 
between the commercial mainstream news media and the politico-business elite in 
times of intra-elite power struggles fought out in the public sphere, this approach 
moves away from media-centred investigations, normative concerns and liberal 
concepts as the dominant way of thinking about the media’s democratic functions.  
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A note on Indonesian names and the translation of Indonesian language sources 
The Indonesian language has used various spelling systems, with the remnants of 
the former systems still reflected in some common names. For common names I 
have generally used the post-1972 system: for example, ‘Suharto’ rather than 
‘Soeharto’. However, where individuals appear to have indicated strong preference 
for alternative (pre-1972) spellings I have made occasional exceptions: for example, 
using ‘Jakob Oetama’ rather than ‘Yakob Utama’. 
Indonesians may be known by a single name (for example, Boediono) or 
multiple names (for example, Sri Mulyani Indrawati). In this study those multiple 
names are shortened according to the particular part of the name by which those 
individuals are ordinarily known in Indonesia. For example, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri is shortened to Megawati, whereas Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is 
shortened to Yudhoyono. Other contractions that are commonly used in Indonesia, 
such as ‘Gus Dur’ for Abdurrahman Wahid or ‘SBY’ for Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, are avoided in this study. However, in respect to quotations or 
translations the spelling of Indonesian names follows the one used in the original 
source. 
 
Translation of Indonesian language sources 
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Introduction 
Media freedoms are widely regarded as pivotal to the flourishing of democracy. 
Consequently, much academic literature focuses on cases which deviate from this 
ideal. However, this thesis posits a more cogent set of questions, namely how, why, 
and for whose benefit are media freedoms compromised? In order to answer these 
questions this thesis, taking Indonesia as a case study, looks at the ways in which a 
particular national politico-business elite has integrated the media in its power 
struggles, and at the vested interests of the owners and practitioners of the media in 
those intra-elite power struggles. 
By placing its analytical focus explicitly on the relationship between the 
commercial mainstream news media and the politico-business elite during intra-
elite power struggles fought out in the public sphere (conflicts frequently termed 
‘scandals’), this approach moves away from the media-centred investigations, 
normative concerns and liberal conceptions, which have dominated thinking about 
the media’s democratic functions. By contrast, this study adopts a different 
approach to examining the media and their possible socio-political implications in 
Indonesia, and post-authoritarian regimes in general. 
The breakdown of the authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998 opened 
Indonesia’s path to democracy. Since then the Indonesian media have been both 
mediators and players in a vast web of power and profit. Developments such as the 
establishment of new print and broadcast media following the simplification of 
license application procedures and requirements, media diversification, and legally 
guaranteed press freedom have freed the media from government control. As the 
2 
frequency with which the media covers cases of political scandal shows, media 
organisations now scrutinize institutions and actors to expose corruption, abuse of 
power and incompetence of the politico-business elite. But, what has been the 
significance of press freedom in post-Suharto Indonesia for elite politics? 
A key argument advanced in this thesis is that instead of fighting against the 
media, the politico-business elite has, to differing degrees, harnessed the concept of 
press freedom by incorporating the media (as an arena and weapon) into its power 
struggles over key positions in political institutions and political resources. The elite 
has also applied other means, such as legal recourse, concentration of ownership, 
and violence, to regain control over the media. But as significant as such strategies 
might be, previous analyses of the Indonesian media have often ignored or 
neglected the link between the media’s power to severely criticise those who try to 
curtail press freedom and the elite’s reliance on a free media. Changes in the 
political structure and political competition among the elite require a media open to 
factions within the political elite competing with each other, and presenting their 
views to the public in order to gain popular support for their cause. This has 
resulted in the Indonesian media becoming a key strategic element in intra-elite 
power struggles. Crucially, the media are not only the arena of those power 
struggles; they are also actors in the struggles (McCargo 1999; 2003; Waisbord 2004: 
1078). 
The Indonesian media – which are now almost entirely privately owned and 
highly diversified – cannot be treated as a unified entity because they are 
fragmented across a range of political, economic, religious, and ideological interests. 
In the media’s role as an actor, the owners of, and practitioners in, the media have 
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their own strategic objectives. Such objectives might conform with particular elite 
interests and might lead, at least temporarily, to mutually beneficial coalitions 
among particular factions within the contesting elite. 
As noted in the first chapter, the rationale for a focus on media-elite relations 
is prompted by the lingering dominance of elites or oligarchs in Indonesia’s political 
economy (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Winters 2011), the dominance in the media 
landscape of a small number of media conglomerates whose owners are either 
members of the politico-business elite themselves or linked to the latter in various 
forms, and the fact that the media have become important sites for intra-elite 
contestation over political and economic power (for example, Haryanto 2011; Hill 
2009; Ida 2011; Sudibyo and Patria 2013; Winters 2013; Tapsell 2012, 2015). This 
preponderance of private media ownership in the hand of the politico-business elite 
along with a high level of conglomeration suggests that the media and the elite are 
intertwined. By drawing on C. Wright Mills’ concept of the power elite (1959) and 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (1988) the thesis establishes that the 
commercial mainstream news media and the politico-business elite in Indonesia are 
intertwined through various forms that go beyond ownership. This is due to the 
commercial mainstream news media’s structural and personal interrelation with the 
politico-business elite and their shared location within capitalist market structures. 
Thus the media operates primarily in ways to reinforce the existing power structure 
rather than to serve the public interest and fulfil the democratic functions assigned 
to it, according to the liberal ideal. 
However, due to political competition the heterogeneous elite is in fierce 
competition with each other on issues that do not question the system’s overall 
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existence; most notably, on issues that concern the distribution of power among 
themselves. During those times of intra-elite contestation – increasingly fought out 
in the public sphere – the free and heterogeneous media, either consciously or 
otherwise, become promoters of a particular faction of the contesting elite. 
Consequently, the dichotomy that those in power (the politico-business elite) are the 
‘bad guys’ constantly seeking more power, while the media performing their 
watchdog role are the ‘good guys’, is not applicable. How this plays out exactly is 
highly contingent on the clash of interests central to any struggle over power fought 
out in the public sphere (such as those dubbed ‘scandals’). 
Through a set of case studies that examine and map out these relationships 
through the analytical focus of scandal I argue the following. First, that the politico-
business elite has integrated the media (as an arena and weapon) into their power 
struggles over key positions in political institutions and political resources. Second, 
that the media are active participants in intra-elite power struggles, that can based 
on the vested interests of owners and/or chief editors who decide on whether, and 
how, to report on intra-elite power struggles. 
 
 
Case study selection and approach 
The examination of media-elite interactions (that is, the media’s integration into 
intra-elite conflicts and their interests in those) in this thesis employs a qualitative 
methodology that draws upon primary and secondary research materials and is 
directed towards answering the research questions outlined above. Primary 
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research material was derived from a range of semi-structured interviews and 
conversations conducted during two fieldtrips to Jakarta between April and 
December 2010. Interviewees included media workers, intellectuals, media analysts 
and politicians. In total, 36 semi-structured interviews were undertaken. Many of 
the interviewees were identified prior to fieldwork but contacted after my arrival in 
Indonesia. In this I relied on the help and support of my research counterpart, the 
national office of the Alliance of Indonesian Journalists (AJI Indonesia) whose 
members offered their connections to contact potential sources informally. These 
contacts often referred me on to other interviewees they thought were relevant to 
my research. Although less than half of these interviews are quoted in this thesis, 
the interviews were important in directing me to written sources. The same applies 
to the numerous informal conversations I had with AJI members, media workers 
and journalists during visits to media organisations and the DPR. Primary sources 
also include media articles, collected from media organisations’ internal databases 
and archives, Murdoch University library, Factiva, Proquest, the "Apakabar" 
Database, and the internet. Secondary research materials, full citations for which are 
provided in the bibliography section, include a wide array of academic, 
governmental, organisational, and media sources. 
The case studies at the core of this thesis were selected because they have in 
common that those who exploited a political scandal aimed to change the 
composition of the democratically elected government through the weapon of 
scandal (the definition of which shall be explored in chapter one). In other words, 
members of the politico-business elite, whose political parties had limited access to 
government resources following the post-election political bargaining process, 
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employed scandal as a means to boost their power, or to do “politics by other 
means” as suggested by Ginsberg and Shefter (1990) their book of the same name. 
The case study selection follows the logic of literal replication (Yin 2009: 54). 
They demonstrate the central argument twice in a slightly different way. The first 
case study (examined in chapters two and three) focuses on two scandals allegedly 
involving President Wahid (1999-2001). In summary, ‘Buloggate’ is about President 
Wahid’s alleged involvement in the diversion of a Rp 35 billion (US $3.5 million) 
fund belonging to the State Logistics Agency’s (Badan Urusan Logistik, Bulog) 
Employee’s Welfare Foundation (Yayasan Bina Sejahtera Karyawan, Yanatera). 
‘Aryantigate’ refers to an alleged extramarital affair between President Wahid and a 
woman called Aryanti prior to his presidency.1 Both scandals were “journalistically 
appealing” (Waisbord 2004: 1087), since they featured President Wahid and 
provided an opportunity to discredit the president. Yet they triggered different 
media responses. This is because Buloggate was a public governance issue that dealt 
with corruption allegations against a president who was widely known to be an 
opponent of ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, 
KKN) and, it had been hoped, would eradicate KKN following the demise of 
Suharto’s corrupt New Order regime. Aryantigate, in contrast, was a personal issue 
about which the media had a choice to cover or ignore. Thus it was particularly 
Buloggate that was employed by Wahid’s opponents. The parliamentary inquiry 
                                                          
1
 As pointed out by Thompson (2000: 119-124; 282) sex scandals that occur in the political field are 
sexual-political scandals and as such a form of political scandal (the definition of which shall be 
explored in section 1.6 of this thesis. Given that Aryantigate was mainly politically motivated (this will 
be discussed in detail in section 3.2 of this thesis) Aryantigate is not treated as a sex scandal but a form 
of political scandal. 
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into the scandal was accompanied by several verbal clashes between parliament and 
president. Eventually the scandal triggered impeachment proceedings. 
The second case study (discussed in chapters four and five) centres on the 
Bank Century scandal which occurred during President Yudhoyono’s second term 
(2009-2014), preoccupying the government, the parliament, the press and the public 
from September 2009 to May 2010. ‘Centurygate’, as the scandal was dubbed by the 
Indonesian media, revolves around the Rp 6.7 trillion (US$ 716 million) government 
bailout of the insolvent Bank Century. The scandal precipitated several showdowns 
between the executive and the parliament. It resulted in Finance Minister Sri 
Mulyani’s resignation and move to the World Bank, and a cabinet reshuffle 
benefiting Golkar. 
 
Case study structure 
Each case study consists of two chapters and is structured so as to answer the 
following questions: What are the contesting elite’s opportunities for, and limits 
upon, utilizing the media to promote their respective interests in the scandals and 
beyond? And further, what are the interests and contrasting positions of the owners 
and practitioners of particular media organisations in those struggles? 
Thus, the first chapter of each case study focuses on how the political elite 
has incorporated scandal as ‘politics by other means’ into their intra-elite power 
struggles, and the ways in which those elite actors who played a decisive role in the 
scandal have tried to use the media to their advantage, that is, to attack each other. 
The second case study chapter focuses on the interests of the owners and 
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practitioners of particular media organisations in those scandals. Obviously this 
undertaking requires some elaboration in matters of approach and unit of analysis. 
 
 
Selection of news publications for analysis: Context and reasons for 
choice 
In order to focus this analysis most effectively, I limit it to the news media, and in 
particular to the press, thus ignoring other mass communication media genres and 
the undeniably pivotal role of television. While the broadcast media disseminate the 
news to the masses, it is those that control the press that determine what is news, 
which has the potential to ‘set the political agenda’ (Sen and Hill 2007: 51).2 In 
addition, the Indonesian press is the most elite-oriented media in the country and in 
terms of content it mostly aims to cater to educated and elite readers, especially 
those living in urban areas (Siregar 2002: 3-4). In particular, some of the country’s 
national broadsheets, as well as Tempo magazine, provide a vibrant forum for 
intellectual discourse about political, economic and social issues (Tomsa 2007: 79).  
Given that this thesis focuses explicitly on media-elite interactions the 
publications chosen for analysis derive from this type of print media. In the context 
of Buloggate I selected Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Republika. In the context of 
Centurygate Kompas, Media Indonesia, Koran Tempo, and Tempo were chosen. In the 
case of Aryantigate the rationale for selecting Gatra, Panji Masyarakat, and Forum 
                                                          
2 “This indirect influence of newspapers (and radio) on television reporters is confirmed in a number of 
other studies and labelled ‘intermedia agenda setting’. Daily contact between the journalists and the 
competitive media environment created a high degree of convergence between different media outlets 
regarding issues and sources” (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006: 92). 
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Keadilan is based on the fact that those publications were the first national quality 
news magazines that made the alleged affair a cover story.3  
As pointed out by Hanitzsch (2004: 184) Kompas, Media Indonesia, and 
Republika, as well as the weekly Tempo, are also ‘defining media’ or ’key media’ that 
are used extensively by journalists in their professional activity.4 By and large, these 
publications report much the same stories, but there are also some differences. 
Those differences in media content are related to a range of factors originating from 
inside and outside of media organisations (Shoemaker and Reese 1997) and are most 
profoundly expressed in editorials. In contrast to articles that provide factual 
information on current views, the editorial is opinionated and represents the views 
of the paper as an organisation, on current and relevant issues of importance. 
According to Henry and Tator (2002: 93) editorials  
are not merely idle statements of senior writers’ opinions; often they express the 
broader ideological stance of the newspaper’s owners and managers. They are 
evidence of the interlocking power structures of any given society; in fact, they 
are often addressed not only to the reading public but more narrowly to 
society’s economic and power elites. 
 
Furthermore, as argued by Waisbord (2004: 1080) in his examination on scandals in 
Argentina, 
  
                                                          
3 The respective publications characteristics will be discussed in detail in section 3.2 of this thesis. 
4 Hanitzsch (2004: 184) notes that Kompas is by far the most influential daily newspaper amongst media 
practitioners, being read by 77.5 per cent of journalists. Republika is the second-most read daily 
newspaper among journalists with 39.9 per cent. Media Indonesia is with 39.3 per cent the third-most 
read daily newspaper among journalists. With a readership of 33.7 per cent among journalists, Tempo is 
the most influential news magazine among journalists.  
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editorials that exonerate or call authorities to resign indicate the position of 
influential voices. Although their impact might be limited among general 
readers, editorials, particularly during political crises, are mandatory reading 
for elites. 
 
Thus, studying editorials is of special significance when attempting to elucidate a 
particular publication’s interest in a scandal. The following section provides an 
overview of the selected publications and their general characteristics. Particular 
characteristics and details, that are crucial for an understanding of the publications 
interest in Buloggate and Centurygate respectively, will be discussed in greater 
depth in the context of the respective case study.5 
 
 
Characteristics of selected publications 
Media Indonesia 
Media Indonesia daily newspaper is part of the Media Group owned by politician 
and businessman Surya Paloh. Paloh, an Acehnese-born entrepreneur and active 
Golkar member with close connections to the political elite, entered the media 
business in the mid-1980s.6 In 1985 he diversified his successful catering business, 
PT Indocater, to establish a publishing holding company, PT Surya Persindo, 
through which he produced the "controversial straight-talking, rather flashy daily 
Prioritas" (Hill 2006: 92) that was banned only two years after its establishment.7 
                                                          
5 For Buloggate see p. 125-8, for Centurygate see p. 235-238. 
6 Paloh joined Golkar in 1968 and served as MPR member from 1977 until 1982 and was a founder of 
the Communication Forum for the Sons and Daughters of Retired Members of the Armed Forces 
(Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, FKPP ABRI), 
military-backed ‘youth’ organisation. 
7 For details on the license revocation of Prioritas see Hill 2006: 40, 92-3. 
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After unsuccessfully applying for a new publication permit for another paper, he 
became co-publisher of Media Indonesia, established in 1970 by Teuku Syah Yousli. 
Out of this collaboration Media Indonesia developed under the new management of 
PT Media Citra Nusa Purnama headed by Surya Paloh (Media Indonesia 2014). 
Sen and Hill (2006: 90) describe Media Indonesia as affiliated with Bimantara, 
a huge conglomerate with its major interests in manufacturing and primary 
industries that was owned by President Suharto's son, Bambang Trihatmodjo. 
However, despite any such affiliation and Surya Paloh’s friendship with Bambang 
Trihatmodjo Media Indonesia’s license had been revoked once temporarily during the 
New Order while the license of Prioritas had been cancelled permanently. 
Furthermore, following the banning of Tempo in 1994 many Tempo journalists 
migrated to Media Indonesia. 
Over the years Paloh’s Media Group empire expanded through the 
acquisition of regional newspapers and diversification into non-media sectors, such 
as energy and natural resources, hospitality and catering (Media Group 2010: 4). In 
November 2000 Surya Paloh launched MetroTV, Indonesia's first news channel. 
Meanwhile Paloh’s political career advanced. He chaired Golkar’s advisory 
board from 2004 to 2009. Following his failure to gain Golkar chairmanship, he 
established a mass organisation, the National Democrats, out of which emerged a 
political party with the same name in mid-2011. Soon afterwards Paloh resigned 
from Golkar (Antara, 7 September 2011) and eventually became Nasdem Party 
chairman in 2013.  
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Media Indonesia cannot be separated from the person of Surya Paloh. 
According to Nainggolan (2003: 223) “Surya Paloh is Media Indonesia”.8 Even 
though Surya Paloh does not have a journalistic background and Media Indonesia’s 
daily news is managed by a chief editor (appointed by Paloh himself), Paloh’s 
dominance over Media Indonesia’s business and editorial affairs penetrates so deeply 
that it constitutes the dominant factor influencing the character of Media Indonesia’s 
reporting (Nainggolan 2003: 218; Hamad 2004: 131). Surya Paloh also has the 
prerogative to determine the content and direction of the main articles, to the point 
of having the right to stop or change that coverage (Keller 2009: 68) and to impose 
self-censorship upon Media Indonesia, if the paper’s coverage might directly conflict 
with his politico-business interests (Keller 2009: 78). Indeed, as highlighted by 
Haryanto (2011: 110-12) there are numerous examples were Paloh was using his 
media empire to promote his political ambitions and business interests. Surya Paloh 
himself admitted in an interview with Tempo (5 April 2004) that he was using his 
media organisation while campaigning for Golkar’s presidential nomination prior to 
the 2004 presidential elections. His answer – translated below – is surprisingly 
candid and direct: 
Honestly I have to admit that I am using Metro TV and Media Indonesia. If I did 
not, what else could I use? If a journalist is not happy with that, well, it’s their 
own fault for becoming a journalist at Metro TV or Media Indonesia. I do not 
want to be a hypocrite.9 
  
                                                          
8 “Surya Paloh adalah Media Indonesia”. 
9 “Surya Paloh: Secara jujur harus saya akui bahwa saya menggunakan Metro TV dan Media 
Indonesia. Kalau tidak, apa lagi yang bisa saya gunakan? Kalau ada wartawan yang tak senang, ya, 
salah sendiri mengapa dia menjadi wartawan di Metro TV atau Media Indonesia. Saya tak ingin jadi 
hipokrit” (Tempo, 5 April 2004). 
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As the sole owner of Media Indonesia, Surya Paloh also exerts direct influence on 
Media Indonesia’s editorial line by appointing the editorial team. The editorial is 
written alternately by one of the team members. Media Indonesia’s editorial style is 
straightforward and free of euphemism (Anwari 2003: 8-9). 
Unlike the other newspapers selected, Media Indonesia’s editorial column has 
been on the paper’s front page since 1990 (Koespradono 2010: viii). Placing the 
editorial prominently on the front page – on a par with the daily headlines – shows 
the great importance Media Indonesia places on the editorial. It also shows the 
paper’s interest in spreading its opinions on the selected current issue and 
simultaneously influencing undecided readers. This effect is amplified through 
broadcasting Media Indonesia’s editorial on MetroTV, the group’s own television 
channel (Koespradono 2010: 7). Media Indonesia has a daily circulation of an average 
of 240,193 and a readership of 323,143 per day.10 
 
Kompas 
As Indonesia’s most respected and best-selling daily newspaper Kompas holds a 
very influential position in society, particularly among members of the elite. Its 
readership consists of educated readers of the middle and upper class (Yani 2002: 
12). Kompas has a daily circulation of an average of 500,000 copies and a readership 
of 1,850,000 per day (Kompas Gramedia 2013a). While Hill (2006: 83) noted that 
“Kompas was established in 1965, by Chinese and Javanese Catholic journalists on 
the initiative of the Catholic Party in an attempt to present a Catholic voice”, the 
connection with the Catholic Party ceased with the depoliticisation of the 
                                                          
10 Compiled from various sources. See Appendix A for details. 
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Indonesian press during the New Order and “[w]ith the growth of Kompas its 
employees became a mirror of the pluralistic Indonesian society” (Aritonang and 
Steenbrink 2008: 973). 
By the early 1990s Kompas had developed into Indonesia’s largest media 
empire, the Kompas-Gramedia Group (KKG).11 This was achieved through a 
strategy of reinvestment and diversification during the 1980s (Hill 2006: 84). KKG 
did not limit itself to the media sector, but also includes hospitality, banking, 
agribusiness, and supermarkets (Kompas Gramedia 2016). According to Nainggolan 
(2003: 103) this expansion was to take advantage of surplus capital to increase 
productivity and to diversify lest there be a sudden press license revocation. 
Kompas and its style of journalism are inextricably linked to Jakob Oetama, 
one of Kompas’ two founding editors, who later became head of the Kompas-
Gramedia Group. Under the leadership of Jakob Oetama Kompas developed a 
unique style of journalism that is non-confrontational, somewhat cautious but never 
sensationalist (Magnis-Suseno 2001: 66). As stated by Hill (2006: 84) “Under Utama’s 
influence as editor-in-chief, Kompas became synonymous with a style of subtle 
indirect and implicit criticism, often dubbed typically ‘Javanese’”. This cautious and 
circumlocuitous style of reporting as well as Oetama’s management style to self-
censor or withdraw publications from the market, or to discipline journalists rather 
“than risking a government or public backlash, which may disadvantage the group 
as a whole" (Hill 2006: 86) secured Kompas’ survival during the socio-political 
turbulences since its establishment in 1965 (Wulandari 2010: 80-1; Kakiailatu 2007: 
61). 
                                                          
11 For detailed information on the diversification of KKG see Dhakidae 1991: 340. 
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In 2001 Jakob Oetama stepped down as chief editor (Pontoh, 1 March 2001) 
but maintained his positions as the head of Kompas and as President Director of the 
Kompas-Gramedia Group (Kompas Gramedia 2013b).12 He continued to play a de 
facto role in determining news content in Kompas (Nainggolan 2003: 110) and 
influences the selection of editorial staff (Keller 2009: 47). Kompas’ editorial is usually 
written by the chief editor, the deputy chief editor, or sometimes still by Jakob 
Oetama himself (Keller 2009: 53).13 
According to Jakob Oetama (2001: 221), “the editorial in Kompas is intended 
not to show a way out, not to preach, but rather merely to hint, suggesting the 
possibility an alternative might be taken into consideration”14. Thus, Kompas 
editorials do not take sides or pin blame (Asiasentinel, 25 July 2013). However, 
based on Kompas’ heritage of being established by Catholic interests, the paper has 
been described as inclined towards the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) (Budianto 2013: 250). Indeed, 
during the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections Kompas indicated editorial 
preference towards PDI-P chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri (EU-EOM 2004: 63; 
Faisol 2010: 4). 
 
Republika 
The daily newspaper Republika was conceived by the Indonesian Association of 
Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) (Hill 2006: 126) 
                                                          
12 Following the KKG’s reorganisation in 2008 the position President Director was renamed President 
Commissioner (Kompas Gramedia 2013b). 
13 Kompas features two daily editorials: one on domestic issues and one on international affairs. 
14 “Tajuk rencana dalam Kompas dimaksudkan tidak menujukkan jalan keluar, apalagi menggurui, 
namum sekadar mengisyaratkan, menunjukkan kemungkinan alternatif dalam pertimbangan.” 
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with the aim “to accommodate the aspirations of the Muslim community in the 
context of a national discourse that fosters pluralism of information to the public” 
(PT. Abdi Bangsa.TBk 2008: 20).15 It was established on 4 January 1993 by ICMI 
through the Abdi Bangsa Foundation and was “designed to produce a 'quality' 
paper which was broadly secular in its coverage of events and issues, yet informed 
ideologically by Islamic values" (Hill 2006: 126). From the beginning, 51 per cent of 
Republika’s shares were owned by PT Abdi Bangsa, 20 per cent by Republika 
employees, and 29 per cent was released the public (Article 19 and AJI 2005: 89). 
Over the years Republika developed into Indonesia’s largest Muslim 
newspaper (PT. Abdi Bangsa.TBk 2008: 21). Nevertheless, in November 2000 
Republika was on the brink of bankruptcy and underwent a change of ownership 
with the Mahaka group buying the majority of its shares (PolitikIndonesia.com, 18 
September 2006; Tempo Interaktif, 19 June 2003).16 Since then Republika has had a 
daily circulation of an average of 216,000 and a readership of 264,000 per day.17 
Republika’s editorial is written alternately by one of the six-person editorial team. It 
includes representatives selected by the chief editor and senior editor (Keller 2009: 
97). 
  
                                                          
15
 ICMI was established in 1990 under the chairmanship of B.J. Habibie who was at that time Minister 
of Research and Technology. For further information on ICMI see, for example, Hefner 1993; Ramage 
1995: 75-121; Porter 2002. 
16 This means, that after eight years under the domination of Yayasan Abdi Bangsa/ICMI, Republika’s 
ownership structure of shares changed. Only 27.5 per cent remained with Yayasan Abdi Bangsa/ICMI, 
with the largest proportion (39.99 per cent) now owned by the Mahaka group (Nainggolan 2003: 268.) 
17
 Compiled from various sources. See Appendix A for details. 
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Tempo Media Group: Tempo and Koran Tempo 
Tempo weekly newsmagazine and Koran Tempo daily newspaper are owned by 
Tempo Media Group (PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk) – a private company, listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The company is owned by several shareholders 
and partly owned by the individual investors.18 Thus, in contrast to Media Indonesia 
and Kompas, there is no single owner who is in a position to influence the content of 
Koran Tempo or Tempo magazine. Although providing other services like printing 
and distributing paper, research marketing and data as well as journalism training, 
the Tempo Media Group’s primary focus is publishing news in print and digital 
format (PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk). 
Tempo was initially established in 1971 at a time when power was shifting 
away from political parties to the capitalist bureaucracy.19 As a corollary, journalism 
was being depoliticised and commercialised. Thus, unlike previous newspapers,20 
Tempo was, from its establishment, not affiliated with a political party but was a 
business. According to Daniel Dhakidae (1991: 255), the foundation of Tempo “was 
the result of a business dealing between a group of capitalists and a group of young 
professional journalists”. When Tempo was founded in 1971 the Jaya Raya 
foundation provided the capital and the journalists recruited brought the 
professional skills needed to run a periodical. In 1974, due to Tempo’s success, 
                                                          
18 Shareholders of PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk are: PT Graffiti Press (21.0169 per cent), PT Jaya Raya 
Utama (16.28 per cent), Yayasan Jaya Raya (8.54 per cent), Yayasan Karyawan Tempo (12.0865 per 
cent), Masyarakat (17.24 per cent); Yayasan Tempo 21 Juni (24.83 per cent) (PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk 
2009: 42). 
19 The most comprehensive analysis of Tempo is provided by Janet Steele 2005. 
20 For example, the establishment of Sinar Harapan was “politically induced”, while the establishment 
of Kompas was “religiously motivated” (Dhakidae 1991: 255). Historically Indonesian newspapers had 
been affiliated with political parties and became industrialized only in the 1970s (Dhakidae 1991: 255, 
272).  
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capital and journalists agreed to a shareholding split of fifty per cent held by Jaya 
Raya and fifty per cent divided between the journalists (Dhakidae 1991: 266). 
This arrangement – embodied in the establishment of the shareholding 
company PT Grafiti Pers – was a novelty in journalist-capital relations and 
strengthened Tempo’s independence (Dhakidae 1991: 267). However, the fifty per 
cent belonging to Tempo workers is represented by the shareholder PT Pikatan. 
Since PT Pikatan is owned by five main individual shareholders21 holding 70 shares 
each, Tempo is not really a worker-owned company (Dhakidae 1991: 268). Rather 
those journalists who gained the shares had changed from “journalist-workers to 
capitalist journalists” (Dhakidae 1991: 268) and thus became part of the capitalist 
class, or, in C. Wright Mills’ (1959) terms, capitalists who are simultaneously 
journalists. Christianto Wibisono, one of Tempo’s founders, emphasizes that a 
journalist’s world view and interest changes by being promoted into a publisher 
and results in an imbalance between those journalists who own and those who do 
not.22 In this context it should also be noted that Fikri Jufri, Tempo’s co-founder and 
former editor, is, together with Kompas’ Jakob Oetama, among Indonesia’s 200 
largest individual tax payers (Haryanto, 3 June 2002). 
Tempo’s philosophy is to “present news as factual, accurate, and balanced”23 
(PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk 2009: 41). Under the leadership of Goenawan 
Mohammad, co-founder and editor of Tempo, the magazine became Indonesia’s 
most trusted and influential news magazine. It is regarded as independent, credible, 
                                                          
21 Harjoko Trisnadi, Goenawan Mohamad, Fikri Jufri, Bur Rasuanto and Lukman Setiawan. 
22 Christianto Wibisono, in Jakarta-Jakarta, Majalah Berita Bergambar, 29 October 1987, p.92 as quoted in 
Dhakidae 1991: 404. 
23 “menyajikan berita peristiwa secara faktual, akurat, berimbang”. 
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critical, investigative and objective. In contrast to Kompas, the language style of 
Tempo was “fresh” and “crisp” (Hill 2007: 89). During the authoritarian New Order, 
Tempo was banned twice, namely in 1982 and 1994, for criticising the government 
(PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk 2009: 41). Tempo remained banned until the demise of the 
New Order but re-established itself in late 1998. Since 2001 Tempo magazine has 
been published by PT Tempo Inti Media and diversified its products, including 
establishing a daily newspaper, Koran Tempo, in 2001 (PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk. 
2009: 41-2). Koran Tempo has a daily circulation of an average of 203,000 and a 
readership of 223,666 per day.24 Estimates over Tempo’s weekly circulation range 
from 180,000 (Lim 2012: 7) to 300,000 (Prayudi 2010: 41) with a claimed readership 
of 640,000 (Silaban 2012: 329). 
The editorials of Koran Tempo and Tempo are determined by a weekly 
editorial meeting that is attended by representatives of the business divisions, chief 
editor, managing editor, bureau chief and senior editor of Tempo and Koran Tempo 
(Keller 2009: 64). Before discussing and planning the themes of forthcoming 
editorials, the editorials of the previous week’s edition are evaluated. The editorials 




Since I was unable to obtain transcripts from speeches and statements of individuals 
involved in the case studies under investigation I rely on information as published 
                                                          
24
 Compiled from various sources. See Appendix A for details. 
25 I attended some of those meetings during fieldwork (April and May 2010). 
20 
in the media. Chapters two and four are thus limited to an analysis of statements 
made by the participants and commentators as published by the media. Even 
though a particular statement by the president (for example, that a scandal’s 
investigative committee was illegally constituted) may be printed by all mainstream 
news media simply because it was deemed newsworthy, each particular newspaper 
will determine how such news is presented and which part of the statement or 
comment is chosen for publication or omission. These differences were obvious in 
the analysis and show that the media are clearly actors in the scandals analysed. 
Because of this, the second part of each case study (chapters three and five) focuses 





This introduction has briefly outlined the major questions at the core of the thesis, 
together with the focus, the methodology and the outline of this study. Chapter one, 
which follows next, provides the foundation for the rest of the study. It highlights 
the lingering dominance of the politico-business elite as well as their compositional 
continuity within Indonesia’s democracy. By drawing on C. Wright Mills’ power 
elite (1959) and Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (1988) the chapter 
conceptualises the terms ‘elite’, ‘media’ and their various forms of inter-relationship 
as well as the implications of this interlock for intra-elite power struggles. It 
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establishes the value of scandal as an analytical focus for the study of media-elite 
interactions. 
Chapter two argues that Buloggate is related to an intra-elite power struggle 
and rooted in the disaffection over President Wahid’s actions to marginalise those 
political parties that had supported his presidential election, restricting their access 
to government resources. It demonstrates how opposing legislators utilized the 
media to implicate President Wahid in Buloggate, and respectively, how President 
Wahid and his political party PKB, utilized the media for their defence. It establishes 
that Wahid’s ability to engage the media positively during the scandal was thwarted 
by the parliament’s and the media’s ability to cover their multiple interests behind 
the veneer of exercising their commonly-perceived watchdog-function towards the 
government. This enabled Wahid’s opponents successfully to use the jargon of press 
freedom and democracy against Wahid. By contrast, arguments and actions made 
by Wahid and his supporters – like questioning the legality and authority of the 
parliamentary inquiry into Buloggate, the occupation of the Jawa Pos offices’ by a 
civilian militia organisation (Barisan Seberguna, Banser) associated with Wahid’s 
religious organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) following Buloggate’s disclosure, and 
Wahid’s repeated criticism of the media – resulted in the distortion of Wahid’s 
relationship with the media and raised doubts about his commitment to press 
freedom and democracy.26 
                                                          
26
 For further information on the NU see, for example, Jones 1984; Fealy and Barton 1996; Porter 2002: 
105-128; Bush 2009. Abdurrahman Wahid had chaired the NU for 15 years (1984-1999) before becoming 
President. On Abdurrahman Wahid’s relationship with the NU see, for example, Greg Barton’s 
biography of Abdurrahman Wahid (2002) and Douglas Ramage 1995: 45-74. 
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Chapter three focus on the media’s interests. Its first part shows how Kompas, 
Media Indonesia, and Republika commented on Buloggate, and explains their 
respective stances in the scandal by disentangling their vested interests. The second 
part examines Aryantigate and the underlying interests of four weekly magazines in 
covering the scandal. This chapter demonstrates and explains the different positions 
of particular media organisations on Buloggate and Aryantigate. The analysis of 
editorial commentary during Buloggate establishes that Media Indonesia was critical 
while maintaining an aura of neutrality, that Kompas showed sympathy for Wahid, 
and that Republika was explicitly opposed to Wahid. The example of Aryantigate 
illustrates that the media adopt principles of press freedom and journalistic ethics to 
justify their decision on whether to publish a scandal or not. Although the editors of 
the magazines that published the Aryantigate story explicitly or implicitly admitted 
that profit-making played a role, none of them admitted that other factors like 
ownership or ideology might have influenced their respective coverage of the 
scandal. However, in the case of Aryantigate, the media’s opportunities to promote 
their interests were limited by the fact that there was not much interest in the case 
and thus not enough supply of information to keep the scandal in the headlines. 
Overall, this chapter establishes that a particular media organisation’s interest in 
Buloggate and Aryantigate, and how the scandal was covered, depended on 
ownership, professional interests, ideology, personal affiliation or a combination 
thereof. 
Chapter four argues that the Bank Century scandal was an intra-elite power 
struggle over key positions and access to political resources, and analyses how those 
involved in the scandal and its investigation both skilfully utilized the media to 
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pursue their causes. It establishes that Centurygate was rooted in the political 
jockeying before and after the 2009 elections, and that the elite with its various 
contesting factions incorporated the media in their power struggle through various 
means. 
Chapter five demonstrates and explains the different positions of Kompas, 
Media Indonesia, Koran Tempo, and Tempo magazine in the Bank Century scandal. The 
analysis of editorial commentary establishes that Media Indonesia was opposed to the 
bailout and to President Yudhoyono, Kompas retained a neutral position on the 
scandal but was supportive of the Yudhoyono-Boediono government, and that 
Koran Tempo and Tempo magazine (both owned by the same media group, PT 
Tempo Inti Media Tbk) supported the bailout, Boediono and Sri Mulyani. In sum, 
this chapter establishes that the publications’ different positions can be best 
explained through the politico-business interests and ideological affiliations of their 
respective owners or prominent (former and current) editors. 
Finally, the conclusion summarises the empirical findings and addresses the 
contribution this thesis makes to the role of the media in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia.  
This thesis aims to provide five key contributions. First, it contributes to an 
understanding of how Indonesia’s politico-business elite harnesses the concept of 
press freedom for their own political and economic interests. It provides insights 
into how this elite has incorporated the media into their power struggles over key 
positions in political institutions and political resources, and why scandals have 
become an opportunity to change the composition of a democratically elected 
government. Second, it shows that the heterogeneous and mostly privately owned 
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media companies positioned themselves as actors in the intra-elite contestations. 
Indeed, the empirical part of this thesis establishes that during those political 
scandals the owners or prominent editors of particular media organisations, either 
consciously or otherwise, have formed temporary coalitions with particular elite 
factions based on shared interests defined by structural conditions and personal 
relations. Thirdly, this thesis contributes to an understanding of the power relations 
among the commercial media and the politico-business elite. Fourthly, this 
dissertation contributes to an understanding of how and why the Indonesian 
commercial media operate in the way do. Finally, this thesis contributes to the 
broader literature on the political role of the media in post-authoritarian regimes, 
and thus has applicability far beyond Indonesia. 
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1 Democracy and the elite  
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that the commercial mainstream media in Indonesia have 
primarily served the interests of those with political and economic power, and that 
press freedom has been exploited by this political and business elite. This is due to 
the structural and personal interrelation between the politico-business elite and 
Indonesia’s mainstream media, and the location of both this elite and the media 
within capitalist market structures. Thus, the way the media operate in Indonesia’s 
democracy mirrors the way the media operate in many other democracies, 
including long established democracies like the United States. However, as pointed 
out by Herman and Chomsky (1988: xii, 302) the media do have room for a range of 
different opinions in times of elite dissent as long as the overall system is not 
endangered. Crucially, the media are not just sites for those intra-elite power 
struggles but also actors within which an owner’s and prominent editor’s vested 
interests may be reflected. Thus, despite their interdependency with the politico-
business elite the heterogeneous and mostly privately owned media play a key role 
in redistributing and mediating power among the elite beyond election times. 
This chapter provides the foundation for the rest of the thesis by establishing 
the analytical framework for the study of media-elite interactions in the context of 
scandal. Firstly, it clarifies concepts such as democracy, elite and media in the 
Indonesian context. Secondly, it analyses the terms of the relationship between the 
media and the elite. Thirdly, it argues for the value of scandal as an analytical focus 
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for the study of media-elite interactions. This is achieved over seven sections, 
following this introduction. 
Section 1.1 examines the political system, more specifically the kind of 
democracy, within which the media operate in Indonesia. It establishes that elites or 
oligarchs from the former New Order regime play a dominant role in Indonesia’s 
electoral democracy. Following the conceptualisation of the Indonesian politico-
business elite in terms of Mills’ power elite in section 1.2, section 1.3 explains the 
linkage between the media and the politico-business elite, and the various forms 
this linkage takes. Section 1.4 conceptualises the commercial mainstream news 
media and their interests. Section 1.5 establishes the power relationship between the 
media and the elite as contingent and dynamic. Section 1.6 introduces scandal as an 
analytical focus and highlights its value for the study of media-elite interactions. 
 
 
1.1 What kind of democracy? 
The views on what has emerged after the New Order’s breakdown are diverse and 
contested (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010: 1; Robison 2002). Even though there have 
been routine elections since 1999 and legally guaranteed press freedom, Indonesia 
lacks several other characteristics of liberal democracies. Indeed, elections alone do 
not guarantee compliance with the ‘rule of law’, which is crucial for a working 
liberal democracy (Jayasuriya 2001: 93; Lynn-Jones 1998). Indonesia still has 
problems with law enforcement and the supremacy of the law (Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 
2004: 195). So far, the judiciary as an institution has managed to resist efforts to 
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impose tighter scrutiny upon it. Due to systematic and institutionalized corruption 
within the judiciary the Indonesian justice system is often described as a ‘mafia 
hukum’ (judicial mafia) (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 189, 212). Consequently, an 
independent judiciary, legal certainty and equality before the law are not a given 
(Stockmann 2009: 71). 
Parliamentarians are widely perceived as corrupt and neglecting their 
proper duties while expanding their wealth and privileges (Dick and Mulholland 
2011: 79-83).27 Disaffection with the performance of political parties and their 
representatives in the legislature is a global phenomenon. However, in contrast to 
long established democracies, Indonesia’s political parties are not well-
institutionalized and remain unpredictable (Tomsa 2010a: 158).28 Robison and Hadiz 
(2004: 228) describe political parties as ‘tactical alliances’, that lack ‘aggregating’ and 
‘articulating’ functions. Such parties are primarily a vehicle for power (Robison and 
Hadiz 2004: 228) rather than an expression of shared ideology.29 Since membership 
                                                          
27 For further information on Indonesia’s parliament see, for example, Sherlock 2010; Ziegenhain 2008. 
28 For further information on political parties see, for example, Tomsa 2008, 2014; Mietzner 2013; Ufen 
2006, 2010. 
29 This view is supported by the high fluidity of personnel between parties and the formation of 
political parties by former New Order elites. After being defeated by Aburizal Bakrie in the 2009 
Golkar chairmanship elections, Surya Paloh and Yuddy Chrisnandi soon left the party. Golkar’s former 
advisory board chairman Surya Paloh joined Hanura and set up his own mass organization Nasional 
Demokrat (NASDEM) which subsequently became its own political party. Yuddy Chrisnandi also 
joined Hanura. In February 2009 he was recruited to Hanura's central board and named party 
chairman for the election campaign team (Bapilu). Former PKB chairman AS Hikam and former PAN 
member Samuel Kotto were also appointed to Hanura’s leadership board. After Fuad Bawazier, a 
business tycoon and former finance minister under Suharto, was defeated in the 2005 PAN 
chairmanship elections, he left PAN and joined Wiranto’s Hanura were he soon became deputy 
chairman. Party switching ahead of local elections has also become common (The Jakarta Post, 12 
March 2015). Dede Jusuf, for example, who became West Java deputy governor with the support of 
PAN, switched to Partai Demokrat in order to increase his chances in the run for West Java’s 
governorship. Bandung mayor Dada Rosada switched from Golkar to Partai Demokrat for the same 
reason. These “chameleon-like changes in the loyalties of the country’s political elite” (The Jakarta Post, 
15 April 2011) highlight the politician’s blatant and ubiquitous opportunism.  
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fees and public funding are mostly trifling, political parties rely on external funding 
and are deeply entrenched in ‘money politics’30 in order to cover their expenses 
(Ufen 2006: 21; Mietzner 2007, 2013).  
Regarding the non-state sector, weak labour and workers’ organizations as 
well as a largely disorganized civil society were unable to secure influence within 
the political process after Suharto’s fall. Furthermore, and in contrast to 
democratisation processes in Western Europe, bonds between organized labour and 
the middle class never strengthened (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 121). 
It is also instructive that in Western European history, reforms guaranteeing 
such civil rights as freedom of speech and association as well as rule of law, and 
those dealing with factory acts and labour laws, often preceded the 
establishment of actual democratic systems (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 135). 
 
To differentiate regimes with such democratic deficits from liberal democracies 
(Tomsa 2008: 10), Indonesia has been qualified as fluctuating between ‘collusive 
democracy’ and ‘delegative democracy’ (Slater 2004), ‘patrimonial democracy’ 
(Webber 2006: 397), ‘patronage democracy’ (Van Klinken 2006); ‘oligarchic 
democracy’ (Törnquist 2006: 247), ‘low-quality democracy’ (Mietzner 2008: 254) and 
‘criminal democracy’ (Winters 2011: 142). Webber’s (2006) description of Indonesia 
as ‘patrimonial democracy’ points out that patrimonial practices, most notably in 
the form of corruption, have survived Indonesia’s transition. In short, the political 
system has changed but patrimonial practices nurtured and protected by powerful 
                                                          
30 That is “a political situation or system in which a politician will promote the interests of a particular 
interest group in return for financial support (Oxford English Dictionary 2002). In Indonesia, money 
politics includes receiving illicit funds for political campaigns from wealthy individuals with vested 
interests and vote buying during elections. For further information see, for example, Aspinall and 
Sukmajati 2016; Hidayat 2009: 129-32; Mietzner 2007, 2013. 
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interests during Suharto’s New Order persist. Likewise, and following Crouch’s 
(1979) description of the New Order as a patrimonial system, Van Klinken (2009) 
conceives Indonesia as a ‘patronage democracy’. 
Yet, regardless of which theoretical approaches or concepts scholars have 
applied in order to explain Indonesia’s democratic transition and what has emerged 
after 1998, scholars generally acknowledge the lingering dominance of elites or 
oligarchs as well as their compositional continuity within Indonesia’s democracy. 
They also point out that elections have become a key means by which those 
individuals compete for power. 
This insight is expressed most profoundly by scholars (Robison and Hadiz 
2004; Winters 2011) applying the concept of oligarchy as an explanatory framework 
to post-Suharto Indonesia. Robison and Hadiz (2004), for example, argue that the 
old politico-business oligarchy survived the decline of the New Order, and 
managed to reorganise their power. In other words, the reform agenda and the new 
democratic institutions have been hijacked by those who were already powerful 
during the New Order. Thus, even though the regime changed from an 
authoritarian state into a democracy, politics remains dominated by the politico-
business oligarchy which has adjusted its political modus operandi to “a democracy 
that is both decentralized and based on electoral politics” (Robison and Hadiz 2013: 
55). Winters (2013: 18-9) concurs with this view and points out: 
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Although oligarchic and elite continuity was nearly 100 per cent, two things 
had changed. One was that the actors at the top had to adapt to the new 
democratic game. Not only did they do this with relative ease, but they were 
better positioned than anyone else to capture and dominate Indonesia’s money-
driven electoral politics . . . The other thing that changed when the New Order 
ended, however, is that Indonesia went practically overnight from having 
Suharto to constrain oligarchs to having to rely on the country’s debilitated 
legal infrastructure to do the job. 
 
Furthermore, Robison and Hadiz (2004, 2013) and Winters (2011, 2013) share the 
view that the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 led to growing tensions between 
Suharto on the one hand and oligarchs and elites on the other, in which the latter 
group abandoned Suharto in order to guarantee their survival (Robison and Hadiz 
2004: 166; Winters 2013: 18). These scholars agree that, as a consequence, the former 
New Order oligarchy has not been undermined by democracy but rather adjusted 
itself to the new system of electoral democracy as a means to perpetuate and justify 
its dominance.  
 
The adoption of democracy 
The nature of Indonesia’s transition to democracy and the legacy of the New Order 
have contributed to the elite’s ongoing dominance in post-Suharto Indonesia. When 
the collapse of the authoritarian New Order appeared to be inevitable, former allies 
turned against Suharto and negotiated a compromise with the moderate opposition 
leaders. Presidential power was transferred to B.J. Habibie, Suharto’s former protégé, 
who announced elections for 1999. However, it is crucial here that the mainstream 
dissident leaders Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais 
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preferred a deal with Suharto’s former allies than with the popular student 
movement or external forces31 (Slater 2006: 209; Aspinall 2000: 334). 
Thus, power was primarily redistributed among the elite, rather than to the 
masses. That the informal networks of the New Order regime survived after Suharto 
became increasingly obvious when the former New Order opponents – most 
notably Wahid, Megawati and Amien Rais – developed working relationships with 
the military and Golkar (Slater 2006: 209) and when former New Order military and 
businessmen turned into politicians. 
This does not mean that nothing has changed or improved. Democracy 
brought elections and has generated some important political and civil rights. 
Several institutions (elections, political parties) and freedoms (freedom of the press, 
freedom of speech) that are directly linked to functioning democracies are now in 
place. However, the elite has proven to be pragmatic and flexible in adapting to new 
circumstances to maintain their power and the prevailing division of society under 
the new circumstances (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 166). In contrast to the New Order, 
the elite’s power is now legitimatized through democratic means. Thus, as stated by 
Higley (2010: 89): 
Like earlier ideologies, democracy is a device used by elites to justify and 
mobilize support for their rule or aspirations to rule. 
 
Calls for democracy were voiced from inside and outside Indonesia long before 
Suharto’s fall (Aspinall 2000; Eklöf 1999). But it was the 1997-98 economic crisis that 
provided the context within which social forces gained the strength to unravel elite 
                                                          
31 Those who were not part of the New Order parliament and government, viz. from outside the 
executive and legislative. 
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loyalties and when the elite began to respond to the masses rather than to one 
another. Thus, the adoption of democracy and Suharto’s overthrow was primarily a 
pragmatic choice that corresponded with the interests of the masses (the majority of 
the Indonesian non-elite) and the international community (represented by such 
institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) (Higley 
2010: 79). The elite adapted to the new system, because it was the only option 
available at that time of economic crisis that could ensure their survival (Robsion 
and Hadiz 2004: 167-82). 
The central premises of democratic elitism – “a representative system with 
limited citizen involvement, the existence of political elites, and elite autonomy in 
governing” (Borchert 2010: 29) – have been incorporated in post-Suharto Indonesia’s 
political system. Thus, instead of thinking about which type or subtype of 
democracy might best describe Indonesia’s political system, Schumpeter’s definition 
of democracy seems to be a cogent concept to describe post-Suharto Indonesia. 
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy derives from a critique of the discrepancy 
between the actual practice of democracy and the classic understanding of 
democracy.32 In doing so, Schumpeter (1976: 250) establishes an ideal type which he 
calls ‘the classical doctrine of democracy’: 
[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself 
decide issues through the selection of individuals who are to assemble in order 
to carry out its will. 
  
                                                          
32 Schumpeter’s definition of democracy derives from dissatisfaction with existing conceptions of 
democracy that are incapable of describing real world conditions. 
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He then compares this definition with the ways democracies actually work and 
finds that, first, there does not, and cannot, exist any common will towards a 
common good; and second, that the ordinary citizen is not sufficiently competent to 
fulfil the role stipulated for him or her by ‘the classical doctrine of democracy’. 
Given these ‘shortcomings’ Schumpeter (1976: 269) outlines another theory of 
democracy: 
[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. 
 
Within that definition the emphasis is moved away from the people’s function of 
deciding on issues towards democracy’s function of producing a government and 
competition for power within the elite. In short, the electorate can decide which elite 
rules, but cannot change the fact that power is always exercised by an elite. 
Robison’s (2002: 107) argument, from a Marxist perspective, that "the form of 
democracy that appears most functional for Indonesia's bourgeoisie is that defined 
by money politics, a parliament and party system that is an auction house for the 
wealthy and powerful", in effect, describes one such form of elite rule. In a similar 
vein Winters (2011: 180) describes Indonesia as staggering  
in the direction of a poorly functioning ruling oligarchy, organized as an 
electoral democracy, in which the only actors who can dominate the political 
stage are oligarchs with massive personal wealth, and elites with a capacity to 
attract or extract sizeable resources from the state. The result is a criminal 
democracy in which untamed oligarchs compete politically through elections. 
 
Similar conditions – where (democratic) institutions provide potential means 
for former authoritarian elites to present themselves to the public as democrats and 
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reformers – can be found elsewhere. For example, as Milton (2000: 119) argues, in 
post-communist societies: “The terms have obviously changed – anti-communism 
now dominates, but the effective control by a small elite remains, and the bulk of the 




Electoral politics provide a vivid example for ongoing elite dominance and the 
conversion of wealth into political influence. Elections are now held regularly on 
national and local level. Theoretically, everybody who wishes to compete in the 
elections has equal opportunity to do so. Yet this opportunity is restricted by 
structural conditions. There are more political parties and leaders from whom to 
choose. But who are they? In general, they are those who have funds and 
connections. Since the New Order’s demise did not change the distribution of power 
within society at large, not many new faces showed up. In other words, personnel 
continuities – albeit shifting positions and roles – are obvious. A look on the 
backgrounds of the candidates who participated in the last four presidential 
elections – 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 – supports that view. In the 2004 and 2009 
presidential elections there were respectively five and three presidential–vice-
presidential pairs from which to choose. All of the candidates were prominent 
members of the former New Order elite. The 2014 presidential election was an 
exemption where one of the candidates – Joko Widodo – was not a member of the 
former New Order elite. However, many people with whom he surrounded himself 
did have links to the New Order (The Jakarta Globe, 23 July 2014).  
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Further evidence of the argument that Indonesian politics has remained 
elitist in nature can be found on the local level. In the context of direct local elections 
Mietzner (2006a) points out that most of the candidates running for office originate 
from the former New Order elite. Thus, direct elections at the local level did not 
result in a displacement of the New Order elite. Before Law No 32/2004 on direct 
elections of local government heads was passed in 2004, governors, regents and 
mayors had been elected by their respective legislature. This process happened 
behind closed doors and the outcome could be determined by ‘money politics’. In 
order to prevent this practice and to make the electoral process more transparent 
Law No 32/2004 handed the authority to vote over to the people who now directly 
elect their local government heads. However, contrary to the initial hope that this 
would decrease money politics, the cost of winning public office exploded 
dramatically. One of the reasons is that, according to the new law, candidates have 
to be nominated by a political party prior to taking part in the election. The 
nomination process resembles an auction: those with the highest bid are nominated. 
The new laws not only have the effect that candidates have to ‘donate’ money to 
local parties and individual politicians, but also additionally they have to raise 
funds to finance their election campaign (Mietzner 2006a). 
Money politics is so deeply entrenched in the functioning of Indonesia’s 
democracy that Ufen (2010) writes of a commercialisation and commodification of 
politics. Indonesia’s election campaigns are an expensive business. This is, for 
example, reflected in the PDI-P’s electoral expenditure during national elections that 
rose from Rp 69.1 billion in 1999 (Mietzner 2013: 73) to Rp 720.4 billion in 2014 
(Mietzner 2016: 92). Furthermore, spending on advertisements in television and 
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print media by political parties contesting in the  legislature elections increased from 
Rp 33.66 billion in 1999 (Danial 2009: 175) to Rp 153.66 billion in 2004 (Badoh and 
Dahlan 2010: 48) and reached Rp 976.71 billion during the 2009 elections (Badoh and 
Dahlan 2010: 121). 
The large amount of money needed in order to take part and succeed in the 
elections limits the ability to compete for office to an already wealthy and powerful 
minority. Indeed, Mietzner’s (2006a) analysis of the socio-economic background of 
candidates running for office in 50 local elections that took place in 2005 reveals the 
following composition: career bureaucrats (36 per cent), businesspeople (28 per 
cent), party politicians/MPs (22 per cent), police and military officers (8 per cent), 
civil society figures (6 per cent) (Mietzner 2010: 178-9, 190). On the national level the 
percentage of legislators owning or managing businesses has increased by 9 per cent 
in a decade to reach 54 per cent in 2009 (Mietzner 2013: 95). 
The opportunity to compete in both national and local elections is further 
constrained by the educational requirement of having at least a senior high school 
degree. Thus, the extent to which individuals can participate in local elections is 
influenced by great inequalities of wealth and education. Thus, what changed are 
the rules of the selection process but not the composition of the candidates from 
which to choose. Again, the citizen’s role is restricted to the acceptance or rejection 
of competing political leaders. 
Since the political system is monopolized by the elite, they decide on the 
personnel, interests and issues to be included. This concentration of power and 
resources within the elite prevents ordinary people from entering politics. As a 
result, the interests of the vast majority of the population, whether workers, middle 
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classes, peasants, women or the urban poor, environmental and or human rights 
activists, are hardly represented (Törnquist 2008) and “[T]he role of the masses is 
[only] to ratify elite decisions” (McChesney 2008: 371). 
Having thus acknowledged the dominance of elites and oligarchs within 
Indonesia’s electoral democracy, the following discussion focuses on how those 
terms are understood and used in this thesis.  
 
Elites and oligarchs 
Robison and Hadiz (2004) who regard oligarchy “as a system of power relations that 
enables the concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense” (2013: 
37) do not focus on individual actors.33 Consequently, they do not define ‘elites’ and 
‘oligarchs’ and use both terms more or less interchangeably. Winters (2011: 6) whose 
concept of oligarchy emphasises individual actors defines oligarchs as “actors who 
command and control massive concentrations of material resources that can be 
deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position”. 
It is this possession and control of material power (wealth) that defines and 
                                                          
33 ‘In Reorganising Power (2004) Robison and Hadiz understand oligarchy in terms of the following 
definition: “Any system of government in which virtually all political power is held by a very small 
number of wealthy people who shape public policy primarily to benefit themselves financially through 
direct subsidies to their agricultural estates or business firms, lucrative government contracts, and 
protectionist measures aimed at damaging their economic competitors—while displaying little or no 
concern for the broader interests of the rest of the citizenry. “Oligarchy” is also used as a collective 
term to denote all the individual members of the small corrupt ruling group in such a system. The term 
always has a negative or derogatory connotation in both contemporary and classical usage.” (The 
original source is Paul M. Johnson, Dept of Political Science, Auburn University, cited on 9 August 
2003. http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/). 
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distinguishes oligarchs from elites who exercise their minority influence based on 
non-material power resources.34 However, Winters (2011: 9) argues: 
Oligarchs can have elite forms of power stacked on top of or blended with their 
defining material foundation. This would make them simultaneously oligarchs 
and elites. But no elite can be an oligarch in the absence of holding and 
personally deploying massive material power.35 
 
In the Indonesian case, as acknowledged by Winters (2013: 16), any distinction 
between elites and oligarchs is often blurred. For example, oligarchs can be directly 
engaged in rule by operating within party institutions and competing for office. 
They can also use their wealth to support individuals to gain political office or lift 
them to the helm of organisations. Elites holding those positions can become 
oligarchs through the accumulation of wealth. Taking this observation into account, 
this study uses the term ‘oligarch’ to refer to a key member of Indonesia’s politically 
active business elite.36 In short, oligarchs are subsumed under the concept of elite. 37 
This subordination of oligarchs under the concept of elite allows me to draw on 
insights of elite theory. As the following section will discuss, C. Wright Mills’ power 
                                                          
34 Those are formal political rights, official positions in government or at the helm of organizations, 
coercive power, and mobilizational power (Winters 2011: 12-3). 
35 The categories of oligarch and elite can be layered upon each other, with oligarchic power potentially 
leading to elite power (and vice versa). But there is no necessary overlap. Many oligarchs have only 
material power resources at their disposal, and many elites never amass empowering fortunes 
(Winters 2013: 15). 
36 The majority of scholarship on post-Suharto Indonesia using the terms elite(s) and oligarch(s) (either 
in plural or singular) in their work does not provide a clear cut definition of both terms and tend to 
conflate the work of Robison and Hadiz (2004; 2013) and Winters (2011; 2013) under the so-called 
‘oligarchy thesis’ without acknowloding their fundamentally different definition of oligarchy.   
37 However, it should be noted here that Winters explicitly rejects the formulation of oligarchs being “a 
special category of economic elites” (Winters 2011: 8). This is rooted in Winters’ theoretical 
conceptualisation of ‘oligarchy’ as distinctive to ‘elite theory' (see Winters 2011: 1-32).  
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elite thesis does not only resonate in many aspects with the Indonesian elite38 but 




1.2 Conceptualising the Indonesian politico-business elite 
For C. Wright Mills (1959: 6) the ‘power elite’ is a minority of individuals that 
occupy key positions in institutions that hold major national power. He writes: 
Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, 
the political, and the military domains. Other institutions seem off to the side of 
modern history, and, on occasion, duly subordinated to these). 
 
It is that position at the apex of economic, military and political institutions that 
enables them to make decisions of major consequence and ensure that their interests 
prevail over all others (Mills 1959: 3-4, 6). Members of the power elite – chosen 
through co-optation and socialization – move within and between these three 
interlocked institutional structures. This interchangeability of power positions is 
based on bureaucratic requirements that resulted in the production of an almost 
uniform world view among them (Mills 1959: 8, 283, 287, 289). With this emphasis 
on institutional factors Mills highlights that the elite are not simply those who have 
the most, but those who are in positions that enable them to exercise power. Mills 
also considers and locates other conceptions of the elite – “the similarity of its 
personnel, and their personal and official relations with one another, upon their 
                                                          
38 This was brought to my attention by William Case (2003) who in his article Interlocking Elites in 
Southeast Asia pointed out that many aspects of Mills’ power elite conform to Southeast Asia’s, 
including Indonesia’s, national elite.  
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social and psychological affinities” – within his definition of the power elite. Thus, 
“origin, career, and style of life of each of the types of circle whose members 
compose the power elite” do inform “the personal and social basis of the power 
elite’s unity” (Mills 1959: 278).  
Mills, however, insisted that there were divisions and quarrels among the 
parts of the power elite. Within the power elite, he argued, "factions do exist; there 
are conflicts of policy; individual ambitions do clash" (Mills 1959: 283). 
Nevertheless, he believed that the "internal discipline" and the "community of 
interests" of these factions and individuals were more powerful than the divisions 
among them (Mills 1959: 283). Thus, Mills did not think of the power elite as a 
homogenous or coherent group. Rather, there are struggles of dominance among the 
instituted elite and their over time shifting interests (Mills 1959: 276, 277).  
As pointed out by Case (2003) various aspects of Mills’ power elite thesis can 
also be applied to Indonesia’s elite. In particular, this applies to the interlocking of 
positions across institutions as well as Mills’ perception of the elite not as a cohesive 
group but divided by a diversity of interests. Indeed, numerous scholars have 
highlighted that the Indonesian elite has never been fully unified and that factions 
within the elite have always existed (Crouch 1979; Robison and Hadiz 2004: 26-7; 
Winters 2011; Barker 2008; Case 2009: 656; Slater 2006: 212). During the authoritarian 
New Order, elite fractions frequently plotted against one another, and, at times, also 
worked to undermine or confront Suharto’s power. However, Suharto was very 
skilful in managing the elite: 
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Suharto first nurtured factional rivalries between different elites, dividing 
military generals, top bureaucrats and business tycoons along functional, 
religious and ethnic lines. However, he then dispensed patronage and 
sanctions in ways that dampened leadership challenges and inter-elite 
struggles (Case 2000: 55) 
 
Indonesia’s post-authoritarian elite is more heterogenous and dispersed than during 
the New Order. In particular, decentralisation and elections have enabled more 
diverse sections of the Indonesian elite to gain powerful positions (Barker 2008: 537). 
The elite – either fractions or individuals – is in contestation, but within boundaries 
since all of them fear nothing more than their removal from power. Based on 
overwhelmingly pragmatic reasons, the Indonesian elite constantly defines and re-
defines relations within the elite and between the elite and non-elites. In order to 
defend their status and interests against each other the elite forms alliances “that 
range across ruling parties, bureaucracies, military forces, and business entities, they 
do so in order to counter similar alliances that are arrayed against them, often 
instigating bitter, even murderous factionalism” (Case 2003: 250).  
Moving between the institutions or simultaneously occupying key positions 
in various institutions as pointed out by Mills is not uncommon for the Indonesian 
elite. In the case of Indonesia, which transformed from an authoritarian state to a 
democracy, the elite not only shifted positions between pre-existing institutions but 
also entered the newly established democratic institutions. In the course of 
democratisation, power was redistributed among different institutions. Amongst 
the institutions whose power increased in relation to the government are political 
parties, the parliament and the media. In contrast, the military’s power decreased. 
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This triggered some former military elites to move to other more powerful 
institutions. There are various examples of military men who entered politics. The 
most prominent examples are Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Prabowo 
Subianto, each of whom established their own political party.39  
In addition to moving between institutions, some members of the 
Indonesian elite are simultaneously businesspeople and politicians. The rise of 
businesspeople occupying key positions in political parties is no coincidence given 
the large cost of election campaigns. Indeed, in 2009 politicians with business 
backgrounds made up 54 per cent of the DPR (Mieztner 2013: 95). A similar 
situation can be observed in political parties where key positions are held by 
businesspeople. For example, in 2005 Soetrisno Bachir, a batik entrepreneur from 
Central Java, was elected as new PAN chairman. In the same year, Pramono Anung, 
former CEO of Yudistira Group, a mining and energy enterprise, became PDI-P’s 
new secretary general. Arifin Panigoro, founder of the oil company Medco Energi 
Internasional, and former Lippo Bank executive Laksmana Sukardi are further 
examples of businesspeople turned politicians who became key figures in the PDI-P. 
                                                          
39 This move enabled these three individuals, after their retirement from the military, to have a say in 
the parliament and also to run for presidency or vice-presidency. The Democratic Party (Partai 
Demokrat), Yudhoyono’s presidential vehicle, was established in September 2001 (Partai Demokrat, 
n.d.). Having only ranked fifth in the 2004 legislative elections (7.5 per cent of the vote), it came first in 
the 2009 legislative elections (26.8 per cent of the vote). Despite its varied success in these legislative 
elections, Yudhoyono was successful in both presidential elections (Lansford 2014: 643-44). After being 
Golkar’s presidential candidate and Megawati’s running mate in the 2004 elections, Wiranto 
established Hanura in 2006 as his own ‘presidential vehicle’ (Lansford 2014: 645) after his failed bid in 
2004 to win both the Golkar chairmanship and internal support for his presidential candidature (The 
Jakarta Post, 25 March 2014). Prabowo founded Gerindra in 2008 (Lansford 2014: 645). In the 2009 
parliamentary elections Gerindra and Hanura won 4.5 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively (Sherlock 
2009). Although Wiranto and Prabowo had been unsuccessful in the presidential elections, Hanura and 
Gerindra gained a place in parliament and established themselves as opposition parties (Lübke 2010: 
85). 
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The position of Golkar Chair, for example, has been held since 2004 by indigenous 
business tycoons, namely Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie (Sugiarto 2006). The 2009 
Golkar chairmanship elections – within which the price for one vote was estimated 
at between Rp 500 million and Rp 1 billion (Kompas.com, 6 September 2009) – was 
contested between two politico-businessmen, Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh, each 
of whom owned a media company and utilized those to their advantage. 
Furthermore, Mills also anticipated the importance of the mass media in the 
political campaign for office when stating “the politician must rely on the mass 
media, and access to these media is expensive.” During the 2004 presidential 
campaingn the Yudhoyono-Kalla team, for example, had spent Rp 20.84 billion on 
adverstising in television and print media (Badoh and Djani 2006: 97). This amount 
increased to Rp 232.58 billion when Yudhoyono paired with Boediono for his re-
election in 2009 (Badoh and Dahlan 2010: 150-1). Crucially, however, Mills (1959: 
315) links the rise the power elite rise with the transformation of the public into a 
mass-like society and argues that the mass media, i.e. the elite’s increased power 
over the media, were among those factors that contributed to this development:  
[T]he media, as now organized and operated, are even more than a major cause 
of the transformation of America into a mass society. They are also among the 
most important of those increased means of power now at the disposal of elites 
of wealth and power; moreover, some of the higher agents of these media are 
themselves either among the elites or very important among their servants. ) 
 
This statement not only states that the media are recognized and used by the elite as 
a means of power. It also implies a linkage between the media and the elite, and is 
thus questioning the media’s democratic functions. In the Indonesian context, clear 
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distinctions between the politico-business elite and media organizations are 
sometimes impossible. This is particularly the case if the media owner holds a 
political office or has been presidential candidate. The nature of Indonesia’s 
transition to democracy and the legacy of its socio-political history have produced 
special patterns of relationships between the media and the elite. In many cases the 
actors involved are the same organisations – and are even the same individuals – as 
under the New Order. In order to fully explicate this, the following section begins 
with an overview of the New Order media before elaborating on the various forms 
of media-elite linkages in post-authoritarian Indonesia. 
 
 
1.3 The Indonesian mainstream media: Commercialisation and elite 
linkages 
During the authoritarian New Order the media were heavily regulated by the 
government.40 Whereas the broadcast media, RRI41 and TVRI42 were state-owned, 
the press belonged to the private sector (Kitley 2001: 260). The 1966 press law 
introduced a licensing system which was one of the most important means for the 
government to regulate media. The license (SIUPP43) could be issued and 
                                                          
40 The media were regulated by the 1966 and 1982 (revised) press laws that guaranteed the 
fundamental right of press freedom. However, the press law contained a number of restrictive articles, 
undermining this statutory right, and allowing the government considerable power over the media 
(Rüland 1998: 267; Kingsbury 2005: 126, 136). 
41 Radio of the Republic of Indonesia; established in 1945. 
42 Television of the Republic of Indonesia, established in 1962. 
43 With the 1982 revised press law the license’s name changed from SIT to SIUPP. 
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withdrawn by the Ministry of Information, sometimes rather arbitrarily.44 Extra-
legal means used to intimidate the press included threatening phone calls (budaya 
telepon) from the military, the police or the civil service as well as the payment of 
‘hush money’ (budaya amplop) (Romano 2003: 62; Kitley 2001: 258). Such legislation 
and control mechanisms forced journalists to self-censor. However, the media 
sometimes did report on politically sensitive news in an effort to increase sales, 
while avoidingthe risk of license withdrawals (Gazali 2005: 25). 
During the New Order the Indonesian press was transformed from being 
primarily a medium of political discourse to a commercially significant industry 
(Dhakidae 1991) or, alternatively from a ‘partisan press’ to a ‘commercial press’ (Sen 
and Hill 2007: 51-71). The New Order’s enforced merger of opposition parties in 
1973 and the annulment of a regulation stipulating that all newspapers had to be 
affiliated with a political party or mass organisation removed the influence of 
partisan politics from the press and encouraged its commercialisation. Those 
newspapers that had previously been bound by party connections were encouraged 
to seek new sponsors. Consequently, most of the media tried to reach a larger 
readership across all social, cultural and political differences to enhance their 
circulation and attract more advertisers. As the domestic economy began to expand, 
the companies increasingly used the press as an advertising medium for their 
                                                          
44 In particular, political tensions between government and media led to license revocations. After the 
Malari riots in 1974, twelve publications were banned. Another conflict arose when the press reported 
extensively on 1977 student protests, which criticised the Suharto clan even calling for Suharto's 
resignation. The government responded in January 1978 with the closure of seven daily newspapers 
and seven student publications (Sen and Hill 2007: 53). In 1994 three leading weekly publications 
(Tempo, Editor and DeTik) were banned over a story about an internal government split over the 
purchase of 39 former East German warships by Research and Technology Minister B. J. Habibie 
(McCargo 1999). 
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products (Dhakidae 1991: 74; Hidayat 1999: 182). The press industry developed into 
a profitable business, in which the Suharto family and its cronies invested. In order 
to protect their business in the event of sudden license revocations, as happened in 
the mid-1970s, many press companies applied a strategy of diversification and 
reinvestment (Sen and Hill 2007: 57). This resulted in the development of huge press 
conglomerates and a decline in the number of media owners. In the mid-1990s the 
press industry was effectively controlled by 16 major press conglomerates 
(Haryanto, 23 August 1997), 45 out of which nine had close links to Golkar and the 
Palace (Sen and Hill 2007: 59).46 
The broadcast industry underwent a similar process of commercialization to 
the press. The government’s abolition of the television monopoly in the 1990s and 
the introduction of private, commercial television channels were mainly based on 
economic considerations, aligned with the government’s policies of economic 
liberalization and deregulation. In the late 1980s television had become the principal 
medium of information dissemination. It followed that manufacturers and 
distributors of products saw television as the most effective medium for reaching 
mass audiences. However, commercial advertising on the state television TVRI was 
prohibited. As the national economy grew there was pressure to permit advertising 
on TV, to expand the consumer market. Eventually, the government gave in to the 
interests of business and removed TVRI’s monopoly, opening television 
                                                          
45 These were: Kompas Gramedia Grup, Grafiti Grup, Media Indonesia Grup, Jawa Pos Grup, Femina 
Grup, Sinar Kasih Grup, Bakrie Grup, Cipta Lamtoro Gung Grup, Bimantara Grup, A Latief 
Corporation Grup, Agung Laksono Grup, Gatra Grup, Subentra Grup, Suara Merdeka Grup, Pos Kota 
Grup, dan Republika Grup (Haryanto, 23 August 1997). 
46 Between June 1994 and May 1998 only individuals or firms with close ties to the political 
establishment received TV licenses, with all five licenses going to Suharto's family and friends (Sen and 
Hill 2000: 60-1). 
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broadcasting to private investment. In 1989, RCTI, the first commercially funded 
channel went on the air. Others followed soon: SCTV (1989), TPI (1990), ANTeve 
(1993) and Indosiar (1995) (Sen and Hill 2007: 111-16; Kitley 2000: 224-6). The private 
stations were independent only in financial terms. They were closely monitored by 
the Information Ministry and owned by individual members of the Suharto family 
and their cronies as part of their business empires (Sen and Hill 2007: 111-13). Due 
to this “pattern of vertical integration between the private media and the ruling 
elite” (Gazali 2004: 23) as well as the state’s control measures the majority of the 
commercial mainstream media supported the New Order regime until the months 
leading up to May 1998 when Suharto’s power structure collapsed after 32 years 
(Harsono 2000: 85). 
After the fall of Suharto, the media were freed from government control 
(Kitley 2001: 256). Developments such as legally guaranteed press freedom, media 
liberalization and the simplification of the licence application procedure have 
resulted in a highly diversified media landscape. Yet recent studies (Armando 2014; 
Ida 2011; Haryanto 2011; Sudibyo and Patria 2013) have shown that media 
liberalisation since the Suharto period did not change the inherited concentration of 
media ownership in the hands of a small number of old players from the New 
Order era. Indeed, although the number of print media exploded from 289 by the 
end of the New Order to 1,881 (of which only 556 published regularly) in 2001 
(Piper 2009: 3),47 the print media industry remained dominated by huge media 
conglomerates48 which had been established during the New Order. Regarding the 
                                                          
47 By 2010 the number had dropped back to 1,076 (Wikan 2011: 2). 
48 Namely, Kompas Gramedia Group, Tempo Inti media, Jawa Pos Group, and Media Group. 
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television sector, five new national commercial television stations49 entered the 
market, joining the six pre-existing TV stations (including the state channel TVRI). 
Most television stations, however, remained under the control of the Suharto family 
or cronies of the New Order regime (Ida 2011: 14). Over time, between 2007 and 
2011, mergers and acquisitions have resulted in the concentration of ownership into 
five conglomerates that control all ten commercial television stations (Sudibyo and 
Patria 2013: 266; Nugroho et al. 2012: 58, Table 5.2.).50 As Table 1.1 below shows, in 
2011 the majority of Indonesia’s media were controlled by twelve major media 
groups (Nugroho et al. 2012: 4). Thus, political and economic liberalisation has 
enabled the elite to retain control over the commercial mainstream news media. 
  
                                                          
49 Global TV, Lativi (TVOne), TV7 (Trans 7), TransTV, MetroTV. 
50 Those conglomerates and their respective television stations are: MNC Group (RCTI, MNCTV 
(previously named TPI), Global TV); EMTEK (SCTV, Indosiar Visual Mandiri), CT Group (TransTV, 
Trans7), Visi Media Asia (ANTV, TVOne), and Media Group (MetroTV) (Nugroho et al. 2012: 58, Table 
5.2.). 
49 
Table 1.1: Major media groups in Indonesia: 201151 
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51 Source: Compiled from various sources: Nugroho et al. 2012: 39 (Table 4.1.), 58 (Table 5.2.); Haryanto 
2011: 106-7 (Table 6.1.); Sudibyo and Patria 2013: 267-70 (Table 1.) 
52 These are businesses run by the same owner/group owner. 
53 PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk 2009: 42. 
50 
Media-elite linkages through ownership 
Some of those owning these media groups or holding key positions within them 
simultaneously hold key positions in political institutions or are affiliated with 
political parties or politicians. The most prominent examples of senior politicians, 
who simultaneously own media companies, are Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar Party 
chairman, TVOne, ANTV, vivanews.com) and Surya Paloh (Nasdem Party chairman 
and former Golkar politician, MetroTV, Media Indonesia).54 As shown in numerous 
cases, both politico-businessmen have frequently used their media organizations for 
their own interests (Anwari 2013; Saragih 2009). Surya Paloh, for example, used his 
media organisation to campaign for his nomination as Golkar’s presidential 
candidate in 2004 (Tempo, 5 April 2004). Bakrie, for example, uses his media empire 
to promote the view that the mud flow in Sidoarjo was a natural disaster and not 
caused by the Bakrie-owned company Lapindo Brantas while drilling for natural 
gas (Tapsell 2010: 8). For example, Bakrie-group owned TV-stations prefer to use the 
term ‘Sidoarjo mud flow’ (Lumpur Sidoarjo) when covering the disaster whereas, 
other stations (for example, MetroTV) use the term ‘Lapindo mud flow’ (Lumpur 
Lapindo) (Cahyadi and Uliyah 2011). However, that Bakrie and Paloh were using 
their respective media companies to their own advantage became most obvious 
when both were running for Golkar chairmanship in 2009 (Tapsell 2010: 5-6). 
Following the failure of his own presidential aspirations in 2014 Bakrie used his 
                                                          
54 After Paloh lost the Golkar chairmanship elections against Aburizal Bakrie in October 2009, he co-
founded the mass organization Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem) in early 2010. In 2011 a new political 
party called the Nasdem Party was established. Surya Paloh, who preferred to focus on the apolitical 
Nasdem organisation was not a board member of the political party at that time. However, Paloh 
funded the Nasdem party (The Jakarta Post, 25 July 2011) and eventually became Nasdem Party 
chairman in 2013. 
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media empire to support the Prabowo-Rajasa candidates while Paloh’s media group 
supported the Jokowi-Kalla team (Tapsell 2014). 
Hary Tanoesoedibjo, the president of MNC Group, also used his media 
empire to promote his interests in business and politics (Dhyatmika, 11 December 
2014). His political ambitions started in 2011 when he took up the role as chairman 
or the board of experts in Nasdem Party. After a disagreement with party founder 
Surya Paloh, he joined Wiranto’s Hanura in 2013 (The Jakarta Post, 19 February 
2013). Simultaneously his media empire MNC switched allegiance from Nasdem to 
Hanura. When Tanoesoedibjo became Hanura’s vice-presidential candidate he 
began to appear on various programs broadcast by his television stations promoting 
his candidacy and political party (Dhyatmika, 11 December 2014). However, when 
Hanura’s poor showing in the legislative election did not allow its candidate pair to 
compete in the 2014 presidential elections, Tanoesoedibjo threw his support behind 
Prabowo’s (Gerindra) candidacy.55 
Following the fall of the New Order Dahlan Iskan, owner of the Jawa Pos 
Group, became increasingly involved in politics. His involvement in provincial 
government businesses started in 1999 when he was appointed CEO of the Wira 
Group at the request of the East Java governor. In the June 2005 Surabaya mayoral 
election he reportedly sponsored (and financed) the candidature of Arif Afandi, 
former Jawa Pos chief editor (Ida 2011: 19- 20). On the national level he established 
                                                          
55 See for example: The Jakarta Post, 25 March 2014; The Jakarta Globe, 21 February 2014; The Financial 
Times, 5 June 2014. Meanwhile, in February 2015, Tanoesoedibjo founded his own political party 
United Indonesia Party (Perindo, Partai Persatuan Indonesia) which draws on the MNC group to gain 
popularity and to support its interests (Tempo.co, 12 June 2015). Before the launch, Perindo was a mass 
organization founded by Tanoesoedibjo following his departure from the NasDem party in 2013 
(Kompas.com, 7 February 2015). 
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links with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and backed his presidency. In 2009 
PresidentYudhoyono selected him as new president director of the state power 
utility PT PLN. Then, from October 2011 to October 2014 he was Indonesia's 
minister for State-owned enterprises. Encouraged by the Democratic Party and its 
chairman President Yudhoyono, Dahlan Iskan joined the Democratic Party's 
presidential convention as an independent candidate to battle for his nomination as 
the party’s presidential candidate for the 2014 elections (The Jakarta Globe, 26 
August 2013).56 Even though Dahlan Iskan won the convention he was not named as 
the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate. This was related to his low personal 
popularity compared to other leading presidential candidates and the Democratic 
Party’s decision to not field its own presidential candidate following its low voter 
turnout during the 2014 legislative elections (The Jakarta Post, 17 May 2014; 
Aspinall and Mietzner 2014: 350).57 Being out of the race for the presidency himself 
Dahlan Iskan rallied his media empire behind Jokowi-Kalla (Tapsell 2014; The 
Financial Times, 5 June 2014), opposing Prabowo-Rajasa whose candidacy was 
supported by the Democratic Party (Kompas.com, 31 May 2014).58 
                                                          
56 The Democratic Party’s decision to select its candidate for the 2014 presidential election through an 
eight month convention (from September 2013 until April 2014) – similar to an US-style presidential 
primary election but open to non-party members to compete – was strategy to determine the most 
publicly appealing figure as its presidential candidate while simultaneously raising the Democratic 
Party’s electability, popularity and acceptability. For further information on the Democratic Party’s 
convention see, for example, RSIS, 20 March 2014; Fionna 2013; Syofyan, 4 September 2013. 
57 According to opinion polls announced by the Democratic Party Dahlan Iskan would get only 2 to 2.9 
per cent of the vote if he were to stand in the presidential race, whereas PDI-P's Jokowi and Gerindra's 
Prabowo would get 29 to 45 per cent and 29 to 35 per cent of the vote, respectively (The Jakarta Post, 17 
May 2014). 
58 Ultimately, following considerations to form a coalition with Golkar to field Pramono Edhie 
Wibowo, who came second in the in the Democratic Party’s presidential convention (The Jakarta Post, 
17 May 2014), as vice-presidential running mate to Golkar’s Aburizal Bakrie (The Jakarta Post, 18 May 
2014), the Democratic Party decided to support the candidacy of Prabowo-Rajasa. 
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Chairul Tanjung, whose company CT Corporation owns the popular online 
platform Detik.com and two national television stations (TransTV and Trans7), is 
reportedly close to Yudhoyono and the Democratic Party (Winters 2013: 28). Chairul 
Tanjung’s closeness to Yudhoyono crystallised in 2014 when he became the 
Democratic Party’s spokesperson and was appointed coordinating minister for 
economics (Tapsell 2015: 33).59 Following this appointment in May 2014 he officially 
stepped down from his position in CT Corp in order to prevent a conflict of interest 
and to maintain the appearance of good governance (The Jakarta Post, 16 May 2014). 
Since the different media groups protect the interests of their owners and 
shareholders, media ownership is considered to be the primary means to control 
media institutions and content. Ownership also provides unlimited media access 
and attention (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 232). Thus, there are also a number of 
politicians who went into the media business. In 2006, for example, then President 
Yudhoyono established Jurnal Nasional, a daily broadsheet paper closely linked to 
the Democratic Party (Tapsell 2012: 235; The Jakarta Post, 26 February 2009).  
Besides highlighting such media-elite linkages, this short overview has 
shown the shifting interests and alliances of media conglomerates, and, as in the 
example of the 2014 presidential elections, that media ownership does not 
automatically translate into political success. However, as the following section will 
show, examples of media-elite linkages take various forms and go beyond 
ownership. 
  
                                                          
59 President Yudhoyono appointed Tanjung to replace Hatta Rajasa, who had resigned to take part in 
Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. 
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Media-elite linkages beyond ownership 
Some journalists and editors supported particular candidates during elections or 
became candidates themselves. August Parengkuan, senior editor of Kompas, for 
example, joined the team Mega Center, a think tank to support the official campaign 
team for the President/Vice-President candidate pair of Megawati Sukarnoputri 
(PDI-P) – Hasyim Muzadi during the 2004 presidential elections (Tempo, 5 July 
2004; Tempo, 13 September 2004). Goenawan Mohamad, former Tempo chief editor 
and founding member of PAN, was a member of the official Amien Rais (PAN) – 
Siswono Yudo Husodo campaign team during the 2004 presidential elections 
(Harsono, 7 June 2004). During the 2009 presidential elections Goenawan Mohamad 
supported Boediono (Kompas.com, 15 May 2009; Mohamad, 18 May 2009). 
However, in those cases it is difficult to establish whether these figures made 
use of their respective media organization or whether the support was individual 
and private. Certainly more obvious is the case of Alwi Hamu, co-owner of Fajar, a 
regional daily that operates under the Jawa Pos Group (Wangkar 2001; Hamad 2004: 
160-1), who had been campaign coordinator for Jusuf Kalla during the 2004 
presidential elections. During the campaign Alwi Hamu used Fajar as well as the 
Jawa Pos News Network (JPPN) to support the Yudhoyono-Kalla candidature 
(Harsono, 7 June 2004). He applied various strategies, for example, displaying news 
of Kalla on the front page, inside pages or tucked in the middle of the news. Fajar’s 
editorial board did not oppose Hamu’s move. According to Fajar’s then chief editor, 
Aidir Amir Daud, there was no reason not to back one of its shareholders and co-
founders, Jusuf Kalla, in his election campaign. When Kalla won the vice-
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presidential seat, Alwi Hamu became part of the vice-president’s special staff 
(Tempo, 24 October 2005). 
According to Tri Agus Susanto Siswowiharjo (27 December 2008) during the 
2004-2009 government term 23 out of 550 legislators had a journalistic background. 
Whereas some had long ceased to practice journalism, others were still journalists 
when they entered politics. During the 2009 general election, there were about 120 
journalists or former journalists throughout Indonesia competing as candidates for 
the legislature (Siswowiharjo, 27 December 2008). Among the successful candidates 
were Hanura’s Akbar Faizal and Golkar’s Bambang Soesatyo who later utilized 
their media experience to promote a parliamentary inquiry into the Bank Century 
scandal. 
In a study on the media’s impact on local elections David Hill (2009: 248) 
highlights the success of the then Jawa Pos chief editor Arif Afandi in the 2005 
Surabaya mayoral election as an example of how the media can be utilized not only 
by its owner but also by an experienced media professional with first-hand 
experience in the media business: 
What Arif Afandi was able to bring to the political equation was not control of 
the media (though his connections would have proved beneficial) nor a media-
generated popular image such as may be enjoyed by “celebrities” or “artistes” 
in the Indonesian context. Rather, he brought a keen understanding of how the 
media operates. He was a “media savvy”. His knowledge and understanding of 
the industry and how it operates, and how an aspiring politician may maximize 
positive images in the media, would have been invaluable. 
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However, Afandi’s candidature for the position of Surabaya’s deputy major was 
also supported financially and personally by Dahlan Iskan, CEO of the Jawa Pos 
Group (Ida 2011: 20). 
There are also numerous prominent media professionals who temporarily 
ceased working as journalists to take their experience into the upper echelons of 
government. For example, Wahyu Muryadi, who took a break from his position as 
Tempo editor in order to become Head of the Protocol Bureau at the Presidential 
Palace during the Wahid Presidency.60 Yopie Hidayat, was chief editor of the 
business tabloid Kontan, before he took up the position as Vice-President Boediono’s 
spokesman following the 2009 presidential elections. PR consultant and prominent 
talk-show host Wimar Witoelar was recruited to become chief Presidential 
Spokesman for President Wahid in early October 2000 to manage the president’s 
relations with the media (The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2000).61 
A journalistic background is no guarantee of being immune to corruption. 
For example, Panda Nababan, PDI-P legislator and former chairman of the party’s 
North Sumatra branch (The Jakarta Post, 11 March 2010), had worked as journalist 
for various publications before joining politics in 1993.62 Once being famous for his 
investigative reports,63 Nababan himself became embroiled in a bribery scandal. In 
January 2011 he was sentenced for receiving bribes worth Rp 1.45 billion to back the 
                                                          
60 Interview with Wahyu Muryadi, chief editor, Tempo, Jakarta, 29 April 2010. 
61 For further details see Witoelar 2002. 
62 For the daily Warta Harian (1969-70), editor for Sinar Harapan (1970-87), deputy general editor for the 
daily Prioritas (1987-88) and head of research and development for Media Indonesia (1988-89) (Tokoh 
Indonesia, 2 February 2003). 
63 In the late 1970s he received the Adinegoro price (Hadiah Adinegoro) for investigative reporting  
(Tokoh Indonesia, 2 February 2003). 
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election of Miranda Goeltom as Bank Indonesia senior deputy governor in 2004 (The 
Jakarta Globe, 31 January 2011). 
As this section has shown, the media and the elite are often intertwined; 
whether through means of media ownership, first-hand experience in the media 
business or personal relationships. Indeed, what becomes significant here is that 
even if the media organisations are structurally differentiated from political 
institutions, this structural gap is bridged through ownership, overlap in personal 
and informal criteria like friendship, common objectives and ideology (Blumler and 
Gurevitch 1995: 65-6). 
 
 
1.4 The commercial mainstream media: Conceptualisation and 
interests  
Following the above discussion of the various forms of media-elite linkages as well 
as the commercial mainstream media’s high level of conglomeration, the 
assumption that the news media serve the public interest and fulfil the democratic 
functions assigned to it according to the liberal ideal is unsustainable. Indeed, 
empirical evidence has shown that “the media industry is becoming increasingly 
important as a business as well as a political tool within Indonesia’s democracy” 
(Sudibyo and Patria 2013: 274) and that media owners, regardless of their 
professional backgrounds, “regard news as a commodity with which to secure their 
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economic and political interests” (Haryanto 2011: 108).64 Nezar Patria, former 
chairperson of AJI Indonesia and political activist during the New Order, explained 
his move from Tempo to vivanews.com, a Bakrie-owned news portal, in a similar vein. 
That is, it was a decision based on professional considerations and the way that the 
media work in a capitalist environment (The Jakarta Post, 4 May 2009): 
It is an uncontested fact in the media industry that we will always work with 
businesspeople. Wherever you go, you will always come across the problem of 
ownership . . . I realize that there is no total independence and the owners 
always want to intervene. 
 
Being emdeded in the free market capitalist structures the privately owned media 
organizations are primarily business companies and, as such, have economic 
interests. In Indonesia, as well as in other democratic societies, the commercial 
mainstream media are, essentially, business groups. For profit-orientated media, the 
primary goal is economic. Other goals, such as serving the public, producing a 
quality product, and achieving professional recognition, are built into this 
overarching objective (Shoemaker and Reese 2004: 34). 
This assumption is supported by the following examples. First, during the 
inter-religious conflict in the Moluccas, Indonesia’s largest print media 
conglomerate, the Jawa Pos Group, funded two separate local newspapers in the 
conflict zone, with one directed at Christians (Suara Maluku) and the other newer 
venture (Ambon Ekspres) serving the Muslim community. The reason for the 
establishment of the second paper was that the established Ambonese newspaper 
                                                          
64 Since Haryanto’s sample is small and the informants remain anonymous his claim is not particularly 
strong. However, it records what is commonly known and accepted: commercial media organizations 
are not a playground for idealists, they are business companies. 
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became increasingly biased in favour for the Christian community. Eriyanto (2002) 
argues that the Jawa Pos Group launched this Muslim newspaper mainly out of 
economic interest. Since the population of Ambon consisted of nearly equal 
numbers of Christian and Muslim residents there was an incentive to serve both 
markets to maximise profit. However, the establishment of Ambon Ekspres was also a 
result of the city of Ambon being divided across religious lines. It had 
becomeimpossible for Suara Maluku’s Muslim journalists to enter Christian-
dominated areas for fact-checking to ensure the accuracy of their stories without 
putting themselves as personal risk, and Christian journalists faced similar risks 
entering Muslim-dominated areas (Widya Laksmini Soerjoatmodjo 2010: 183-5). 
Thus, one could argue that, in establishing the second paper, the Jawa Pos Group 
was not only upholding the ideal of press freedom by providing a means of mass 
communication for the Muslim community but also taking into account concerns 
relating to staff safety and survival. 
As a second example, the Jawa Pos Group facilitated the publishing of media 
associated with newly established political parties65 in the run-up to the 1999 
national elections. Namely, the daily Duta Masyarakat Baru (PKB), and the three 
weekly tabloids Amanat (PAN), Abadi (PBB), and Demokrat (PDI-P). Whereas the 
Jawa Pos Group provided funding and was in charge of management and 
marketing, the respective political parties were in charge of editorial policy and 
content (Hamad 2004: 152; Luwarso, 31 August 2000). By March 1999, less than half 
                                                          
65 In the Reform era, after the fall of Suharto in May 1998, more than 200 political parties emerged. 
Eventually, 48 of them were allowed to participate in the June 1999 elections, the first free elections 
since 1955 (Crouch 2010: 51). In order to promote those newly established political parties and their 
program to the public numerous ‘partisan media’ emerged (Karim et al. 2004: 193). 
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a year after the establishment of Duta Masyarakat Baru and Amanat in late 1998, the 
Jawa Pos Group sold shares of these publications at substantial profit (SiaR, 10 
March 1999).66 Both examples show that concentration of ownership does not 
necessarily result in less product or content diversity. More likely it shows the 
superiority of economic interests compared to ideological interest (McChesney 
2000). 
For commercial media, advertising is the crucial source of income. As shown 
in Graph 1.1 advertising revenue in the media business has increased steadily and 
exemplifies the media industry’s ongoing profitability. 
 
 
Graph 1.1: Advertising revenue television and print media67 
 
  
                                                          
66 The shares of Duta Masyarakat Baru and Amanat were sold for an estimated Rp 2 billion respectively 
(SiaR, 10 March 1999). 
67 All data are from Nielsen but compiled from various sources: 2000 to 2008: Jatmikasari, 5 November 




















The annual advertising expenditure on television and print media has grown from 
Rp 7,12 trillion in 2000 to Rp 118 trillion in 2015.68 The government and political 
organisations are among the top media advertising spenders. This is because of the 
mass media’s pivotal role as the central medium for political communication and 
marketing in post-Suharto Indonesia (Qodari 2010: 123). 
Political parties and politicians have become more media-consciousness, and 
invest heavily in political advertisement in the run-up to the elections. Since the 
1999 elections, the mass media have been the main information source for the 
electorate and the arena for competing political parties and candidates.69 Whereas 
political parties and politicians place advertisements in order to compete for votes, 
the government uses advertisements as a means to inform and educate the voter. 
Their advertisement spending during elections has increased significantly over the 
years: Whereas government and political organisations spent Rp 97,24 billion70 in 
1999 and Rp 494 billion71 in 2004, they spent Rp 2,15 trillion72 and Rp 4,58 trillion73 in 
2009 and 2014 respectively. 
Following the discussion above, it is argued that the mainstream media, due 
to their structural and personal linkages with the politico-business elite and their 
                                                          
68 Over the period from 2000 to 2009 there was little variance in the annual advertising expenditure by 
media type. On average 66.4 per cent went to television, 28.1 per cent to newspapers, and 4 per cent to 
magazines and tabloids (Jatmikasari, 5 November 2009: 22). In 2012, 64 per cent went to television, 33 
per cent to newspapers and 3 per cent to magazines and tabloids (Kontan, 6 March 2013). 
69 Under Suharto's New Order, the campaign activities were described as pesta demokrasi and held in 
the form of convoys and public meetings. The campaigning activities were subjected to strict 
restrictions and opposition parties had only limited access to mass media. They were neither allowed 
to place political ads in the media nor to hold a dialogue with the electorate through electronic media. 
(Hamad 2001: 56, Voionmaa 2004: 159). 
70 Randini, 11 August 2008: 14. 
71 Hicks, 14 July 2009. 
72 Tempo Interaktif, 14 July 2009. 
73 The Jakarta Post, 24 November 2015. 
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location within capitalist market structures, form coalitions of interest with the elite. 
Evidence that the mainstream news media are linked with the elite and primarily 
serve the latter’s interests can be found across a range of scholarly work (Bennett 
1990; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Castells 2010; Gans 1979; Hallin 1986; Herman 
and Chomsky 1989; McChesney 2008; Mills 1959; Schudson 2002). 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (1988) is particularly useful for an 
understanding of how and why the mainstream media propagate elite interests in 
capitalist democracies. The model’s strength lies in its focus on real world 
conditions and the straight forward identification of five mutually interacting 
‘filters’ that shape and constrain media content in the interest of the economic and 
political elite. The ‘filters’ are first, the media’s ownership and profit orientation; 
second, the commercial media’s dependence on advertising as a major source of 
income; third, the media’s reliance on information provided by government, 
corporate and associated ‘expert’ sources; fourth, ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining 
the media; and fifth, the ideology of free market fundamentalism.74 Only those news 
items or information that can pass through these filters is going to be published. The 
filters, or forces, then cause the media to play a propaganda role. Since these filters 
are structural and derive from the dominant media’s place in the free market 
system, it is largely self-censorship rather than state-imposed censorship that causes 
the mass media to propagate elite interests. In other words: 
                                                          
74 In the original propaganda model the fifth filter was the ideology of anti-communism. In later work, 
written in the post-Cold War era, anti-communism was replaced with free market fundamentalism as 
an ideology (Herman 1996: 125, 2000: 109). 
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[T]he mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful 
sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest 
(Herman and Chomsky 1989: 18). 
 
By stressing the major media’s structural enmeshment with the interests of the 
political and economic elite Herman and Chomsky encourage an engagement with 
those forces that do have the power to influence media performance according to 
their interests. Indeed, several scholars – including those who did not utilize the 
propaganda model – have presented evidence for the mass media’s tendency “to 
manufacture consent for elite preferences, both in terms of domestic and foreign 
policy issues” (Mullen 2010: 678). Of course, there are different explanations and 
opinions of how the media serve elite interests and avoid democratic control by the 
public (Herring and Robinson 2002: 2).75 Nevertheless, the model explains how and 
why a free press in a democratic regime can and does perform a propaganda 
function or, in other words, it explains the media’s involvement in processes of 
‘manufacturing consent’. 
The propaganda model has been applied to case studies that focus on the 
role of the news media in manufacturing public consent for US foreign policy. 
Within such a context, contestations within the elite are not important or not as 
fundamental as the common interest. However, Herman and Chomsky (1988: xii) do 
acknowledge that the media are not unified on all issues and that elite 
disagreements (which do not question the system’s overall existence) are reflected in 
media content. More specifically: 
                                                          
75 The authors argue further that “Herman and Chomsky’s analysis of the relationship view of US 
media-elite relations is marginalized despite the fact that it is fundamentally mainstream”(Herring and 
Robinson 2002: 2). 
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[T]he U.S. media do not function in the manner of the propaganda system of a 
totalitarian state. Rather, they permit – indeed encourage – spirited debate, 
criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of 
presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so 
powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness (Herman and 
Chomsky 1988: 302). 
 
Paletz and Entman’s (1981: 21) observation that only “few elites disagree about the 
essential desirability and perfectibility of the system they control” also applies to 
Indonesia’s politico-business elite. But, as outlined before, there is fierce competition 
within the system, and members of the heterogenous elite compete with each other 
within the system’s boundaries. It is exactly here where the news media play a 
pivotal role. More specifically, 
when elite sources conflict, the press will contain a diversity of views about 
issues, problems, events. . . . Elite conflict is a prime cause of the nature of the 
news reports of any event or problem: the more conflict, the more coverage, the 
more varied the views stories contain (Paletz and Entman 1981: 21). 
 
With the Indonesian politico-business elite having realized the importance of the 
media in the new democratic circumstances, the competition over the news media 
has become a central element in intra-elite contestations. Indeed, as argued by 
Sudibyo and Patria (2013: 258), “the media industry has become an important site of 
political contestation in the context of a highly competitive electoral democracy”. In 
other words, the elite has, to differing degrees, harnessed the concept of press 
freedom by incorporating the media into intra-elite power struggles. Based on the 
fact that press freedom is guaranteed and that the mostly privately owned media 
companies “do not constitute a monolithic entity” (Van Belle 2000: 97), it is the 
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media that provide the means and the arena for intra-elite contestation. Crucially, 
the media are not only the arena for those power struggles but also an actor 
(McCargo 1999, 2003; Waisbord 2004: 1078). In their roles as actors the owners and 
practitioners of the media have their own strategic objectives that might reinforce or 
contradict the objectives of particular members of the contesting elite. But precisely, 
how can we conceptualise the relationship between the media and the elite at times 
of intra-elite contestation? 
 
 
1.5 Conceptualisation of media-elite interactions 
Essentially, the nature of the relationship between the media and the elite is defined 
through power. Conceptions of power are manifold and contested. Their respective 
pros and cons are examined and discussed elsewhere.76 The focus here is on finding 
a conceptualization of power that is suitable for analysing the phenomenon under 
study: the way in which social relations (power relations) between the media and 
the elite are patterned within times of intra-elite power struggles fought out in the 
public sphere. I adopt Weber’s definition of power77 “as the opportunity [Chance] to 
have one’s will prevail [durchsetzen] within a social relationship, also against 
resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on”.78 
                                                          
76 See, for example, Lukes 2005a, 2005b; Haugaard 1997; Hay 1997, 2002; Berenskoetter 2007; Wrong 
1995. 
77 As found in ‘Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft’„Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen 
Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese 
Chance beruht” (Weber 1976: 28) as cited in Berenskoetter (2007). 
78 The translation of Weber’s definition of power is problematic as different academics approach the 
word differently. Therefore in my thesis I have opted to follow Berenskoetter (2007: 3) whose 
translation seems most accurate to me as a German speaker. For an overview and discussion of the 
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This definition and how it is used in this thesis requires further clarification. 
First, power is a phenomenon among identifiable actors.79 Second, Weber only 
speaks of an opportunity [Chance] that does not have to be exercised, and because of 
that power is potential, a capacity, which has to be translated into actual influence. 
Therefore, “identifying power has much to do with identifying the position 
someone is placed in vis-à-vis others” (Berenskoetter 2007: 3). Third, since 
overcoming resistance is not a necessity, one can accomplish one’s will not only 
against others but also in cooperation with others (Berenskoetter 2007: 3). In all its 
dimensions, power is relational. 
In addition to Weber’s definition – which is agency-based and focuses on the 
direct relationship between the actors involved – power can also work more 
indirectly through both actors being positioned in an institutional setting and the 
ability of one actor to shape this setting in their favour (Hay 2002: 185-7, 
Berenskoetter 2007: 8). In other words, indirect power (context-shaping power) refers 
to the ability of actors to shape structures, institutions and organizations in such a 
way as to alter the parameter of subsequent action (Hay 2002: 185-6). Members of 
the elite, if they are politicians or the head of state, have direct access to law-making. 
As such they are able – through passing legislation, e.g. the press law – to affect and 
shape the context which defines the range of possibilities of others. 
With respect to this research project, and its underlying assumption that the 
elite and the people who run the media are neither natural enemies nor inevitably of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
translations of Weber’s definition of power as found in prominent academic publications, see 
Wallimann et al. (1977). 
79 “Actors may be individuals, groups, roles, offices, governments, nation states, or other human 
aggregates“(Dahl 1957: 203).  
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identical interests (Sparks 2000: 47), this definition of power allows us to see the 
media and the elite not necessarily as opponents and does not rule out some 
common interests. In short, their relationships are contingent and can be dynamic. 
As pointed out by Jenkins (2009: 141), “Weber acknowledged that people can 
‘get things done’ in a range of ways, drawing on varied resources”. Therefore, the 
utilization of resources (rather than ownership) is a precondition for the exercise of 
power.80  
Listings of resources are endless (Clegg 2006: 127), since virtually anything can 
become a resource under the appropriate circumstances: 
To the extent that specific resources are related to power in a general way, 
without regard for context, they are not very helpful. Anything can be a 
resource in the right context but it is the context that it is important (Clegg 2006: 
128). 
 
Often, resources are interrelated and multiple: a combination of various resources 
needs to be utilized to achieve a particular goal. Phenomena which might become 
resources of power in media-elite interactions include: common ideological ground, 
capital, patronage networks, access and contacts with higher-echelon members, 
information, position, assets, ownership of or shares in media companies, an 
understanding of how the media work, and so on. However, as mentioned before, 
the context is important for media-elite interactions. 
  
                                                          
80 “In short, observing the exercise of power can give evidence of its possession and counting power 
resources can be a clue to its distribution, but power is a capacity [opportunity], and neither the 
exercise nor the vehicle of this capacity [opportunity]” (Lukes 2005a: 479). 
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1.6 Scandal 
One illuminating way to study media-elite interactions is in the context of scandal.81 
‘Scandal’ is commonly perceived as misconduct revealed. Activities or events 
involving some sort of transgression must be disclosed or made visible through 
mediated forms of communication in order to elicit a public reaction and develop 
into a scandal. Since "a scandal by definition is not a scandal until knowledge of it 
becomes public" (King 1984: 174), media publicity is essential.82 
In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the now-free media are extremely eager to 
investigate and publicize alleged misconduct. The prominence of scandal news 
headlines, particularly concerning corruption, shows that the politico-business elite 
is subjected to intense scrutiny and media exposure (AJI Indonesia, 19 April 2011; 
Astraatmadja, 2010; Robison and Hadiz 2004: 208). By exposing secret official 
wrongdoing and corruption allegations, the media fulfils a ‘watchdog’ role. 
However, scandals are also commodities (Lowi 2004: 70) – for both political actors 
and the media. As the following discussion will show, this is related to the very 
character of scandal. 
Several definitions of (political) scandal exist. For instance, Thompson (2000: 
245) argues that “scandals are struggles over symbolic power in which reputation 
                                                          
81 I should mention in this context that Markovits and Silverstein (1988: 6) see media scandals as a 
phenomenon that can only take place in liberal democracies. But, while Indonesia may not fully satisfy 
the established understanding of a liberal democracy, it does have sufficient institutionalized political 
competition and media freedom for scandals to be a real and important phenomenon. 
82 Indeed, as argued by Waisbord (2004: 1079) “[m]edia coverage is the barometer that indicates the 
existence (or absence) of a scandal”. 
69 
and trust are at stake.”83 For Markovits and Silverstein (1988: 6) “the critical feature 
of any political scandal is . . . the presence of any activity that seeks to increase 
political power at the expense of process and procedure”. Balán (2011: 460) sees 
“scandals as a byproduct of political competition.” Citing the title of Ginsberg’s and 
Shefter’s (1990) work Waisbord (2004: 1072) argues that “scandals offer 
opportunities for doing ‘politics by other means’”. In a similar vein, Castells (2009: 
242) observes “the politics of scandal is a more rooted and typical form of power 
struggle than the conduct of orderly political competition as per the rules of the 
state”. Highlighting the close relation between scandal and corruption, Tiffen (1999: 
10) argues that both terms are “weapons which different groups have opposing 
interests in attaching to particular situations”. Thus, political scandals are not 
coincidence: they are embedded in a particular context and brought into existence 
purposely to discredit political opponents (Thompson 2000: 77; Nyhan 2015: 436). 
What makes a scandal a political scandal, is according to Thompson (2000: 96) the 
fact that “a political scandal is a scandal involving individuals or actions which are 
situated within a political field and which have an impact on relations within the 
field”. Following this definition, sex scandals in the political field are sexual-political 
scandals and as such a form of political scandal (Thompson 2000: 119-24, 282). 
The relentless succession of reports and counter-reports of scandals in the 
Indonesian media suggests that the politico-business elite is revealing information 
on others’ wrongdoing – real or alleged – as a “political commodity” (Djani 2008) 
and out of self-interest to gain political advantage (The Jakarta Post, 21 July 2000; 
                                                          
83 Thompson (1995: 17) defines ‘symbolic power’ as the “capacity to intervene in the course of events, 
to influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and 
transmission of symbolic forms”. 
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Deny JA, 9 May 2005; Aditjondro, 10 January 2001; Witoelar, 3 February 2010). 
Recent research (Kramer 2013, 2014; RSIS, 28 February 2014) has confirmed that 
scandal politics, particularly revelations and allegations of corruption, often directly 
aimed at specific political leaders, have become the weapon of choice for intra-elite 
power struggles in contemporary Indonesia. Here, similar to elections, the general 
public’s role is limited to choosing between the standpoints offered by the 
conflicting elite through the media. In other words: 
Political scandal is an elites’ game in which public opinion plays a major but 
mainly passive role . . . Therefore, the game, in the beginning and in the turns it 
can go through, basically depends on the stands adopted by the elites, 
particularly those of the elites in politics and the media (Jiménez 2004: 112). 
 
Widespread corruption increases the opportunity to use scandal as ‘politics by other 
means’ (Tumber and Waisbord 2004: 1034). Thus, it is common knowledge among 
media personnel and the politico-business elite that almost everyone who holds a 
powerful position is most likely (either directly or indirectly) involved in some sort 
of wrongdoing that, if revealed, has the potential to turn into a scandal.  
In this way, the hunt begins; advisors prepare ammunition to attack or defend, 
and journalists attempt to fill their roles as investigative reporters finding 
stories to increase both audience and sales” (Tumber and Waisbord 2004: 1034). 
 
However, a scandal’s market value and thus its potential to become an effective 
weapon within intra-elite contestations is shaped by the political environment: if 
neither the media nor members of the politico-business elite show an interest, there 
are no ‘buyers’, and the scandal fades away or makes room for another one (Lowi 
2004: 70-1). Thus, a coincidence of interest between both actors to pursue the same 
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topic is a decisive point to sustain a scandal (Tiffen 1999: 48). Arguing that the press 
and the opposition party have a symbiotic relationship and do face similar 
professional incentives in investigating and publicizing alleged misconduct by the 
president and his administration, Nyhan (2015) sees the creation of presidential and 
executive branch scandals as a ‘co-production’ of both institutions. 
Thompson (2000: 78) identifies some general aspects of media organisations 
in order to explain the inclination of media personnel towards scandal. That is, first, 
financial gain. Since most media organisations are commercial enterprises that 
operate in free market conditions they have to generate profit, and it is commonly 
known that ‘scandal sells’ (Thompson 2000: 78-9). Indeed, scandal news in the 
Indonesian media receives high ratings from media audiences (Astraatmadja, 2010). 
Since audience ratings verify a publication’s and a program’s selling power, 
commercial media organizations, in particular TV stations, are concerned about 
ratings. High ratings determine considerations of advertisement placing (The 
Jakarta Globe, 23 June 2009), and in turn influence the media organization’s decision 
on what news to cover. Second, Thompson (2000: 79-81) identifies political 
objectives. Even though the media – due a process of commercialisation and 
depolitisation – do not depend on political parties for their financial support they 
nevertheless take a political position. This is particularly the case in Indonesia where 
the media and the politcal elite are – as discussed earlier – intertwined. The last two 
aspects conducive to the media’s interest in scandal stem from competitive rivalries 
among media organisations; and good journalistic practice that tends to emphasize 
factuality and entertainment, or a combination of both (Thompson 2000: 81-4). 
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Emphasizing the media’s active role in scandal Thompson (1997: 49) 
introduces the term ‘mediated scandal’ and elaborates 
that the very nature of these scandals – their emergence, their developmental 
logic, their prominence, the ways within which they are experienced by both 
participants and non-participants, their consequences – are shaped by the 
media. Most “mediated scandals” are not simply scandals which are reported 
by the media and exist independently of them: they are in varying ways and to 
some extent, constituted by mediated forms of communication. 
 
Consequently, the media wields significant power, as they affect how the matters 
unfold, what is promoted and what is neglected. Hereby the owners and 
practitioners of the media have their own strategic objectives and vested interests 
which overlap with the news media’s ideal socio-political role to fulfil a ‘watchdog’ 
role successfully (Thompson 2000: 77-84; Tiffen 1999: 206-39). Thus, the media’s 
motivation in the creation and development of political scandal is tainted by 
opportunism and their relationship with those actors who play a decisive role in the 
scandal. How this exactly plays out will be investigated in the following case study 
chapters. 
In summary, scandal as an analytical focus allows us to examine: (1) the 
ways in which individual members of the politico-business elite and political parties 
exploited scandal as a means to discredit their opponents; (2) the ways in which 
individual elites whose alleged actions lie at the centre of the scandal encounter the 
allegations; (3) the vested interests of the owners and practitioners of the media. 
Whereas points (1) and (2) focus on the protagonists’ strategies and claims in their 
struggle within and over the media, point (3) concerns the interests and priorities of 
media organisations beyond their professional incentives to scrutinize the powerful. 
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Conclusion 
This first chapter of the thesis has discussed the predominant role of the politico-
business elite within Indonesia’s democracy and has shown that the media and the 
elite are often intertwined. Even though the nature of Indonesia’s transition to 
democracy and the legacy of the New Order have produced specific characteristics, 
the way the media work and their relationship with the elite is not much different 
from the realities prevailing in established liberal democracies. The literature 
examined in this chapter has shown that liberal democracies also have issues in 
managing the media and the elite. Significant here is not whether the United States, 
for example, are more democratic than Indonesia but how Indonesia’s elite has 
managed to adapt to media scrutiny and the media’s role as both actor and 
battlefield for intra-elite contestations. Instead of fighting against the media, the elite 
forms coalitions with the media based on shared interests defined by structural 
conditions and personal interrelations. By going beyond normative concerns about 
the democratic character of mass media and its focus on the elite this study provides 
a different approach to examining the media and its possible socio-political 
implications in Indonesia, and post-authoritarian regimes in general. 
The chapter has also shown that using scandal as an analytical tool sheds 
light on the dynamics of media-elite interactions in intra-elite struggles. In sum, the 
first chapter has established the conceptual and contextual basis for this 
investigation of media-elite interactions in the following case study chapters. 
Having laid out the theoretical focus that informs this thesis, the following chapters 
move on to the case studies. 
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2 Elite-media interaction during the Bulog scandal 
 
Introduction 
This chapter interrogates media-elite interactions in the context of the Bulog 
scandal. ‘Buloggate’ is about President Wahid’s alleged involvement in the 
embezzlement of Rp 35 billion belonging to the State Logistic Agency’s (Badan 
Urusan Logistik, Bulog) Employee Welfare Foundation (Yayasan Bina Sejahtera 
Karyawan, Yanatera). It is argued that Buloggate is an expression of intra-elite 
power struggles and rooted in the disaffection over Wahid’s actions to marginalise 
those political parties that had supported his presidential election. This chapter 
examines how those members of the political elite who had been deprived of their 
access to political resources exploited this scandal, utilizing the media in 
conjunction with the parliament, to deplete President Wahid’s legitimacy through 
corruption allegations over his involvement in Buloggate; and reciprocally, how 
President Wahid and his political party PKB, utilized the media for their defence. 
This chapter establishes that Wahid’s ability to engage the media positively 
during the scandal was thwarted by the parliament’s and the media’s ability to 
cover their multiple interests behind the veneer of exercising their commonly 
perceived watchdog-function towards the government. This enabled Wahid’s 
opponents to use the jargon of press freedom and democracy successfully against 
Wahid. In contrast, arguments and actions made by Wahid and his supporters – like 
questioning the legality and authority of the parliamentary inquiry into Buloggate, 
NU-Banser’s occupation of the Jawa Pos offices following Buloggate’s disclosure, 
and Wahid’s repeated criticism of the media – resulted in the distortion of Wahid’s 
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relationship with the media and overshadowed his reputation as a democrat and 
proponent of press freedom. 
This chapter consists of four parts. Following this introduction, section 2.1 
explains Buloggate as an expression of intra-elite power struggles rooted in the 
disaffection over Wahid’s actions to deprive those political parties that had ‘made’ 
him president from access to political resources. Section 2.2 focuses on how Wahid’s 
opponents utilized the media to turn the misappropriation of Bulog Yanatera funds 
into a fully-fledged scandal shifting from allegations of Wahid’s involvement in the 
scandal to questioning his legitimacy. The establishment of a parliamentary inquiry 
was crucial in this process because it guaranteed continuing news supply and 
extended the scandal to a power struggle between President and parliament. Section 
2.3 examines how Wahid and his political vehicle, the PKB, utilized the media to 
defend and attack those exploiting the scandal against him. Section 2.4 closes with a 




2.1 Buloggate: Development and background 
Scandal overview 
The Bulog scandal surfaced in May 2000 when it was disclosed that Rp 35 billion 
belonging to Bulog Yanatera had been diverted. Apparently Bulog deputy chief 
Sapuan had disbursed the money to Wahid’s personal masseur Suwondo whom he 
believed was acting on the president’s orders to finance humanitarian programs in 
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Aceh.84 According to media reports, the money was then partly distributed to 
people close to the president.85 
Suspicions of Wahid’s involvement in the case hardened following Sapuan’s 
claim that he had confirmed the issue with Wahid (Kompas, 30 May 2000), at a 
meeting between Bulog officials and the President in January 2000 (Tempo, 29 May 
2000). On that occasion Wahid had allegedly requested that the allocation half of 
Bulog's tactical funds to finance an Aceh reconciliation project (Tempo, 29 October 
2000a). During an interview with Kompas (31 May 2000) Wahid admitted that he had 
considered doing so, but ultimately decided against it.86 Instead he admitted to 
using a US$ 2 million donation from the Sultan of Brunei towards this end. The 
disclosure of this information prompted criticisms of Wahid for accepting the 
Sultan’s donation without following government accounting procedures (The 
Jakarta Post, 13 July 2000a; The Jakarta Post, 20 September 2000) and of having used 
it for personal or political purposes (Witoelar 2002: 97; The Jakarta Post, 13 July 
2000a). 
Meanwhile, it turned out that the Rp 35 billion from Bulog Yanatera ended 
up in the accounts of close associates of Suwondo (Tempo, 29 May 2000b; The 
                                                          
84 Suwondo was fugitive when the scandal broke and thus could not be asked to clarify the matter. He 
was only captured and arrested by the police in October 2000 (The Jakarta Post, 16 October 2000). 
85 Besides the president’s brother, Hasyim Wahid, media reports mentioned Bondan Goenawan (State 
Secreatry), Alwi Shihab (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Djoko Mulyono (Presidential secretary) and PDI-
P legislator Suko Sudarso as beneficiaries of the Bulog money. See, for example, Tempo, 22 May 2000b; 
The Jakarta Post, 16 June 2000; The Jakarta Post, 26 May 2000; The Jakarta Post, 30 May 2000; 
Republika, 7 May 2000a; BBC, 25 May 2000; Barton 2002: 304-5; Kompas, 26 May 2000. 
86 More specifically, Wahid denied Sapuan’s allegations that he had approved the disbursement of the 
funds and claimed that he had only enquired whether there was some money available from Bulog 
which could be used for Aceh. But once he learnt that a presidential decree (SK, Surat Keputusan) was 
required – which meant that it had to put into the national budget and then to parliament – he 
abandoned the idea anticipating bureaucratic and parliamentary delays. 
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Jakarta Post, 16 June 2000).87 Since some of the beneficiaries had connections to the 
president, rumours of Wahid’s involvement continued. However, on 14 June 2000 
the police declared President Wahid free of all charges involving Buloggate, though 
shortly afterwards they questioned him seeking a clarification (The Jakarta Post, 16 
June 2000). 
Suspicions that the police were not transparent in examining Wahid’s role in 
the scandal and distrust in the legal system triggered the People’s Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) to conduct its own investigations 
through the Bulog-Bruneigate committee (Panitia Khusus Dana Yanatera Bulog dan 
Dana Bantuan Sultan Brunei Darussalam, Pansus Bulog-Bruneigate) in addition to 
investigations by the police and the attorney general.88 
Following a four month inquiry (from October 2000 to January 2001) the 
committee reached the overall conclusion that, in both scandals, the president 
abused his powers, lied to the public and created a new form of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, KKN) (Pansus Bulog-
Bruneigate 2001: 35).89 On 1 February 2001 the DPR accepted the committee’s report 
by a vote of 393 to 4 and issued a memorandum to censure Wahid for having 
violated the state guidelines (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN), namely 
                                                          
87 After having received the money from Bulog Yanatera, Suwondo transferred it to four individuals: 
Rp 10 billion to Teti Sunarti, Suwondo’s wife; Rp 15 billion to Suko Sudarso, an executive of PDI-P; Rp 
5 billion to businessman Leo Purnomo; and Rp 5 billion to Siti Farika, a Central Java-based 
businesswomen who is known to be close to the President (Tempo, 29 May 2000; The Jakarta Post, 16 
June 2000). The police questioned the suspects and recovered some of the money soon afterwards (The 
Jakarta Post, 20 June 2000). 
88 See, for example, Republika, 30 June 2000; Republika, 22 July 2000; Republika, 25 June 2000; 
Republika, 26 June 2000; Media Indonesia, 1 February 2001. 
89 The committee’s conclusions were made based on the explanations of 40 witnesses including 
President Wahid (Tempo, 5 February 2001a). 
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Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution on the oath of office, and the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) Decree No XI/ 1998 on the 
implementation of clean government free of KKN (Kompas, 2 February 2001). 
The issuance of a memorandum over Bulog- and Bruneigate meant that 
Wahid’s opponents had been successful in using the scandals as grounds to start an 
impeachment process which ended on 23 July 2001 with President Wahid’s 
dismissal (Lindsey 2008: 17).90 
 
A coincidence of media and elite interests 
There were numerous factors that boosted Buloggate’s prominence in the media 
after its initial disclosure. First of all was the involvement of high profile people: 
namely, the president and people close to him.91 The corruption allegations against 
people close to President Wahid over the Bulog embezzlement went beyond the 
usual criticism of the government since it had the potential to implicate the 
president directly with KKN (The Jakarta Post, 9 May 2000). Furthermore, news of 
Wahid being involved in corruption contradicted the widely held perception of him 
as an opponent of KKN and promoter of democracy. This was reinforced by the fact 
that the media, due to the introduction of press freedom and the new democratic 
environment, could now report freely on corruption allegations involving the 
                                                          
90 For further information on President Wahid’s impeachment see, for example, NDI (2001); Butt and 
Lindsey (2012: 40-6). In respect to the legal process the Attorney General had cleared Wahid of any 
involvement in Bulog- and Bruneigate on 28 May 2001 (The Jakarta Post, 29 May 2001). Sapuan and 
Soewondo were sentenced to a jail sentence of two and 3.5 years respectively over their involvement in 
Buloggate (The Jakarta Post, 7 August 2001; The Jakarta Post, 21 March 2001). 
91 Besides the President’s brother, Hasyim Wahid, media reports mentioned Alwi Shihab (Minister of 
Foreign Affairs), Bondan Gunawan (Wahid's state secretary), Djoko Mulyono (the president’s 
secretary) and PDI-P legislator Suko Sudarso as beneficiaries of the Bulog fund (The Jakarta Post, 16 
June 2000; The Jakarta Post, 26 May 2000; The Jakarta Post, 30 May 2000; Republika, 7 May 2000a). 
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president, and that the media were eager to scrutinize the government in their role 
as watchdog. Another factor that contributed to the scandal’s prominence was the 
actions of a militia organisation (Banser) associated with Wahid’s religious 
organisation (NU) to limit press coverage of the issue, thereby endangering press 
freedom following Buloggate’s disclosure. 
Conducive to the scandal’s ongoing currency was that in addition to the 
media’s willingness to engage with it, political parties had an interest in pursuing 
the scandal (Tiffen 1999: 48) in order to discredit President Wahid. This interest 
went beyond professional incentives to control the president and was rather based 
on disaffection over Wahid’s actions to marginalise those political parties that had 
supported his election, restricting their access to government resources. 
 
Alienating the press 
The Bulog scandal was disclosed in Tempo’s 1 May 2000 cover story on the dismissal 
of Jusuf Kalla (Minister of Industry and Trade, from the Golkar party) and 
Laksmana Sukardi (Minister of Investment and State Enterprises, from the PDI-P) 
from the cabinet (Tempo, 1 May 2000a; Republika, 7 May 2000a). It was this article 
‘Behind those dismissals’92 that first mentioned the names of Abdurrahman Wahid 
and his brother Hasyim Wahid in connection to the disappearance of Rp 35 billion 
from Bulog Yanatera. Even though other publications93 picked up this news 
(Detikcom, 7 May 2000a) the Bulog embezzlement only became a popular media 
                                                          
92  ‘Di Balik Pencopotan itu’. 
93 For example Tabloid DeTak and MBM Gamma (Detikcom, 7 May 2000a). 
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topic due to the events following the publication of a Jawa Pos (6 May 2000) article 
on the issue that explicitly focused on KKN surrounding the NU and Wahid. 
 
The Jawa Pos-NU Banser incident 
On 6 May 2000 members of Banser, an NU-affiliated civilian militia group, ‘visited’ 
the Surabaya office of the Jawa Pos. They were protesting against the article 
‘Reigning six month, corruption begins to hit Gus Dur?’94 (Jawa Pos, 6 May 2000) 
that had alleged the president and NU-leaders were involved in KKN at Bulog. The 
article was accompanied by an infographic with the headline ‘Indications of 
corruption that put Gus Dur under pressure’95. Besides a photo of Rozy Munir 
(Minister of Investment and State Enterprises), Abdurrahman Wahid and Hasyim 
Muzadi, the infographic included the caption that NU-leader Hasyim Muzadi had 
allegedly received Rp 35 billion of Bulog funds.96 As the source of this information 
the Jawa Pos quoted the Tempo edition of 1 May 2000. However, Jawa Pos journalists 
overlooked an error in Tempo’s original coverage; Tempo had incorrectly reported 
that NU-leader ‘Hasyim Muzadi’ was alleged to have received Rp 35 billion from 
the State Logistics Agency’s (Bulog) employee pension fund when in fact the 
allegations referred to the president’s brother ‘Hasyim Wahid’ (Tempo, 1 May 
2000a). 
Over following days several national media reported that Banser’s protest 
had involved occupying the Jawa Pos office, even physical assault and material 
                                                          
94 ‘Enam bulan memerintah, KKN mulai menerpa Gus Dur?’. 
95 ‘Indikasi KKN yang Menyudutkan Gus Dur’. 
96 PW GP Ansor Jawa Timur, 2000; Republika Online, 8 May 2000; Tempo, 8 May 2000a. 
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damage, and caused the Jawa Pos to cancel its Sunday edition.97 The media, 
journalist organisations and media watchdog organisations both national and 
international were outraged over Banser’s action and described it as a threat against 
press freedom.98 This outrage was enforced by Wahid’s reluctance to condemn 
Banser’s action. Instead, he accused the Jawa Pos of having violated the journalistic 
code of ethics and of publishing the article as "part of a conspiracy to topple and 
discredit the government" (The Jakarta Post, 9 May 2000). He further emphasised 
that he could sue the Jawa Pos over the report on the grounds that it had violated the 
journalistic code of ethics by repeating incorrect information from Tempo magazine 
without prior cross-checking (Kompas, 9 May 2000; Republika, 9 May 2000).99 
Indeed, it was in the context of the NU-Banser occupation of the Jawa Pos 
offices and Wahid’s comments on the incident that major national newspapers, like 
Kompas, Republika and The Jakarta Post, picked up corruption allegations against the 
president.100 Wahid’s reaction to the incident and the incident itself had a long term 
impact on the dynamics of Wahid’s relationship with the media and the way he and 
his supporters were subsequently viewed by the media – in general and in the 
                                                          
97 See, for example, Republika, 7 May 2000b; Detikcom, 7 May 2000c; The Jakarta Post, 8 May 2000; The 
Jakarta Post, 9 May 2000; Kompas, 7 May 2000; Kompas, 9 May 2000; Tempo Interaktif, 6 May 2000. 
98 See, for example, Republika Online, 8 May 2000; Kompas, 8 May 2000; Antara, 8 May 2000; Antara, 9 
May 2000; CPJ, 19 March 2001; IFEX, 10 May 2000; Luwarso and Solahudin 2001: 13. 
99 His allegations of the Jawa Pos being involved in a conspiracy to topple and discredit his government 
should be understood in the context of widely publicised attempts to change the forthcoming Annual 
MPR session in August 2000 into a MPR special session to impeach him, and as a reaction on the 
constant critique on his administration (Media Indonesia, 28 May 2000). There were indeed indications 
of a conspiracy by the political elite to impeach President Wahid at the Annual MPR session in August 
(Media Indonesia, 21 July 2000). Those derived from indications that PDI-P and Golkar, which 
achieved highest votes in the 1999 election, were disappointed by the Wahid government’s 
performance, and would form a political alliance as a 'show of force' in the Annual MPR session 
(Media Indonesia, 28 May 2000; Media Indonesia, 3 August 2000). 
100 See, for example, Republika, 7 May 2000a; Republika, 7 May 2000b; Republika Online, 8 May 2000; 
Republika, 9 May 2000;  The Jakarta Post, 8 May 2000; The Jakarta Post, 9 May 2000; Kompas, 8 May 
2000; Kompas, 9 May 2000; Detikcom, 7 May 2000b. 
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context of the Bulog-Bruneigate investigation. This will be discussed in detail in 
section 2.4 of this chapter that focuses on Wahid’s relationship with the media. For 
now, I proceed with a discussion on further factors that contributed to the scandal’s 
prominence. 
 
Buloggate: an intra-elite power struggle 
The Bulog scandal did not emerge spontaneously but was related to intra-elite 
power struggles in the political environment; in particular to tensions between the 
parliament and the president. Indeed, as argued by Robison and Hadiz (2004: 215), 
the corruption allegations against Wahid were interwoven with, or must be seen in 
the larger context of, intra-elite power struggles and political interests. Those are 
rooted in the outcome of the 1999 legislative elections and the subsequent election of 
Wahid as Indonesia’s fourth president by the MPR.101 Wahid gained the presidency 
through “clever behind-the-scenes horse-trading” (Potter 2011: 228) and “an 
intricate process of bargaining among political elites” (Robison and Hadiz 2003: 241) 
that took place in the period leading up to the presidential election in October 1999 
and resulted in the establishment of a heterogeneous government prone to conflict. 
 
The 1999 election and the establishment of the Wahid government 
The June 1999 general election was the first free election in Indonesia since 1955. 
Forty-eight parties competed, with 21 winning at least one of the 462 seats in the 
                                                          
101 At that time, the MPR consisted of 500 DPR members plus 200 appointed members (135 
representatives from regional legislatures and 65 appointed members from various social groups). 
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DPR.102 The election outcome had different implications for its major players. Based 
on the PDI-P’s victory Megawati saw herself as the natural candidate to succeed 
President Habibie. Although the PDI-P had won the largest number of votes, this 
only translated into 153 seats in the DPR and 185 seats in the MPR, only marginally 
higher than Golkar’s 181 MPR seats. This meant that Megawati would have to enter 
political negotiations with other political parties or factions to secure support for her 
presidential candidacy. However, she failed to consolidate her advantage by 
neglecting to forge coalitions and taking Wahid’s support for granted. Particularly 
the latter was a serious miscalculation. Disappointed by the PKB’s low turnout in 
the elections and filled with indignation by Megawati’s decision to give the PKB 
only one cabinet position as well as numerous other incidents within which she 
made him feel that she now held the upper hand in their relationship, Wahid 
“concluded that Megawati had no intention to give him a major role in her political 
plans” (Mietzner 2000: 42). Megawati had also alienated Amien Rais, whose 
National Mandate Party (PAN) had only received 34 seats in the DPR.  
Initially acknowledging her right to lead, Rais became affronted by 
Megawati’s disinterest in forming a coalition with him and started to assemble a 
coalition among those who feared being sidelined by a Megawati presidency. He 
found allies in the Islamic political parties whose leaders rejected the idea of a 
female president and feared that under a secular-nationalist Megawati presidency 
political Islam might be sidelined. Amien Rais promoted this alliance – dubbed the 
‘central axis’ (poros tengah) – as an alternative to the growing tension between the 
Megawati and Habibie camps. By floating the idea of nominating Wahid as its 
                                                          
102 The 500 member DPR consists of 462 elected and 38 appointed from the military and the police. 
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presidential candidate Amien Rais convinced Wahid and the PKB to join poros 
tengah. Wahid’s decision to join poros tengah meant that he turned his back on 
Megawati and joined forces with modernist Islamic parties, “a group that he had so 
often branded as a threat to the unity of the state” (Mietzner 2000: 49) and “once 
denounced as Islamist sectarians” (Mietzner 2000: 40). 
Following the rejection of incumbent President Habibie’s accountability 
speech and his subsequent decision to pull out of the presidential race, the majority 
of the Golkar faction threw support behind Wahid. General Wiranto, who had been 
officially nominated by Habibie as his vice president, instructed the faction that 
represented Indonesian military and police forces (TNI/Polri) to vote for Wahid in 
the MPR general session since Wahid had offered him “’protection’ and high office” 
(McIntyre 2001: 94). Eventually Wahid defeated Megawati with 373 votes to 313 
(Crouch 2010: 28). 
The bargaining and compromise that resulted in Wahid’s victory were 
reflected in the structure of governance and the cabinet: PDI-P’s Megawati became 
vice president, poros tengah leader Amien Rais MPR speaker, Golkar chairman 
Akbar Tanjung DPR speaker, and members of the leading parties as well as military 
officers were awarded with key cabinet posts (Cleary et al. 2000: 5; ICG 2001: 6) that 
allowed them access to economic assets (Mietzner 2001: 41). However, this power 
sharing deal crumbled when Wahid started to change the formation of the coalition 
cabinet and ignored the interests of key political parties. 
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Cabinet dismissals and the disclosure of Buloggate 
When Wahid started systemically to replace key cabinet ministers with those loyal 
to him, his relationship to the political parties that had backed his election 
deteriorated. This narrowed Wahid’s base in parliament (Siddel 2001: 3) and led to 
growing opposition from those parties that had been cut off from controlling 
resourceful institutions (Horowitz 2013: 103). As pointed out by Mietzner (2009: 
265), “[a]s a result, key political groups alienated by Wahid forged a coalition 
against him, with parliament serving as its major institutional base”. 
In November 1999, only one month after the formation of the cabinet, Wahid 
soured the relationship with poros tengah by making Coordinating Minister for 
People’s Welfare Hamzah Haz, who was also PPP chairman, resign from cabinet. 
General Wiranto (Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs) was also 
forced to resign in February 2000 by Wahid “for his alleged involvement in 
atrocities committed in East Timor and Aceh” (Miller 2009: 62). Wahid’s subsequent 
dismissals of Jusuf Kalla (Minister of Trade and Industry) from Golkar and 
Laksmana Sukardi (Minister of Investment and State Enterprises) from PDI-P– 
angered their respective political parties (Haris 2002: 14-5).103 
                                                          
103 Furthermore, the replacement of Sukardi with PBNU deputy chair Rozy Munir raised speculations 
that Wahid was allocating key ministries to  loyalists in an attempt to gain control over “financially 
lucrative state industries” (Liddle 2001: 209-10). What made matters worse was that Wahid did not 
clarify KKN allegations that had been raised against Rozy Munir before appointing him to the 
ministerial post (Tempo, 1 May 2000a; Tempo, 22 May 2000a) from which he had previously fired 
Laksmana Sukardi because of unsustained corruption allegations. Additionally, the dismissal of the 
two economic ministers on grounds of corruption allegations raised concerns Wahid was using such 
allegations as a pretext for firing ministers (Ziegenhain 2008: 141). Reportedly corruption allegations 
had also played a role in the replacement of former Welfare Minister and chair of PPP, Hamzah Haz 
(Liddle 2001: 209; Gorjão 2003: 30-1, Barton 2002: 290). Previously Wahid had mentioned that three 
ministers of his government were involved in KKN, but refused to say specifically who they were. 
Soon afterwards, in November 1999, Hamzah Haz, suddenly resigned (Gorjão 2003: 30-1) ostensibly to 
focus on leading and managing his party (Kompas, 27 November 1999). “Haz denied that there was 
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This anger intensified when in addition to Wahid’s official explanation that 
Sukardi and Kalla had been dismissed due a lack of cohesion among the economic 
team, another explanation, namely that both had been dismissed because of their 
alleged involvement in KKN cases in their respective sectors, surfaced in the media. 
This confidential explanation that had been made by Wahid during a closed 
consultation meeting with DPR members was immediately leaked to the media 
which reported the president as saying that both ministers were afflicted with 
KKN.104 
Kompas (28 April 2000),105 for example, came up with the headline ‘Two 
former ministers mentioned as involved in KKN’106. Sukardi and Kalla – who was 
also sacked from his simultaneously held position as Bulog chairman – reacted to 
the media reports and dismissed the President’s allegations as slander (Kompas, 28 
April 2000). Kalla even threatened that: 
A session of the DPR’s special committee will prove whether it is me or him 
(Abdurrahman) who is involved in corruption, collusion, and nepotism.107 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
any link between his resignation and Wahid’s statement; but most observers were convinced that there 
was a connection” (Barton 2002: 290). 
104 This meeting, on 27 April 2000, which was initially scheduled to be broadcasted live by TVRI, was 
closed at the President’s request (Kompas, 28 April 2000; The Jakarta Post, 28 April 2000). Reportedly 
the president also asked that nothing of what was said in connection with the dismissals should be 
released to journalists. Apparently, the president’s request for confidentiality was based on the 
consideration that he wanted to address the reasons for the ministerial replacements openly within 
parliament while simultaneously avoiding negative consequences for the two ministers (The Jakarta 
Post, 21 July 2000a; Wahid, S. 2000). 
105 Kompas (28 April 2000) named Golkar Party faction chairman Eki Syachrudin as having disclosed the 
information to reporters after attending the consultation meeting. 
106 ‘Dua mantan menteri disebut terlibat KKN’. 
107 “Di sidang Panitia Khusus DPR nanti, akan terbukti saya atau dia (Abdurrahman) yang berlaku 
korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme” (Tempo, 1 May 2000a). 
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I'm waiting for the formation of a special committee in the DPR. I'll tell 
everything. Later it will be proven, whether it’s me or Gus Dur who is lying, me 
or him who is involved in corruption, collusion, and nepotism.108 
 
Interestingly, the above threats were published in the very Tempo cover story that 
first mentioned the names of Abdurrahman Wahid and his brother Hasyim Wahid 
in connection to the disappearance of Rp 35 billion from Bulog Yanatera.109 The fact 
that a corruption case within Bulog allegedly involving the president and members 
of his inner circle was exposed shortly after the sacking of Jusuf Kalla from his 
position as Bulog chairman prompted speculations by the media that the exposure 
was related to Kalla's dismissal (The Straits Times, 10 June 2000; DJI, 25 May 2000). 
However, Tempo itself did not name the sources and only wrote that the scandal was 
revealed by a high ranking MPR member and confirmed by a Bulog senior official. 
Thus, it is impossible to know whether Kalla deliberately revealed a corruption case 
within the agency from which he was just fired, as a weapon against the president 
or whether it was a random sequence of events. 
By mid-2000 the discontent among the key political parties over Wahid’s 
actions was so palpable that they called for the transformation of the August 2000 
MPR Annual Session into a Special Session that could impeach the president. 
Additionally, they began to attack Wahid by exercising their parliamentary rights 
through an interpellation motion over the cabinet dismissals of Kalla and Sukardi, 
                                                          
108 “Saya menunggu pembentukan Panitia Khusus di DPR. Akan saya ceritakan semuanya. Nanti akan 
terbukti, saya atau Gus Dur yang bohong, saya atau dia yang ber-KKN” (Tempo, 1 May 2000b). 
109 In the article ‘Behind those dismissals’ (‘Di Balik Pencopotan itu’), Tempo, 1 May 2000a. 
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which was approved by the DPR with large majority, and the right of inquiry (hak 
angket) into Bulog-Bruneigate.110 
Initially suggested by the PPP faction, the proposal for an inquiry into 
Buloggate (Republika, 25 June 2000; Republika, 26 June 2000) gained support from 
several other parliamentary factions.111 The Reform faction suggested expanding the 
proposed inquiry to investigate also the confusion surrounding the US$2 million 
donation from the Sultan of Brunei (Republika, 29 June 2000). Ultimately, the 
proposal to form a parliamentary inquiry into both scandals received the support of 
237 legislators and was submitted to parliament in mid-July 2000 (Republika, 13 
July 2000). However, the DPR’s consultative body (Badan Musyawarah, Bamus) 
agreed to propose the inquiry not immediately but at the DPR’s forthcoming 
plenary session on 28 August 2000 (Republika, 19 July 2000). This provided 
antagonistic parliamentarians with a bargaining card to sustain political pressure 
against Wahid until after the Annual MPR session (Liddle, 3 August 2000). 
Meanwhile, in an attempt to ease tension, Wahid sent a conciliatory letter to the 
DPR which resulted in the DPR’s decision to let the matter rest until after the annual 
MPR session in August 2000 (Barton 2002: 314-5; Mietzner 2001: 42). 
At the annual session of the MPR on 7-18 August 2000, within which the 
President had to account for his performance, Wahid “faced criticism for his erratic 
                                                          
110 In June 2000 the DPR approved the interpellation motion with large majority (Gorjão 2003: 31-2). 
Meanwhile, tensions between Wahid and the DPR intensified (Fealy 2001: 107) when the latter in the 
interpellation session on 20 July 2000 refused to explain the dismissals on constitutional grounds 
(Horowitz 2013: 103; Kompas, 21 July 2000) and claimed that the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers was a presidential prerogative (Ziegenhain 2008: 141; Van Dijk 2002: 521). 
111 In this context it should be mentioned that Wahid had previously alienated the PPP (which was 
associated with PAN, one of the main elements in the Central Axis in the DPR) by replacing the 
Welfare Minister and chair of PPP Hamzah Haz with a non-PPP figure (Garjao 2003: 31). 
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political style, reputed cronyism, failure to repair the economy and inability to 
control escalating communal violence and separatism” (Huxley 2002: 20). Political 
tension only subsided when Wahid closed a power sharing agreement with 
Megawati and promised a cabinet reshuffle (Mietzner 2001: 42). 
However, the announcement of the new cabinet on 23 August 2000 made it 
obvious that Wahid “intended to keep power in his own hands” (ICG 2001: 6). 
Instead of enforcing the coalition relationship with those political parties that had 
supported his presidency Wahid marginalised them and entrusted the management 
of state assets to those loyal to him.112 The new cabinet did not include any Golkar 
representatives, none of the key cabinet posts went to PDI-P (ICG 2001: 6) and PAN 
lost the Ministry of Finance. Additionally, legislators were angry that, from shortly 
after his election, Wahid had “displayed contempt for the coalition that had brought 
him to power and for parliament itself” (McIntyre 2005: 223). Wahid’s stance was 
based on his conviction that Indonesia’s presidential system “guaranteed him an 
undisturbed five-year term, with or without the support of the legislature” 
(Mietzner 2009: 262). 
On 28 August 2000, only a week after the announcement of the new cabinet, 
the DPR retaliated against Wahid when it voted for a special inquiry into Bulog- 
and Bruneigate. Of the 356 legislators who participated in the vote, 307 voted for, 
                                                          
112 The announcement of the new cabinet on 23 August 2000 was accompanied by criticism from 
observers and politicians who remarked that the cabinet was almost wholly comprised of people 
deemed loyal to President Wahid. Tempo (3 September 2000a), for example, commented “this cabinet is 
a pure cabinet Abdurrahman Wahid”(“kabinet ini adalah murni kabinet Abdurrahman Wahid”). This 
of course, gave the impression that the new cabinet was not free from KKN and raised questions about 
the government's commitment to clean government and good governance. On the other hand Wahid 
strengthened the Cabinet’s unity by removing ministers with dual-loyalties (Tempo, 28 August 2000a; 
Tempo, 28 August 2000b; The Jakarta Post, 24 August 2000). 
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four voted against and 45 abstained. An overwhelming majority had turned against 
Wahid (Media Indonesia, 29 August 2000).113 Greg Barton (2002: 345), author of 
Wahid’s official biography, commented on the establishment of the committee as 
follows: 
Although the grievances of individual parliamentarians against the president 
were multifarious, in the end they decided on the single best mechanism to 
achieve his downfall: to push ahead with the investigations of the special 
parliamentary committee (pansus) examining the Bulogate and Bruneigate 
scandals. It was felt that this would provide a suitable trigger for an 
impeachment, on the grounds that proof of corruption constituted gross 
violation of the constitution. This was the constitutional requirement for 
impeaching a sitting president. 
 
The inquiry committee – Pansus Bulog and Brunei – consisted of 50 
legislators114 across political parties and was split into two sub-committees to 
investigate one scandal each. The composition of the committee reflected the 
composition of parliament. Thus, the committee was dominated by legislators from 
Golkar, the Central Axis and PDI-P, with legislators representing Wahid’s political 
vehicle PKB in the minority. Furthermore, the committee included some outspoken 
legislators, such as Ade Komaruddin (Golkar) and Alvin Lie (PAN) who had 
strongly criticised Wahid and spearheaded the DPR’s attacks against the president 
(The Straits Times, 8 November 2000; Reuters, 5 September 2000). 
                                                          
113 “In fact, in retrospect, the impeachment process of President Wahid began with this vote” 
(Indrayana 2008: 229). 
114 Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) 15, Golkar Party (Partai Golongan 
Karya, Golkar) 12, United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) 6, National 
Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) 5, Reform Faction (coalition between National 
Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) 4, TNI/Polri 4, 
Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) 1, (Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia, KKI) 1, (Partai 
Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, PDKB) 1, (Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah, PDU) 1 (Panus Bulog-Bruneigate 
2001: 7). 
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2.2 The DPR’s strategies 
The establishment of a parliamentary inquiry into Bulog-Bruneigate was crucial. It 
demonstrated the DPR’s emancipation from its New Order legacy of being largely a 
rubber stamp for the executive and sustained prolonged news coverage.115 
Prolonged news coverage is secured by continuous news supply through routine 
reporting (Tiffen 1999). Most legislators denied that the inquiry was meant to attack 
the president or was a conspiracy to topple him, but was rather an effort to cease the 
slanderous allegations against the president and to restore his good name 
(Republika, 1 November 2000; DJI, 28 August 2000; The Straits Times, 29 August 
2000). By carefully phrasing the inquiry’s aim in this way and emphasising that the 
DPR was merely carrying out its control function to guarantee a clean government 
(Reuters, 5 September 2000), legislators denied political motives behind the 
investigation (The Jakarta Post, 25 August 2000; The Financial Times, 5 September 
2000). Simultaneously, legislators made it quite clear from the beginning – even 
before the establishment of the parliamentary inquiry – that if Wahid was found to 
have abused his power they would push for impeachment proceedings. In so doing 
they linked the outcome of the investigation with Wahid’s legitimacy.116 
                                                          
115 For example, MPR speaker and PAN chairman Amien Rais, one of Wahid’s most outspoken critics 
who had previously publicly regretted having proposed Wahid for presidency and suggested he 
resign over his failure to resolve the country’s multiple problems (BBC, 26 October 2000; BBC, 27 
October 2000), hailed the DPR's vote to launch an inquiry into Bulog-Bruneigate as further proof of the 
greater power that the legislative branch enjoyed. He argued that "It shows that the House is no longer 
subordinate to the wishes of the executive branch, as in the past” (The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2000a).  
116 DPR speaker Akbar Tanjung, for example, had already raised the possibility of calling a MPR 
Special Session when he received the signatures for an inquiry into Bulog- and Bruneigate (Kompas, 13 
July 2000). MPR speaker Amien Rais confirmed that if Wahid’s involvement in both scandals was 
proven a special session would be a certainty and that this would be the end of the Wahid government 
(Republika, 17 October 2000a). Legislators, including Alvin Lie and members of the Golkar faction, 
stated they would press for a special parliamentary session to impeach Wahid if it turned out that he 
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During its working period (from October 2000 to January 2001) it became 
increasingly obvious that the committee’s focus shifted from probing Wahid’s 
possible involvement in both scandals to efforts to topple him (Kompas, 29 January 
2001). However, this process was subtle and committee members masked their real 
intensions by referring to the DPR’s function to oversee government and denied 
allegations that the committee was designed to overthrow Wahid and to prove that 
Wahid abused his power, thereby giving parliament a reason to impeach the 
president (Tempo Interaktif, 26 December 2000; Suara Pembaruan, 31 October 2000). 
Those arguments, that the DPR was exercising its control function towards 
the government in concert with the spirit of reformasi and thus in line with the 
interest of the media who adopted an explicit watchdog stance towards the 
president. This was a big advantage for Wahid’s opponents and enabled them 
successfully to use the jargon of press freedom and democracy against Wahid. The 
following discussion takes a closer look at how those committee members eager to 
implicate Wahid in Buloggate used the media during the parliamentary 
investigation process. 
 
Commenting on and leaking information from the committee hearings 
The decision of the DPR to hold the Bulog-Bruneigate hearings as ‘closed’ (‘secara 
tertutup’) meetings made the process less transparent and shifted the power balance 
in favour of the political elite since it was they who could filter the information 
rather than the media which – when they broadcast live or report on open meetings 
                                                                                                                                                                    
was indeed implicated in Buloggate (The Straits Times, 16 October 2000). Committee chairman 
Bachtiar Chamsyah (PPP) contended that if Wahid was involved in the scandals his government would 
fall (Republika, 22 September 2000). 
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– have to decide on the amount and character of information that will be 
transmitted to the public. Witnesses as well as committee members had the 
opportunity to speak to journalists before and after the hearing outside the meeting 
room (Kompas, 18 October 2000; Media Indonesia, 19 October 2000). Consequently, 
those who physically attended the hearings could ‘filter’ information they provided 
to the media on the committee’s meetings’ substance and the testimony of witnesses 
according to their interests by emphasizing or omitting particular details; and in 
doing so creating the impression that Wahid was indeed involved in the scandals. 
For example, in early December 2000 the committee’s deputy chairman, 
Alvin Lie (PAN), told the media that according to his personal opinion President 
Wahid could no longer escape the Bruneigate case. By further stating that he had 
complete and powerful data he signalled indirectly to the media that he had more 
information which he might be willing to share upon request (Media Indonesia, 12 
December 2000). In the context of Buloggate, committee members – hiding behind 
their anonymity – had stated early in the investigation process that the involvement 
of Wahid could be expected (Republika, 18 October 2000a) and that “[f]rom what 
we have now, we can already conclude that the President is involved in abuse of 
power in the Bulog scam" (The Straits Times, 8 November 2000). Committee 
members opposed to Wahid also used the capture of Wahid’s masseur, Suwondo, in 
their interest by raising suspicions that Suwondo’s capture was a prearranged 
matter. Alvin Lie, for example, raised the possibility that Suwondo was arrested on 
purpose to defend Wahid (The Straits Times, 16 October 2000) and so Suwondo 
could be made the scapegoat (Republika, 18 October 2000b). Those comments by 
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committee members on the investigation process were an elite strategy to politicise 
the inquiry and to create the perception that Wahid was involved in the scandals. 
A further strategy – albeit unlawful – was the leaking of testimonies 
incriminating Wahid from the committee’s closed door meetings.117 By leaking the 
substance from the closed hearings committee members deliberately breached the 
DPR’s code of conduct (tata tertib) and the stipulations of Law No. 6/1954 on the 
DPR’s right of inquiry (Media Indonesia, 19 October 2000). Even though violation of 
confidentiality could lead to moral and administrative sanctions or even an 
expulsion from the DPR under the relevant DPR regulations (Lumbuun, 29 January 
2001), details of the committee’s findings118 as well as information on the testimony 
of witnesses who had been questioned during closed-door committee meetings 
were widely publicized in the media without any sanction against those who leaked 
the information (Lumbuun, 29 January 2001; Muhammad 2002: 181). The following 
discussion shows that the leaking of testimonies of Bulog officials and members of 
the police force that incriminated Wahid was used successfully to undermine 
                                                          
117 The sessions of the Bulog-Bruneigate committee – within which the committee asked for 
explanations and information from people allegedly involved in Buloggate and Bruneigate and those 
who had knowledge of the two cases (Panus Bulog-Bruneigate 2001: 7; BBC, 5 September 2000) – were 
conducted as closed-door meetings (Panus Bulog-Bruneigate 2001: 6). This meant its substance was 
confidential as a matter of principle and must not be made public by its attendees (journalists, 
members of the committee, witnesses, observers) (Lumbuun, 29 January 2001; Kompas, 31 October 
2000). 
118 For example, that the committee would come to the conclusion “that the President was involved in 
the two scandals, abused his power and told lies” was published in the media prior to the report’s 
presentation to the DPR on 29 January 2001 (The Jakarta Post, 24 January 2001). Then the leaking of 
copies of the committee’s final report from the DPR’s closed plenary session on 29 January to the 
media prior to the DPR’s voting on 1 February (The Jakarta Post, 31 January 2001b). 
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Wahid’s legitimacy (Republika, 1 December 2000; Media Indonesia, 1 November 
2000).119 
Following the testimony of high ranking Bulog officials120 on 17 October 2000 
committee members Ade Komaruddin (Golkar) and Didi Supriyanto (PDI-P) told 
reporters that the three officials had testified that Wahid had ordered the transfer of 
the Yanatera funds (AWSJ, 18 October 2000; Republika, 18 October 2000b). 
Furthermore, information leaked from former Bulog executive Saleh Sofyan’s 
second testimony on 20 November 2000 contradicted Wahid’s previous denials that 
he did not know anything about the disbursement of the Yanatera funds, alleging 
that Wahid knew about Suwondo’s hiding place while he was a fugitive (Republika, 
22 November 2000; Tempo, 4 December 2000). 
Against the background of the testimony of members of the police force121 on 
2 November 2000, committee member Hafizd Zawawi (Golkar) told the media that 
according to the police’s testimony the main characters in the Bulog case were 
Sapuan and Suwondo, and that the case was unrelated to Wahid. In fact, the police 
would treat the case as one of embezzlement and fraud. By assessing the police’s 
testimony as an effort to divert the Bulog case from an issue between the 
government, more specifically the president, and Yantera to a private matter 
between Suwondo and Yanatera (Republika, 3 November 2000) Zawawi utilized 
information that could have been understood as the police genuinely not belivieng 
that there was sufficient evidence that Wahid was a major suspect as a means to 
                                                          
119 Committee members did not doubt the credibility of the testimonials of Rusdihardjo and Saleh 
Sofyan. 
120 Namely Syafei Atmodiwiryo, Moeljono, Jacob Ishak, and Jusuf Kalla (Tempo, 12 November 2000). 
121 Namely Mulyono Sulaiman, Alex Bambang Riatmodjo, and Harry Montolalu (Republika, 3 
November 2000). 
96 
raise doubts about police independence and to imply police collusion with the 
president. 
However, the most spectacular incident was when details of the in camera 
testimony of former National Police Chief General Rusdiharjo were widely 
publicized in the media (Lumbuun, 29 January 2001; Gatra 4 December 2000). 
Rusdihardjo’s testimony that Wahid had given an Indonesian businesswoman, Siti 
Farikha, a cheque for Rp 5 billion , which was reportedly obtained from Bulog 
Yanatera, heavily incriminated Wahid in Buloggate (The Jakarta Post, 2 December 
2000; Media Indonesia, 29 November 2000). Indeed, Rusdiharjo’s testimony 
substantiated the public’s belief that Wahid was involved in the scandal and in so 
doing contributed to mobilising public opinion against him. An opinion poll 
conducted by Tempo Interaktif shortly after Rusdihardjo’s testimony showed that 
more than 80 per cent of respondents believed Wahid was involved in Buloggate, 
whereas only 14 per cent believed otherwise (Tempo, 17 December 2000). 
Furthermore, Rusdiharjo’s testimony delivered ammunition to Wahid’s critics in the 
DPR who had been utilizing Wahid’s alleged involvement in the scandals as a 
reason to call for his resignation (The Jakarta Post, 2 December 2000). 
 
Media events 
Committee members also frequently set up meetings with civil society groups, 
students, and visited famous personalities to receive and seek moral support and 
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encouragement for the inquiry.122 During the four months of its operations the 
committee received almost daily various groups from society who came to convey 
their aspirations (Media Indonesia, 1 February 2001). 
Those staged events were aimed at keeping the scandal in the media and 
showcasing the committee as having broad support from the public. Additionally, 
such events provided a platform for committee members to criticise the actions of 
the president (Media Indonesia, 14 December 2000) or to strengthen the 
interpretation that Wahid was involved in the scandals. During a meeting with 
prominent Indonesian Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid, for example, 
committee member Ade Komaruddin stated that the committee had already 
received lots of information and evidence of the involvement of President Wahid 
(Media Indonesia, 7 October 2000). Committee members also utilised those events to 
affirm that the committee would not compromise with anyone (Republika, 10 
October 2000) or be influenced by money politics (Media Indonesia, 7 December 
2000) in its search for the facts (Media Indonesia, 18 January 2001). These events and 
the committee members’ pledge to do their work properly were rooted in public 
distrust of the committee and concerns at political bargaining among the elite 
(Republika, 29 November 2000; Republika, 30 November 2000). Indeed, even though 
the media shared the legislators’ interest in uncovering the Bulog scandal, they were 
also critical of the DPR’s ability to do so and closely scrutinized the legislators’ 
actions and motives.123 
                                                          
122 See, for example, Republika, 10 October 2000; Republika, 9 December 2000; Media Indonesia, 10 
October 2000; Media Indonesia, 6 December 2000; Media Indonesia, 7 December 2000; Media 
Indonesia, 2 December 2000; Media Indonesia, 14 December 2000; Media Indonesia, 18 January 2001). 
123 See chapter three, section 3.1 of this thesis. 
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Accusing the government of hampering the inquiry 
Another strategy adopted by committee members to discredit Wahid and to create 
the perception that he was indeed involved in Buloggate was to disseminate 
allegations through the media that Wahid’s camp was actively hampering the 
inquiry’s investigation. By, for example, telling the press that at least two committee 
members had recently refused a 25-billion-rupiah offer by a tycoon close to the 
president (The Straits Times, 8 November 2000) and that he himself had been 
approached by PKB functionaries to meet with Wahid (Tempo, 12 November 2000), 
Alvin Lie created the impression that Wahid supporters were trying to subvert the 
committee’s work. This impression was intensified by adding that he had received 
anonymous threats (The Straits Times, 8 November 2000) and by media reports 
alleging witnesses had been terrorised in relation to their testimonies (The Jakarta 
Post, 1 November 2000). More specifically, it was reported that, during his 
testimony on 30 October, former Bulog executive Saleh Sofyan had asked for police 
protection since he had been threatened with violence by an unknown person in 
relation to his testimony. Committee member Samuel Koto (PAN, Reform Faction) 
commented that intimidation directed towards Sofyan was understandable since 
Sofyan was thought to possess information or data that would shed light on the 
Wahid’s involvement. By adding that some people would be prepared to defend 
Wahid at any cost Kotto implied that it was Wahid supporters who were 
threatening Sofyan (Media Indonesia, 1 November 2000). 
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2.3 The government’s strategies 
Wahid’s and the PKB’s strategies focused on denying the accusations and attacking 
the motives of the accusers. The PKB as well as the NU promoted the view that the 
scandals and the parliamentary inquiry into the scandals were part of a larger 
conspiracy to topple the President.124 The following section elaborates on the PKB’s 
and Wahid’s strategies to deal with the accusations. 
 
PKB’s strategies 
The PKB was convinced of Wahid’s innocence in both scandals. It argued that the 
$US 2 million donation from the Sultan of Brunei was a personal gift to Wahid 
(Republika, 14 July 2000) and that Wahid was not involved in the embezzlement of 
Bulog Yanatera funds (Media Indonesia, 5 June 2000a). PKB secretary general 
Muhaimin Iskandar, for example, argued that Buloggate was not a corruption case 
but a mere case of fraud between Bulog deputy chief Sapuan and Suwondo (The 
Jakarta Post, 5 June 2000; Media Indonesia, 28 January 2001a) that was “politically 
manipulated by ‘certain’ political elites to undermine the president” (The Jakarta 
Post, 5 June 2000). According to Muhaimin Iskandar the Bulog case was part of a 
larger effort by Wahid’s opponents – the remnants of the New Order and those 
disappointed by unfavourable political repositioning – to overthrow Wahid through 
a trial by public opinion, by creating and propagating the perception that Wahid 
was guilty through the mass media (Gatra, 5 December 2000). 
  
                                                          
124 See, for example, The Jakarta Post, 25 January 2000; Tempo Interaktif, 29 January 2001; Media 
Indonesia, 5 June 2000a; Media Indonesia, 14 July 2000. 
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Discrediting the parliamentary inquiry 
Criticising the DPR and its inquiry into Bulog-Bruneigate the PKB described the 
DPR’s investigation as politically motivated (Media Indonesia, 14 July 2000). 
Overall, the PKB tried to create a perception that the committee had no intention of 
serving the objectives of transparency or accountability. Rather it was an instrument 
of the forces of the New Order in the DPR and its allies to unseat President Wahid. 
According to the PKB this was already evident in the DPR’s decision on 28 
August 2000 to approve only an inquiry into Bulog-Bruneigate but to reject a second 
proposal to launch an inquiry into unaccounted Bulog non-budgetary funds 
amounting to Rp 2.8 trillion from 1993 to 1999 (Media Indonesia, 27 August 2000).125 
Arguing that the PKB had voted for both proposals in order to show their 
commitment to KKN eradication and good governance (The Straits Times, 29 
August 2000, The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2000a) they denied these intentions to 
Golkar and poros tengah members who had voted for an inquiry only into Bulog-
Bruneigate. For PKB chairman Matori Abdul Djalil the attitude of Golkar and poros 
tengah confirmed the suspicion that neither of those parties had a genuine interest in 
achieving a clean government, but rather wanted to topple President Wahid. This 
scenario and a failure of reformasi would be beneficial for Golkar since it would 
ensure that its members were not brought to task for their wrongdoings during the 
New Order (Republika, 30 August 2000; The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2000a; 
Kompas, 29 August 2000). Matori further claimed that Golkar did not vote for an 
inquiry into Bulog’s non-budgetary funds out of fear that some of its prominent 
                                                          
125 This proposal, with Golkar and poros tengah voting against it, was rejected by the DPR with 152 to 
162 votes (Republika, 29 August 2000). 
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members were involved in the arbitrary misuse of Bulog’s non-budgetary funds 
(BBC, 30 August 2000). Taufikurrahman Saleh, chairman of the PKB’s parliamentary 
faction, claimed the political parties that had voted for an inquiry into Bulog-
Bruneigate but against an inquiry into Bulog’s non-budgetary funds were 
hampering reform and perpetuating the status quo through being inconsistent in 
dismantling KKN cases that had caused losses to the state (Republika, 31 August 
2000). 
As the following examples show, the PKB continued to uphold this line of 
argument in its critique of the inquiry. PKB deputy secretary Chatibul Umam 
Wiranu stated that "[t]hrough the commission the House no longer performs its 
controlling duty, but a systematic act of corroding the government's legitimacy and 
character assassination in a bid to oust the President" (The Jakarta Post, 29 January 
2001). PKB legislator Abdul Khaliq Achmad and Arifin Junaidi respectively claimed 
that the investigation was politicized to discredit the president (The Jakarta Post, 31 
January 2001a) and that the committee was “part of a conspiracy to undermine Gus 
Dur” (The Strait Times, 8 November 2000). PKB committee member Ali Masykur 
Moesa criticized the committee for conducting its investigations based on an 
assumption the President was involved (The Jakarta Post, 9 November 2000) and 
argued that “the investigation has been engineered by certain groups in the special 
committee to come to the conclusion that the President was involved in the scandals 
and their main objective is to discredit the government” (The Jakarta Post, 23 
January 2001a). 
The PKB also disputed the legality of the committee and argued that the 
committee had violated parliamentary procedures during its investigation (AFP, 29 
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January 2001). Allegations included that the committee had failed to produce its 
monthly report during its working period, never reported its budget, and leaked 
witness testimonies as well as investigation results to the press (The Jakarta Post, 31 
January 2001a). Furthermore the PKB alleged that the committee was seemingly 
acting as if it was a judge and forced those giving testimonies to make false 
confessions (Media Indonesia, 28 January 2001a). It claimed that the committee’s 
report was unbalanced, being mostly based on interpretations instead of facts 
(Antara, 1 February 2001). 
In reaction to the leaking of witness testimonies by the committee, 
Muhaimin Iskandar criticised the committee of violating Law Number 6/1954 on the 
DPR’s right of inquiry according to which committee members must keep the 
testimonies obtained in the examination secret (Media Indonesia, 19 October 2000). 
He threatened to propose the establishment of a DPR Honorary Council (Dewan 
Kehormatan DPR) to prosecute the committee if it continued to exceed its authority 
and functions (Tempo Interaktif, 23 October 2000). PKB legislators also threatened 
to press charges over the leaking of Rusdihardjo’s testimony (Republika, 1 
December 2000). 
Furthermore, PKB legislators also tried to deny the credibility of key 
testimonies by pointing out that “Suwondo was working for former President 
Suharto” (The Jakarta Post, 5 June 2000) and questioning the credibility of 
Rusdihardjo’s testimony by suggesting that Rusdihardo incriminated Wahid out of 
resentment at having been replaced as chief of police with Bimantaro (Republika, 1 
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December 2000).126 The PKB members labelled Rusdihardjo’s statement as 
slanderous (Media Indonesia, 28 January 2001a). 
In order to promote their point of view the PKB published a White Paper 
following the DPR’s memorandum against President Wahid on 1 February 2001 
(Kompas, 17 February 2001; Media Indonesia, 18 February 2001).127 The publication 
of the White Paper in mid-February 2001 was preceded by a publicity campaign 
through the media as well as through dialogues and panel discussions.128 
 
Revealing corruption allegations against Golkar and its chairman 
The PKB’s counterattacks were particularly aimed at Golkar. This is evident in the 
PKB’s support for a parliamentary inquiry into all of Bulog's non-budgetary funds 
following allegations that Golkar had received Bulog non-budgetary funds to 
finance its 1999 election campaign (The Jakarta Post, 27 June 2000a; The Jakarta Post, 
12 May 2000).129 Additionally, PKB members claimed that Golkar chairman Akbar 
Tandjung should be called to account for his alleged involvement in financial 
irregularities in the Civil Servants Housing Savings' Scheme (Tabungan Perumahan, 
Taperum) and proposed a parliamentary inquiry into the scandal (dubbed 
                                                          
126 Wahid dismissed Rusdiharjo as National Police chief on 18 September 2000 over his failure to arrest 
Tommy Suharto and to maintain security in Jakarta (The Jakarta Post, 19 September 2000).  
127 F-KB (Fraksi Kebangkitan Bangsa). 2001. Menegakkan kebenaran: kesaksian Fraksi Kebangkitan Bangsa 
DPR RI tentang dana Yanatera Bulog dan bantuan Sultan Brunei: buku putih. Jakarta: Fraksi Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Republik Indonesia. 
128 The PKB stated in the media that one million copies will be printed and distributed free of charge 
(Gatra, 13 February 2001). Additionally, the White Paper was promoted locally through dialogues and 
panel discussions that in turn received media coverage (Tempo Interaktif, 24 February 2001; Suara 
Merdeka, 25 February 2001). 
129 A special inquiry into all of Bulog's non-budgetary funds and not only into the Rp 35 billion 
allegedly stolen by President Wahid's masseur was initially proposed by the United Development 
Party (PPP) faction. 
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‘Taperumgate’). The allegations of Tandjung’s involvement in Taperumgate were 
based on an audit report by the State Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, 
BPK) of the Civil Servants Housing Savings' Scheme that had identified financial 
irregularities amounting to Rp 179.9 billion in 1996 while Tandjung was state 
minister for people's housing. However, the PKB’s counterattacks against Golkar 
failed due to insufficient support by other factions to establish a parliamentary 
inquiry into all of Bulog’s non-budgetary funds and their focus on KKN allegations 
involving President Wahid. 
In January 2001, however, the PKB faction attacked Akbar Tanjung again by 
calling for an investigation into the alleged misappropriation of DPR funds 
amounting to Rp 35 billion that had occurred in 2000.130 Then, in February 2001, 
following the issuance of the DPR’s memorandum against President Wahid, the 
PKB intensified their attacks to discredit Golkar and individual party members. 
Those included revived allegations that Golkar had received Rp 90 billion from 
Bulog during the 1999 election (Tempo, 26 February 2001b; The Jakarta Post, 14 
February 2001) and efforts to urge Attorney General Marzuki Darusman to speed 
up the investigation of corruption cases allegedly involving leading Golkar figures, 
including Akbar Tandjung and Ginandjar Kartasasmita (Tempo, 25 February 2001; 
Republika, 9 February 2001). Bringing up those allegations at this particular point in 
time, i.e. to coincide with the issuance of the DPR’s memorandum against President 
Wahid, suggests that the corruption allegations were a political manoeuvre to get 
                                                          
130 This concerns two cases: the alleged squander of Rp 21 billion during the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU) conference in September 2000 and the alleged squander of Rp 14 billion for the renovation of the 
DPR/MPR housing complex in Kalibata, South Jakarta, in July 2000 (The Jakarta Post, 18 January 2001; 
Gatra, 17 January 2001). 
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Golkar to open negotiations for compromise in order to avoid further steps towards 
Wahid’s impeachment (Tempo, 26 February 2001b). 
 
President Wahid’s strategies 
Wahid called allegations of his involvement in Buloggate a figment of imagination 
(Republika, 13 July 2000) and a part of a conspiracy to topple him (The Jakarta Post, 
9 May 2000). Consequently, he denied any involvement in the extortion of money 
from Bulog Yanatera (Republika, 7 May 2000a) and affirmed that he had no 
knowledge about the case or about Suwondo’s actions (Media Indonesia, 25 May 
2000). He emphasised that the law should take its course in solving the case (Media 
Indonesia, 6 June 2000) and was co-operative with, and talked to, the media about 
the allegations. For example, in a Kompas interview within which he was confronted 
with Sapuan’s allegations – including, that he had authorised the disbursement of 
Bulog funds. He also repeatedly stated that he would be available to be questioned 
by the police and to provide clarification to the DPR.131 During the Annual MPR 
session he clarified that the US$ 2 million donation from the Sultan of Brunei had 
been a personal gift (Kompas, 10 August 2000). In respect to Buloggate he stated 
that "the investigation into this case has been completed and the case file has been 
transferred to the South Jakarta District Court dated 8 August 2000 on charges of 
harming state finances”132 (Kompas, 10 August 2000). This statement, however, and 
Wahid’s earlier statement that according to the police Buloggate was just "a civil 
                                                          
131 Republika, 5 June 2000; Republika, 17 June 2000; Media Indonesia, 5 June 2000b; Media Indonesia, 20 
June 2000; The Jakarta Post, 27 June 2000b. 
132 “Penyidikan atas kasus ini telah diselesaikan dan berkas perkara telah dilimpahkan ke Pengadilan 
Negeri Jakarta Selatan tanggal 8 Agustus 2000 dengan tuduhan merugikan keuangan negara” 
(Kompas, 10 August 2000). 
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case of lending and borrowing"133 (Republika, 16 June 2000), only resulted in 
legislators becoming more suspicious. Wahid countered the legislators’ attacks by 
arguing that they should take the matter to court if they had proof of his 
involvement in the scandals instead of utilizing the legislature as a forum 
(Republika, 19 August 2000). 
Wahid did not have an issue with the establishment of a parliamentary 
inquiry (Republika, 17 October 2000b) and only emphasised that all its activities 
must follow the law. But following the legislators’ announcements that they also 
intended to question him, he stated to the press that he would not appear before the 
committee to answer questions over the two financial scandals (Republika, 11 
October 2000). However, he, offered to answer queries over the two cases in writing 
or, if necessary, to receive the respective members of the DPR to question him 
directly at a mutually determined time (Kompas, 16 November 2000). Yet the 
committee’s calls to summon Wahid intensified following Rusdihardjo’s testimony 
incriminating Wahid on 28 November 2000. This prompted Wahid to change his 
strategy from defence to attack. 
 
Questioning the committee’s legality 
On 1 December 2000 Wahid claimed that the establishment of the committee was 
illegal since it had not been listed in the state gazette as stipulated in Law No. 6/1954 
on the DPR’s right of inquiry (Kompas, 2 December 2000; The Jakarta Post, 2 
December 2000). Legislators rejected those claims by referring to other laws as the 
committee’s legal basis, such as Law No. 4/1999 on the composition and status of the 
                                                          
133 “soal pinjam-meminjam atas dasar perdata”. 
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MPR, DPR and DPRD (The Jakarta Post, 4 December 2000). Wahid further alleged 
that some committee members were utilizing the inquiry as a means to topple him 
and that the inquiry was part of a scenario aiming to overthrow the government 
(Kompas, 2 December 2000; Kompas, 4 December 2000a; Republika, 3 December 
2000). 
As the following discussion will show, Wahid’s plan to paralyse the 
committee by questioning its legality did not succeed. The committee’s legality, and 
its authority to call the president, was subject to legal and constitutional ambiguity, 
remaining a point of contention.134 However, Wahid’s claim that the committee was 
illegal and his defiance against testifying before the committee backfired. This was 
because Wahid only asserted the committee was illegal following the testimony of 
former national police chief Rusdihardjo’s (28 November 2000) which claimed the 
president had played an active role in Buloggate (The Jakarta Post, 2 December 
2000; Media Indonesia, 29 November 2000). This gave legislators the opportunity to 
link Wahid’s attack on the committee with the content of Rusdihardjo’s testimony. 
Committee chairman Bachtiar Chamsyah (PPP), for example, suggested “Perhaps 
the president is in a state of fatigue or feels cornered so he cannot make an 
interpretation other than a statement like that”135 (Republika, 2 December 2000). 
Committee member Julius Usman (PDI-P) questioned the logic of Wahid’s 
                                                          
134 See, for example, Kompas, 18 October 2000; Kompas, 30 November 2000; Kompas, 4 December 
2000b; Kompas, 5 December 2000; Liputan 6.com, 6 December 2000; Tempo Interaktif, 1 December 
2000; Tempo Interaktif, 7 December 2000; Republika, 13 October 2000; Republika, 16 January 2001. 
135 "Mungkin Presiden sedang dalam keadaan lelah atau terpojok sehingga tidak bisa membuat sebuah 
intepretasi sampai muncul pernyataan seperti itu". 
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statement and suggested that “Gus Dur was panicked after hearing Rusdihardjo’s 
testimony”136 (Republika, 2 December 2000). 
Committee members also renewed and intensified their call to question 
Wahid over his role in the scandal by sending him an invitation to appear in front of 
the committee on 17 January 2001 (Republika, 23 December 2000). Eventually the 
meeting between president and the committee took place on neutral ground in the 
Jakarta Convention Centre on 22 January 2001 (Kompas, 22 January 2001). The 
meeting, however, ended abruptly before questioning was completed. The 
journalists waiting outside the venue were puzzled when the president left the 
hearing earlier than anticipated without providing clarification (Kompas, 23 January 
2001a). During a press conference immediately following, some committee members 
used the incident to their advantage. They voiced their astonishment over Wahid’s 
reaction, emphasized his unwillingness to cooperate with the committee, and 
asserted his ‘walk out’137 was disrespectful towards the parliament and a sign of 
panic.138 Deputy committee chairman Alvin Lie, for example, stated "There was no 
reason for Gus Dur to become emotional . . . The President failed to uphold mutual 
respect between the legislative body and the presidency" (The Jakarta Post, 23 
January 2001b). 
Later that day, Wahid called a snap news briefing at the presidential palace 
at which he clarified his walkout. He stated that since the committee was unable to 
answer his question as to whether the meeting was a political or legal forum he did 
                                                          
136 “Gus Dur terlihat panik setelah mendengar keterangan Rusdihardjo”. 
137 The English term was used widely in media reports. 
138 See, for example, Republika, 23 January 2001; Media Indonesia; 23 January 2001; The Jakarta Post, 23 
January 2001b; Tempo Interaktif, 23 January 2001. 
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not see any point continuing the meeting and left the room (Kompas, 23 January 
2001b). He “accused members of the committee of using the scandals ‘to undermine 
the authority of the government and the President. So, what's happening here is 
character assassination’”(The Jakarta Post, 23 January 2001b). In a similar vein, PKB 
secretary-general Muhaimin Iskandar, criticised the press for being unjust in 
headlining Wahid’s walkout from the committee hearing without reporting on what 
happened during the interrogation, and specifically explaining what triggered 
Wahid’s walk out (Media Indonesia, 28 January 2001a). 
 
Power struggle between DPR and president 
The controversy over the committee’s legality and whether the president was 
(legally) obliged to appear before the committee (or whether the committee had the 
authority to call the president) needs to be been seen in the context of the power 
struggle between parliament and president. During Wahid’s presidency the system 
of government in Indonesia was still based on the 1945 Constitution which “does 
not clearly state whether Indonesia is to have a presidential or a parliamentary 
system of government”(Hara 2001: 315). Thus, Wahid’s defiance when called to the 
DPR to testify in front of the committee was due to a lack of clarity regarding the 
hierarchy of authority between the legislative and executive branches of 
government. For Wahid, Indonesia had a presidential system of government, in 
which the president was not accountable to the DPR and thus could not be called to 
parliament in order to be questioned by a parliamentary investigation committee 
(McIntyre 2005: 129). The legislators instead referred to law no. 4/1999 on the 
composition and status of the MPR, DPR and DPRD which gives the DPR the right 
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to subpoena everyone. However, as stated by Ziegenhain (2008: 143), Law no. 4/1999 
“does not explicitly mention the president”. 
Given the ambiguous legal framework Wahid felt he could not compromise 
presidential authority by submitting to summons or interrogation at the will of a 
committee whose legal authority over the president was unclear (Witoelar 2002: 105; 
Tempo Interaktif, 19 January 2001). If President Wahid had come to parliament it 
would have meant that he accepted the legal authority of the committee to question 
him (Ziegenhain 2008: 143). On the other hand, if committee members had refrained 
from calling for the Wahid’s testimony or agreed to come to the Presidential Palace 
they would have relinquished authority and would have created the impression 
that they had come to do a political deal with the President. 
However, the way the president and his supporters started doubting the 
committee’s legality and even demanding its disbandment raised suspicions that 
the president had something to hide.139 Furthermore, legislators and Wahid’s 
opponents made media statements that made the president’s refusal to come to the 
DPR look like an act of stubbornness on his part or an attempt to conceal his 
involvement in the two scandals. Alvin Lie, for example, stated: "Refusal to meet the 
invitation means the President disrespects the House and democracy" (The Jakarta 
Post, 14 December 2000) and "[h]is refusal to attend is an insult to the dignity and 
honour of parliament" (The Financial Times, 16 January 2001). MPR chairman 
Amien Rais stated that the president “should be reminded that in the present reform 
                                                          
139 See, for example, The Jakarta Post, 19 January 2001; Kompas, 9 November 2000; Media Indonesia, 14 
December 2000. 
111 
era, the executive, legislative and judicative organs of the state were functioning at 
the same level” (Antara, 11 October 2000).140 
In so doing legislators interpreted Wahid’s refusal to come to the DPR to 
answer questions from legislators and instead inviting the committee to the 
Presidential Palace not as a sign of the president’s willingness to meet with the 
committee despite its ambiguous legal framework but as an effort to put himself 
above the parliament, showing that he regarded the presidential office as superior 
and more powerful. Such behaviour was reminiscent of the way Suharto used to 
run the government. 
This impression that Wahid had slipped towards authoritarianism in order 
to defend his presidency,141 was enforced by some of Wahid’s actions: First, his 
support of a lawsuit against the Bulog-Bruneigate committee on charges of illegality 
and libel. This lawsuit had been filed by three individuals allegedly involved in 
Buloggate with close links to NU and PKB.142 Second, Wahid directly criticised the 
media and accused the legislature of being dominated by the forces of the New 
Order (Juru bicara kepresidenan, 27 January 2001; Kompas, 29 January 2001). Third, 
he made threats to mobilize his supporters on to the streets (The Jakarta Post, 2 
February 2001) and to suspend the DPR if legislators commenced impeachment 
                                                          
140 In this context it should be mentioned that Wahid prior to the establishment of the committee had 
agreed to be interrogated by the police as a witness despite the unclear legal situation (Media 
Indonesia, 13 June 2000; Media Indonesia, 25 June 2000) and had given a brief clarification surrounding 
Bulog-Bruneigate during the Annual MPR session (Republika, 10 August 2000). 
141 Wahid stated that he would not step down since the constitution authorised him to hold the 
presidency until 2004 (Media Indonesia, 30 December 2000). He repeated that he had no intention to 
step down in late January 2001 (Media Indonesia, 28 January 2001b). 
142 More specifically, Siti Farikha family ties with the NU, Aris Junaedi is a brother of PKB legislator 
Arifin Junaidi, and Masnuh is the deputy treasurer at the NU executive board (The Jakarta Post, 30 
December 2000; Republika, 8 January 2001).  
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proceedings against him (Asia Times, 31 January 2001). This way of dealing with the 
legislative tarnished Wahid’s image as a democrat and supporter of press freedom. 
The remainder of this chapter takes a closer look at how Wahid’s actions, 
particularly his interaction with the press, impaired his initially positive relationship 
with the media. 
 
 
2.4 The impact of Buloggate on Wahid’s relationship with the media 
Under the Suharto regime Wahid had been celebrated by the press as a symbol of 
resistance, and dubbed “the media’s golden child during the New Order” (Romano 
2003: 52). Consequently, the press had welcomed his election as president with 
enthusiasm. Wahid enforced his commitment to press freedom by  ratifying the 
1999 Press Law, abolishing the licensing system through the closure of the Ministry 
of Information, and by providing journalists with direct access to the palace 
(Muryadi 2010; Barton 2002: 372). This led to a situation where the press enjoyed 
unprecedented freedom (Tempo, 8 January 2001) and could publish freely, 
including news about the president and the government without fear of being 
banned (Dharma et al. 2003: 5). But this initially positive relationship between 
Wahid and the media deteriorated during the course of his presidency (Romano 
2003: 51; Sudibyo 2002: 261; Sng 2001). 
This was largely due to Wahid’s and his supporters’ reaction to the 
disclosure of Buloggate as well as Wahid’s strategies to deal with the antagonistic 
DPR and the press during the inquiry into Bulog-Bruneigate. Indeed, Wahid’s 
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difficulties in engaging positively with the media were inextricably related to the 
events following Buloggate’s disclosure. NU-Banser’s occupation of the Jawa Pos 
office over (the inaccuracy of) a Jawa Pos article alleging the president and top NU-
leaders had been involved in KKN at Bulog – as well as Wahid’s reaction to the 
incident – had a long term impact on his future relationship with the media. It 
changed the way Wahid and his supporters were viewed by the media – in general 
and in the context of the Bulog-Bruneigate investigation. Vatikiotis (2001: 145) 
describes Banser’s alleged occupation of the Jawa Pos offices as “one of the turning 
points . . . in the relationship with his government and the press”. The incident also 
contributed to the fact that in May 2001 AJI nicknamed President Wahid (and his 
followers) as an “Enemy of press freedom” (Solahudin et al. 2001; Supriyanto, 5 
January 2010).143 
Banser’s decision to visit the Jawa Pos office instead of exercising the right of 
reply or legal recourse in reacting to the inaccuracy of the Jawa Pos report created 
the impression that the media could not criticise the president and NU-figures 
without facing intimidation and potentially physical threat. There were conflicting 
accounts over the number of Banser members involved and what exactly happened 
during Banser’s visit to the Jawa Pos office. However, the mere appearance of 
members of a civilian militia group affiliated to a 40-million member strong 
organisation that supports the president at a media organisation created anxiety 
among media professionals. Among other concerns was the worry that it would 
                                                          
143 This verdict was based on a number of cases where Wahid’s supporters expressed their disaffection 
with the media by oppressing, intimidating and using violence against journalists and the media 
(Supriyanto, 5 January 2010). According to AJI’s advocacy team, the NU was responsible for 11 out of 
47 recorded cases of imposed pressure upon the media between May 2000 and May 2001 (Solahudin et 
al. 2001: 6-7). 
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encourage self-censorship by media as a strategy to avoid occupation or ‘mob 
violence’. In an effort to defend press freedom the incident triggered a kind of 
solidarity among the media that resulted in media coverage that “tended to focus on 
the Jawa Pos as the victim of Banser paramilitaries, and its poor reporting was not 
made known to the general public” (Asgart 2003: 663).144 
The Jawa Pos journalists’ failure to contact Hasyim Muzadi over the issue 
(PW GP Ansor Jawa Timur, 2000) and to re-check the correctness of Tempo’s 
allegations before repeating these was clouded by the media’s critique of Banser’s 
protest. Tempo’s article on the incident, for example, with the headline ‘Quoted 
Tempo, Jawa Pos occupied by Banser’145 (Tempo Interaktif, 6 May 2000), does 
acknowledge that the Jawa Pos took the information from Tempo magazine but does 
not inform the reader that it was Tempo that had mixed up the names of Hasyim 
Wahid and Hasyim Muzadi. Consequently, there was no critique of the Jawa Pos’ 
shortcomings. Other national newspapers like Kompas and Republika, mentioned the 
confusion of names within the text but clearly highlighted Banser’s protest through 
the selection of headlines ‘Protested, the Jawa Pos was not published’146 (Kompas, 7 
May 2000) and ‘Banser occupies the Jawa Pos’ editorial office’147 (Republika, 7 May 
2000b). Additionally, the media, journalist organisations and media watchdog 
                                                          
144 Additional info: If the Jawa Pos had contacted Tempo prior to publication they would have learned 
that Tempo had already sent a letter of apology to Hasyim Muzadi on 3 May 2000 (Solahudin et al. 
2001; The Jakarta Post, 9 May 2000). This might also explain why there was no NU demonstration in 
front of Tempo (Solahudin et al. 2001). In its following edition Tempo acknowledged its mistake and 
printed a correction (Tempo, 8 May 2000b). 
145 ‘Kutip Tempo, Jawa Pos diduduki Banser’. 
146 ‘Didemo, "Jawa Pos" tak Terbit’. 
147 ‘Banser Duduki Kantor Redaksi Jawa Pos’. 
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organisations were outraged over Banser’s action and described it as a threat to 
press freedom.148 
Banser’s and NU’s image suffered irrevocable damage from this incident 
that has been described as the ‘climax of violence against the media and journalists’ 
(Supriyanto, 5 January 2010). This was even though Banser strongly rejected 
allegations raised in media reports that its protest included physical violence and 
had been responsible for the cancellation of the Jawa Pos’ Sunday edition, inflicting a 
loss of Rp 1 billion upon the media company.149 
Wahid had not ordered Banser to attack the Jawa Pos and reportedly “had 
intervened and asked the NU to ensure that the Banser ‘did not go too far’” (The 
Jakarta Post, 3 May 2001). He “was rather angry when Banser made a noisy protest 
against Jawa Pos” (The Jakarta Post, 8 January 2001). Yet the incident had a 
significant impact on Wahid’s relationship with the media. This is due to Wahid’s 
affiliation with the NU: he chaired the 35 million people strong Muslim organisation 
for 15 years before he became president. Furthermore, during the Suharto period 
Banser was considered part of the pro-democracy alliance. But when Wahid became 
president a shift in the image of Banser occurred (Stanley 2006: 195, 204). Being 
previously perceived as supporter of the reform movement and democratisation, 
Banser subsequently was perceived as “willing to use extra-legal means to defend 
the president with tactics comparable to those of New Order organizations of the 
                                                          
148 See, for example, Republika Online, 8 May 2000; Kompas, 8 May 2000; Antara, 8 May 2000; Antara, 9 
May 2000; CPJ, 19 March 2001; IFEX, 10 May 2000; Luwarso and Solahudin 2001: 13. 
149 Apparently Jawa Pos managing editor Arief Affandi decided to cancel the Sunday edition and not 
Banser. Banser actually wanted them to run the Sunday edition so they could publicly apologize in that 
edition (The Jakarta Post, 11 May 2000; PW GP Ansor Jawa Timur, 2000). However, one could argue 
just as well that Banser disrupted work at the office due to their sit in and ultimately prevented the 
publication of the Jawa Pos due to its mere presence (Antara, 9 May 2000). 
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type of Pemuda Pancasila” (Ryter 2001: 155).150 Consequently, a fear developed that 
Wahid would use NU, especially Banser, to fight against and to intimidate his 
opponents and political rivals (The Jakarta Post, 8 January 2001). This fear was 
enforced by Wahid’s reluctance to condemn Banser’s action. Instead, he accused the 
Jawa Pos of having violated the journalistic code of ethics and of publishing the 
article as "part of a conspiracy to topple and discredit the government" (The Jakarta 
Post, 9 May 2000).151 In a similar vein, PKB deputy secretary general Chotibul 
Umam Wiranu claimed that there was a print media conspiracy to oust Wahid. 
Elaborating on the issue Wiranu stated that 60 per cent of the print media were 
conspiring with Wahid’s opponents, whereas the remaining 40 per cent were 
divided equally between those neutral and those supporting Wahid (The Jakarta 
Post, 6 October 2000). Wahid further emphasised that he could sue the Jawa Pos over 
the report on the grounds that it had violated the journalistic code of ethics by 
republishing erroneous information from Tempo magazine without prior cross-
checking (Kompas, 9 May 2000; Republika, 9 May 2000). 
Those statements gave the impression that Wahid seemed to support 
Banser’s action or at least had tried to justify Banser’s action by shifting the blame to 
the Jawa Pos by highlighting its breach in professionalism. Furthermore, Wahid’s 
reaction raised doubts about his commitment to press freedom and concerns that he 
was unknowingly slipping towards authoritarianism. Added to those concerns was 
Wahid’s failure to explain the reasons for Kalla’s and Sukardi’s dismissal from the 
                                                          
150
 The Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila, PP) is an Indonesian paramilitary organization established 
in 1959. It was absorbed semi-official political gangsters (preman) that supported Suharto’s New Order. 
For further information see Ryter 2002. 
151 See also Republika, 7 May 2000b. 
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cabinet while simultaneously insisting on his prerogative to replace Cabinet 
ministers, and his questioning of Bulog-Bruneigate inquiry’s legality. As a result, 
many of those who had initially welcomed Wahid’s election as president and 
sympathized with him became increasingly disappointed and ultimately alienated 
(Budiman, 15 May 2000). 
However, Wahid’s statement that he could sue the Jawa Pos over the report 
on the grounds that it had violated the journalistic code of ethics by taking over 
erroneous information from Tempo magazine without prior cross-checking was 
indeed justified and pointed to the media’s shortcomings. The simplification and 
liberalisation of procedures for starting new publications had resulted in an 
explosive growth in the number of publications. Following Suharto's fall and the era 
of reform 1,398 new publications entered the market (Nurbaiti and Solahudin, 26 
December 2001).152 This was in addition to the 289 existing publications during the 
                                                          
152 Most formal restrictions on the press were removed after Suharto’s fall in May 1998. The 
requirement that press publications have a license, known as SIUPP, issued by the Ministry of 
Information before they might publish, stopped being applied after Suharto’s fall. Since licensing was 
no longer a barrier to publication a large number of new publications entered the market. By 
eliminating the Ministry of Information in 1999, Wahid abolished the licensing system altogether 
(Nurbaiti and Solahudin, 26 December 2001). However, market realities forced the majority of the 
newly established publications out of business. According to AJI the decline in the number of 
publications was explained by three factors. First, many of the newly established media lacked 
professionalism. Second, the market was saturated by too many media that raised the same issues. 
Third, funding by investors stalled (Nurbaiti and Solahudin, 26 December 2001). More specifically: AJI 
estimates that by the end of 2000 the 1,398 newly established publications and those 289 pre-existing 
publications had dropped to 487 and 219 respectively (Nurbaiti and Solahudin, 26 December 2001). By 
2001 the number of publications dropped further to around 500. According to the Indonesian 
Newspaper Publishers Association (SPS) (as quoted in World Association of Newspapers, 2007: 380) 
the number of titles of paid-for dailies and non-dailies was 493 in 2001; compared to 1142 in 2000 
respectively. According to data from the Indonesian Press Council the number of print media had 
increased from 1381 in 1999 to 1881 in 2001. Out of those titles 551 published regularly in 1999 or 566 in 
2001 respectively. This data shows the tough competition in the media business and that it is easier to 
establish a publication than keep it going (Dewan Pers 2002: 11). Due to the relaxation and the later 
abolition of the licensing system the actual number of publications can only be estimated and 
consequently results in statistical discrepancies. 
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New Order. The majority of the new publications consisted of tabloids that 
provided sensational coverage of politics (Olle 1999). In order to attract readers and 
to remain competitive, some publications, mainly newly established tabloids, 
“publish[ed] speculative and irresponsible reports, which freely mix[ed] facts with 
opinion and conjecture” (Harsono 2000: 90) or resorted to “sensationalism rather 
than accuracy and fresh insights and analyses of issues” (Basorie 2001: 72). 
The overall increase in the number of print publications – despite a notable 
fluctuation between 1999 and 2001 – not only resulted in greater competition but 
also in heightened demand for journalists. Since the demand for trained journalists 
could not be met, many publications had to draw their personnel from outside the 
media industry. This lead to a decline in the standards of journalism (Ali 1999: 61; 
Hanitzsch 2005: 493-4). According to Bambang Bujono (interview 5 April 2010, 
Jakarta), former managing editor of the weekly tabloid D&R and ex-Tempo 
journalist, the competition among the media companies to attract readers also 
caused journalists to follow allegations and assumptions about which news stories 
would maximise demand, for example, Buloggate. Media professionals (Antara, 9 
May 2000; Lubis, 14 June 2000) and journalist organisations (Solahudin et al. 2001: 
13) were also aware of those shortcomings, and “Indonesian journalists admitted 
that problems of professionalism and ethics did exist in the media” (Clear 2005: 173). 
Thus, Wahid’s criticism of the press and his talk about “suing some 
newspapers for outright false information” (Witoelar 2002: 174-5) was not 
unwarranted. However, being aware that legal action against errant media would 
create a chilling effect on the media in general he refrained from doing so in order to 
maintain press freedom and democracy (BBC, 31 January 2001). Instead, he 
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frequently criticised and complained about the press by pointing to its shortcomings 
and poor performance, noting for example, that some media emphasize 
sensationalism rather than facts, objectivity and accuracy in reporting (Kompas, 13 
March 2001a). Wahid further accused some sections of the press of frequently 
twisting his words (Gunawan, 28 February 2002), to systematically ruin his 
reputation, of carrying out a ‘character assassination’ and of not being interested in 
reporting the government's achievements (CNN, 29 May 2001; Harsono, 1 June 
2001; Laksamana.Net, 25 June 2001). Additionally, he also appealed to journalists to 
refrain from sensationalism and to keep their public responsibility in mind 
(Republika, 13 July 2000). 
However, even though there was “considerable justification for Wahid’s 
claim that the post-Suharto media circulate inaccurate and ill-founded reports” 
(Romano 2003: 52) his way of dealing with the media was counterproductive since it 
antagonized the media and ultimately created the impression that Wahid was 
hostile to the media and press freedom (Barton 2002: 347-8; Supriyanto 2001; 
Sudibyo 2002). Didik Supriyanto, secretary-general of AJI at that time, argued that 
Wahid’s verbal attacks against the media inflamed antagonism towards the media 
and triggered his supporters to take action against the press (Supriyanto 2001). 
However, Wahid rejected those accusations and saw himself as a victim of the 
media (Sng 2001). He believed that the media deliberately discredited him and his 
policies and he suspected a conspiracy by his opponents behind it (Laksamana.Net, 
25 June 2001). In late December 2000, for example, he stated that some media had 
been paid – and that editors were being intimidated – to launch a character 
assassination against him by publishing lies, slander and inappropriate comments 
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(The Jakarta Post, 29 December 2000). In early 2001, he became more precise and 
argued that the press had been bought by particular groups153 – to one of which he 
also assigned Bulog-Bruneigate committee leaders Bachtiar Chamsjah (PPP) and 
Alvin Lie (Fraksi Reformasi) – who were trying to undermine his position as 
president (Republika, 8 January 2001). When Wahid sought to call a state of 
emergency in May 2001 he listed character assassination initiated by the media 
among the reasons behind this measure.154 This claim was reinforced by the media’s 
ownership structure during the Wahid presidency.155 
Ownership and control of the media are largely in the hands of Wahid’s 
political opponents and so-called Soehartoists – those related or linked to the 
Soeharto family and who have an interest in preserving the status quo (Pit Chen 
Low 2003: 31). 
 
Thus it is easy to assume Wahid's opponents consciously used sections of the media 
in order to sabotage the reforms initiated by Wahid and to maintain the status quo as 
far as possible. According to Barton (2002: 299) “Abdurrahman’s political enemies, 
including elements aligned with the former regime, were manipulating the media 
on a grand scale through money and intimidation”. In a similar vein, Sudibyo (2001) 
argues that the political elite systematically delegitimized Wahid through the 
media. 
                                                          
153 He outlines the four groups as follows: first, the people who have a very strong personal ambition; 
second, people who are afraid of the law; third, people who want to maintain the status quo; fourth, 
Islamists (Republika, 8 January 2001). 
154 As the two other reasons he named first, that his political enemies were using the parliament as a 
tool to judge and condemn him; second, to control anticipated clashes between pro- and anti- President 
Wahid (Laksamana.Net, 25 June 2001; Republika, 29 May 2001). 
155 For detailed information on media ownership around that time see for example Piliang 2002; 
Kingsbury 2005: 130, 139-40; Sen and Hill 2007: 111-6; Sng 2001. 
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Against this background Wahid’s allegations that there was a conspiracy to 
overthrow him and Wahid’s talk about “fighting ‘dark forces’ aligned with the 
former regime” (Barton 2002: 301) should not be simply dismissed as an attempt to 
find scapegoats. As discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, the former New 
Order elite was still powerful and had successfully hijacked the country’s new 
democratic institutions. Those loyal to Suharto or to their own interests would not 
hesitate to destabilise the new government in order to protect their interests (Barton 
2002: 301). There was widespread a assumption that the media had contributed to 
Wahid’s fall.156 The media’s negative portrayal of Wahid – through highlighting and 
exaggerating his mistakes, downplaying his achievements, interlacing KKN charges 
in Buloggate with other shortcomings of his presidency, describing him as 
incompetent in managing the government, favouring statements by those critical of 
Wahid and ignoring his replies to his accusers (Witoelar 2002: 108; Sudibyo 2002) – 
not only tarnished the president’s image but also contributed to the decline of public 
confidence in the government’s ability to overcome the country’s economic and 
political crises. This led ultimately to the president’s impeachment (Sng 2001). 
However, media ownership and shortcomings in professionalism as well as 
Wahid’s and his supporters strategies to deal with the media can only partially 
explain the media’s attitude towards Wahid, and their unbalanced coverage of 
Bulog- and Bruneigate in particular (Sudibyo 2002; Solahudin et al 2001). On the 
other hand, the media were exercising their supervisory function by criticising the 
government. Indeed, following the end of Suharto’s authoritarian regime and the 
introduction of press freedom and democracy, the Indonesian media were 
                                                          
156 See, for example, Barton 2002; Supriyanto 2010; Koran Duta, 30 October 2001. 
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particularly sensitive to issues of law enforcement and the embodiment of a clean 
government. Or, as stated by Pit Chen Low (2003: 70): 
the newly freed press has moved from one extreme to the other in its euphoria 
of freedom. After coming out of a period of tight government control and 
censorship, it now sees itself as the Fourth Estate and defines its role as a 
watchdog of the government. It appears that emphasis is placed on its “check-
and-balance” role of keeping the government accountable for its action instead 
of its primary role to inform the people. The press has become hyper-critical of 
the government and its policies. 
 
In accordance with the spirit of reformasi and democratisation the media pushed for 
political, economic, administrative and legal reform (Sudibyo 2002). When it became 
obvious that Wahid was unable to put those demands into practice and was 
increasingly entrapped into charges of corruption in Buloggate, the media’s support 
began to ebb and criticism increased (Supriyanto, 5 January 2010). Entering 2001, 
against the background of the intensifying power struggle between the DPR and the 
President, the media began increasingly to lose faith in the Wahid government’s 
ability to overcome the political and economic crisis. Ultimately, around June 2001, 
as stated by AJI’s then secretary-general, Didik Supriyanto, the media took the 
position that  
Gus Dur’s rule could not continue . . . Consciously or not, at that time the media 
united with the alliance of political groups that wanted to end Wahid’s rule.157 
  
                                                          
157 “kekuasaan Gus Dur tidak bisa dilanjutkan . . . Sadar atau tidak, media saat itu bersatu dalam 




This chapter has shown that Buloggate was an intra-elite power struggle over access 
to political resources. The contesting elite has incorporated the media in their power 
struggle. However, the opportunities and limitations to do so were at this point in 
time related to one’s position. Due to his position as president, Wahid’s 
opportunities to utilize the media were limited. Having been tightly controlled by 
the government during Suharto’s authoritarian New Order the now free media 
were particularly sensitive towards government interference and took a pronounced 
watchdog stance towards the president. Other members of the politico-business 
elite, in particular Wahid’s political enemies and members of the former New Order 
elite, profited from the media’s ‘watchdog function’ and utilized this (in conjunction 
with parliament) to promote their interests. Making Wahid’s position worse was his 
conflict with parliament. 
Following Indonesia’s authoritarian experience – marked by the media’s 
submission under government control and the parliament’s rubber stamp function – 
both institutions were eager to scrutinize the government. This spirit, and a high 
degree of intra-elite contestation that was played out in the power struggle between 
legislative and executive, made the Wahid administration vulnerable to scandal. 
Since the media were extremely sensitive towards issues of government corruption, 
and equally alert to the market potential of sensationalist expose of government 
corruption, Bulog- and Bruneigate were the perfect weapon for Wahid’s opponents 
to discredit and delegitimize the president. Yet President Wahid’s criticism of the 
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media and the legislative was countered by opponents’ claims that Wahid was 
slipping towards authoritarianism or was attempting to restrict press freedom. 
Having discussed the various strategies through which the contesting elite, 
particularly legislators and President Wahid, integrated the media in their power 
struggle, the following chapter turns its focus on the role and interests of particular 
media organisations in those struggles. 
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3 The media’s role in Buloggate and Aryantigate 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the interests and contrasting positions of particular media 
organisations in two different scandals, namely the Bulog Yanatera scandal 
(Buloggate), which has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, and 
Aryantigate. The latter refers to an alleged extramarital affair between President 
Wahid and a woman called Aryanti prior to his presidency. Since both scandals 
featured President Wahid and provided an opportunity to engage in “politics by 
other means”(Ginsberg and Shefter 1990) they fitted Waisbord’s (2004: 1087) 
description of an issue that was “journalistically appealing”. Yet the scandals 
triggered different media responses. This is because Buloggate was a public 
governance issue that dealt with corruption allegations against an incumbent 
president who was widely regarded as an opponent of KKN. Aryantigate in 
contrast was a personal issue that had occurred in 1995 during Wahid’s third term 
as NU chairman. This means that the media had a choice over whether to cover or 
ignore Aryantigate, whereas they had to cover Buloggate in order to fulfil their role 
as the Fourth Estate checking on government and rectifying abuses of power. 
However, this chapter argues that the contrasting positions of the media in 
both scandals can be best explained through the politico-economic interests and 
ideological affiliations of their respective owner or prominent editors. Besides 
focusing on particular media organisation’s interests and positions on Buloggate 
this chapter also sheds light on how the government’s and the committee’s 
strategies were perceived by the media, and came to be regarded as successful. 
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This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part (section 3.1) examines 
editorial commentary on Buloggate in three daily national newspapers. Media 
Indonesia, Kompas, and Republika were selected based on the following 
considerations: Kompas, is generally accepted as politically neutral and non-partisan. 
However, Kompas does prioritise issues which have a national economic relevance 
(Hamad 2004: 27). The nationalist-secular orientated Media Indonesia is owned by 
businessman and Golkar Party member Surya Paloh and is influenced by the 
political interests of the owner (Hamad 2004: 27). Republika is close to the Indonesian 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, 
ICMI158) and poros tengah (central axis159). Thus Republika is affiliated with interests 
politically and ideologically opposed to Wahid. Furthermore, whereas Kompas 
appeared to align with reform parties (among others, PKB), Media Indonesia and 
Republika were among those newspapers that showed partisanship towards non-
reform parties and Golkar (Hamad 2004: 24, 27). It is argued that these factors 
influenced the respective newspapers’ editorial stances on the Bulog scandal. In 
2000, when Buloggate was disclosed, Kompas had a readership of 1,598,000160, 
compared to Media Indonesia and Republika readerships of 396,000161 and 335,000162 
                                                          
158 ICMI was established in 1990 under the chairmanship of Habibie who was at that time Minister of 
Research and technology. For further information on ICMI see, for example, Hefner 1993; Ramage 
1995: 75-121; Porter 2002. 
159 A loose coalition of Islamic parties, which included, among others, National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional, PAN), Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), United Development Party (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) (Sidel 2006: 135). 
Initally, the poros tengah was brought together by Amien Rais to support the election of Wahid as 
president in the 1999 MPR election (Sukma 2004: 98; Bourchier 2000: 23). For further information see 
for instance: Sukma 2004; Bourchier 2000.  
160 Media Index AC Nielsen 1990-2000, quoted from Nainggolan (2003: 102). 
161 Media Index AC Nielsen 1990-2000, quoted from Nainggolan (2003: 215). 
162 Media Index AC Nielsen 1990-2000, quoted from Nainggolan (2003: 267). 
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respectively. Among those three newspapers Kompas had also the highest 
circulation with 507,000, followed by Media Indonesia and Republika with circulations 
of 170,000 and 160,000 respectively.163 
Part two (section 3.2) analyses Aryantigate. Following an overview of this 
scandal, the subsequent paragraphs offer an understanding of why the three 
weeklies Gatra, Panji Masyarakat, and Forum Keadilan made the alleged affair a cover 
story, whereas Tempo did not cover the scandal at all. It establishes that the 
difference in coverage on Aryantigate in the three weeklies was due to their 
ownership, ideological factors and economic interests. 
 
 
3.1 The media’s role and interest in Buloggate 
The following paragraphs focus on editorial commentary covering the Bulog 
scandal in Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Republika. The analysis includes all editorials 
from the time of the Bulog Yanatera scandal’s disclosure in May 2000 until the first 
editorial following the parliament’s acceptance of the Bulog-Bruneigate 
parliamentary inquiry’s final report on 1 February 2001 that mention the word 
‘Bulog’ in the context of the Bulog Yanatera scandal (Buloggate) even if the editorial 
might not focus on the Bulog scandal itself.164 This rather broad analysis is done to 
avoid missing a comment crucial to the respective newspaper’s point of view on the 
issue and in order to show that the media kept Buloggate alive by incorporating it 
                                                          
163 WAN 2001: 120 (quoted from Press Reference Indonesia). 
164 Excluded from the analysis are editorials that refer to ‘Bulog’ in another context not related to the 
Bulog Yanatera scandal, for example to Bulog as an institution or to another scandal in Bulog (eg. 
Bulog-Goro). 
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as an example of other broader concerns like corruption eradication and law 
enforcement. Counted in that way, these particular newspapers carried the 
following number of editorials: Kompas 31, Media Indonesia 18, and Republika 15.165 
Thus, Kompas published more editorials mentioning the word ‘Bulog’ in the 
context of the Bulog Yanatera scandal (Buloggate) than the two other newspapers 
under scrutiny. Yet this number should be interpreted carefully since Kompas often 
used the Bulog scandal as an example to illustrate other issues facing the Wahid 
government. Of Kompas’ 31 editorials, only 11 focus on the Bulog Yanatera scandal 
itself. This illustrates Kompas’ indirect style and criticism. Thus, in order to present a 




3.1.1 Media Indonesia: Critical while maintaining an aura of neutrality 
Overview of Media Indonesia’s position 
Media Indonesia is not specific about how Wahid might have been implicated in 
Buloggate but rather only implies that he might have had a role. Media Indonesia 
wants Buloggate solved but, by referring to how previous corruption scandals had 
                                                          
165 A list of all the editorials is in Appendix C. 
166 The Bulog Yanatera scandal was most prominent in editorials from late May to early June 2000 
(phase I) and from late January to early February 2001 (phase II). During these months all three 
newspapers discussed the issue in their editorials. This reflects the milestones in the scandal’s 
development: During phase I the scandal was disclosed, its main actors Suwondo and Sapuan were 
identified, Suwondo was on the run whereas Sapuan was arrested by the police, Sapuan’s testimony 
incriminated President Wahid, Wahid’s defense in the Bulog scandal led to disclosure of Bruneigate, 
and the stolen Bulog Yanatera funds were returned. Phase II evolved around the Bulog-Bruneigate 
parliamentary investigation committee’s final conclusion and the DPR’s reaction to it. However, as the 
accompanying table in Appendix B illustrates, the Bulog case was also sporadically discussed in 
editorials from July 2000 to December 2000. 
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been handled by the DPR, it doubts whether Buloggate will be resolved any more 
satisfactorily. Media Indonesia discusses Buloggate in the broader context of 
corruption scandals as exemplifying the rampant KKN prevailing in post-Suharto 
Indonesia, and the Wahid government’s failure in upholding law and justice. In this 
context, Media Indonesia argues that the only difference between the New Order and 
the Wahid government resides in the fact that high-profile corruption cases are now 
vigorously pursued initially but, as under Suharto, they still end without clarity and 
in favour of the accused. However, Media Indonesia does not merely hold the 
government responsible for this but also the legislature, and complains about the 
demoralisation and ineffectiveness of these monitoring institutions. 
In sum, Media Indonesia views the parliamentary investigation into Bulog- 
and Bruneigate and its outcomes primarily as a manoeuvre by the DPR in its 
conflict with Wahid. It remains neutral and calls upon the DPR as well as the 
president to improve and to reconcile their differences. Media Indonesia is critical of 
Wahid’s involvement in Buloggate yet attempts to maintain an aura of neutrality in 
its coverage of the scandal. 
 
Editorial analysis 
For Media Indonesia Buloggate shakes the credibility of the government (28 May 
2000) and demonstrates that New Order-style corruption still prevails in the new 
government (31 May 2000). Moreover, Media Indonesia (31 May 2000) is disappointed 
that Wahid not only squashed hopes to eradicate corruption but seems – as 
allegations surrounding Buloggate indicate – to even be involved in those practices. 
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Now even though the times have changed, with a new president, [those in] 
power are still familiar with fraud. Misappropriation of state funds . . . has still 
not receded! . . . Look at the many corruption cases that adorn our mass media, 
generally involving officials, both in the region and the centre. And, now the 
most recent scandal is the case of Bulog . . . In fact, President Abdurrahman 
Wahid was our hope . . . However, Wahid has let us down. He, with a 
reputation for being clean, it turns out, cannot guarantee that he is determined 
to stand in the vanguard, to start living clean. The Bulog scandal is a tangible 
example. This is indeed still a suspicion. However, according to various 
testimonies, especially from the former Bulog deputy head Sapuan, Gus Dur 
had a role in corrupting the people's money gathered through the Bulog’s 
Employee Welfare Foundation, to the sum of Rp 35 billion.167 
 
The last sentence as well as Media Indonesia’s editorial commentary on Bondan 
Gunawan’s resignation (3 June 2000) and Suwondo’s capture (19 October 2000) 
suggests that the president had a role in the scandal. In respect of the former, Media 
Indonesia (3 June 2000) implicitly states that Bondan Gunawan – who was among 
those mentioned as beneficiaries of the Bulog funds – resigned voluntary from his 
position as state secretary in order to protect Wahid. The paper compares this 
behaviour with New Order practices. 
Bondan Gunawan who willingly resigned from two prestigious positions: 
Acting Secretary of State and Secretary for Government Affairs, deserves our 
respect. Why? Because he respects the law in order to facilitate the investigation 
                                                          
167 “Sekarang meski zaman berganti, dengan presiden baru, kekuasaan tetaplah akrab dengan 
penyelewengan. Embat-mengembat uang Negara . . . tetap tak surut! . . . Lihatlah sekian banyak kasus 
korupsi yang menghiasi media massa kita, pada umumnya melibatkan para pejabat, baik di daerah 
maupun di pusat. Dan, kini skandal yang paling gres adalah kasus Bulog . . . Padahal, Presiden 
Abdurahman Wahid adalah harapan . . . Tetapi, Abdurrahman Wahid telah mengecewakan kita. Dia, 
dengan segala record sebagai orang bersih, ternyata, tak bisa menjadi jaminan bahwa ia bertekad 
berdiri paling depan dalam memulai hidup bersih. Skandal Bulog adalah contoh yang nyata. Ini 
memang masih serbadugaan. Tetapi, dari berbagai keterangan, terutama dari bekas Wakabulog 
Sapuan, Gus Dur punya peran dalam membobol uang rakyat yang dikumpulkan lewat Yayasan 
Kesejahteraan Karyawan Bulog sebesar Rp 35 miliar itu” (Media Indonesia, 31 May 2000). 
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in case he really was allied with Suwondo. However, from the undertones of his 
words, it is clear he wants to protect his master. It is the bitter reality. If during 
the New Order era, the master desperately protected his aides, now it is just the 
opposite. Both are equally as bad.168 
 
In its editorial commentary on Suwondo’s capture Media Indonesia (19 October 2000) 
does not only imply Wahid was involved in the scandal but also indirectly accuses 
him of having engineered Suwondo’s capture: 
From the mouth of Soewondo in court later, we expect a number of facts to 
become explicit, including facts about whether President Abdurrahman Wahid 
is involved or not in the scandal of the misappropriation of the Yanatera Bulog 
funds amounting to Rp 35 billion. However, precisely because that is the case 
the opposite is also true. Namely, because Soewondo is too important to Wahid 
he 'preferably’ should not be captured. From this perspective, one might ask 
why was it really so hard to catch a Soewondo . . . Soewondo was actually 
'around’ the police. He was not arrested because it was not yet time for him to 
be arrested. So, there is someone who is holding the cards, who determines 
whether or not it is feasible to arrest Soewondo. There is someone who 
determines whether capturing Soewondo is now necessary or not . . . We wait 
[to find out] whether the arrest of Suwondo was indeed an achievement, 
planned or accidental.169 
                                                          
168 “Bondan Gunawan yang rela mengundurkan diri dari dua jabatan prestisius: Pjs Sekretaris Negara 
dan Sekretaris Pengendalian Pemerintahan, memang patut kita hargai. Kenapa? Karena ia menghargai 
hukum agar memudahkan pengusutan kalau-kalau dia memang benar bersekutu dengan Suwondo. 
Tetapi, dari nada-nada ucapannya, jelaslah ia ingin melindungi tuannya. Ini adalah realitas yang getir. 
Jika di zaman Orde Baru, sang tuan mati-matian melindungi para pembantunya, kini justru 
sebaliknya. Dua-dua sama buruknya” (Media Indonesia, 3 June 2000). 
169 “Dari mulut Soewondo di pengadilan kelak, kita berharap sejumlah fakta menjadi gamblang, 
termasuk fakta apakah Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid terlibat atau tidak dalam skandal bobolnya 
dana Yanatera Bulog sebesar Rp 35 miliar. Akan tetapi justru karena itulah pula perkara sebaliknya 
juga benar. Yaitu, Soewondo justru terlalu penting untuk Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid karena itu ia 
'sebaiknya' tidak berhasil ditangkap . . . Soewondo sesungguhnya berada di 'sekitar' polisi. Mengapa ia 
tidak ditangkap karena memang belum waktunya boleh ditangkap. Jadi, ada yang memegang kartu, 
yang menentukan, apakah sudah layak ditangkap atau belum. Ada yang mengatur, apakah 
menangkap Soewondo sekarang sudah memenuhi kebutuhan atau tidak . . . Kita tunggu, apakah 
penangkapan Suwondo memang prestasi, atau kebetulan yang direncanakan” (Media Indonesia, 19 
October 2000). 
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Other commentary like “Soewondo, the masseur who carried the name of the 
president, so as to deceive Bulog of tens of billions”170 (25 May 2000) or “[t]he Bulog 
case . . . involves people close to President Abdurrahman Wahid”171 (7 August 2000) 
imply that Wahid was not involved himself. Furthermore, Media Indonesia (13 
December 2000) is also critical of Rusdihardjo’s testimony that implicates Wahid in 
the Bulog scandal and questions his credibility by pointing out that he only spoke 
out against the president after he had been dismissed from his position as National 
Police chief by Wahid. This indicates that Media Indonesia is critical of Wahid’s 
involvement in Buloggate but attempts to maintain an aura of neutrality. 
Media Indonesia (7 August 2000) criticises Wahid for being eccentric and the 
Wahid government for its weakness in upholding the rule of law, weak economic 
performance, and widespread KKN. However, emphasising that one year of the  
Wahid presidency is not enough to solve all those issues that accumulated during 
the 32 year New Order and by praising the maintenance of freedom of expression, 
Media Indonesia (7 August 2000) strongly rejects utilizing the 2000 Annual MPR as 
means to topple Wahid. Ultimately, Media Indonesia (3 February 2001) does not 
demand Wahid’s resignation over Buloggate but his commitment to KKN 
eradication and law enforcement. Media Indonesia’s major concern is that Buloggate 
will be resolved properly and that those involved will be brought to justice. 
Media Indonesia sees Suwondo as the main actor in the case. In this context 
Media Indonesia appreciates Wahid’s order to capture Suwondo (25 May 2000) but 
                                                          
170 “Soewondo, tukang pijit yang membawa-bawa nama presiden, sehingga mampu mengelabui Bulog 
puluhan miliar” (Media Indonesia, 25 May 2000). 
171 "Kasus Bulog . . . melibatkan orang dekat Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid” (Media Indonesia, 7 
August 2000). 
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questions the commitment of law enforcement agencies in doing so (3 June 2000). 
Media Indonesia’s concern that the Bulog case will join the long list of initially 
vigorously pursued but ultimately unsettled cases (3 June 2000) increases following 
the return of the stolen Bulog funds to the police (9 June 2000). In order to support a 
successful conclusion to the investigation, Media Indonesia (9 June 2000) urges the 
police to continue pursuing the case and calls upon Wahid to keep his promise to 
“explain the Bulog case before the DPR. If not, we recommend that this matter will 
be put on the agenda of the forthcoming Annual General MPR session.”172 
Media Indonesia’s distrust of law enforcement instiutions is also expressed in 
the following examples. Media Indonesia (23 August 2000) criticizes the arrest and 
trial of Bulog deputy chief Sapuan as well as of other corruptors as a farce: 
A show trial for the sake of political maneuvering only. Some are deliberately 
protected but some deliberately played with as if there was a commitment to 
law enforcement.173 
 
Additionally, the fact that, following his capture, Suwondo was examined by a 
doctor and not the police raises concerns for Media Indonesia (19 October 2000). 
Namely, that Suwondo’s trial will be similar to President Suharto’s trial174 or that he 
will be declared mentally ill. 
Media Indonesia (13 September 2000) labels the DPR’s call for an inquiry into 
Bulog- and Bruneigate as a mere manoeuvre in the context of the DPR’s conflict 
                                                          
172 “membuka kasus Bulog ini di hadapan DPR. Jika tidak, kita anjurkan agar soal ini dijadikan agenda 
dalam Sidang Umum Tahunan MPR nanti” (Media Indonesia, 9 June 2000). 
173 “Sebuah show trial demi manuver politik saja. Ada yang sengaja dilindungi tetapi ada yang sengaja 
dimain-mainkan seolah-olah ada komitmen terhadap law enforcement” (Media Indonesia, 23 August 
2000). 
174 Shortly before, in September 2000, the corruption case against former President Suharto was 
dismissed by court after a panel of doctors had declared him medically unfit to stand trial (Elson 2001: 
296). 
134 
with the president. Media Indonesia rejects the executive’s and the DPR’s public 
display of mutual power and authority, and demands: 
We want the DPR and the executive to show intelligence in the search for a 
solution. The exchange of ridiculousness is only good for a farce. Not for 
problem solving. Because the DPR and the executive are busier with this foolish 
conflict, it is not surprising that the reforms are now stagnating. Thus, there is 
no change in the attitude of the DPR and the executive in the reform era. 
Instead they are only boldly pretending to then reach an embarrassing 
compromise.175  
 
In so doing Media Indonesia (28 January 2001) criticizes both institutions. This 
critique becomes clearer at the end of January 2001: 
What is shown by the two state institutions nowadays, the presidency and the 
parliament, is the arrogance of authority. The DPR feels most right while Gus 
Dur has never felt wrong. There is no spirit in the leaders of these higher state 
institutions to view this and think about it in the context of [good] 
governance.176  
 
Media Indonesia argues that the mass actions for and against Wahid surrounding the 
announcement of the parliamentary inquiry’s verdict on 29 January 2001 create fear 
and disrupt the economy. For Media Indonesia (27 January 2001) such mass politics is 
an expression of institutional failure. 
                                                          
175 “Kita mau DPR dan eksekutif memperlihatkan kecerdasan dalam mencari solusi. Adu kekonyolan 
hanya bagus untuk lelucon. Tidak untuk pemecahan masalah. Karena DPR dan eksekutif lebih sibuk 
beradu konyol, maka tidak mengherankan kalau reformasi kini mengalami stagnasi. Jadi, tidak ada 
perubahan sikap DPR dan eksekutif di era reformasi. Yang ada cuma mereka lebih berani 
bersandiwara untuk kemudian mencapai kompromi-kompromi memalukan” (Media Indonesia, 13 
September 2000). 
176 “Apa yang dipertontonkan oleh dua lembaga tinggi negara sekarang ini, lembaga kepresidenan dan 
parlemen, adalah arogansi kewenangan. DPR merasa paling benar sementara Gus Dur tidak pernah 
merasa bersalah. Tidak ada semangat para pemimpin lembaga tinggi negara untuk melihat dan 
berpikir dalam konteks pemerintahan” (Media Indonesia, 28 January 2001). 
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That Media Indonesia sees the investigation into Bulog- and Bruneigate first 
and foremost in the context of the conflict between Wahid and the DPR is evident in 
an editorial following the DPR’s verdict. Media Indonesia (3 February 2001) describes 
the memorandum “as a very tough political and moral verdict“177 that “has 
undermined his credibility and shaken his legitimacy as a leader of the country . . . 
the memorandum is like the DPR taking a whip to Gus Dur so that he becomes 
conscious and changes.”178 
In the context of the conflict between Wahid and the DPR Media Indonesia 
assigns the blame more to the president. For example, it states that the “political 
commotion that has arisen so far is caused more by the persistence of Gus Dur who 
does not give in to anyone or anything.”179 However, Media Indonesia accepts the 
president’s apology and his promise to improve law enforcement and to eradicate 
KKN following the issuance of the DPR’s memorandum, but it simultaneously 
emphasizes that he has to show commitment to his promises and improve his style 
of managing the government. However, the editorial closes with the following 
appeal: 
Forgiveness and promises should be part of a civilised polity. How wonderful if 
Gus Dur and all those who are in conflict could sincerely forgive each other 
while mutually promising to improve themselves and their respective 
                                                          
177 “vonis politik dan moral yang amat berat” (Media Indonesia, 3 February 2001). 
178 “telah meruntuhkan kredibilitas dan mengguncang legitimasinya sebagai pemimpin negara . . . 
Memorandum adalah pecut DPR kepada Gus Dur supaya sadar dan berubah” (Media Indonesia, 3 
February 2001). 
179 “Kegaduhan politik yang timbul selama ini lebih banyak disebabkan oleh kegigihan Gus Dur untuk 
tidak mengalah terhadap siapa dan apapun” (Media Indonesia, 3 February 2001). 
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institutions so we could immediately leave the ignorance that has been 
exhibited with great arrogance.180 
 
In so doing Media Indonesia also blames other institutions supportive of democracy 
and calls upon them to resolve the conflict and work together in harmony. 
 
Explaining Media Indonesia’s coverage 
Media Indonesia’s critical but neutral coverage could be explained by it adopting the 
spirit of reformasi and, in so doing, critically watching the government. Indeed, as 
argued by Anwari (2003: 17) Media Indonesia’s editorials often appeared to be 
written “as an imperative to what should be done by the actors managing power 
and national leaders”. 
Nonetheless, Media Indonesia’s editorials on President Wahid were thick with 
cynicism, satire, and subjectivity (Desiani 2000: 77181) and Media Indonesia, in contrast 
to Republika and Kompas, had shown partisanship towards Golkar during the 1999 
elections (Hamad 2004: 25, 27). Media Indonesia, however, is not opposed to 
President Wahid. Nor had there had been any personal animosity between Media 
Indonesia’s owner Surya Paloh and Wahid. Indeed, Surya Paloh describes their 
personal relationship as excellent (Antara, 17 March 2014). President Wahid had 
even made a speech at the ceremony celebrating MetroTV’s launch as Indonesia’s 
first news TV station, in November 2000 (The Jakarta Post, 19 November 2000). 
                                                          
180 “Maaf dan janji harus menjadi bagian dari peradaban politik. Alangkah indahnya kalau Gus Dur 
dan semua orang yang berseteru saling memaafkan secara tulus sambil sama-sama berjanji untuk 
memperbaiki diri dan lembaga masing-masing agar kita segera bangkit meninggalkan kebodohan 
yang telah dipamerkan dengan amat angkuhnya” (Media Indonesia, 3 February 2001). 
181 According to Media Indonesia journalist Edy A Effendi, as quoted in Desiani (2000: 77). 
137 
Furthermore, Surya Paloh did not hold an office in Golkar during the Wahid 
presidency and thus was not actively involved in politics at that time. Thus, it seems 
that scrutinizing the government was paramount for Media Indonesia during 
Buloggate. This, as shall be discussed later, is in stark contrast to Media Indonesia’s 
interest in the Bank Century scandal. 
 
 
3.1.2 Kompas: Showing sympathy for Wahid 
Overview of Kompas’ position 
Kompas argues that New Order practises still take place during the Reform era but is 
torn about Wahid’s alleged role in Buloggate and wants him to stay in office until 
the end of his term. Thus Kompas condemns the parliamentary inquiry’s efforts to 
topple him. Kompas’ main concern, however, is that the involvement of the masses 
in the intra-elite fighting could lead to unrest. Consequently, Kompas appeals to the 
conflicting elite, more specifically President Wahid and the DPR, to find a 




Kompas (26 May 2000) was the first newspaper among those under scrutiny that 
provided a comprehensive assessment of Buloggate and its implications for the 
Wahid government. For Kompas (26 May 2000), the Bulog scandal was significant 
not in terms of money: 
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What is more significant, because behind the scandal that smells of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (KKN) it is mentioned – because it's not necessarily true 
– that a number of names in the circle of the Presidential Palace are involved. 
That in the present era there are still people who behave in the same way as in 
the previous era, namely treating Bulog as a tactical source of funding that does 
not need accountability, there are still rulers who assume that state funds can be 
utilized arbitrarily. 
That’s ironical. Is it not one of the most important mandates for the government 
of President Abdurrahman Wahid to resolve cases of corruption from the old 
regime, including former President Suharto and his cronies, as well as to lay the 
foundation for the creation of a clean government? In other words, is not the 
eradication of corruption a major target of the current government?182 
 
Thus, for Kompas the main issue is that New Order practices like the arbitrary use of 
state funds still seem to take place in a government that took office to eradicate 
KKN and lay the basis for a clean government (26 May 2000; 27 May 2000). In short, 
the Bulog case raises doubts about the government’s commitment to reform and 
shows that KKN is apparently still rampant during reformasi (27 May 2000; 29 May 
2000). However, compared to the other newspapers under scrutiny Kompas (26 May 
2000) avoids finger-pointing by highlighting that, to that point in time, the details of 
Buloggate were unclear. 
                                                          
182 “Yang lebih berarti, sebab di balik skandal itu tercium bau korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme (KKN) 
yang disebut-sebut – karena itu belum tentu benar – melibatkan sejumlah nama dalam lingkaran 
Istana Kepresidenan. Bahwa pada era sekarang masih ada orang berperilaku sama dengan era 
sebelumnya, yakni memperlakukan Bulog sebagai sumber dana taktis yang tak perlu 
pertanggungjawaban, masih ada penguasa yang menganggap bisa semena-mena mendayagunakan 
uang Negara. Itulah ironi. Bukankah salah satu amanat paling penting untuk pemerintahan Presiden 
KH Abdurrahman Wahid adalah menyelesaikan kasus-kasus KKN rezim lama, termasuk mantan 
Presiden Soeharto beserta kroninya, sekaligus meletakkan kerangka landasan bagi terciptanya 
pemerintahan yang bersih (clean government)? Dengan kata lain, bukankah pemberantasan KKN 
merupakan target utama pemerintahan sekarang?” (Kompas, 26 May 2000). 
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According to Kompas (26 May 2000) the scandal is “highly politically charged 
or at least very likely to be politicized”183 and, if not handled properly, could have 
the potential to undermine the government’s authority and credibility. This 
presumption is also clearly expressed in the editorial’s headline ‘The Bulog scandal 
could become a stumbling block for the Abdurrahman government’184 (26 May 
2000). In order to avoid that, Kompas urges that the case be settled in a timely 
manner. However, while praising Wahid’s order to capture all involved in the 
scandal as a step towards law enforcement (26 May 2000), Kompas (29 May 2000) 
doubts that justice will be done and implicitly recommends that the scandal not be 
prolonged: 
Already we expect that it would not be simple to complete the Rp 35 billion 
case legally. Namely, the law that unfolds truth and justice, the truth nothing 
but the whole truth [sic], the truth as it is. When, for example, the law does not 
succeed to uncover the issue until a sense of justice is met, an increasing 
number of lawsuits the processing and completion of which increases the 
frustration with the society and encourages people increasingly to turn to 
vigilantism. Yes, no-nonsense. For days at least, the attention of the government 
and the public will be disrupted. The concentration on economic recovery 
efforts is disturbed by the continuation of the case of the Rp 35 billion funds.185 
  
                                                          
183 “sangat kental dengan muatan politis atau paling tidak sangat mungkin diperpolitisasi” (Kompas, 
26 May 2000). 
184 ‘Skandal Bulog bisa jadi batu sandungan pemerintahan Abdurrahman’ (Kompas, 26 May 2000). 
185 “Sudah dapat kita perkirakan, tidak akan sederhana, menyelesaikan perkara Rp 35 milyar itu secara 
hukum. Yakni hukum yang menguakkan kebenaran dan keadilan, the truth nothing but the whole 
truth, kebenaran seperti apa adanya. Manakala misalnya, hukum tidak berhasil menguak persoalan 
hingga rasa keadilan terpenuhi, bertambahlah perkara hukum yang lagi-lagi penanganan dan 
penyelesaiannya menambah frustrasi masyarakat dan mendorong masyarakat semakin cenderung 
main hakim sendiri. Ya, ada-ada saja. Berhari-hari, sekurang-kurangnya, perhatian pemerintah dan 
masyarakat terganggu. Konsentrasi pada usaha pemulihan ekonomi diganggu oleh kelanjutan perkara 
dana Rp 35 milyar” (Kompas, 29 May 2000). 
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Kompas nevertheless sharply condemns the arbitrary use of state funds (5 June 2000) 
and wants law enforcement agents to follow up the case despite the return of the 
majority of the missing Bulog funds (9 June 2000). Yet a parliamentary inquiry into 
both scandals is seen by Kompas (1 September 2000) as a political manoeuvre. 
Kompas is torn over Wahid’s role in the Bulog case. For example, Kompas (29 
May 2000) appreciates the immediate arrest of Sapuan and the government’s need 
for funds, but questions whether “Soewondo was a fugitive or was he given the 
opportunity to run?”186 and is suspicious why the funds then went to private 
accounts (Kompas, 29 May 2000). In so doing Kompas tries to be appreciative while 
simultaneously highlighting the limitations of its sympathy. 
Kompas (2 December 2000) sees the emergence of Buloggate as a consequence 
of the President’s behaviour and in so doing comes to Wahid’s defense by 
highlighting that he did not act in bad faith.187 
The president had innately good intentions, just taking things easy . . . [He] 
does not understand the depth and seriousness of the problem. If he wants to 
be like that, go ahead.…. The issues that came to be known as Buloggate and 
Bruneigate, originate also from there. [He] does not mean any harm, but tends 
to take the easy way out of the problem. The result appears in the chaotic 
situation.188 
  
                                                          
186 “Soewondo sempat buron atau diberi kesempatan buron?” (Kompas, 29 May 2000). 
187 Kompas reaction in respect to the president’s role in Bruneigate is similar. By posing the question 
why Wahid talked publicly about the two million dollar he had received from the Sultan of Brunei if 
he had something to hide Kompas (12 June 2000) denies him any ill-intention. Instead Kompas justifies 
Wahid’s behaviour by referring to his weakness in dealing with money and bureaucracy as well as his 
lack of experience in ruling. 
188 “Presiden berpembawaan maksud baik, gampang-gampang saja . . . Tidak memahami secara 
mendalam dan secara serius persoalannya. Maunya begitu, silakan saja. Nanti, bagaimana 
pelaksanaannya, urusan nanti. Persoalan-persoalan yang kemudian dikenal sebagai Buloggate dan 
Bruneigate, dari sana pula asalnya. Tidak bermaksud buruk, tetapi cenderung memudahkan 
persoalan. Akibatnya muncul situasi amburadul” (2 December 2000). 
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Kompas does not avoid criticising Wahid and points out his weaknesses (12 June 
2000, 16 June 2000; 27 January 2001). 
The problem lies in the fact that he has absolutely no experience in governing. 
His inclination is more towards vision, more intellectual, as a humanist and 
religious scholar. Weak in consistency or outlining a vision into consistency. 
Weak in terms of organizing or bureaucracy. Weak and careless in financial 
issues. It is this weakness that has repeatedly led to a variety of statements, 
policies and actions accompanied by or causing controversy, differences in 
judgement, conflict.189 
 
Despite this frequent critique, including condemning Wahid’s claim that the inquiry 
was illegal (5 December 2000), Kompas does not see Wahid’s actions as ill-intended 
and wants him to stay in office until the end of his term. 
Democracy requires stability . . . The president showed various weaknesses, 
omissions, and errors during his seven-month government. But for the political 
parties in the DPR and the MPR and for the elite and the political forces outside 
the representative institutions, in our opinion, the replacement of the president 
in the middle of the road will be of no use.190 
Carried to its extreme, if Gus Dur no longer has integrity and purpose, it 
doesn’t matter who else or which group, his successor will experience the same 
thing. This is why taking turns alternately will neither create democratic 
stability nor would it be democractic!191 
                                                          
189 “Masalahnya terletak pada kenyataan bahwa ia sama sekali tidak mempunyai pengalaman 
memerintah. Inklinasinya lebih ke visi, lebih intelektual, budayawan dan kyai. Lemah dalam 
konsistensi atau menjabarkan visi menjadi konsistensi. Lemah dalam cara mengatur atau berbirokrasi. 
Lemah dan ceroboh dalam masalah keuangan. Kelemahan itu berkali-kali menyebabkan berbagai 
pernyataan, kebijakan dan tindakannya disertai atau menimbulkan kontroversi, perbedaan penilaian, 
konflik” (Kompas, 12 June 2000). 
190 “Demokrasi memerlukan stabilitas . . . Presiden melakukan berbagai kelemahan, kealpaan, dan 
kesalahan selama tujuh bulan pemerintahannya. Akan tetapi oleh partai-partai politik di DPR dan 
MPR dan oleh elite dan kekuatan politik di luar lembaga perwakilan, menurut pendapat kita, tidak 
akan digunakan untuk mengganti Presiden di tengah jalan” (Kompas, 12 June 2000). 
191 “Ekstremnya, jika Gus Dur jatuh di luar ketulusan dan kepamrihan siapa pun dan kelompok mana 
pun, penggantinya akan mengalami hal serupa. Akan silih berganti dan karena itu tidak ada stabilitas 
demokrasi atau demokratis!” (Kompas, 16 June 2000). 
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Kompas (29 January 2001) reinforces its position by stating on the day the committee 
was scheduled to present its findings to the DPR that it only supports the 
parliamentary inquiry as a means to clarify Wahid’s involvement in Bulog- and 
Bruneigate but not as means to topple him. 
Kompas (12 January 2001, 22 January 2001) sees the issues surrounding the 
inquiry into Bulog- and Bruneigate as the most imminent cause of tension between 
the government, particularly the president, and the DPR. Kompas argues that the 
inquiry has turned its focus from probing Wahid’s possible involvement in Bulog- 
and Bruneigate to efforts to topple him. In other words, that the parliamentary 
inquiry into the scandals is being used as a means to topple the President 
constitutionally (29 January 2001). 192 Kompas’ main concern though is that the 
masses have been drawn into, and polarized over, this intra-elite conflict. Indeed, 
following the DPR’s return from recess on 15 January 2000 demonstrations for and 
against Wahid in connection with his alleged role in Bulog- and Bruneigate were a 
frequent occurrence. The fear that the intra-elite bickering surrounding the Bulog- 
and Bruneigate inquiry could ignite a violent conflict among the polarised masses 
and lead to bloodshed crystallises as Kompas’ main concern as the inquiry nears its 
end (12 January 2001, 30 January 2001). In order to avoid that, and to not prolong 
the uncertainty over the inquiry’s outcome, Kompas (24 January 2001) would have 
preferred that the meeting between the president and the committee in the Jakarta 
Convention Centre would have resulted in a political compromise instead of a 
stand-off between the president and the committee: 
                                                          
192 Through constitutional means as the investigation's results may lead the DPR to issue a 
memorandum that could ultimately lead to Wahid’s impeachment. 
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The substance of Buloggate itself in fact may also be considered in terms of 
morality and conscience. Such a perspective and approach would open an 
elegant solution because anyone can be at fault and therefore can also correct 
errors. Now, after the meeting ended dramatically-silent, we're back in a 
situation that is unclear. It is not clear how the Buloggate case will end up. We 
can just answer let the case be resolved through the democratic mechanism in 
the DPR. Yet this reasonable answer may not resolve the issue well, because this 
mechanism taken by the Special Committee is already embroiled in politics like 
the politics of pros and cons. Meanwhile, signs are present, the pro and cons 
also already involve the power and the masses of pro and contra.193 
 
Kompas’ fear of the involvement of the masses becomes reality when the DPR’s 
plenary session on 29 January 2001 – within which the committee presented its 
conclusion that Wahid was involved in the sandal – is accompanied by unrest 
between Wahid opponents and supporters. Criticising the committee’s conclusion 
as hardening fronts, Kompas fears that the DPR’s bickering over the committee’s 
report – namely whether to accept or reject the committee’s conclusion – could 
translate into violent conflict among the masses and endanger reformasi and the 
overall democratisation process. Kompas appeals to all actors – first and foremost to 
the elite – to avoid that happening and “to seek the best possible exit”194 (30 January 
2001). On the day prior to the DPR factions’ scheduled presentation of their 
                                                          
193 “Substansi Buloggate sendiri, sebenarnya juga dapat dipertimbangkan dari segi moralitas dan suara 
hati. Sudut pandang dan pendekatan itu pun membuka solusi yang elegan, mengingat siapa pun 
dapat bersalah dan karena itu dapat pula memperbaiki kesalahannya. KINI setelah pertemuan yang 
berakhir secara dramatis-bisu itu kita kembali berada dalam situasi yang tidak jelas. Tidak jelas akan 
berakhir semacam apakah kasus Buloggate itu? Kita bisa saja menjawab, biarlah kasus itu diselesaikan 
melalui mekanisme demokrasi di DPR. Jawaban yang masuk akal itu belum bisa menyelesaikan 
persoalannya secara baik, karena terhadap mekanisme seperti yang ditempuh dengan Pansus telanjur 
disertai politik serta perpolitikan pro dan kontra. Sementara itu, hadir tanda-tanda, sikap pro-kontra 
juga telanjur melibatkan kekuatan dan massa pro dan kontra. Kali ini kita cenderung menyerahkan 
penyelesaian masalahnya kepada Presiden, Wakil Presiden, para pemimpin politik, dan elite politik” 
(Kompas, 24 January 2001). 
194 “untuk mencari exit yang sebaik-baiknya” (Kompas, 30 January 2001). 
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opinions Kompas (31 January 2001) calls upon the conflicting parties to put aside 
their own interests and work together in finding a solution that leads to stability 
and security in order to move on with the democratisation process and economic 
reform. 
We are waiting for the continuance of the DPR plenary’s stance on the results of 
the Bulog- and Bruneigate inquiry. In the current phase, we cannot anticipate 
clearly, where the political conflict that has formed around the inquiry of the 
two cases ends. Will it be fought out politically in Parliament in accordance 
with constitutional mechanisms or reconciled in a search for an amicable 
settlement? If the choice is to fight it out politically in the DPR, we question, 
what the impact is on the different positions at the mass level. Will the mass 
also take the view that it should fight it out outside of the DPR building and 
outside of the institutions of democracy? 
The following question emerges. Will the process of settlement of result of the 
inquiry in the DPR and outside DPR take place quickly or over a long time? 
Will it be completed on Thursday, 1 February, or will it be prolonged? This 
question, first of all, is associated with the serious problem that the uncertainty 
is unsettling.. Among others, entrepreneurs and the business community, are 
very sensitive to the uncertainty factor  . . . The theme of this review is the 
uncertainty and vagueness of the political constellation. The subtheme of this 
review cues us constantly, trapper toujours [sic], let us not play with fire, but 
rather show wisdom. Put the interests and safety of the whole nation above the 
interests of the party, class, and personal interests.195 
                                                          
195 “Kita menantikan kelanjutan sikap bidang paripurna DPR terhadap hasil angket Pansus Buloggate 
dan Bruneigate. Pada fase sekarang, belum dapat kita antisipasi dengan jelas, ke mana muara konflik 
politik yang mengental sekitar Pansus dua kasus itu. Bertarung habis-habisan secara politik di DPR 
sesuai dengan mekanisme konstitusional atau berislah mencari penyelesaian secara baik-baik? 
Andaikata dipilih bertarung secara politik habis-habisan di DPR, kita persoalkan, apa pengaruhnya 
terhadap perbedaan sikap pada tingkat massa. Apakah massa juga akan mengambil sikap habis-
habisan di luar gedung DPR dan di luar institusi demokrasi? Pertanyaan berikutnya muncul. Proses 
penyelesaian hasil kerja Pansus di DPR dan di luar DPR akan berlangsung cepat atau lama? Apakah 
selesai pada hari Kamis 1 Februari atau akan berkepanjangan? Pertanyaan itu pertama-tama dikaitkan 
dengan masalah serius yang selama ini sudah mengganggu yakni ketidakpastian. Di antaranya, para 
pengusaha dan masyarakat bisnis, amatlah peka terhadap faktor ketidakpastian . . . Tema pokok 
ulasan ini ialah ketidakpastian dan ketidakjelasan peta politik. Subtema ulasan ini, isyarat kita terus-
menerus, trapper toujours, janganlah kita bermain api, melainkan bijak. Menempatkan kepentingan 
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For Kompas, the DPR’s decision to censure the president brought worries it would 
lead to a further decline in economic conditions and prolonged political uncertainty 
(2 February 2001a). Against this backdrop Kompas (2 February 2001b) repeats its 
appeal to the conflicting elite to prioritise the safety of the nation when considering 
their next steps. 
 
Explaining Kompas’ coverage 
Kompas’ sympathy towards Wahid may derive from its inclinations towards the 
Catholic community, which is a minority,  leading the newspaper to hold an interest 
in keeping a pluralist and open minded president in office.196 Indeed, the stream of 
political interests that opposed Wahid consisted of Islamic political groups that had 
ideological differences with Kompas’ leaders (Koran Duta, 30 October 2001). 
Furthermore, Kompas co-founder Jakob Oetama and Wahid were good friends 
(Wahid 1998: 66). Even though Jakob Oetama stepped down as chief editor from 
Kompas in January 2000, he maintained his positions as head of Kompas and 
President Director of Kompas Gramedia, and was sometimes still writing the 
Kompas’ editorial. Furthermore, Jakob Oetama’s style of journalism, philosophy and 
values are embodied in Kompas. Kompas’ preference to keep Wahid in office, 
however, is also related to fears that the inquiry’s efforts to topple Wahid could lead 
to mass unrest between pro- and anti-Wahid forces resulting in political instability 
                                                                                                                                                                    
dan keselamatan seluruh bangsa di atas kepentingan partai, golongan, dan pribadi” (Kompas, 31 
January 2001). 
196 Conversation with Yanti Muchtar, Advisory Council of Kapal Perempuan Institute, 14 May 2014, 
Perth. 
Furthermore, since the 1970s Wahid had been writing regular columns for various print media, 
including Kompas and Tempo, in which he promoted “pluralism, religious tolerance, and the protection 
of minority rights” (Wahid and Ikeda 2015: 59). 
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and economic slump. This is in line with Kompas’ paramount economic 
considerations. 
Kompas’ dilemma in following its principles of remaining neutral while 
fulfilling its watchdog function is most profoundly expressed in an editorial (27 
January 2001) that elaborates on its reasons and justification in covering Buloggate: 
[W]hy was the press so persistent in questioning Buloggate? Not because it 
went along with the legislative. The press based its judgment on issues that it 
considers most principle and very decisive for the implementation of 
democracy and democratic governance. Namely since the beginning of its 
establishment even in contrast to the old government, this government has 
wanted to implement clean, authoritative, effective and efficient governance. 
The establishment of good government as well as good governance. 
When the case developed the press was nervous of becoming partisan or even a 
source of polarization. This should have been prevented to avoid coverage 
becoming partisan, and it should have remained tied to our common 
commitment (commitment to reform) to create a government, governance as 
well as politics that are clean. 
Even though the mode of presentation and quality of effort is different, the 
mass media, because of the character inherent to the media, will select and pick 
up events and issues which it determines to be of most interest.197 
  
                                                          
197 “[M]engapa pers gigih mempersoalkan kasus Buloggate? Bukan karena ikut-ikutan legislatif. Pers 
mendasarkan pertimbangannya pada persoalan yang dipandangnya amat prinsipil dan amat 
menentukan untuk penyelenggaraan demokrasi dan pemerintahan demokrasi. Yakni tegaknya sejak 
semula bahkan secara kontras (terhadap pemerintah lama) pemerintah dan pemerintahan yang bersih, 
berwibawa, efektif, efisien. Tegaknya good government maupun good governance.  
Pers gamang, ketika kasus itu berkembang menjadi partisan bahkan dijadikan sumber polarisasi. 
Seharusnya perspektif kasus itu dicegah menjadi partisan dan tetap diikatkan pada komitmen kita 
bersama (komitmen reformasi) membangun pemerintah, pemerintahan serta kehidupan politik yang 
bersih. Sekalipun cara presentasi dan kualitas upayanya berbeda-beda, media massa karena karakter 
yang melekat pada media, akan memilih dan mengangkat peristiwa dan masalah yang diperkirakan 
paling menarik” (Kompas, 27 January 2001). 
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3.1.3 Republika: Anti-Wahid  
Overview of Republika’s position 
For Republika, Buloggate shows that New Order-style KKN is still prevalent among 
power holders despite a change of leadership and reform efforts. The paper wants 
Buloggate to be settled. Republika not only doubts the commitment and ability of the 
law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and the DPR to settle the case. It also 
suggests that the government and Wahid are actively trying to divert attention from 
the scandal and hampering its investigation. Republika presents the President as 
involved in Buloggate and wants him to resign over the case.198 
 
Editorial analysis 
Republika (31 May 2000) reacts to Buloggate in a similar way to Kompas and Media 
Indonesia. Namely that the scandal is of serious concern 
because it occurs during the post-reform [period], and involves key people who 
are in power today. The Bulog scandal, at least, reminds us again that the style 
of the old ways of the Soeharto regime in managing state finances was still 
ongoing, although the New Order went two years ago. As if the stigma is still 
alive in this country: if you enter the circle of power be ready to get dirty. This 
means that the reform movement has not managed to make substantial changes 
to the culture of power in this country. The new reforms managed to change the 
face and the name of the ruler, but the culture of power is still the same: KKN is 
still strong.199 
                                                          
198 In the context of Bruneigate Republika (2 June 2000) only criticises Wahid's lack of transparency in 
the acceptance of the US$ 2 million donation from the Sultan of Brunei.  
199 “karena justru terjadi pada pascareformasi, dan melibatkan orang-orang penting dalam kekuasaan 
sekarang ini. Munculnya skandal Bulog, setidaknya, kembali menyadarkan kita bahwa cara-cara lama 
ala rezim Soeharto dalam mengelola keuangan negara ternyata masih berlangsung, meski penguasa 
Orde Baru itu sudah lengser dua tahun silam. Seakan masih hidup stigma di negeri ini: jika Anda 
memasuki lingkaran kekuasaan bersiaplah untuk ikut terkena lumpur. Ini artinya, gerakan reformasi 
belum berhasil melakukan perubahan yang mendasar terhadap budaya kekuasaan di negeri ini. 
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Whereas in this excerpt Republika only complains about the failure of the reforms in 
tackling corruption, its view on Wahid’s involvement starts to take shape in its 
commentary on Bondan Goenawan’s resignation in the same editorial (31 May 
2000). 
But, Bondan himself admitted his resignation was solely to ease the burden of 
the president. Lately, Bondan was mentioned as being involved in the case of 
'the theft' of Rp 35 billion belonging to Yanatera Bulog. And, he felt that he had 
been targeted as an intermediary to attack Abdurrahman. Therefore, to ease the 
burden of the president – while asserting that he knew nothing about the 
scandal that came to be called the Buloggate – the FORDEM activist [Bondan 
Goenawan] chose to resign.200 
 
That Republika sees Wahid implicated in Buloggate becomes more evident when 
discussing the cause of the case: 
In this case [Bulog], there are very strong indications of the involvement of the 
palace. Moreover the testimony of Sapuan as deputy head of Bulog in front of 
the DPR’s Commission III last week, has clearly revealed that it was President 
Abdurrahman Wahid who first intended to use these [Bulog] funds.201 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Reformasi baru berhasil mengganti wajah dan nama penguasa, tapi budaya kekuasaannya masih 
sama: kuatnya kasus KKN” (Republika, 31 May 2000). 
200 “Tapi, Bondan sendiri mengaku pengunduran dirinya semata-mata untuk meringankan beban sang 
Presiden. Belakangan, Bondan memang disebut-sebut terlibat dalam kasus 'pembobolan' dana Rp 35 
miliar milik Yanatera Bulog. Dan, ia merasa telah dijadikan sasaran antara untuk menyerang 
Abdurrahman. Karena itu, untuk meringankan beban sang Presiden – sambil menegaskan bahwa ia 
tidak tahu-menahu tentang skandal yang kemudian disebut Buloggate itu – aktivis Fordem ini 
memilih untuk mengundurkan diri” (Republika, 31 May 2000). 
FORDEM is the acronym of Forum Demokrasi (Democracy  Forum), a loose association of liberal, 
social democratic and religious intellectual and political figures critical of the Suharto government. It 
was formed in 1991 under the patronage of Abdurrahman Wahid. For further information see Aspinall 
2000: 101-13. 
201 “Dalam kasus ini [Bulog], sangat kental indikasi keterlibatan kalangan istana. Bahkan keterangan 
Sapuan sebagai Wakil Kepala Bulog di depan Komisi III DPR minggu lalu, jelas terungkap Presiden 
Abdurrahman Wahid-lah yang pertama berniat untuk menggunakan dana [Bulog] tersebut” 
(Republika, 5 June 2000). 
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Both of these issues, long known as the Buloggate and Bruneigate scandals, 
involve President Abdurrahman Wahid.202 
 
In the judicial proceedings Dr Sapuan, deputy head of Bulog who signed the 
disbursement of the Yanatera funds, revealed indications of the indirect 
involvement of President Abdurrahman Wahid and the palace.203 
 
Republika’s (22 November 2000) editorial headed ‘Evidence of the involvement of the 
President’204 following Saleh Sofyan testimony in front of the Bulog- and Bruneigate 
committee incriminating Wahid, leaves no doubt on its position towards Wahid’s 
implication: 
The mystery of the involvement of President Abdurrahman Wahid in the 
Buloggate case has been lifted. Praise Be To God, former Bulog general bureau 
chief, Sofyan Saleh finally dared to reveal the truth, even if he previously 
received death threats. The courage of this key witness in the case of the misuse 
of Rp 35 billion funds from Yayasan Yanatera Bulog must be appreciated. In a 
meeting of the Special Committee and Bruneigate Buloggate last Monday, 
Sofyan revealed the involvement of Abdurrahman Wahid.205 
 
In praising Soyfan’s courage in speaking the truth Republika implies that Wahid is 
not speaking the truth. Sofyan’s testimony that Suwondo organised a meeting 
between him and the President after a search warrant against Suwondo had been 
                                                          
202 “Kedua masalah ini sudah lama kita kenal sebagai skandal Buloggate dan Bruneigate yang 
melibatkan Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid” (Republika, 30 August 2000). 
203 “Dalam proses peradilan Dr Sapuan, Waka Bulog yang menandatangani pencairan dana Yanatera, 
terungkap adanya indikasi keterlibatan Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid dan kalangan istana secara 
tidak langsung” (Republika, 16 October 2000). 
204 ‘Bukti Keterlibatan Presiden’ (Republika, 22 November 2000). 
205 “Terkuak sudah misteri keterlibatan Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid dalam kasus Buloggate. 
Alhamdulillah, Ir Saleh Sofyan, mantan Kabiro Umum Bulog, akhirnya berani mengungkapkan 
kebenaran, sekalipun sebelumnya mendapat ancaman akan keselamatan jiwanya. Keberanian saksi 
kunci kasus penyalahgunaan uang Yayasan Yanatera Bulog sebesar Rp 35 miliar itu patut disyukuri. 
Dalam rapat Pansus Buloggate dan Bruneigate Senin lalu, Sofyan mengungkapkan keterlibatan 
Abdurrahman Wahid” (Republika, 22 November 2000). 
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issued subverted Wahid’s denial that he did not know about the disbursement, and 
revealed that there was continuing communication between the president and 
Suwondo. Based on the latter, Republika (22 November 2000) imputed Wahid of 
having known about Suwondo’s hiding place and having even engineered his 
capture: 
Based on [Sofyan’s] testimony, people are easily drawn to the conclusion that 
the President knew Suwondo’s hideout. In fact, let us hope that it was not the 
president who organised and protected the fugitive until he was later was 
arrested by police perhaps due to some some manipulated intervention.206 
 
For Republika (22 November 2000) the testimony of former Bulog executive Saleh 
Sofyan is a delayed gratification since Wahid’s implication into Buloggate provides 
a strong reason – even for those who tolerated Wahid’s previous contested actions 
and the government’s lack of performance – to lead the president  to a Special 
Session of the MPR. Republika doubts that after Sofyan’s statement Wahid could any 
longer deny his implication and suggests: 
Wouldn’t it be better for you to resign immediately instead of being disgraced 
in a MPR special session?207 
 
Republika (29 January 2001) links the DPR’s decision on the Bulog- and Bruneigate 
report to the question of whether Wahid still has the legitimation and credibility to 
continue his presidency until the end of his term. The newspaper repeats the 
                                                          
206 “Berdasarkan keterangan itu, orang mudah menarik kesimpulan bahwa Presiden mengetahui 
tempat persembunyian Suwondo. Bahkan, jangan-jangan Presiden yang mengatur dan melindungi si 
buron sampai ia kemudian, entah dengan rekayasa apalagi, ditangkap polisi” (22 November 2000). 
207 “Tidakkah seyogianya Anda mundur secara sukarela secepatnya daripada harus dipermalukan 
dalam SI MPR?” (Republika, 22 November 2000). 
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suggestion that Wahid step down following the DPR’s acceptance of the 
committee’s report (2 February 2001): 
Many believe that it would be better if President Abdurrahman Wahid resign 
immediately. Such a scenario may smooth the resolution of the current political 
crisis.208 
 
This clearly shows that Republika wants Wahid to step down from presidency over 
Buloggate. Republika wants to avoid bloodshed between the pro- and anti-Wahid 
groups over the DPR’s decision on the committee’s report and calls upon the groups 
to accept the DPR’s decision. 
Republika wants Buloggate to be solved (31 May 200) and highlights the 
importance of doing so by arguing (7 June 2000): 
The eradicatioin of corruption without distinction, including within the State 
Palace, is important to build the image of a just government, clean and 
dignified. Let it not transpire that KKN scandals are never completely solved 
because they simply serve as as 'political fodder’.209 
 
However, Republika doubts whether this will happen. Republika’s (15 May 2000) 
concern that Buloggate will be covered up is already evident in its first editorial 
mentioning the scandal. Here, Republika voices its critique of the silence of anti-
corruption organisations and the DPR. 
  
                                                          
208 “Banyak kalangan berpendapat bahwa akan lebih baik bila Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid segera 
mengundurkan diri. Hal demikian dinilai akan mempermulus penyelesaian krisis politik sekarang” 
(Republika, 2 February 2001). 
209 “Memberantas KKN tanpa pandang bulu, termasuk di lingkungan Istana Negara, penting untuk 
membangun citra pemerintahan yang adil, bersih, dan berwibawa. Jangan sampai skandal-skandal 
KKN tak pernah diselesaikan secara tuntas karena hanya dijadikan 'makanan politik'” (Republika, 7 
June 2000). 
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The officials who disbursed the money are already known, the palace cronies 
who received the money are already detected, but the loud noise from ICW 
[Indonesian Corruption Watch] or other anti-corruption bodies has already 
disappeared . . . Commission members in the DPR who are responsible for the 
reputation of the government, responsible for enforcing the rule of law, are 
silent.210 
 
Republika explains the silence of these institutions by pointing out that ICW leader 
Teten Masduki had lost his independence due to his co-option into the National 
Ombudsman Commission (Komisi Ombudsman Nasional) – an institution 
established in March 2000 by Wahid in an attempt to enforce clean and good 
governance.211 The paper further implies that legislators in the fight against high 
profile KKN put political interests above legal action. In this context Republika (25 
May 2000) also blames the attorney general, the judiciary (kejaksaan) and the police 
for being sluggish in handling the Bulog case. 
For example, Republika (26 June 2000) sees the investigation of Wahid by the 
police in the context of Buloggate more as a mere formality rather than a 
demonstration of the supremacy of law. The paper argues that during the Wahid 
government the law had merely become a political instrument. Republika also 
directly criticises Wahid by questioning: 
  
                                                          
210 “Pejabat yang menyerahkan uang pun sudah jelas, kroni istana yang menerima uang pun sudah 
terdeteksi, tetapi suara keras dari ICW atau lembaga antikorupsi lainnya sudah menghilang . . . para 
anggota Komisi di DPR yang bertanggung jawab atas nama baik pemerintah, bertanggung jawab 
menegakkan supremasi hukum, diam seribu bahasa” (Republika, 15 May 2000). 
211 For further information on the National Ombudsman Commission see, for example, Bhargava et al. 
2004: 222; Butt et al. 2015: 135-8. 
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How can it be that a president who had founded the institution “Democratic 
Forum” and had been praised when opposing the Suharto government . . . 
turned out to be is using the law as an instrument to achieve his goal once he 
was in power?212 
 
Republika (16 October 2000) criticises the government’s failure in upholding law and 
justice. More specifically, it laments that in high profile cases trials are only theatre 
and court decisions are only a pretence since they do not derive from legal 
considerations but are a product of negation and compromise. 
Republika (16 October 2000) conveys the impression that the government was 
covering up Buloggate by, for example, avoiding the capture of Suwondo out of 
concern that Suwondo’s testimony could incriminate the President in the scandal, 
and by suggesting that re-opening investigations into Baligate213 just at the time the 
Bulog scandal broke was merely a tactic by the government to extend the issue of 
KKN and divert public attention from the Bulog scandal (7 June 2000): 
Interestingly, the reopening of Baligate that caused the state losses of Rp 904 
billion, happened precisely when President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid 
and people around the Presidential Palace were being linked with a new KKN 
scandal, Buloggate . . . Therefore, although the intention of the attorney general 
inreopening Baligate was purely to resolve KKN, yet an impression that the 
motives were political is unavoidable. Many people directly assumed, the 
reopening of the scandal was simply to expand the issue of KKN and diverting 
                                                          
212 “Bagaimana mungkin seorang Presiden yang pernah mendirikan sebuah lembaga ''Forum 
Demokrasi'' dan dipuji saat melawan pemerintahan Soeharto . . . ternyata ketika berkuasa justru masih 
menjadikan hukum sebagai instrumen untuk mencapai tujuan?” (26 June 2000). 
213
 The Bank Bali scandal (‘Baligate’) broke in July 1999. It revolved around the alleged illegal transfer 
of about Rp 546 billion from Bank Bali to PT Era Giat Prima (EPG) as a commission for helping the 
bank recoup interbank claims. Given that those claims were already guaranteed by the government 
and that EPG was linked to Golkar and President Habibie loyalists, it was suspected that the 
commission would be used for the re-election bid of Habibie in the October 1999 presidential election. 
For further information see, for example, Booth 1999; Saydam 1999. 
154 
public attention from the Buloggate scandal that was enough to shake the 
credibility of the government of Gus Dur.214 
 
However, following the capture of Suwondo Republika’s (16 October 2000) opinion 
of the police improves: 
[W]e should express our appreciation to the police officers who have 
successfully captured Suwondo, because it turns out they do not want to 
become a tool of the power again.215 
 
In respect to the judiciary and the forthcoming parliamentary inquiry, Republika (16 
October 2000) remains critical: 
It is important that this case is taken up . . . because it became an example of 
how the authorities use their powers for the benefit of their cronies, regardless 
of the public . . . Therefore, the trial of Suwondo later must be an independent 
trial, it must not be regulated and engineered for the interests of the authorities. 
Not just tactics and strategies to avoid and pass the blame to a particular person 
both in court and at the hearing of the special Buloggate committee by the DPR 
that is reportedly not very long away. 216 
  
                                                          
214 “Yang menarik, mencuatnya kembali Baligate yang merugikan negara Rp 904 miliar ini justru 
terjadi ketika Presiden Abdurrahman 'Gus Dur' Wahid dan orang-orang di sekitar Istana Negara 
sedang dikait-kaitkan dengan skandal KKN baru, Buloggate . . . Karena itu, meskipun sangat mungkin 
niat Kejaksaan Agung mengungkap kembali Baligate itu adalah murni untuk menuntaskan KKN, tapi 
kesan politis tidak dapat dihindari. Banyak orang lantas menduga, dibukanya kembali skandal itu 
sekadar untuk memperluas persoalan KKN dan mengalihkan perhatian publik dari skandal Buloggate 
yang cukup menggoyang kredibilitas pemerintahan Gus Dur” (Republika, 7 June 2000). 
215 “kita patut memberi penghargaan yang tinggi kepada aparat kepolisian yang telah berhasil 
menangkap Suwondo, karena ternyata mereka tidak mau lagi jadi alat kekuasaan” (Republika, 16 
October 2000). 
216 “Kasus ini penting diangkat . . . karena menjadi contoh bagaimana sebuah penguasa menggunakan 
perangkat kekuasaan untuk kepentingan kroninya, tanpa menghiraukan publik . . . Karena itu, 
peradilan Suwondo kelak haruslah peradilan yang mandiri, tidak boleh diatur dan direkayasa untuk 
kepentingan penguasa. Bukan sekadar taktik dan strategi untuk mengindar dan melemparkan 
kesalahan kepada orang tertentu baik di pengadilan maupun pada sidang panitia khusus Buloggate 
oleh DPR yang kabarnya tidak lama lagi digelar” (Republika, 16 October 2000). 
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While welcoming the DPR’s decision to form a parliamentary inquiry into Bulog-
Bruneigate (30 August 2000) and praising the committee for its persistence (22 
November 2000), Republika (30 November 2000) is critical as to whether the 
committee can be strong enough to follow up the case and to resist “a bargain, 
political bargaining, which ignores the truth of law. We hope that the Buloggate 
Special Committee is not tempted to get caught in that direction.”217 
 
Explaining Republika’s coverage 
As the editorial analysis of Buloggate has shown, Republika was more critical of 
President Wahid than Media Indonesia or Kompas. This can be explained by 
Republika’s ideological affiliation: “Republika had a strong association with Habibie 
and ICMI and was later associated with the leader of PAN, Amien Rais, the Poros 
Tengah, and Islamic-oriented military officers” (Kingsbury 2005: 127-8). Thus 
Republika was part of a group that was opposed to President Wahid and NU. 
Furthermore, Wahid had strongly opposed the formation of ICMI in 1991 by 
“denouncing it as sectarian and a refuge for Islamic fundamentalists” (Hefner 1999: 
55). 
Hamazaki (1998) described Republika as a newspaper that was edited by 
Muslim intellectuals and protected by Habibie and Suharto along with his cronies.218 
Habibie’s influence over Republika – according to Schwarz (1999: 328) Habibie kept 
“Republika on a tight leash” – also explains why Republika did not criticise the 
government’s performance during the Habibie presidency (Nainggolan 2003: 286). 
                                                          
217 “sebuah tawar-menawar, bargaining politik, yang mengabaikan kebenaran hukum. Kita berharap 
Pansus Buloggate tidak tergoda untuk terjebak ke arah itu” (Republika, 30 November 2000). 
218 As quoted in Nainggolan 2003: 264. 
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Later, with the fall of Habibie and the rise of Wahid as president, Republika’s 
editorial policy changed to be often critical of government policy (Nainggolan 2003: 
319-320). Mulyanti Syas (2001) also found that Republika provided a negative view of 
President Wahid’s policies and a positive representation of President Habibie’s 
policies. Parni Hadi, former chief editor of Republika “admits to being strongly 
critical of the Wahid government through the voice of Republika” (Romano and 
Seinor 2005: 114). 
Parni Hadi was removed from his position as Republika’s chief editor in May 
1997 but kept his position as CEO of Republika (Kompas, 5 June 1997). Thus, even 
though Parni Hadi was no longer chief editor of Republika in the era of Wahid's 
leadership, he still had an influence on Republika’s news content and its attitude 
towards President Wahid’s leadership (Nainggolan 2003: 385). Parni Hadi also had 
a personal feud with President Wahid. In March 2000 President Wahid had replaced 
Parni Hadi as the head of the state owned Antara news agency after accusations that 
Parni Hadi lacked the support of the majority of employees and had tried to enforce 
his plan to transform Antara into a private company against the will of those who 
disagreed with the privatisation plan (AFPR, 24 March 2000). However, the 
replacement of Parni Hadi might also have been influenced by political concerns 
(The Jakarta Post, 22 March 2000). First, Hadi’s proposed privatization of Antara 
would have decreased the government’s influence over the agency (Romano and 
Seinor 2005: 120). Second, Parni Hadi had been installed by Wahid’s predecessor 
President Habibie as Antara’s general manager. Both were connected by a long-
standing friendship and a shared involvement in ICMI. Given this and the fact that 
most of the privately owned media were critical of Wahid, the President may have 
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decided to replace Antara’s general manger with a candidate of his choice. 
Furthermore, the fact that Parni Hadi was member of ICMI, a political appointee 
and close associate of President Habibie, and editor of the Republika newspaper (The 
Jakarta Post, 22 March 2002), and was part of group opposed President Wahid and 
NU, made his replacement strategic.219 
President Wahid had shown his animosity for Republika in February 2000 
when he deliberately did not provide Republika with the news that Wiranto was 
being replaced as TNI General at the State Palace on 13 February 2000 (despite 
providing this information to Kompas and Media Indonesia). When asked by 
journalists why he had only provided this information to Kompas and Media 
Indonesia but not Republika President Wahid stated that he deliberately did not 
distribute the information to Republika because he regarded it as incompetent 
(Nainggolan 2003: 87, 320). Furthermore, in 1994 Republika had launched a campaign 
to oust Wahid from the NU leadership (Nainggolan 2003: 269, 270). 
Besides such ideological reasons and personal vendettas, financial objectives 
appear to have played a role in Republika’s coverage of Buloggate. Republika reported 
on the Bulog scandal much earlier than Kompas and Media Indonesia. Its first front 
page report on the scandal was on 7 May 2000 under the headline ‘The President 
denies having received a bribe of Rp 35 billion’220. Additionally, on this and the 
following day Republika printed front page reports on Banser’s occupation of the 
                                                          
219 Affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah respectively, Wahid and Hadi were from politically 
opposing groups. Furthermore, Wahid had strongly opposed the formation of ICMI in 1991 by 
“denouncing it as sectarian and a refuge for Islamic fundamentalists” (Hefner 1999: 55). 
For further detail on the NU and Muhammadiyah relationship in general and during Wahid’s 
presidency see, for example: The Jakarta Post, 8 January 2001.  
220 ‘Presiden Bantah Terima Suap Rp 35 Miliar’. 
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Jawa Pos offices that mentioned NU leader Hasyim Wahid as beneficiary of the 
disbursed Bulog Yanatera funds. In so doing, Republika connects the scandal 
disclosure with an outbreak of violence on behalf of those close to Wahid, namely 
NU Banser. Additionally, as found by Wardhana (2002: 274), at the time the 
Buloggate case broke, the majority of sources in Republika were critical of Wahid 
(Wardhana 2002: 274). Furthermore, Republika was the only newspaper among the 
three newspapers under scrutiny that kept the scandal alive to the end of June 2000 
by reporting on it daily on its front page and during July 2000 by sporadically 
reporting on its front page. Overall, Republika printed more cover page articles on 
the Bulog scandal than the other two newspapers under investigation.221 
Having discussed and explained the editorial position of Kompas, Media 
Indonesia and Republika the following section contrasts Buloggate to another scandal 





Aryantigate refers to an alleged affair between Abdurrahman Wahid and a married 
woman, named Aryanti, between 1995 and 1997. Information on the alleged affair 
emerged during the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Annual Session, 7-18 
August 2000. At that time Aryanti and her ex-husband Yannur, visited several 
                                                          
221 Whereas Republika published 63 cover page articles on the Bulog Yanatera scandal in the period 
from the scandal’s disclosure to the day following the issuance of the First Memorandum (2 February 
2001), Kompas and Media Indonesia only printed 47 and 50 respectively on the issue. 
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legislators and ministers with a dossier entitled ‘Testimony about the behaviour of 
KH Abdurrahman Wahid’222 and a photo depicting Aryanti sitting on Wahid’s 
lap.223 Soon the photo circulated among DPR and MPR members, and became 
known to the media. 
While the media waited for each other to publish on this case, rumours of 
the affair continued to spread. When NU executives learned about the affair and 
that Panji Masyarakat was planning to publish the photograph in its forthcoming 
edition (Gatra, 28 August 2000) they issued a circular telling their followers not to be 
provoked by this. The circular was distributed to all NU branches in East Java and 
also to the media which were expected to disseminate its content. The government-
owned Antara news agency and the NU-owned newspaper Duta Masyarakat 
immediately published the information in an attempt to avoid unrest among NU 
members (Detikcom, 8 September 2000a; Gatra, 28 August 2000; The Jakarta Post, 30 
August 2000). 
The news item reported by Antara on 23 August 2000 under the headline 
‘Gus Dur was rumoured to be photographed with a woman who is not a close 
relative’,224 prompted no immediate media interest among major newspapers and 
                                                          
222 ‘Kesaksian tentang Perilaku KH Abdurrahman Wahid’. 
223 Among them were MPR speaker Amien Rais (PAN), DPR-speaker Akbar Tanjung (Golkar), 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita (Golkar), Soetipto (PDI-P), Sukron Makmun (PKB), and Hamzah Haz (PPP). 
At that time some former ministers and MPR member received a dossier containing a written 
confession by Aryanti that she had sexual intercourse with Wahid and that he had reneged on his 
promise to marry her, as well as a photograph showing Abdurrahman Wahid with Aryanti on his lap. 
The dossier was distributed by Aryanti’s ex-husband Yannur who, with Aryanti’s consent, made the 
affair public. 
224 ‘Gus Dur diisukan berfoto dengan wanita bukan muhrim’. 
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was only picked up by some online media.225 The scandal only broke when the news 
weekly magazine Gatra made it the cover story of its 28 August 2000 edition. Soon 
afterwards the story hit the headlines of numerous print and electronic media. 
According to Eriyanto (2002: 203) there were two different views that 
developed around the Aryanti case. Some construed it as pointing out the depravity 
of the Wahid government: a government that is not only incompetent in running the 
economy and the political system, but was also suffering from moral decay. Others 
claimed that Wahid’s political opponents were resorting to a personal problem 
(masalah pribadi) regarding Aryanti to unseat Wahid after some other scandals 
failed to achieve this. However, some established media like Tempo, Media Indonesia 
and Kompas did not report the issue at all.226 This raises the question why certain 
news organizations stressed or downplayed the alleged affair. 
Besides the limited media interest in the issue, legislators did not call for a 
probe into the affair since they regarded the alleged affair as a personal matter 
which happened before Wahid became president and thus had no bearing on his 
duties as president and Head of State. Several usually outspoken legislators and 
critics of Wahid, also did not use the alleged affair to attack the president (The 
                                                          
225 Those are Detik.com, 25 August 2000; Berpolitik.com, 25 August 2000; and Panji.co.id, 26 August 
2000 (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). 
226 August Parengkuan, former deputy chief editor of Kompas, and current communication director of 
the Kompas-Gramedia group explained that it was Kompas editorial policy not to publish any news on 
the affair since the issue was very personal, concerning someone’s privacy and was not current 
(Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). Media Indonesia did not cover the story but mentioned it twice in the context of 
listing the problems and controversies surrounding Wahid (9 September 2000; 24 September 2000). 
Reportedly, Surya Paloh had already – before Gatra and Panji Masyarakat reported on the alleged affair 
– warned Media Indonesia’s editorial office not to publish on it since he didn’t want Media Indonesia to 
publish controversial news. For Imam Anshori Saleh, executive editor of Media Indonesia, the news did 
not concern the public interest but was a private matter between Wahid and Aryanti, happened a long 
time ago, and appeared to be revived suspiciously for a political motive (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). 
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Jakarta Post, 7 September 2000; Detikworld, 29 August 2000). NU and PKB officials 
as well as Wahid’s supporters described reports of the alleged affair as slanderous 
accusations fabricated by certain groups, namely people from the New Order 
regime, to topple the president (The Jakarta Post, 3 September 2000a; Antara, 30 
August 2000; The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2000b). Wahid himself, as well as the 
public (Reuters, 5 October 2000), widely ignored the allegations of an affair (The 
Jakarta Post, 30 August, 2000). His only comment was “For something like that, 
why bother? Who on earth is that woman?” 227 (Adil, 31 August 2000). 
Thus the supply of news beyond the scandal’s initial disclosure was limited. 
Such news reports as did appear were mostly sourced from an investigation 
launched by the police regarding libel against the president that focused on Aryanti 
and the two magazines, Gatra and Panji Masyarakat, that had initially reported the 
alleged affair.228 Discussion in the media generally focused on journalistic ethics and 
on the motives of those publications which covered the scandal enthusiastically.229 
Furthermore, the circumstances and the timing of Aryantigate’s disclosure 
had an impact upon some media organisations’ decision as to whether to report the 
news or not. Considering that the relationship between Wahid and Aryanti 
purportedly occurred in 1995, Aryanti’s confession at the time of 2000 MPR Annual 
Session, in the midst of the tense political rivalry, raised suspicions that there was a 
                                                          
227 ‘Gitu aja kok diurusin. Siapa sih wanita itu?’. 
228 It should be noted the police acted on its own initiative in undertaking an investigation. A police 
investigation of parties spreading slander against President Wahid was supported by the PKB but not 
by the president himself who insisted that he would ignore rumours about his personal life and allow 
people to make their own judgment. 
229 See, for example, Qodari 2001; Eriyanto 2002; The Jakarta Post, 31 August 2000; Antara, 30 August 
2000; The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2000b; The Jakarta Post, 30 August 2000; The Jakarta Post, 3 
September 2000b; The Jakarta Post, 2 September 2000. 
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political motive behind the scandal’s disclosure. Further decisive factors were 
whether the story was true or not (i.e. determining Yannur’s and Aryanti’s 
credibility as well as the photo’s authenticity), ethical considerations (whether it’s a 
personal or public matter), and what would be the consequences for a media 
organization publishing an alleged affair of the president (i.e. physical violence as in 
the Banser attack on the Jawa Pos or libel charges). After all, Aryanti’s allegations 
involved the president and even though press freedom was guaranteed through the 
1999 Press Law, defamation of the president remained a criminal offence. Under 
articles 134, 136, and 137 of the Criminal Code anyone who “disseminates, 
demonstrates openly or puts up a writing or portrait containing an insult against the 
president or vice president" could be imprisoned for up to six years (Human Rights 
Watch 2003).230 
The following paragraphs offer an indication of the actual motives that 
prompted the weeklies Gatra, Panj Masyarakat, and Forum Keadilan to make the 
alleged affair a cover story, and Tempo to ignore it.231 This is done by first, focusing 
on how the scandal was covered, if at all, and second by explaining why it was 
covered in a particular way or, in the case of Tempo, why it was not published. 
Gatra (28 August 20000), Panji Masyarakat (6 September 2000), and Forum 
Keadialan (10 September 2000) gave the story the same priority by featuring it on the 
front cover illustrated by a close up of Aryanti. However, there were differences in 
the way in which each magazine presented the information (for example, through 
the choice of photograph of Aryanti it displayed on its cover and the main cover 
                                                          
230 These articles, also known as the ‘lèse majesté’ articles, were annulled in 2006 (SEAPA 2006). 
231 See Appendix D for a listing of all the articles analysed. 
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line), in the amount of space, the number of articles devoted to the scandal, and the 
selection of sources. 232 
Since the Aryantigate scandal also developed into a controversy among 
journalists, the editors of the four magazines mentioned above shared their opinions 
and arguments pertaining to coverage of the issue publicly. This, as well as a 
particular media’s ownership, provides evidence to account for dissimilar interests 
and positions among news organizations. Gatra is owned by Suharto crony Bob 
Hasan who had been put under house arrest by the attorney general just a few days 
before Gatra broke Aryantigate. By virtue of its ownership Panji Masjarakat is close 
to Wahid’s opponents poros tengah and Golkar. Forum Keadilan is a law and justice 
magazine considered to be close to former President Habibie and Golkar. Tempo was 
not affiliated with any political group. However, Presidential Protocol bureau chief 
Wahyu Muryadi was former managing editor of Tempo. The following paragraphs 




Gatra’s (28 August 20000) main cover headline ‘Uproar about an intimate photo of 
Gus Dur and Aryanti’233 is impartial and value-free. Basically, it only announces the 
existence of such a photo. Gatra’s report filled six pages and consisted of three 
articles. Gatra’s main report’s title ‘A tune of conspiracy behind Aryanti’s 
                                                          
232
 See Appendix E for a photo of the cover pages. 
233 ‘Heboh foto intim Gus Dur- Aryanti’. 
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whistleblowing‘234, was selected carefully. It is written in a very polite style that does 
not contain accusatory terms, like ‘affair’ or ‘infidelity’. According to Qodari (2001: 
90-1) this article implies the affair should be ignored, by delegitimizing Aryanti’s 
position. This is done in two ways: First, by printing the comments of sources that 
questioned or rejected the photo’s authenticity. Second, by writing about some 
theories and evidence about the possibility of a conspiracy to topple Wahid during 
the Annual MPR session. For example, that Aryanti was said to have received some 
Rp 100 million from an unidentified party for exposing her alleged close 
relationship with Wahid. Yet in another article ‘Honour a confession’235 Gatra gives a 
strong impression that the affair between Wahid and Aryanti was true and not a 
product of imagination. This is done through an interview with Aryanti and an 
investigation and cross check of the people and locations she mentioned (Qodari 
2001: 90-1, 96). In so doing Gatra covered both sides. However, there is a third article 
that consists of an interview with a member of NU’s executive board. The 
interviewee does not believe the affair occurred and is of the opinion that 
conspiracy to topple Wahid lies behind the revelations of an affair (Gatra, 28 August 
2000). This interview clearly supports Wahid. Another study, conducted by the 
Media Watch Society,236 assesses Gatra as tending to take the side of President 
Wahid by publishing more interviews and comments from NU figures. Overall, the 
headlines and reports in Gatra gave the impression that the whole issue was merely 
                                                          
234 ‘Nada Konspirasi di Balik Nyanyian Aryanti’. 
235 ‘Honor sebuah pengakuan’. 
236 a non-governmental organization whose members consist of lecturers and students from the 
University of Indonesia's communication studies postgraduate program. 
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a political stunt and that Aryanti was said to have been paid compensation for 
disclosing the scandal (The Jakarta Post, 10 October 2000). 
 
Explaining Gatra’s coverage 
Gatra was established in 1994 by some Tempo staff after Tempo had been banned. 
However, Gatra’s credibility suffered because it was owned by Suharto crony Bob 
Hasan, a wealthy businessman who was appointed Minister of Trade and Industry 
by Suharto in 1998. With numerous corruption allegations surrounding him, Bob 
Hasan had been put under house arrest by the attorney general just a few days 
before Gatra broke Aryantigate (Forum Keadilan, 10 September 2000). This raised 
suspicions that Gatra broke the affair as a kind of counter attack in response to the 
attorney general’s ruling to put its owner Bob Hasan under house arrest. However, 
Gatra’s chief editor Widi Yarmanto denied that the publication of the news about the 
Aryanti affair had anything to do with investigations into allegation of corruption 
against Bob Hasan, explaining that Hasan never interfered in the magazine’s 
editorial policy (Detikcom, 8 September 2000b). 
Kingsbury (2005: 128) noted that although Gatra “was formerly owned by 
Suharto crony Bob Hasan, [it] was funded in the post-Suharto period by Jusuf 
Feisal, who was deputy chair of Abdurrahman Wahid’s PKB.” This might explain 
why, even though Gatra  was the first print media to make a cover story out of the 
alleged affair and thus contributed to disseminating the scandal, the magazine did 
not target the president like, for example, Panji Masyarakat, did (Detikcom, 8 
September 2000b).  
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Gatra’s decision to make a cover story out of the issue was preceded by a 
lively discussion among editors. Ultimately, Gatra justified its decision by arguing 
that although the alleged affair was a private matter and happened a long time ago, 
the public had nevertheless the right to know since it concerned the moral character 
of a public official who serves as a role model. However, in order to avoid the 
impression that Gatra was reporting the news to attack Wahid, whether as an 
individual or in his capacity as president (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001), and of being 
utilized by warring political groups (Detikcom, 8 September 2000b), Gatra’s chief 
editor Widi Yarmanto decided that prior to the publication the following 
considerations had to be met. First, both sides needed to be covered; second, in 
order to make the story timely or newsworthy the right news peg should be awaited 
(Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). This explains why– even though it had already collected 
comprehensive material as well as interviewed Yannur and Aryanti twice by 17 
August 2000 – Gatra postponed the publication for another week while awaiting 
confirmation from the palace and the right news peg. Eventually, it was Antara’s 
report on the circular that ultimately triggered Gatra’s publication of its material on 
the alleged affair as cover story (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001; Detikcom, 8 September 
2000b). This, as well as mentioning in its report that Panji Masyarakat had initially 
planned to publish on the affair and to even print the photo of Wahid and Aryanti 
in its previous issue, gave the story more credibility and allowed Gatra (28 August 
2000) to protect itself by indicating that if Gatra had not broken the scandal, Panji 
Masyarakat would have. 
Gatra profited from publishing on Aryantigate first. To meet the heavy 
market demand, Gatra reprinted its edition with the Wahid-Aryanti cover story 
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(Quodari 2001: 89). This explains the two different publication dates (28 August and 
2 September 2000) of Gatra’s edition on the alleged affair. Gatra’s circulation soared 
from about 50,000 to 65,000 copies. Furthermore, this Gatra edition was sold for Rp 
15,000, rather than the original price of Rp 8,800 (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). Gatra was 
able to make such profit because it was the first print media to run this affair as its 
cover story. 
While Wahid supporters described Gatra’s report as character assassination 
some media figures praised its journalistic quality. For example, praise came from 
Andreas Harsono (1 June 2001), and Antara news agency general manager M. 
Sobary who commented: "This time the Gatra report is very honorable, very ethical. 




3.2.2 Panji Masyarakat 
Panji Masyarakat’s (6 September 2000) main cover line, ‘Aryanti Boru Sitepu: Gus 
Dur lied to me’237, was provocative and clearly sympathizes with Aryanti. Panji 
Masyarakat covered the story with six articles over 12 pages. Panji Masyarakat’s main 
report, ‘From an intimate photo to political gossip’238, stretched over four pages. It 
follows a five page interview with Aryanti under the headline ‘Gus Dur said, later 
we will repent’239 and a separate interview with Aryanti’s ex-husband Yannur titled 
                                                          
237 ‘Aryanti Boru Sitepu: Gus Dur bohongi saya’. 
238 ‘Dari Foto Imtim ke Gosip Politik’. 
239 ‘Gus Dur Bilang, Nanti Kita Tobat’. 
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‘He said he is already married’240. Panji Masyarakat also interviewed Wahid’s 
younger brother, Salahuddin Wahid, and provided an international comparison 
with a story on sexual affairs of several other heads of state. However, Panji’s report 
tended to show partiality towards Aryanti, by giving more space to sources that 
support her version of the story (Quodari 2001: 91) and only building on Aryanti's 
confession (The Jakarta Post, 10 October 2000). For example, the magazine consulted 
a multi-media specialist who confirmed the photo’s authenticity, and it printed 
Aryanti’s denial of having received money for her confession. Furthermore, 
Eriyanto (2002) found that Panji Masyarakat framed the scandal as a moral issue by 
focusing on Wahid’s morality at the personal level and in terms of his position as 
president. Aryanti is viewed as the victim of Wahid’s broken promise and as the 
victim of intimidatory terror by Wahid supporters after the case’s disclosure. 
Consequently, the report stresses that there was no political motive on Aryanti’s 
behalf. Instead, Aryanti’s decision to publicly reveal details of the scandal involving 
someone as important as the president was not because she wanted to be famous or 
to make money, but was based on noble motivations. 
 
Explaining Panji Masyarakat coverage 
After Gatra, Panji Masyarakat was the second magazine to publish on the affair. Panji 
Masyarakat started as an Islamic magazine in 1959, but following a change of 
ownership in 1997, became a general news magazine.241 Panji Masyarakat was one of 
                                                          
240 ‘Dia bilang sudah nikah’. 
241 Panji Masyarakat was founded by Muslim scholar and former chairman of the Indonesian Ulema’s 
Council (MUI) Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka). It first appeared in 1959 and remained under 
the Hamka’s family control until it stopped publication in March 1996. Following a one year hiatus, the 
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the most anti-Wahid magazines (Coppel, 12 November 2000) and had been 
particularly negative towards the president during 2000 (Asmarani, 12 November 
2000). Panji Masyarakat’s ownership was close to Wahid’s political opponents: poros 
tengah and Golkar (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). More specifically, Panji Masyarakat was 
associated with the Islamic political alliance of poros tengah, being co-owned by 
Golkar executive member Fahmi Idris and PAN legislator Fuad Bawazier who 
happened to have been a Minister of Finance under President Suharto. He was also 
mentioned as one of the most important civilian donors financing Laskar Jihad,242 
one of the major Islamic militia groups responsible for the escalation of the 
Moluccan conflict (Kingsbury 2005: 128; Noorhaidi 2005: 128).243 
Some media also accused Fuad Bawazier of being behind the scandal’s 
disclosure (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). However, by explaining that “Fuad’s interest in 
Panji was purely business and that he never interfered in the magazine’s editorial 
content” (Pit Chen Low 2003: 32), Panji Masyarakat’s chief editor Uni Z. Lubis 
rejected those allegations as well as suspicions that the magazine had received 
bribes from some members of the political elite to exaggerate the case or that the 
magazine was used by poros tengah as a political tool to damage President Wahid’s 
reputation (The Jakarta Post, 10 October 2000, Koridor.com, 30 August 2000). 
Panji’s decision to publish the story was preceded by deliberations among 
the editors. First, they considered that news on infidelity could lower Panji 
                                                                                                                                                                    
magazine reappeared under the new management of PT Panji Media Nusantara. The change of 
ownership also involved a change in orientation. In order to reach a larger audience the magazine no 
longer focused its coverage on Islamic oriented news but became a general news magazine (The 
Jakarta Post, 5 January 2000; The Jakarta Post, 1 August 2011). 
242 In April 2000, Laskar Jihad leader Jafar Umar Thalib, stated in an Panji Masyarakat interview that 
Laskar Jihad wanted to remove Wahid (Panji Masyarakat, 26 April 2000). 
243 On the Moluccan conflict see, for example, Van Klinken 2007; Bräuchler 2003.  
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Masyarakat’s prestige and cheapen its reputation. Second, there might become 
subject to a physical threat in the form of an office occupation by NU Banser as 
experienced by the Jawa Pos. Third, previously such issues of personal morality were 
not considered explicitly when covering the election or appointment of a president 
(Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). However, as emphasised by Uni Z. Lubis, those concerns 
were overridden by the story’s high news value (that is, the involvement of a 
leading public figure) and the existence of factual evidence in the form of Aryanti’s 
confession (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001; Koridor.com, 30 August 2000). 
Initially, Panji Masyarakat had planned to publish on the affair earlier. By 21 
August 2000 Panji Masyarakat had already conducted interviews with Yannur and 
Aryanti as well as collected comprehensive material. However, following Aryanti’s 
request to postpone the publication244 and the wish to give Wahid more time to 
respond to their request for confirmation, Uni Z Lubis decided not to publish the 
report in its 24 August 2000 edition (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). However, Panji 
Masyarakat did expose the issue on its website (26 August 2000) – albeit disguising 
Wahid’s name by only identifying him as a senior government official called ‘Cak’245 
(Gatra, 28 August 2000; Qodari 2001: 91). 
  
                                                          
244 Shortly before Panji Masyarakat’s Tuesday deadline Aryanti reportedly called Uni Z. Lubis 
requesting in tears that the article be postponed as her son had just returned from being kidnapped by 
an unknown person for 24hours (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). 
245 Javanese for older brother, respectful title.   
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3.2.3 Forum Keadilan 
Forum Keadilan’s (10 September 2000) main cover headline ‘Aryanti: Deliberately 
insulting the President?’246 questions Aryanti’s motives. Its report on Aryantigate 
consisted of four articles spread over six pages. In contrast to the two other 
magazines that appeared earlier, Forum Keadilan framed the scandal from a legal 
angle. Its main report discusses the legal implications of Aryanti’s allegation, more 
precisely, whether she could be accused of insulting the President.247 The report’s 
legal assessment suggests that Aryanti and Yannur could be accused of libel and 
defamation towards the president. The report does not discuss whether Wahid 
could face any legal implications, if he was found to have promised to marry 
Aryanti but did not do so. Forum Keadilan also discusses the possible legal 
implications for Gatra of publishing details of the affair. 
Forum Keadialan creates the impression that Aryanti’s allegations were true.  
By presenting sources who claimed they could confirm the photo’s authenticity 
Forum Keadialan conveys to the reader that the story of a relationship between 
Wahid and Aryanti was true. This is done by, first, a comparison of the photo of 
Wahid and Aryanti with a photo of the hotel room where the portrait was allegedly 
taken and a comment from the hotel’s room boy who claims to have taken a photo 
of Wahid and ‘a woman’ in that room; second, interviewing a multimedia specialist 
who confirms the photo’s authenticity. However, this is contrasted with comments 
from an NU and PKB source who judged the allegations of the affair to be slander or 
                                                          
246 ‘Aryanti: Sengaja menghina Presiden?’. 
247 Writing the article from this angle was only possible since Forum Keadilan published later than Gatra 
and Panji Masyarakat. In so doing, Forum Keadilan had more information than the two other magazines, 
namely that the police were planning to investigate Aryanti’s accusation. 
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cheap gossip, and an interview with a NU ulama (Muslim scholar) who doubts the 
story’s authenticity and suspects it is a means to discredit Wahid. By heading the 
two-page interview with Aryanti Sitepu ‘I am also experiencing mental distress'248, 
Forum Keadialan points to the impact of the scandal on Aryanti. Being asked during 
the interview with Forum Keadilan whether she had been paid for her confession, 
Aryanti denied the accusation and rejected any other motives other than revealing 
the truth. The report concludes with an article that discusses the act of adultery from 
the perspective of Islamic law. Thus, Forum Keadilan provided the most impartial 
coverage of Aryantigate among the three magazines under scrutiny. 
 
 
Explaining Forum Keadilan’s coverage 
Forum Keadilan was established in 1988 by Yayasan Keadilan, “a foundation 
involving senior figures in the Attorney-General's Office” (Sen and Hill 2007: 59-60). 
It is a law and justice magazine (PWI 2008) that primarily covers the connection 
between legal issues and politics (Asmarani, 12 November 2000). In 1991 it came 
under the management of Graffiti Press, publisher of Tempo magazine. From this 
cooperation PT Mandiri Forum Adil was born and became the new management 
company for the magazine. The stock holdings were as follows: Yayasan Keadilan 
and Grafiti Pers owned 40 per cent respectively, and the rest was held by Forum 
Keadilan’s employees. In fact, when Tempo was banned in 1994, Forum Keadilan 
managed to take its role as the leading mainstream critical newsweekly (PWI 2008). 
Three years later, however, “Grafiti was forced to relinquish its share of Forum to 
                                                          
248 ‘Saya juga mengalami tekanan mental’. 
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PT Larsa, owned by Rahmat Ismail, a businessman from the Bukaka Group, 
considered close to Habibie" (Sen and Hill 2007: 60) and Golkar (Kingsbury 2005: 
128).  
Initially, Forum Keadilan’s chief editor Noorca M. Massardi did not want to 
report on the Aryanti affair. He considered the alleged infidelity to be private and 
suspected behind it “low, vulgar, inelegant politics, to bring down the president”249 
(Hartoyo, 2 April 2001).While contemplating the alleged affair Forum Keadilan’s chief 
editor considered both the impact of the news upon Yannur and Aryanti (i.e 
whether they could, for example, be accused of insulting the President), and the 
consequences for the media publishing the story. Those considerations ultimately 
triggered him to report on the alleged infidelity from a legal angle. However, the 
report did not boost Forum Keadilan’s circulation (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). 
Forum Keadilan wrote “The story of Aryanti-Wahid was first reported by 
Gatra magazine, issue September 2, a few days after businessman Bob Hasan, one of 
the financiers of the magazine, was put under house arrest by the attorney 
general.”250 In so doing Forum Keadilan created the impression that Gatra broke the 
affair as a kind of counter attack in response to the attorney general’s ruling to put 
its owner Bob Hasan under house arrest. Of course, it could also be that Forum 
Keadilan only wanted to provide background information to the reader. 
  
                                                          
249 “Itu kan cara berpolitik yang rendah dan vulgar, tidak elegan, untuk menjatuhkan presiden”. 
250 “Kisah Aryanti-Gus Dur itu pertama kali dilansir Majalah Gatra, edisi 2 September lalu, beberapa 
hari setelah pengusaha Bob Hasan, salah seorang pemodal majalah itu, dibubah statusnya menjadi 
tahanan rumah oleh Kejaksaan Agung”. 
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3.2.4 Tempo  
Tempo did not run the story of the President's alleged affair with Aryanti. According 
to its chief editor Bambang Harymurti, Tempo heard about the alleged affair during 
the MPR’s annual session but decided not to publish the story at that time due to the 
following considerations: The alleged incident took place five years previously and 
had nothing to do with Wahid’s capacity as President. Furthermore, “[a]s a kyai 
(religious scholar), Abdurrahman never preached or stated his opposition to 
polygamy, and he is not a hypocrite” (The Jakarta Post, 23 September 2000). 
Additionally, the motive behind the case was unclear and there were claims that 
Aryanti had been paid to reveal the affair. Overall, the issue was deemed not to be 
of public interest and to be more suited to sensationalist media or the so-called 
‘yellow press’. Tempo did not want to compromise its credibility and reputation by 
reporting rumour or being used in the interests of certain parties attempting to 
blackmail Wahid (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001). However, according to Harymurti, Tempo 
did not categorically exclude publishing information on the alleged affair. Rather it 
did not want to publish at the first opportunity. He therefore ordered journalists to 
keep track of the story by collecting information and conducting interviews with 
impartial sources in case the story continued to unfold. Harymurti argued that 
Tempo would have taken a different view if Aryanti had been kidnapped, if the issue 
went to court, or if the DPR summoned the president. If this had been the case the 
story would warrant public discussion and coverage by Tempo (Hartoyo, 2 April 
2001). In editorial meetings, Tempo’s executive editor Toriq Hadad strongly opposed 
the publication of the news on the alleged affair in order to avoid Tempo being 
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regarded as a political tool of anti-Wahid forces (Hartoyo, 2 April 2001; Detikcom, 8 
September 2000b). 
In this context it should also be mentioned that Wahyu Muryadi, 
presidential protocol bureau chief under Wahid and former managing editor of 
Tempo, doubted the compromising photo’s authenticity and commented on Gatra’s 
report as follows: "It's not news, it is just rumor; cheap gossip which is meant to 
humiliate the President" (The Jakarta Post, 29 August 2000b). 
The example of Aryantigate illustrates that the media adopted principles of 
press freedom and journalistic ethics to justify their decision on whether or not to 
publish on the alleged affair. Although the editors of the magazines that published 
the story explicitly or implicitly admitted that profit-making played a role, none of 
them admitted that other factors like ownership or ideology might have influenced 
their respective coverage of Aryantigate. However, in the case of Aryantigate the 
media’s opportunities to promote their interests were limited by the fact that there 
was not much interest from Wahid’s political opponents in the case and thus not 




The analysis in this chapter has shown that all the newspapers under scrutiny saw 
themselves as the Fourth Estate. By emphasising their check-and-balance role of 
keeping the government – particularly the President – accountable for their actions 
Media Indonesia, Kompas, and Republika showed their commitment to reformasi. 
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However, as the editorial analysis has shown, the three newspapers took a different 
position on Buloggate and on Wahid’s involvement in the scandal. 
Republika’s anti-Wahid stance can be explained by the newspaper’s 
ideological affiliation with ICMI, its association with those critical and opposed to 
Wahid, namely Amien Rais, the Central Axis, and Wahid’s personal differences 
with Republika’s former chief editor Parni Hadi. 
The interests of Media Indonesia and Kompas in Buloggate – beyond fulfilling 
their watchdog role – are less salient. Even though Media Indonesia is owned by 
Surya Paloh, a senior Golkar politician with excellent relationships to the former 
New Order elite, the newspaper – albeit critical of Wahid’s involvement in 
Buloggate – did not push for Wahid’s impeachment over Buloggate nor did it align 
itself with the DPR. Instead, it rather sees the inquiry into Buloggate as one of the 
DPR’s manoeuvres in its conflict with the President and calls upon both institutions 
to overcome their power struggle in order to focus on reform. The example of Media 
Indonesia’s editorial position in Buloggate indicates that Surya Paloh, despite his 
political and personal affiliations with the New Order elite, did not utilize Media 
Indonesia’s editorial voice to attack Wahid through Buloggate. 
Kompas’ sympathy towards President Wahid is based on economic and 
ideological considerations. Namely, concerns that Wahid’s resignation could lead to 
national unrest and an economic downturn, which would also have an impact on 
the Gramedia Group’s business interests, that are not limited to profit maximisation 
but also include the responsibility to preserve jobs. Indeed, in Jakob Oetama’s view 
“business is also a mission of enlightenment and humanity, not merely to collect 
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profits indiscriminately.”251 Ideologically, Jakob Oetama and Wahid shared the ideal 
of religious pluralism, and as a Catholic newspaper Kompas had an interest in 
keeping a pluralist president in office. 
With regard to Aryantigate the very decision whether or not to publish on 
the alleged affair has been influenced by ownership and political affiliation. Indeed, 
all the three magazines that were more or less affiliated with Wahid’s opponents, 
did publish on the scandal – even though their coverage was significantly different 
– whereas Tempo did not. Tempo, whose former managing editor, Wahyu Muryadi, 
was Wahid’s Presidential Protocol bureau chief at the time the scandal broke, was 
nonetheless independent of any political grouping.  
In sum, this chapter has shown that the media’s contrasting positions in both 
scandals, particularly in the context of Buloggate, were influenced by professional 
journlastic considerations as well as the ideological affiliations and politico-
economic interests of their respective owners or editors. Having discussed media-
elite interactions in the context of Bulog- and Aryantigate, the next chapter moves 
on to the second case study: Centurygate. 
  
                                                          
251 “berbisnis juga membawa misi pencerahan dan kemanusiaan, tidak melulu mengumpulkan 
keuntungan tanpa pandang bulu” (Kompas.com, 28 September 2015). 
178 
4 Elite-Media interaction during the Bank Century scandal 
 
Introduction 
This chapter interrogates how those actors and institutions playing a decisive role in 
the Bank Century scandal interacted with the media. ‘Centurygate’ centers on the 
controversial government bailout of the privately owned Bank Century that 
involved high ranking government officials and allegations that some bailout funds 
were channeled to President Yudhoyono’s 2009 re-election campaign. While the 
government argued that the bailout was necessary in order to save the national 
economy amid the 2008 global financial crisis, some legislators raised doubts about 
the government’s assertions and questioned why the bailout costs rose to Rp 6.7 
trillion, a far larger sum than initially approved by parliament. 
It is argued that the Bank Century scandal is an expression of an intra-elite 
power struggle over issues of economic policy making, access to political resources, 
personal animosities, and ideology. This chapter examines how those members of 
the political elite unhappy with the 2009 election outcome exploited the scandal, 
utilizing the media in conjunction with parliament to destabilize the Yudhoyono 
government through allegations of government misconduct in the bailout. The 
exposure of the scandal only four weeks after Yudhoyono’s re-election was an 
opportunity for those who saw their patronage networks and entrenched elite 
interests threatened by a continuation of Yudhoyono’s reform agenda, particularly 
in respect to bureaucratic reform and corruption eradication measures. 
Cast as an effort to promote good governance and transparency, a highly 
publicised parliamentary inquiry into the bailout rather served as a vehicle for 
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legislators to undermine the newly established government and to promote their 
political parties’ agenda. This became particularly evident when legislators began to 
attack well respected reformers Vice-President Boediono and Finance Minister Sri 
Mulyani, both of whom had played a key role in authorising the bailout, with 
publicly voiced allegations of misconduct and repeated calls for their resignation. 
Using the parliament as a platform the Islamic coalition parties PAN, PKS and PPP 
mainly aimed to replace Boediono with one of their party members. Coalition 
partner Golkar instead sought to oust Sri Mulyani, who had become a threat to the 
business interests of its chairman, Aburizal Bakrie. For the opposition parties (PDI-
P, Hanura and Gerindra) the scandal provided an opportunity to erode the 
government’s credibility in combating corruption (Lübke 2010: 85). 
This chapter establishes that this coalition of vested interests was more 
successful in utilizing the media to their advantage than were government actors. 
This is partly due to the fact that the media shared the parliament’s watchdog 
function in investigating alleged government misconduct and thus had professional 
incentives to report on the scandal and focus their attention on those government 
actors who had played key roles in authorizing the controversial bailout. This, in 
addition to the fact that those two television stations that broadcasted live from the 
parliamentary hearings were owned by senior Golkar politicians faulting the 
bailout, limited the opportunities of government actors and institutions to engage 
positively with the media.252 
This chapter is divided in four parts. Following this introduction, section 4.1 
provides a summary of the Bank Century scandal. This section explains how 
                                                          
252 MetroTV is owned by Surya Paloh and TVOne by Aburizal Bakrie.  
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Centurygate is rooted in, and an expression of, intra-elite power struggles between 
those promoting reform in an effort to put an end to Suharto-style KKN and those 
resisting it. It argues the Bank Century scandal is related to struggles and alliances 
evident through the political jockeying before and after the 2009 election. Section 4.2 
focuses on how elite members, more specifically legislators critical of the bailout, 
utilized the media to turn the controversy over the Bank Century bailout into a 
fully-fledged scandal. A milestone in this process was the establishment of a 
parliamentary inquiry that generated continuing news coverage of the scandal and 
kept those alleged of wrongdoing in the media spotlight. The last section focuses on 
how those either directly or indirectly implicated in the Bank Century scandal 
utilized the media to justify the bailout and defend themselves. 
 
 
4.1 Centurygate: Development and background 
Scandal overview 
In 2004 Bank Century was created by a merger of three ailing banks, Bank Century 
Intervest Corporation (Bank CIC), Bank Danpac and Bank Pikko. Following Bank 
Century’s liquidity difficulties in late 2008, the Indonesian Central Bank (Bank 
Indonesia, BI) governor Boediono identified Bank Century as a failed bank and 
asked the Financial System Stability Committee (Komite Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan, 
KSSK) to decide on the bank’s fate. The KSSK meeting, chaired by Finance Minister 
Sri Mulyani, took place on the night of 20 to 21 November 2008 and resulted in the 
decision to bailout Bank Century. This decision was based on the assumption that 
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the bank’s closure during the prevailing global financial crisis would have a 
systemic impact on the financial sector. Furthermore, the cost of Bank Century’s 
takeover by the government was estimated to be less than the cost of the bank’s 
collapse.253 Shortly after the meeting, Bank Century’s management was taken over 
by Indonesia’s Deposit Insurance Corporation (Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan, LPS), 
and Robert Tantular, Bank Century’s major shareholder, was arrested over fraud 
allegations (Asia Times, 17 September 2009). During the following months LPS 
provided capital injections amounting to Rp 6.7 trillion into Bank Century – an 
amount significantly higher than the initially anticipated bailout cost of Rp 632 
billion. 
However, it was not until late August 2009 that legislators started 
questioning why the initially anticipated cost of Rp 632 billion increased to Rp 6.7 
trillion. According to newspaper reports, the DPR had only agreed upon Rp1.3 
trillion to rescue Bank Century and had not been informed by the LPS during a joint 
meeting on 26 February 2009 that the disbursements into Bank Century had already 
reached Rp 6.1 trillion by that time (Rakyat Merdeka, 26 August 2009). In order to 
clarify the huge bailout funds the DPR’s Commission XI, which oversees financial 
affairs, summoned Bank Indonesia, the Finance Ministry and the LPS on 27 August 
2009. Besides querying the bailout costs, legislators also questioned the legalities of 
the infusions in February and July 2009, noting that they were paid after the DPR 
had rejected the government’s draft for the financial safety net law, a planned law to 
legitimize such actions. However, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani explained that the 
government decided to bail out Bank Century because its collapse could have 
                                                          
253 Rp 632 billion vs Rp 5.5 trillion (KSSK, 21 November 2008).   
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resulted in a systemic risk to the banking sector. Sri Mulyani also disclosed a 
chronology of the LPS disbursements to Bank Century that amounted to a capital 
injection of Rp 6.7 trillion. It was only then that information on the bailout became 
widely disseminated. Being unsatisfied by the government’s explanation, the 
legislators called for further investigation into the bailout. The parliament then 
asked the Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, BPK) to audit the 
bailout process (BPK RI, 15 September 2009).254 
Meanwhile, the case escalated due to media reports that the decision to 
rescue Bank Century had been made in order to salvage funds belonging to high-
profile, well-connected people, and allegations that the bailout had served the 
interests of Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) during the 2009 
election campaign.255 When the BPK audit revealed irregularities and indications of 
legal violations in the bailout process, opposition parties and government coalition 
partner Golkar proposed a parliamentary inquiry into the case.256 
While initially established to trace the flow of bailout funds the inquiry 
shifted its focus to the legality of the bailout decision. During the three-month 
inquiry, the majority of political parties voiced fierce opposition to the government's 
bailout decision, targeting Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Vice-
President Boediono who, in their respective roles as KSSK chair and Bank Indonesia 
                                                          
254 Prior to that, on 5 June 2009, the KPK had already requested the BPK to investigate Bank Century. 
However, due to Bank Indonesia’s resistance the BPK only started its preliminary investigation on 26 
August 2009. The BPK received the DPR’s request for an investigative audit of Bank Century on 1 
September 2009 (BPK RI, 15 September 2009). 
255 See for example: The Jakarta Post, 1 September 2009; The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2009; Lübke 
2010: 81-2. 
256 The BPK audit investigation report was crucial because now not only rumours but proven 
irregularities justified a further investigation into the case. 
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governor, had authorized the bailout, by launching vague corruption allegations 
against them. Eventually, the special inquiry committee (Panitia Khusus Hak 
Angket, Pansus) proposed two conflicting recommendations to the DPR: one that 
faulted the bailout (Option C) and one that justified it (Option A).257 Of the 537 
legislators attending the DPR’s plenary session on 3 March 2010, 325 voted for the 
Option C and 212 for Option A.258 This meant that the majority of DPR members, 
including legislators from government coalition parties (Golkar, PKS, and PPP), 
condemned the government’s decision to bailout Bank Century and recommended 
further legal measures against those alleged of wrongdoing. 
The DPR’s recommendations, however, had no legal impact on the status of 
Sri Mulyani and Boediono since none of the official legal and prosecutorial 
institutions had yet found evidence implicating them in corruption  (Castle and 
Manuwoto 2011: 60). Furthermore, President Yudhoyono expressed his confidence 
in Sri Mulyani and Boediono. Several legislators nevertheless kept demanding Sri 
Mulyani’s resignation and continued to harass her by, for example, disrupting 
legislative hearings involving her and using the discovery of a syndicate of corrupt 
tax officials in the tax department against her. Eventually, on 5 May 2010, Sri 
Mulyani resigned to join the World Bank.259 Soon afterwards President Yudhoyono’s 
cabinet was restructured with the formation of a ‘joint secretariat’ (Sekretariat 
Gabungan, Setgab) of coalition parties. Though officially chaired by Yudhoyono, the 
secretariat was managed by Golkar chairman Aburizal Bakrie and thus widely 
considered a concession to Golkar. 
                                                          
257 For details on the content of the two proposed options see: Koran Tempo, 3 March 2010. 
258 For a split-up on the parliamentary vote on the Bank Century bailout see: Lübke 2010: 83 (Table 2). 
259
 For interpretations of the exact circumstances of Sri Mulyani’s resignations see Tomsa 2010b: 313. 
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A coincidence of media and elite interests 
How did the Bank Century bailout become defined as a scandal? What are the 
factors that guaranteed ongoing media attention? Initially, as an economic issue, the 
Bank Century bailout did not receive much attention. The majority of media reports 
on Bank Century centred on the bank's mismanagement and financial crimes 
conducted by the bank’s owners as well as on the capture and trial of Bank 
Century's largest shareholder, Robert Tantular.260 Even though media reports that 
the DPR wanted to call KSSK and Bank Indonesia to account for the bailout 
disbursements had already circulated in July 2009,261 it was only after the meeting in 
parliament on 27 August 2009 when Commission XI criticised the government over 
the lack of transparency in disclosing the cost of the bailout that the issue was 
covered on newspaper front pages for several consecutive days and became known 
as ‘Centurygate’.262 
This means that the Bank Century bailout was turned into a scandal by 
legislators who suddenly started questioning the government as to why the cost to 
bail out Bank Century had increased from Rp 1.3 trillion to Rp 6.7 trillion without 
the parliament’s approval (The Jakarta Globe, 27 August 2009). The media neither 
uncovered the story nor initiated coverage. The media coverage of the Bank Century 
scandal began with the reporting of information which came through routine 
channels and was simultaneously available to a number of media outlets which 
                                                          
260 In September 2009 Robert Tantular was convicted of banking fraud and sentenced to jail (The 
Jakarta Globe, 10 September 2009). 
261 For example: Koran Tempo, 3 July 2009; Media Indonesia, 29 July 2009; Kompas, 29 July 2009; Koran 
Tempo, 29 July 2009. All three newspapers covered the issue in their business section. 
262 See for example, Media Indonesia (31 August-5 September 2009); The Jakarta Post (1-9 September 
2009); Kompas (28 August-5 September 2009); Republika (28 August-5 September 2009); Rakyat 
Merdeka (26 August-2 September 2009). 
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have their ‘parliamentary beat’ reporters. From its beginning the Bank Century case 
was of sufficiently high news value – the alleged misuse of public funds, the 
involvement of high-profile officials, and the fact that the issue was discussed in 
parliament – that the media could seemingly not ignore the story. 
The involvement of Sri Mulyani and Boediono in the scandal as well as 
rumours that some of the bailout funds had been channelled to Yudhoyono’s 
election campaign increased the media’s interest in the scandal. Following Waisbord 
(2004: 1076), “[s]candals originate in the publication of information that contradicts 
what is publicly known about certain individuals and institutions”. This is 
particularly important for the persons who were at the centre of the Bank Century 
scandal, namely Boediono and Sri Mulyani, who were widely perceived as highly 
qualified and experienced economists in public service. Both had impeccably clean 
track records, international reputations, and were widely respected for their success 
in reducing opportunities and incentives for corruption during their respective 
ministerial terms.263 In particular, Sri Mulyani was widely known as an anti-
corruption and reform champion due to her reform of the tax and customs office in 
her role as Finance Minister under Yudhoyono’s first administration (The Age, 5 
August 2009).264 Others, for example bureaucrats within the Finance Ministry as well 
as businessmen and politicians who had profited from the status quo, saw their 
interests endangered by Sri Mulyani’s ruthless implementation of the government’s 
reform program. 
                                                          
263 Boediono had been Finance Minister under President Megawati (2001-2004). 
264 For further details on Sri Mulyani’s reforms in the Finance Ministry see McLeod 2008: 197-201; 
Majeed 2012; LaForge 2016. From Sri Mulyani’s perspective on the reforms and the challenges of their 
implication see Indrawati, 14 July 2009; Indrawati, 29 March 2012. 
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As pointed out by Bubandt (2014: 33), the Bank Century case was 
particularly sensitive and complex because it raised the probability “that the two 
most prominent reformers of the government were actually ‘vampires’ leaching on 
state funds (as protestors repeatedly pictured Vice-President Boediono and Minister 
of Finance Sri Mulyani); or that the President's election on an anti-corruption 
platform was, in reality, funded through corruption”. Thus, the actual motives that 
prompted newspapers and newscasts to follow the scandal lay in the media’s self-
perception as public watchdog. 
However, the media, particularly television, were also driven by economic 
interests and treated the case as a commodity (Paok 2012: xxv; Heryanto 2010). 
News coverage of the Bank Century scandal was very popular and received high 
audience ratings.265 This attracted advertisers and generated profit for media 
organisations in turn. Thus, the profit orientation was definitely a factor that 
encouraged TV stations to broadcast on the Bank Century case and in so doing keep 
the scandal alive.266 Additionally, Indonesia’s two national news channels were 
owned by Golkar senior politicians who had their own agenda in the scandal. 
Conducive to the scandal’s occurrence and sustainability was that, in 
addition to the media, political parties from within and outside of the government 
coalition also had an interest in seeing the scandal escalate that went beyond their 
“professional incentives to investigate and publicize alleged misconduct by the 
president and his administration” (Nyhan 2015: 438). The involvement of vested 
political interests in the Bank Century scandal was crucial because it affected both 
                                                          
265 Shanti Ruwyastuti, Deputy News Director, MetroTV during a Q&A session in the context of an open 
forum held by The United States-Indonesia Society (USINDOBrief, 31 March 2010). 
266 Interview with Rojes Saragih, producer, TV One, Jakarta, 14 June 2010. 
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whether media attention could be sustained and influenced the direction in which 
the scandal developed. The Bank Century bailout gained intensive news attention 
because it could be given a political focus and it was within various political parties’ 
interests to see it escalate. As pointed out by Patunru and von Lübke (2010: 12): 
For the Islamic parties (PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB), who were unhappy with 
SBY’s choice of the technocrat Boediono as his vice-presidential running mate, 
the case provided a useful platform from which to press for his replacement. 
For the opposition parties (PDI-P, Hanura and Gerindra), the parliamentary 
inquiry offered an opportunity to undermine the government’s anti-corruption 
image. And for Golkar, which remained a somewhat reluctant coalition partner 
at best, it provided a possible means to unseat Mulyani, who had become 
persona non grata for the party’s chair, Aburizal Bakrie. 
 
This coincidence of interests between the political elite and the media over the Bank 
Century case was essential for transforming the controversial bailout into a scandal 
and crucial for its perpetuation after its initial disclosure (Nyhan 2015; Tiffen 1999: 
48). Those members of the elite who had an interest in seeing the Bank Century 
scandal escalating utilized this coincidence of interests to their advantage. The 
media, even though promoting a thorough investigation into the bailout and 
supporting the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry as a means to do so, also 
scrutinized the various political parties’ interests in the scandal and raised doubts 
about their rhetoric that they were merely performing their oversight function 
through parliament.267 
                                                          
267 See chapter five. 
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Before elaborating on how the elite utilized the media the following section 
explains how the Bank Century scandal is rooted in, and an expression of, intra-elite 
power struggles before and after the 2009 national elections. 
 
Centurygate: An intra-elite power struggle 
In going beyond media coverage and addressing the politics that generate events for 
media coverage, this subchapter aims to show that the Bank Century scandal was 
triggered because it served particular interests in the struggle for power (Esser and 
Hartung 2004: 1066). For those unhappy with the 2009 election outcome and 
Yudhoyono’s choice of cabinet the controversy surrounding the Bank Century 
bailout provided an opportunity to attack Boediono and Sri Mulyani (Patunru and 
von Lübke 2010: 7) and “to undermine the government’s anti-corruption image” 
(Patunru and von Lübke 2010: 12). From the very beginning there were concerns 
that the Bank Century scandal was aimed at Sri Mulyani to prevent her from being 
re-appointed Finance Minister. Sri Mulyani, reportedly unpopular in business 
circles because of her reformist anti-corruption policies at the tax and customs 
offices (The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2009; ABC, 28 October 2008), not only had a 
number of policy disagreements with Golkar’s chairman Aburizal Bakrie but also 
had tense relationships with PDI-P and PKS (Tempo, 10 May 2010). However, in 
order to comprehend the root cause of the Bank Century scandal it is necessary to 
review Yudhoyono’s first administration (2004-2009). 
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The roots of this intra-elite struggle: Yudhoyono’s first term (2004-2009) 
Among other things, the Bank Century scandal exemplifies intra-elite struggles 
between market-oriented technocrats and those opposing it due a preference for 
“[p]opulism – in Indonesia usually referring to economic nationalism, i.e. 
protectionism for pribumi” (Chua 2008: 96). This conflict became obvious in the 
economic team of Yudhoyono’s first administration, in particular between 
technocrats Sri Mulyani and Boediono on the one hand versus indigenous politico-
businessmen Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie on the other (Asia Times, 12 May 
2007; Asia Times, 4 August 2007). President Yudhoyono was caught between those 
forces. Whereas he needed Boediono and Sri Mulyani to bolster his international 
reputation and achieve more effective national economic policies, he had needed 
Bakrie to finance his 2004 presidential election campaign and Kalla as vice-
presidential candidate to secure Golkar’s support.268 
Yudhoyono had won his 2004 presidency on an anti-corruption platform 
and the promise of better governance. However, his Democratic Party controlled 
less than 10 per cent of the parliamentary seats. In order to reach a stable 
parliamentary majority President Yudhoyono had to make concessions in the 
selection of his ministers. The PKS’s threat to withdraw its support if he picked ‘pro-
IMF’ candidates for the key positions in the economics team prevented Sri Mulyani, 
who at that time held an executive position in the IMF, becoming either 
                                                          
268 In the beginning of his first term Yudhoyono could not rely on majority support in parliament. 
Golkar, the largest faction in parliament only moved away from its initial opposition to president 
Yudhoyono when Vice-President Jusuf Kalla became Golkar chairman in December 2004. Only then 
did the president gain a sufficient majority in the DPR (Ufen 2009: 166; Ziegenhain 2009: 39). Jusuf 
Kalla’s election a Golkar chairman strengthened the party’s strategic position in Indonesia’s political  
system (Tomsa 2009: 176) and secured it the benefits of governing, i.e. that is, ministerial posts (Ufen 
2009: 166-7). 
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Coordinating Minister for the Economy or Finance Minister (The Jakarta Post, 20 
October 2004).269 The appointment of Sri Mulyani as Finance Minister had also been 
opposed by Vice-President Kalla by reason of her closeness to the IMF (Liddle 2005: 
331). Furthermore, President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Kalla had reportedly 
made an agreement that Kalla would oversee economic policy making (Liddle 2005: 
328). Kalla’s control over economic management was achieved through appointing 
his close political associates Aburizal Bakrie and Jusuf Anwar, both members of 
Golkar, as Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Finance Minister 
respectively (Asia Times, 12 May 2007).270 Thus the economic policy-making process 
was dominated by Golkar and two of Indonesia’s most successful indigenous 
(pribumi) entrepreneurs, namely Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie (Hill and Shiraishi 
2007:130). 
Kalla’s control over economic management only weakened in December 
2005 following a cabinet reshuffle focusing on key economic posts. Among other 
factors, the reshuffle was a response to slow economic growth in 2005, unpopular 
decisions to increase domestic fuel prices, and “considerable unease in relation to 
possible conflicts of interest faced by the then Coordination Minister for Economic 
Affairs, Aburizal Bakrie, because of his extensive business operations” (Kuncoro 
and Resosudarmo 2006: 8). By shuffling Aburizal Bakrie and Jusuf Anwar out of 
their positions as Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance Minister, 
                                                          
269 Instead, she was appointed State Minister for National Development Planning and chairperson of 
the National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Bappenas) 
(The Jakarta Post, 20 October 2004). 
270 Tempo (17 November 2008) suggested that Bakrie’s financial support of the 2004 presidential 
campaign of Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla earned him the position of Coordinating Minister for 
economy in President Yudhoyono’s first cabinet.  
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and replacing them with Boediono and Sri Mulyani, Yudhoyono gained greater 
control over economic affairs and demonstrated his preference for liberal economic 
policy (Hill and Shiraishi 2007: 130) as well as his commitment to reform and 
corruption eradication. 
Consequently, the remainder of the term of Yudhoyono’s first Indonesian 
Cabinet was characterised by conflicts over economic policies between Sri Mulyani 
and Boediono on the one hand and Kalla’s camp, including Aburizal Bakrie who 
was given the post of the Coordinating Minister for Welfare instead of being 
removed from the cabinet in order to placate Kalla and Golkar, on the other. Sri 
Mulyani and Boediono, both technocrats and neither directly affiliated with any 
political party nor owning one of Indonesia’s top conglomerates, “have strongly 
argued that economic policymaking should be insulated from politics to ensure 
economic and financial stability” (Asia Times, 12 May 2007). This policy directly 
clashed with the interests of Kalla’s camp since “Kalla and Bakrie have been stung 
by media criticism of big state infrastructure contracts that their respective families' 
businesses have won through allegedly opaque bidding procedures” (Asia Times, 
12 May 2007). One case, the Jakarta monorail project brought Kalla – who was 
involved in the project through his business unit, PT Bukaka – into direct conflict 
with Mulyani and Boediono (Asia Times, 12 May 2007). Arguing that the project did 
not conform to existing regulations both technocrats refused to issue a government 
loan blanket guarantee for the project as demand by Kalla. Eventually President 
Yudhoyono stepped in by issuing a Presidential Decree on the provision of 
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government guarantees for the Jakarta Monorail Project (Tempo, 7 May 2007; Asia 
Times, 12 May 2007).271 
A helicopter deal through the Kalla family's Bukaka group led to another 
clash with Sri Mulyani. In 2006 as head of the National Disaster Management 
Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, 
Bakornas PB), Kalla ordered the purchase of 12 helicopters from Germany through a 
subsidiary of his family’s Bukaka group. In order to cover the purchase costs Kalla 
planned to lease the helicopters to Bakornas to fight forest fires. When the 
helicopters arrived, customs officials under Sri Mulyani's Ministry of Finance seized 
the shipment since Bukaka refused to pay the import tax of Rp 2.1 billion on the 
helicopters.272 
                                                          
271 The Jakarta Monorail was a projected monorail network in Jakarta. Construction began in 2004 after 
then-Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso had appointed PT Jakarta Monorail, a consortium of private investors, 
to develop the monorail project. The project, however, stalled over the issue of financial guarantees to 
secure overseas loans. The main financier behind the project, the Dubai Islamic Bank consortium, had 
requested such a guarantee from PT Jakarta Monorail (PT JM), the project developer (Tempo, 7 May 
2007; The Jakarta Post, 5 August 2006). Whereas Vice-President Kalla, whose business unit, PT Bukaka, 
was also among the companies involved in the project, favoured a government loan blanket guarantee 
to PT Jakarta Monorail, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani refused the request in August 2006. Sri Mulyani's 
decision was based on existing regulations – among others Presidential Regulation No. 67/2005 on 
public-private partnerships for the provision of infrastructure projects and the Finance Ministry 
Regulation No. 38/2006 on the control and management of infrastructure risks – stating that a 
government guarantee could only be given to developers appointed through a competitive bidding 
process/public tender, not based on direct appointment as in the case of PT Jakarta Monorail (The 
Australian Financial Review, 20 September 2006; The Jakarta Post, 6 November 2006). Kalla 
subsequently redirected the guarantee request to the Policy Committee for the Acceleration of 
Infrastructure Provision (Komite Kebijakan Percepatan Penyediaan Infrastruktur, KKPPI), that was 
chaired by Boediono, Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs. Arguing that the monorail project 
did not meet certain government-specified requirements, the KKPPI also refused to endorse the 
government guarantee. Being furious upon the KKPPI rejection Kalla blasted that the KKPPI’s job was 
to accelerate projects, not delay them. In subsequent meetings with Boediono and Mulyani, Kalla 
continued to push for a government financial guarantee. In December 2006 President Yudhoyono 
eventually issued Presidential Decree No. 103/2006 on the provision of government guarantees for the 
Jakarta Monorail Project (Tempo, 7-13 May 2007; Asia Times, 12 May 2007). 
272 For details see Tempo’s cover story ‘Kisruh Helikopter Kalla’, 26 March 2007. 
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As these conflicts have shown it was less the question of the preference for 
economic policies but issues of transparency and accountability, including 
adherence to existing rules and regulations, which were the issue of contention 
between Kalla and Sri Mulyani. 
 
Policy disagreements between Sri Mulyani and Aburizal Bakrie 
Having analysed the conflict over economic policies in Yudhoyono’s first 
administration the following section elaborates on the troubled relationship 
between Sri Mulyani and Aburizal Bakrie that became public during the course of 
the Bank Century scandal. The conflict between Sri Mulyani and Aburizal Bakrie 
developed over a series of issues. Sri Mulyani repeatedly stated that the Bakrie-
owned company PT Lapindo should take responsibility for the 2006 Sidoarjo 
mudflow disaster273 and opposed Bakrie’s wish to buy shares of PT Newmont Nusa 
Tenggara, one of the country’s largest gold mines, arguing that all of the company’s 
divestment shares should be bought by state companies (Tempo Interaktif, 5 May 
2010). Tensions further increased following Sri Mulyani’s issuance of travel bans on 
executives from Bakrie group companies accused of tax evasion. However, the 
biggest conflict arose in 2008 and was related to the trading suspension of shares in 
the Bakrie group-owned coal mining firm, PT Bumi Resources.274 
Amidst the global financial crisis in late 2008 the Indonesian stock market 
dropped by more than ten per cent and trading was suspended for three days to 
                                                          
273 The disaster is also known as Lapindo mudflow. For more details on the disaster see: Schiller, Lucas, 
and Sulistiyanto 2008; McMichael 2009. 
274 Bumi Resources accounts for 70 per cent of the Bakrie Group’s business (Forbes Asia, 22 December 
2008). 
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prevent further damage. The decline in the price of shares in Bakrie-owned 
companies (following rumours they were having trouble repaying debt) played a 
central role in the index's massive fall (The Jakarta Post, 9 October). After the 
Indonesian Stock Market resumed trading on 13 October, trading in shares of some 
major Bakrie –– owned companies (such as PT Bumi Resources, PT Energy Mega 
Persada, and PT Bakrie & Brothers) remained suspended. The suspension provided 
Bakrie with valuable time to arrange refinancing while containing nervous creditors 
(Davidson 2015: 172). The prolonged suspension of Bumi shares was controversial 
and accompanied by friction within Yudhoyono’s cabinet, particularly “between the 
old guard, patronage-driven forces of Bakrie and the clean and accountable ways of 
Indrawati, the reformer”, for there were suspicions that the government was using 
the suspension to help Bakrie to unload some of his company’s debt (The Jakarta 
Post, 13 October 2008) by allowing state-owned companies to purchase stakes in PT 
Bumi Resources (Witoelar, 20 October 2008). Sri Mulyani opposed the prolonged 
suspension of Bumi shares and the use of state funds to rescue the Bakrie group.275 
On 6 November 2008 the trading suspension of PT Bumi resources was lifted 
following intra-governmental bickering between Sri Mulyani who had ordered 
trading resumption and Yudhoyono, Kalla and State Enterprises Minister Sofyan 
Djalil who tried to overturn her decision. Sri Mulyani reportedly threatened to 
resign if Yudhoyono kept protecting the Bakrie group and undermining her 
authority (The Jakarta Post, 8 November 2008; Tempo, 17 November 2008). The 
                                                          
275 She made her standpoint clear by reportedly telling “Kadin, Indonesia's crony-heavy chamber of 
commerce” (Asiasentinel, 24 October 2008) during a speech "I am the Finance Minister. My job is to 
protect the state fund. Companies have a job to protect their own financial affairs. If they fail, it is their 
fault and they deserve to go bust” (The Jakarta Post, 22 October 2008). 
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resumption, that prompted a free fall of Bumi shares, contradicted the Bakrie 
company’s wish to maintain the trading suspension for an additional 21 to 28 days 
until a deal to sell a 35 per cent stake in PT Bumi Resources could be closed. 
As pointed out by Hal Hill (17 May 2010), “[t]he trading suspension of Bumi 
shares was highly politicized and had been the subject of a conflict of opinion 
between Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Aburizal Bakrie, and President 
Yudhoyono.” As later in the Bank Century case President Yudhoyono was caught 
between two antithetical forces personified in Sri Mulyani and Aburizal Bakrie. 
Aburizal Bakrie is a pribumi businessman linked to the New Order regime’s KKN-
culture. Sri Mulyani was a non-party technocrat, who stood for a ‘clean, 
accountable, transparent and efficient’ bureaucracy. Due to her widespread public 
national and international popularity as a crusading anti-corruption reformer, Sri 
Mulyani’s resignation during the height of the financial crisis would have had a 
negative impact on Indonesia’s economy and was thus something Yudhoyono 
sought to avoid. Aburizal Bakrie, on the other hand, was a senior Golkar politician 
and held a cabinet post as Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare and had 
financially supported Yudhoyono’s 2004 election campaign (The Jakarta Post, 16 
October 2008). 
 
After the 2009 elections 
As the winner of the 2009 elections the Democratic Party was the strongest political 
force in the parliament. Even more significant, by winning 26 per cent of 
parliamentary seats the Democratic Party met the minimal requirement to name its 
own presidential candidate pair (without having to collaborate with another 
196 
political party by giving them the vice-presidential post).276 This result enabled 
Yudhoyono to make Bank Indonesia governor Boediono his running mate, and to be 
independent of Golkar and outgoing Vice-President Kalla. However, Yudhoyono’s 
decision to partner with Boediono,277 was met with resistance by his coalition 
partners. Representatives of the Muslim Parties PKS, PPP and PAN all disapproved 
Boediono’s selection, rather than a choice of one of their own candidates278. They 
raised doubts of Boediono’s ability to represent Islam and argued that “Boediono's 
‘neo-liberal Western economic perspective’ was not suited for Indonesia's economic 
situation” (Asia Times, 11 June 2009). 
Following his re-election with more than 60 per cent of the vote Yudhoyono 
formed a coalition with Golkar, PKS, PKB, PAN and PPP. The three remaining 
parties – PDI-P, Hanura and Gerindra – made up the opposition. Accommodating 
the interests of six out of nine political parties the Second United Indonesia Cabinet 
(Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II) was dominated by political party officials. However, 
Yudhoyono’s subsequent retention of Finance Minister Sri Mulyani and Trade 
Minister Mari Pangestu, in addition to his selection of Boediono as vice-president, 
signalled a continuation of liberal economic policy making (Chandra 2011: 15) and 
re-affirmed the Yudhoyono administration’s “agenda of reforming the structure of 
government to eliminate the networks of patronage and corruption that have 
                                                          
276 Only parties, or a coalition of parties, that win at least 20 per cent of votes in the parliamentary 
election, or 25 per cent of the parliamentary seats, can nominate candidates for the presidential election 
(Law No. 42/2008). 
277 In 2008, Boediono, then Coordinating Minister for the Economy, had been elected Governor of the 
Indonesian Central Bank, Bank Indonesia by the DPR. This prompted him to step down as 
Coordinating Minister for the Economy. After he was selected by Yudhoyono as a running mate in the 
2009 presidential election, Boediono submitted his resignation from the central bank post. 
278 The PKS had proposed Hidayat Nur Wahid, the PPPAkbar Tandjung, and the PAN Hatta Radjasa. 
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dominated policy-making and the wider political culture” (Sherlock 2009: 18). 
Furthermore, by giving economic ministries to technocrats he cut off indigenous 
businessmen-turned-politicians who favoured “economic nationalism, i.e. 
protectionism in favour of pribumi” (Chua 2008: 96) from economic policy-making. 
Indeed, without Kalla as Vice-President and Bakrie in the cabinet following the 2009 
election both individuals and Golkar had lost access to resources. This was crucial 
since Kalla, during his vice-presidency, had a strong influence on economic policy 
and had also kept facilitating Bakrie's businesses, albeit facing a lot of opposition 
from Sri Mulyani (Rendi A. Witular279, interview, Jakarta 24 June 2009; The Jakarta 
Post, 31 August 2009). 
However, in October 2009 Bakrie regained power when he became chairman 
of Golkar, the second largest party in the DPR with 106 seats, and announced that 
Golkar, despite having joined the government coalition, would continue to criticise 
the government policies. Consequently, Golkar demanded the government 
investigate the bailout thoroughly (The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2009) and joined the 
opposition in their call for a parliamentary inquiry into the bailout only a few days 
after the inauguration of the new cabinet with Sri Mulyani as finance minister. In 
early November 2009 Yudhoyono reportedly tried to reconcile tensions between 
Bakrie and Mulyani which had intensified following “attempts by Mulyani to 
proceed with an investigation into alleged tax violations by Bakrie mining 
companies” (The Jakarta Post, 16 December 2009b). The meeting, however, ended in 
a deadlock and Golkar intensified its push for an inquiry. Thus, the controversy 
around Bank Century cannot be separated from the troubled relationship between 
                                                          
279 journalist, The Jakarta Post. 
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Mulyani and Bakrie and “the sharp rivalry between the group of Kalla and the 
Boediono camp, including Sri Mulyani”280 (Koran Tempo, 1 September 2009a). 
Indeed, as the following discussion will show, Kalla played a significant role in the 
scandal’s escalation by objecting to the government’s justification of the bailout. 
However, as discussed previously those with interests in escalating the Bank 
Century controversy to undermine the second Yudhoyono administration went 
beyond those of Golkar or its individual members. 
 
 
4.2 Keeping the scandal alive 
The following section discusses how the controversy around the bailout developed 
into a scandal and how elite members – particularly political parties from within 
and outside of the coalition – utilized the media to turn the controversy over the 
Bank Century bailout into a fully-fledged scandal. The most vocal critics in the Bank 
Century scandal were a mix of opposition and coalition parties who were less 
successful than the Democratic Party in the 2009 election and aimed to undermine 
the legitimacy of the government. Their motives were political, or in other words, 
their aim was to increase their power.281 
Comments by outgoing Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, who was also the last-
placed presidential candidate in the 2009 elections, immediately after the Bank 
                                                          
280 “persaingan sengit kelompok Jusuf Kalla dan kubu Boediono, termasuk di dalamnya Menteri 
Keuangan Sri Mulyani” (Koran Tempo, 1 September 2009a). 
281 Which meant here – as opposed to the Wahid case – not to overthrow the government but to gain 
better access to the government. Due to constitutional changes impeachment in 2009 was far more 
difficult than in 2001. For a detailed discussion on constitutional provisions on presidential 
impeachment see Butt and Lindsey 2011: 40-8. 
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Century scandal’s disclosure, heightened the controversy’s news value. During an 
impromptu press conference on the handling of the bailout Kalla fuelled the 
controversy by publicly stating: 
The matter of Bank Century, I say, is not a matter of the economic crisis, but is 
criminal. It is robbery because the owners of the bank were taking customers’ 
money . . . That is the weakness of BI’s supervision.282  
 
I say, the solution is not to bailout. The solution is to arrest this guy (the owner 
of Bank Century, Robert Tantular – Red) first for robbery . . .  But, Boediono 
said there was no legal basis. I was forced to take over. I immediately 
telephoned the Police to arrest Robert Tantular and the directors deemed 
responsible to prevent their escape.283 
 
In so doing, Kalla contradicted the government’s statement that justified the bailout 
by saying that there was a danger of a systemic impact should the government let 
Bank Century default. Furthermore, by accusing Bank Indonesia of weak 
supervision Kalla placed the blame for the bank’s failure on his successor Boediono 
who was the then Bank Indonesia governor (Koran Tempo, 1 September 2009b). 
Kalla, who was acting president at the time the decision to bail out Bank Century 
was taken, also publicly denied that he had prior knowledge of the bailout as 
claimed by Finance Minister Sri Mulyani.284 By further saying that, if he had known 
                                                          
282 “Soal Bank Century itu saya katakan bukan masalah krisis ekonomi, melainkan  kriminal. Itu 
perampokan karena pemilik bank ini mengambil uang nasabah . . . Itulah kelemahan pengawasan BI” 
(Media Indonesia, 1 September 2009).  
283 ''Saya bilang, penyelesaiannya bukan dengan bailout. Penyelesaiannya, ini orang (pemilik Bank 
Century, Robert Tantular – Red) harus ditangkap dulu karena perampokan . . . Tapi, Boediono bilang 
tidak ada dasar hukumnya. Terpaksa saya ambil alih. Saya langsung telepon Kapolri untuk tangkap 
Robert Tantular dan direksi yang bertanggung jawab agar tidak melarikan diri'' (Republika, 1 
September 2009). 
284 Sri Mulyani’s chronology of the bailout stated that she had met then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla on 
the 22 November 2008 to inform him about the bailout was publicly denied by Kalla. This gave him the 
opportunity to enter the controversy. By arguing that this meeting took place on the 25 November 
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about it beforehand he would not have approved it and by being the one who had 
initiated Robert Tantular’s arrest, Kalla avoided criticism. Kalla’s description of the 
Bank Century issue as a criminal case that caused losses to the state contributed to 
media publicity (Kompas.com, 31 August 2009; Koran Tempo, 2 September 2009) 
and provided the ammunition for legislators to attack the government. 
In addition to accusing the government, Bank Indonesia and the LPS of not 
having been transparent (The Jakarta Post, 28 August 2009), questioning the 
justification of a systemic threat, the legal grounds used for the bailout, and how the 
initially anticipated cost of Rp 632 billion could jump to Rp 6.7 trillion, legislators 
also started questioning the government’s motivation for the bailout decision. They 
raised suspicions that Bank Century was bailed out not in order to protect the 
national economy but to protect politically connected major depositors whose assets 
exceeded the maximum Rp 2 billion per individual guaranteed by the government 
(The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2009, Asia Times, 17 September 2009). In this context, 
members of the DPR’s Commission XI publicly stated that there were indications 
that big depositors, including some donors to Yudhoyono’s 2009 election campaign, 
might have forced Bank Indonesia to bailout Bank Century which in turn then had 
pressed the government to rescue Bank Century (The Jakarta Post, 2 September 
2009; The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2009; The Jakarta Post, 3 September 2009) This, 
in combination with allegations that bailout funds were channelled to finance 
certain political activities (Republika, 3 September 2009) or to party political 
activities (Republika, 5 September 2009), extended the Bank Century controversy to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2008, which was later confirmed by Sri Mulyani, Jusuf Kalla denied that he had prior knowledge of the 
bailout. 
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also implicate President Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party as well as giving rise 
to the belief that there was a conspiracy behind the decision to bailout Bank Century 
instead of letting it collapse. 
Leaking confidential information to the media or making statements that 
were directly addressed to harm particular actors were further strategies adopted by 
legislators to raise suspicion that there was something inappropriate with the 
bailout. PAN legislator Drajad Wibowo, for example, leaked to the media the 
minutes of the 21 November 2008 KSSK meeting, which was the last meeting before 
the decision to bailout Bank Century. Those minutes reveal that Bank Indonesia 
insisted on saving Bank Century and indicated that then Bank Indonesia governor, 
Boediono, apparently did not provide sufficient data to support the claim that Bank 
Century's collapse could lead to a systemic threat to the country's banking system 
(The Jakarta Post, 19 November 2009). 
In order to promote their parties’ political interest, legislators also used the 
media to create the impression that the government was hampering an investigation 
into the case. For example, following the Attorney General's Office statement in 
October 2009 that no unlawful act could be found in the disbursement of the Rp 6.7 
trillion bailout funds (Republika, 24 October 2009), some legislators raised concerns. 
PDI-P legislator Maruarar Sirait, for example, told the press he suspected the 
statement was an attempt to protect those who collectively made the decision to bail 
out Century, namely officials from the Finance Ministry, BI and LPS (The Jakarta 
Post, 27 October 2009). Former PAN legislator Drajad Wibowo interpreted the 
AGO’s statement as reflecting systemic efforts to terminate the case in the public 
interest (Detiknews, 26 October 2009). Although those efforts by individual 
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legislators to pursue the case were important, it was their lobbying for a 
parliamentary inquiry that secured ongoing media attention. 
 
Lobbying for a parliamentary inquiry: Team 9 
Behind the move to initiate a parliamentary inquiry into the Bank Century bailout 
was a group of nine legislators across all parliamentary factions, except 
Yudhoyono’s governing Democratic Party.285 They called themselves ‘Team 9 for the 
Truth’.286 
Encouraged by the BPK’s preliminary audit287 of the bailout – that had 
revealed a number of violations in the bailout and an indication of criminal conduct 
in the disbursement of bailout funds (Koran Tempo, 30 September 2009) – those 
nine legislators, who had only just met each other following the inauguration of the 
new legislature on 1 October 2009, initiated a petition for a parliamentary inquiry to 
be established, and distributed it among legislators (Soesatyo 2010: 38). The media 
followed up on the petition and kept the readership updated on its progress by 
announcing the number of legislators who had signed it.288 Thus the petition became 
                                                          
285 The members of Team 9 are: Maruarar Sirait (PDI-P), Bambang Soesatya (Golkar), Ahmad Muzani 
(Gerindra), Akbar Faisal (Hanura), Andi Rahmat (PKS), Mukhamad Misbachun (PKS), Candra 
Tirtawijaya (PAN), and Liliy Wahid (PKB), Ahmad Kurdi Moekri (PPP) (Inilah.com., 30 November 
2009). 
286 ‘Tim 9 untuk kebenaran’. 
287 The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) revealed its preliminary audit on the bailout on 28 September 
2009. 
288 See, for example: Republika, 11 November 2009; Republika, 12 November 2009; Republika, 14 
November 2009; Republika, 15 November 2009; Republika, 18 November 2009; The Jakarta Post, 12 
November 2009; The Jakarta Post, 18 November 2009; The Jakarta Post, 19 November 2009b; The 
Jakarta Post, 20 November 2009; The Jakarta Post, 25 November 2009; The Jakarta Post, 1 December 
2009; Media Indonesia, 5 November 2009; Media Indonesia, 11 November 2009; Media Indonesia, 14 
November 2009; Media Indonesia, 17 November 2009; Media Indonesia, 18 November 2009; Media 
Indonesia, 24 November 2009; Koran Tempo, 12 November 2009; Koran Tempo, 16 November 2009; 
Koran Tempo, 25 November 2009. 
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an indicator of the support for an inquiry among legislators. The issue also made 
headlines when legislators successfully pushed the DPR’s deputy speakers to read 
out the petition in parliament. On orders of the absent DPR speaker Mazurkie Ali 
(Democratic Party) the DPR’s deputy speakers  had initially refused to read out the 
petition during a plenary session (The Jakarta Post, 18 November  2009). 
Furthermore, the DPR’s proposed inquiry received positive feedback from 
the media.289 Parliamentary support for the inquiry grew when, in late November 
2009, the BPK’s final audit confirmed irregularities in the bailout. Even legislators 
from the Democratic Party signed the petition after the BPK’s revelation. Given that 
the number of signatures had surged to more than 400 out of the 560 DPR 
legislators, the establishment of an inquiry looked inevitable (The Jakarta Post, 25 
November 2009). However, in order to press the DPR to establish the inquiry during 
its forthcoming plenary session, Team 9 decided to intensify their efforts. Indeed, 
given that the majority of political parties were supporting the Yudhoyono 
administration, the DPR’s willingness to establish a special inquiry remained 
uncertain (Media Indonesia, 30 November 2009). 
From the outset, Team 9 was aware that the media were crucial in ensuring 
the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry into the bailout, and integrated the 
media in that effort. Two members of Team 9, Akbar Faizal (Hanura) and Bambang 
Soesatyo (Golkar), were former journalists who knew exactly how the media 
worked.290 Prior to the plenary session on 1 December 2009 where the decision about 
                                                          
289 This refers to a media analysis of five national newspapers (Kompas, Koran Tempo, Media Indonesia, 
Republika, and Seputar Indonesia) conducted between 11-17 November 2009 by LSI Network 
(Detiknews, 19 November 2009). 
290 Interview with Akbar Faizal and Bambang Soesatyo, Jakarta,  27 May 2010. 
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the forming of a special inquiry committee was scheduled, Team 9 created various 
activities with the sole purpose of attracting media coverage. These activities that 
aimed to sway public opinion (and thus parliamentarians) in favour of an 
investigation included the establishment of Team 9 itself and meetings with public 
figures and the media (The Jakarta Globe, 30 November 2009). On 29 November 
2009 nine members across political fractions staged a media event within which they 
gave their group the name ‘Team 9 for truth‘291 and made a joint pledge to 
investigate the Bank Century scandal thoroughly. The event was staged in a 
restaurant in Senayan close to the DPR and thus within easy reach of the press 
gallery. Consequently, the establishment of Team 9 received the desired media 
publicity (Tempo Interaktif, 29 November 2009). 
Dubbed ‘Road show Team 9’ or ‘Safari of Truth’292 in the Indonesian media, 
Team 9 also met with leaders and senior political figures. The figures whose support 
was sought by Team 9 had a strong reputation for moral politics in their respective 
fields.293 In addition to the influence on their respective communities, their support 
also had an impact both on the internal politics of parliament and outside 
                                                          
291 ‘Tim 9 untuk kebenaran’. 
292 ‘Safari Kebenaran’.  
293 Those figures included Gus Dur, Amien Rais, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Jusuf Kalla, Hasyim Muzadi, 
Din Syamsuddin, Wiranto, Aburizal Bakrie, Hilmi Aminuddin, Jakob Oetama, and Prabowo. Tim 9 
also met with Surya Paloh, Rikard Bagun, Editor in Chief Kompas, and a number of national mass 
media leaders (Soesatyo 2010: 48). Tim 9 also met with civil organisations, for example with Koalisi 
Masyarakat Sipil Anti Korupsi (Kompak) on 26 November 2009 (Kompas.com, 3 December 2009; 
Republika Online, 26 November 2009). 
Towards the final vote of the Bank Century inquiry committee in March 2010 Team 9 conducted 
another safari kebenaran similar to the one in December 2009. They started on 18 February by visiting 
Muhammadiyah patron Syafi’i Ma’arif and NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi. They also met with the 
chairman of Hanura, Wiranto, former chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, Amien Rais, 
and chairman of the National Demokrat organisation and media owner Surya Paloh (The Jakarta Post, 
27 February 2010). 
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parliament (Inilah.com, 30 November 2009). Team 9 also visited media companies 
and provided them with data and print-ready material that supported their call for 
an investigation. Because of its news value and importance for the public, Team 9’s 
lobbying tour was covered intensively by the media.294 The meetings themselves 
and the public figures’ opinions and recommendations became further raw material 
for the media. Surya Paloh, for example, owner of Media Indonesia and Metro TV, 
printed a photo of his meeting with Team 9 members on the cover page of Media 
Indonesia (4 December 2009).295 With their decision to meet with Team 9 these public 
figures showed their support for an investigation into the Bank Century scandal. 
Finally, on 1 December 2009, the DPR approved the proposal for an inquiry into the 
Bank Century case with an overwhelming majority – 503 out of its 560 members.296 
The establishment of the Bank Century committee received mixed reactions. 
Whereas Scherlock (2010: 171) describes it as "a textbook example of effective 
parliamentary oversight of the executive" others were more critical. Political analyst 
Boni Hargens (The Jakarta Post, 3 December 2009) saw the inquiry as a ‘bargaining 
chip against Yudhoyono’ to achieve Sri Mulyani’s removal from her post as Finance 
Minister (The Jakarta Post, 3 December 2009). However, regardless of its agenda, the 
formation of the inquiry was an important step. Indeed, as argued by Tiffen (1999: 
93) parliamentary inquiries bring “an authority and integrity to public reporting 
                                                          
294 See for example: Antara, 28 November 2009; Kompas.com, 3 December 2009; VIVAnews, 28 
November 2009; Antara, 3 December 2009. 
295 See also: Detik.com, 24 November 2009. 
296 The event marks the first time the DPR of the 2009-2014 period exercised its right of inquiry. The 
DPR of the 2004-2009 period used this right several times on different issues. The composition of the 
30-member inquiry committee was based on the proportionality principle, with the number of faction 
representatives in the committee determined in accordance with the size of the factions concerned. The 
Democratic Party got eight seats, Golkar six seats, PDI-P five, PKS three, PKB two, PAN two, PPP two, 
Gerindra one, and Hanura one seat (Penerbit Buku Kompas 2010: 337). 
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where before there had existed suspicion and contention“, and guarante continuing 
routine news supply. This was amplified following the decision to make the 
hearings open to the public and to the media. 
 
The special inquiry committee and publicity 
From its very beginning the Bank Century case was ‘newsworthy’ and full of 
controversy. It met the media’s criteria of newsworthiness or news value (Heryanto, 
2 March 2010). The Bank Century scandal enabled the media to show themselves as 
an important ‘pillar of democracy’ by informing the public and ‘watching’ the 
government. In so doing, the media created political transparency and public 
accountability (Mu’ti, 9 November 2010). The mass media coverage of the Bank 
Century scandal reached its climax from December 2009 to early March 2010. This 
was the period of the Bank Century parliamentary inquiry. During this time the 
media were constantly fed new information that kept the story running and 
interesting. News of Bank Century was broadcast every day on almost all national 
television stations and filled the front pages of the newspapers. Often the news was 
accompanied by in-depth analysis from various perspectives, special features and 
talk shows. 
Beneficial to the Bank Century scandal’s ongoing media presence was the 
decision to hold the committee hearings open to the public. Committee members 
had started debating whether the committee hearings should be open or closed 
immediately after the committee’s establishment (Republika, 9 December 2009). 
During the debate legislators from PDI-P, PKS, Golkar, PAN and Hanura turned to 
the media to promote committee hearings that were open to the public (Republika, 
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14 December 2009; Republika, 18 December 2009) in order to create transparency, to 
dismiss concerns that the committee has a hidden agenda, to establish credibility in 
the new DPR, and to avoid backdoor dealings.297 This move was clearly aimed at 
gaining public support and trust. Although the media supported a parliamentary 
investigation into the Bank Century case, they were sceptical of the inquiry’s ability 
and commitment.298 Those concerns derived from the failure of previous 
parliamentary inquiries (Media Indonesia, 11 December 2009a) and were enforced 
by the election of a legislator from the government coalition as chairman299 
(Republika, 14 December 2009, Media Indonesia, 8 December 2009) and Sri 
Mulyani’s subsequent allegation that the Bank Century probe was an attempt to 
discredit her (Asian Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2009). 
To allow even privately owned television stations to broadcast live from 
special committee hearings was a precedent in Indonesia’s history, and exemplified 
media freedom and the democratisation of politics. The live broadcasts raised the 
political awareness of the public (The Jakarta Post, 31 January 2010), created 
publicity for the conflicting elite factions, and more profit for media organisations. 
As the following discussion will show, the live broadcasts benefitted both the 
committee members and the media. Mutually reinforcing strategies of legislators 
and media transformed the hearings into an entertaining spectacle worth watching 
and easy to follow for people of diverse educational backgrounds, economic status, 
political and religious views (Mu’ti, 19 January 2010). 
                                                          
297 See, for example, Suwarna, 24 January 2010; The Jakarta Post, 12 December 2009; Mu’ti, 9 November 
2010; Fajar, 5 March 2010. 
298 See for example: Media Indonesia, 29 October 2009; Media Indonesia, 8 December 2009; Kompas, 7 
December 2009; Koran Tempo, 19 December 2009. 
299 Namely Golkar legislator Idrus Marham. 
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The hearings provided attractive content for television and other mass 
media. What made the hearings interesting for the media and the public? First of all, 
the hearings were full of sensation and dramatization, akin to a telenovela or reality 
show with the revelation of new information in each episode (Heryanto, 2 March 
2010). Heated debate among committee members and testimonies or quarrels 
among the members of the committee transformed the hearings into an entertaining 
spectacle and gave the impression that there was a conflict between a pro-bailout 
and a counter-bailout block, with another group floating in between (Hudijono, 25 
January 2010). Viewers could see the drama, conflict, hostility, in such scenes as the 
legislators yelling at each other (Suwarna, 24 January 2010). In so doing committee 
members simplified the story of a complicated political and financial scandal into 
something more akin to a soap opera plot (Mu’ti, 19 January 2010; Suwarna, 24 
January 2010). Thus the hearing was interesting in itself. Indonesia’s leading news 
channels, MetroTV and TVOne, deemed it worth broadcasting live and in full. The 
production costs in broadcasting the hearings were cheap. The only thing the TV 
producers had to do was to vary the camera and picture angles (Suwarna, 24 
January 2010). Television amplified the hearing’s entertainment value by presenting 
it in diversified formats and as events that were important to follow. For example, 
by showing close-up images of politicians, split-screen, in order to give the 
impression that they are facing each other while arguing (Hudijono, 25 January 
2010). Both television stations often supplemented the live broadcasts from the 
hearings with talk show programs (Suwarna, 24 January 2010). 
A survey conducted by AGB Nielsen showed that coverage of the Bank 
Century controversy, in particular live broadcasts from the parliamentary hearings 
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and the subsequent parliament plenary session (Sidang Paripurna DPR) on the 
Century Bank bailout (2 to 3 March 2010), had high ratings.300 All Indonesian TV 
stations receive viewer ratings from AGB Nielsen on a daily basis in order to verify 
a program’s selling power and internal program evaluations.301 According to 
TVOne’s general manager, the committee hearings were so popular among viewers 
that TVOne’s live broadcast of the testimony of Sri Mulyani, Boediono and the 
questioning of Kalla, for example, achieved an audience rating and share that 
equalled those of the generally more popular entertainment programs (Suwarna, 24 
January 2010). This attracted advertisers and generated profit for media 
organisations. A producer at TVOne said that as long as ratings were high, the Bank 
Century case would be covered.302 However, TVOne’s and MetroTV’s interest in the 
Bank Century scandal went beyond financial objectives. 
The respective owners of TVOne and MetroTV had political interests in the 
case. While both stations were anti-bailout, their focus was upon different 
                                                          
300 ABG Nielsen, January 2010: 3. 
According to the study, the audiences of special news programs increased from 9.6 per cent in 
December 2009 to 12.6 per cent in January 2010 and 12.9 per cent in February 2010. The survey also 
showed that the total duration of news programs in January 2010 was 116 hours, 128 percent higher 
than in December 2009. In March 2010 the number of those watching news programs increased by 20 
per cent compared to the previous month. The Parliament plenary session (Sidang Paripurna DPR) on 
the Century Bank bailout (2 to 3 March 2010) was among the national events that lead to an increased 
interest in news programs. On 2 March, during the first day of the plenary session 33,000 people 
followed the news on TV. On the following day, when the House of Representatives decided that the 
Bank Century bailout was illegitimate, approximately 59,000 people watched news. This number 
means that news viewing almost doubled compared to the average news audience in March which was 
around 30,000. The President's speech to the conclusions and recommendations of the DPR also 
boosted the number of viewers up to 43,000 people, or 43 per cent above the average news audience in 
March (ABG Nielsen, March 2010: 5). 
301 Interview with Rojes Saragih, producer, TV One, Jakarta, 14 June 2010. AGB Nielsen is not the only 
company providing TV audience measurement (TAM). But it is the one with the highest standards and 
thus the most trusted. This explains why all the TV stations use AGB Nielsen’s service. Thus, even if 
the media market is open for competition, AGB Nielsen Media Research (Indonesia) has the absolute 
monopoly on TV audience measurement (TAM) in Indonesia (Wibisono, 19 February 2007). 
302 Interview with Rojes Saragih, producer, TV One, Jakarta, 14 June 2010. 
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individuals: TVOne was aiming primarily at Sri Mulyani, while MetroTV was aiming 
at President Yudhoyono and Boediono.303 This can be explained with reference to 
the TV station’s ownership. TVOne is owned by the Bakrie group whose head is 
Golkar chairman Aburizal Bakrie. Due to his troubled relationship with Sri 
Mulyani, who had been responsible for a number of ministerial decisions that 
harmed Bakrie-owned companies, Bakrie had a personal interest in ousting Sri 
Mulyani. Studies have shown that TVOne presented Sri Mulyani as the individual 
most responsible for the bailout (Setiawan 2011: 440) and was biased towards 
Golkar in its presentations (Farhanah 2010: 23). TVOne producer Rojes Saragih, 
however, denied that Bakrie had actively intervened in TVOne’s coverage on 
Centurygate. Instead, he argued, the coverage on Centurygate and the conflict 
among Sri Mulyani and Bakrie was rather influenced by common sense among 
TVOne’s personnel that the station is owned by Bakrie.304 
MetroTV, while opposed to the bailout, broadcasted interviews with Sri 
Mulyani and government funded advertisements that aimed to strengthen the pro-
bailout opinion (Tempo, 4 January 2010).305 Surya Paloh, the owner of MetroTV and 
Media Indonesia, had a personal rift with President Yudhoyono because the President 
had supported Bakrie’s candidature during the Golkar chairmanship election in 
October 2009.306 
                                                          
303 Interview with Rendi A. Witular, journalist, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 24 June 2010. 
304 Interview with Rojes Saragih, producer, TV One, Jakarta, 14 June 2010. 
305 More specifically, the advertisement explained the issue of bank restructuring as a way to overcome 
the 2008 global financial crisis. The advertisement was produced by Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat 
(LSM) Peduli (Metro TV, January 2010) and aimed to assert that the government’s decision to bail out 
Bank Century was correct and based on rational analysis (Metro TV, January 2010). 
306 As a consequence of his loss against Bakrie, Paloh started to prepare his own political movement, 
National Democrat (Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem). 
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Legislators were aware that television provided a political stage upon they 
could star. Consequently, they sought to employ the live broadcasts from the 
committee hearings as a means to increase their popularity as well as to convey a 
positive image to their electorate. As stated by The Jakarta Post (20 February 2010): 
The (over) exposure of the House of Representatives Bank Century inquiry 
committee in the national press has catapulted some of its 30 members to 
stardom, without having to go through an energy-zapping, nerve-wracking 
audition. Few might have known who Golkar's Bambang Soesatyo and Akbar 
Faisal of the People's Conscience Party (Hanura) were before they joined the 
inquiry. The two politicians are now among the familiar faces whose popularity 
may currently outshine soap opera stars. 
 
Whereas some committee members, like Bambang Soesatyo (Golkar) and Ruhut 
Sitompul (Democratic Party), were vocal, excessively asking questions to increase 
their profile, others were more subtle in their efforts. Andi Rahmat (PKS), for 
example, used the Bank Century hearings to convey the image of being a fresh 
young politician, idealistic, and full of energy (Suwarna, 24 January 2010). Others 
simply avoided creating any negative impression by paying close attention to their 
on-screen behaviour. When Ganjar Pranowo (PDI-P), for example, was caught on 
camera playing with his Blackberry, one of his staff who was following the live 
broadcast, sent him a text message advising him not to use his Blackberry when on 
camera.307 Committee members also appeared on talk shows discussing the bailout 
and were sought after sources by the media in their scandal coverage (Suwarna, 24 
January 2010). 
                                                          
307 Ganjar Pranowo, personal communication, Jakarta, 10 June 2010. 
212 
The live broadcast of the Bank Century inquiry hearings changed the 
relationship between the media and the elite. Whereas previously legislators could 
influence media coverage only by revealing particular information from closed 
meetings, legislators were now able to focus media attention by asking particular 
questions or pointing out particular issues during the inquiry. Previously, for 
example in the Bulog-Bruneigate inquiry committee proceedings, the media relied 
on commentary by those participating in the closed sessions. The live broadcast 
enabled the public to receive their information with less filtering by the media. 
However, the TV stations that broadcast live still filtered by deciding when to take a 
commercial break or what camera angles to use to show the witnesses or 
investigators. Their choices can either be favourable or unfavourable. The live 
coverage can also be influenced by the presenter’s comments or additional 
information provided, during or after the live coverage. In short the live broadcasts 
shifted the power from the elite to the media, or more precisely to the politico-
business elite who owned those television stations broadcasting live from the 
hearings. 
 
Individual attacks  
During the ongoing investigation, committee members and their respective political 
parties utilized the media to disseminate their views. This included statements 
about their current stance in the inquiry, comments on new findings and 
revelations, the sharing of incriminating or exculpating material, and alleged 
wrongdoing of individuals. 
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In an effort to discredit Sri Mulyani, Golkar legislator Bambang Soesatyo, for 
example, alleged Sri Mulyani had conspired with Robert Tantular, the former owner 
of Bank Century. Soesatyo claimed to have a recording of a conversation 
purportedly between Sri Mulyani and Robert Tantular that had allegedly taken 
place a few hours before the decision to bail out the bank was made on 21 
November 2008. Soesatyo supported his allegations with a transcript of the alleged 
recoding. After learning about the allegations through the media Sri Mulyani, 
Boediono and Robert Tantular immediately denied that such a conversation had 
taken place prior to the bailout decision. A few days later, on 13 December Sri 
Mulyani disproved the allegations with supporting material. In late February 2010 
Bambang Soesatyo also alleged that there was a report indicating that Vice 
President Boediono's spokesman, Yopie Hidayat, had received money from the 
Bank Century bailout fund (The Jakarta Post, 24 February 2010a). 
As the following quotes show, legislators and their respective political 
parties also used the media to affirm that they were only using the inquiry to 
exercise their control function and to encounter allegations that they were using the 
inquiry to pursue their own agenda. 
Gayus Lumbuun (PDI-P): '''There is no intention to topple the government 
through the right of inquiry into Century”308 (Republika, 15 November 2009). 
 
Mahfud Siddiq (PKS) "We want to make the Century case as clear as possible. 
We don't want the public to think that coalition parties also received funding 
from Century" (The Jakarta Post, 30 November 2009). 
  
                                                          
308 “Tidak ada niat menjatuhkan pemerintah lewat hak angket Century”. 
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Bambang Soesatyo (Golkar): "We are not targeting Mulyani. Our goal is to 
thoroughly investigate violations in the channelling of the bailout funds" (The 
Jakarta Post, 3 December 2009). 
 
Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar) "Golkar is going to be at the frontline in the inquiry 
committee at the House of Representatives. However, it is very important not to 
let the committee move to an impeachment agenda. Whatever the reasons, Pak 
SBY [Yudhoyono] and Boediono are the symbols of the nation. Therefore, they 
must be saved" (The Jakarta Post, 4 December 2009). 
 
Idrus Marham (Golkar): “It is an understatement if Golkar was only thinking 
about Sri Mulyani”309 (Media Indonesia, 11 December 2009b). 
 
However, during the course of the inquiry, it became evident that the various 
parties were using the inquiry to exert pressure on the government. Tactics included 
raising calls for Boediono’s and Sri Mulyani’s temporary suspension during the 
ongoing investigation process (Koran Tempo, 5 December 2012) as well as starting a 
discussion on the possible impeachment of the president and vice-president over 
the scandal. Furthermore, PDI-P and Golkar, for example, announced amidst the 
ongoing investigation that Sri Mulyani and Boediono were to blame for the bailout 
(Koran Tempo, 28 January 2010); committee member Gayus Lumbuun (PDI-P) 
called for President Yudhoyono’s testimony (Republika, 13 December 2009; The 
Jakarta Post, 17 January 2010), and Golkar executive Setya Novanto stated that 
Golkar would recommend Boediono be impeached over his role and Bambang 
Soesatyo announced that Golkar would propose a forensic audit of the bailout 
disbursements (The Jakarta Post, 18 February 2010). 
  
                                                          
309 “Terlalu  kecil kalau Partai Golkar hanya memikirkan Sri Mulyani”. 
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4.3 The government’s strategies 
Even though it was a government decision to bailout Bank Century, the decision to 
do so was taken by particular institutions and actors: namely, Bank Indonesia, 
KSSK, and LPS; and those who held key positions in one of these institutions that 
decided to bailout Bank Century. From the very beginning the media focus was on 
in individual actors, particularly on Finance Minister Sri Mulyani – who in her role 
as head of the KSSK had initiated the bailout.310 However, President Yudhoyono 
and the Democratic Party were implicated in the scandal due to allegations that 
some of the bailout funds had been channelled to the Democratic Party to finance 
Yudhoyono’s 2009 election campaign. The following paragraphs examine how these 
institutions and actors who played a decisive role in the bailout and the subsequent 
parliamentary inquiry reacted to media scrutiny and used the media to launch 
attacks against those faulting the bailout. 
 
Sri Mulyani Indrawati 
Sri Mulyani came into the media spotlight following a meeting with the DPR’s 
financial commission on 27 August 2009 within which legislators questioned the 
Department of Finance, Bank Indonesia, and LPS over the Bank Century bailout. 
During that meeting she disclosed the chronology which led to the bailout of Bank 
Century amounting to Rp 6.7 trillion. She defended the bailout by arguing that it 
was done to save the national economy since Bank Century’s collapse could have 
                                                          
310 However, the decision to bailout Bank Century was based on data provided by Bank Indonesia, the 
institution that was fully responsible for supervising and handling bank issues, including Bank 
Century. 
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resulted in a systemic risk to the banking sector (Rakyat Merdeka, 28 August 2009). 
She further asserted that the bailout had been conducted following  proper 
procedures and that all decisions made by her as the chair of the Financial System 
Stabilization Committee (KSSK) were based on sound legal grounds, namely by 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-
Undang, Perppu) No 4/2008 regarding the Financial System Safety Net (Jaring 
Pengaman Sistem Keuangan, JPSK) and Law No.24/2004 on Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan, LPS) (Kompas.com, 30 August 2009). 
However, she pointed out that the decision to rescue Bank Century was made by 
Bank Indonesia and that the data provided by Bank Indonesia on Bank Century 
were incomplete. Given the economic uncertainty at that time she believed Bank 
Indonesia’s data and agreed to the bailout (Media Indonesia, 28 August 2009; Koran 
Tempo, 16 September 2009). A few days later, in an effort to shift the blame to Bank 
Indonesia, she admitted having been unaware of both Tantular's fraud at the time of 
the bailout (Media Indonesia, 2 September 2009) and of his close ties with high-
ranking Bank Indonesia officials since the 1990s (The Jakarta Post, 4 September 
2009). 
In response to the high cost of the bailout Sri Mulyani argued that the 
injected Rp 6.7 trillion bailout funds did not come from the pockets of the state 
(Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN) but from LPS (Republika, 28 
August 2009) and that, provided it was managed well, Bank Century had the 
potential of being sold at a good price within the next five years (Republika, 6 
September 2009). 
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Sri Mulyani also denied rumours that President Yudhoyono was involved in 
the Bank Century case (Koran Tempo, 8 September 2009, Media Indonesia, 10 
September 2009) or that Bank Century was rescued in order to salvage its major 
depositors (Media Indonesia, 9 September 2009, Koran Tempo, 28 September 2009). 
In so doing she dismissed allegations that there was “political deal behind the 
rescue of ailing Bank Century”(The Jakarta Post, 8 September 2009). 
Based on the conviction of not having committed any wrongdoing and that 
investigations would remove suspicions, Sri Mulyani was consistent in her 
demands to investigate the case fully. Consequently she welcomed efforts by the 
Supreme Audit Body (BPK), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and the 
Attorney General's Office (AGO) to conduct a full investigation (Bisnis Indonesia, 31 
August 2009; Koran Tempo, 28 August 2009). Sri Mulyani also interpreted the 
controversy over the bailout “as the inevitable criticism of ministers who manage 
economic and finance portfolios and take crucial decisions to maintain systemic 
stability during times of crisis” (Asia Times, 17 September 2009). In late September 
2009 Sri Mulyani gave an interview about Bank Century to Tempo staff. She used the 
interview, that was published in both Koran Tempo (28 September 2009) and Tempo 
magazine (28 September), to justify the bailout and to elaborate on the bailout 
policy. In sum, Sri Mulyani offered an open, detailed and active defence that aimed 
to demonstrate that there was no case to answer. 
Following the establishment of the parliamentary inquiry committee in early 
December 2009 Sri Mulyani started lobbying and actively approaching the media. 
She met with academics, analysts, political parties and the media, among others 
with Kompas’ editorial staff, in order to explain that the bailout policy was in 
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accordance with the law (Inilah.com, 8 December 2009). A senior journalist at one of 
Indonesia’s quality national newspapers311 stated that Sri Mulyani had visited 
Kompas to ask why the newspaper was attacking her. During this visit she 
reportedly tried to persuade Kompas owner Jakob Oetama that she had not done 
anything wrong.  But Jakob Oetama declined to support her and got offended when 
a member of Sri Mulyani’s staff identified the Kompas-Gramedia group as a tax 
evader. If this account is true it implies that Sri Mulyani’s camp threatened Kompas 
to get it to change its coverage in favour for Sri Mulyani in exchange for waiving of 
the paper’s tax obligations. Kompas staff, however, denied the occurrence of such a 
threat and emphasised that Agung Adiprasetyo (CEO and member of Board of 
Director Kompas Gramedia) has been awarded best tax payer of the year.312 
Meanwhile, some media had started to link Golkar’s aggressive stance in 
Centurygate to the well-known animosity between Bakrie and Sri Mulyani that 
stemmed from a series of policy disagreements during Yudhoyono’s first 
administration. Suspicions that Bakrie was indeed trying to oust Sri Mulyani over 
Centurygate was reinforced by Bakrie’s statement that Golkar would not use the 
inquiry to go after Yudhoyono or Boediono, nor would it start impeachment 
proceedings through the inquiry (The Jakarta Post, 4 December 2009). Additionally, 
media reports interpreted the election of Golkar’s secretary general Idrus Marham 
as inquiry Chair as being the result of negotiations between Golkar and the 
Democratic Party in order to prevent the inquiry from being chaired by the 
opposition who aimed for a thorough investigation into the possible flow of bailout 
                                                          
311 Interview Jakarta, 24 June 2009. The source wished to stay anonymous. 
312 Mardiana Estilistiati, senior journalist Kompas, conversation, Perth, 20 March 2014. 
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funds to Yudhoyono’s inner circle and the Democratic Party (The Jakarta Post, 30 
November 2009). 
This meant that Sri Mulyani was virtually left alone in her defense. Thus, a 
few days after Idrus Marham’s election as committee chairman which raised the 
possibility of Bakrie having “major influence in determining the committee's 
agenda” (The Jakarta Post, 2 December 2009) as well as calls for her and Vice-
President Boediono’s suspension during the course of the inquiry, Sri Mulyani 
changed her strategy and started a counter attack against her critics.313 In an 
exclusive interview with the Wall Street Journal (10 December 2009) Sri Mulyani not 
only restated that the bailout was the right decision and legal, but also claimed: 
“’Abuizal [sic] Bakrie is not happy with me . . . I'm not expecting anyone in Golkar 
will be fair or kind to me’ during the probe” (The Wall Street Journal, 10 December 
2009). She also pointed out that tensions between her and Aburizal Bakrie dated 
back to 2008 when she opposed the closure of Indonesia's stock exchange amid a 
run on PT Bumi Resources, a Bakrie group owned mining company (The Wall Street 
Journal, 10 December 2009).314 In so doing, Sri Mulyani alleged that the Bank 
Century probe was an attempt to discredit her by politicians who opposed her 
reform agenda, notably leaders of Golkar, including chairman Aburizal Bakrie. 
Why did Sri Mulyani speak out to the Wall Street Journal and not in the 
Indonesian media? Why did she openly talk about her tensions with Bakrie? In 
                                                          
313 Counter-attack is an active defence that re-directs attention back upon the accusers, rather than 
addressing the accusations. This can be done by questioning the accuser’s motives and methods, 
discrediting them in order to destroy their credibility and alleging wrongdoing (Tiffen 1999: 124, 129). 
314 Another issue of contention that Sri Mulyani highlighted in the interview was that she had imposed 
a travel ban on a number of coal-mining executives, including those in Bakrie owned companies, after 
a dispute over the refusal of the companies to pay royalties on the sale of coal to the government (The 
Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2009). 
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Indonesian culture generally and even in public politics, personal conflicts are not 
usually discussed in public, with behind-the-scenes political deals more common. 
Wimar Witoelar, who developed into a kind of media advisor for Sri Mulyani 
during the Bank Century case, explained Sri Mulyani’s behaviour as follows: “Oh, 
that is not Indonesian, that is Sri Mulyani”315. According to Witoelar, Sri Mulyani 
was culturally an academic who prefers straight talk, and not the obtuse language 
so often used by Indonesian officials who are obfuscating. Sri Mulyani may also 
have wanted to show the world what was going on in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
given Sri Mulyani’s position as Finance Minister and her international reputation, 
she may have regarded it as important to give a signal to foreign investors.316 
According to Koran Tempo journalist Metta Dharmasputra (interview, 7 June 2009, 
Jakarta), Sri Mulyani had also spoken with Indonesian media about the issue, but 
always ‘off the record’. When Indonesian journalists later asked Sri Mulyani why 
she finally had spoken out in the foreign media she reportedly attributed it to a 
mere coincidence.317 
Although the interview sparked outrage among Golkar legislators (The 
Jakarta Globe, 11 December 2009), presenting herself as a victim of party-political 
power plays also gained Sri Mulyani more sympathy among journalists.318 This was 
crucial for Sri Mulyani, whose political communication – due to her personality and 
role as a technocrat – was regarded by journalists as less guarded than most 
                                                          
315
 Interview with Wimar Witoelar, public relations and communications expert, Jakarta, 22 May 2009 
316 Interview with Wimar Witoelar, public relations and communications expert, Jakarta, 22 May 2009. 
317 Interview with Metta Dharmasaputra, journalist, Koran Tempo, Jakarta, 7 June 2009. 
318 In discussion with AJI members, Jakarta, May 2010 and Hadi Rahman, journalist, Jakarta 18 May 
2010. 
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politicians, but instead ‘mood driven’.319 Mulyani’s counter-attack, however, was 
also criticised by the media and legislators, who described the disclosure of her 
personal conflict with Bakrie as inappropriate. 
The conflict between Sri Mulyani and Bakrie further intensified when 
allegations of Bakrie being involved in tax evasion suddenly hit the news. On 11 
December 2009, only one day after Sri Mulyani had disclosed her troubled 
relationship with Bakrie, a subordinate of Sri Mulyani, the director-general of 
taxation Mochamad Tjiptardjo, publicly disclosed that the tax office was 
investigating three Bakrie Group-owned companies320 for possible tax evasion 
totalling around Rp 2.1 trillion.321 If the allegations were proven, the three 
companies would be liable for both their taxes plus a 400 per cent penalty. This 
would total approximately Rp 10 trillion (The Jakarta Globe, 11 December 2009) 
significantly higher than the Rp 6.7 trillion cost of the Bank Century bailout. 
Given the fact that the case had been investigated since March 2009, the 
disclosure of this information at this particular point in time may have been 
intended not merely to showcase the government’s commitment to eradicate graft. 
Rather, although denied by Tjiptardjo (The Jakarta Post, 14 December 2009), a link 
between the tax evasion allegations and the inquiry into the Bank Century bailout 
seems obvious.322 The tax evasion allegations against Bakrie triggered some 
momentary critical press coverage, particularly from Koran Tempo and Media 
                                                          
319 In discussion with AJI members, Jakarta, May 2010 and Hadi Rahman, journalist, Jakarta 18 May 
2010. 
320 PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC), PTArutmin Indonesia and parent company PT Bumi Resources. 
321 The investigation into possible irregularities of these Bakrie-owned companies had officially started 
in March 2009 and was related to the three companies’ tax obligations in 2007. 
322 See, for example, Rakyat Merdeka Online, 16 December 2009; Detikfinance, 17 December 2009; The 
Jakarta Post, 16 December 2009a. 
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Indonesia, focusing on his conflicts of interest in politics and business (O’Rourke, 18 
December 2009) as well as his ulterior motives in the Bank Century inquiry (Media 
Indonesia, 13 December 2009). 
Overall, Sri Mulyani’s opportunities to utilize the commercial mainstream 
media were limited. This was mainly due to media ownership. As pointed out by 
O’Rourke (18 December 2009) “Bakrie and opposition parties such as PDI-
Perjuangan tend to exert influence over several major media outlets, which limits 
scrutiny of Bakrie’s interests”. Furthermore, Kompas, Indonesia’s most prominent 
and widely read newspaper, decided not to pick up on the tax evasion allegations 
against Bakrie other than commenting on it in its satirical corner (pojok) on its 
opinion page: “Three of Bakrie’s companies are alleged to have manipulated tax of 
Rp2.1 trillion. Each rival holds their own trump card“323 (Kompas, 16 December 
2009).324 Thus, Kompas saw the tax allegations against Bakrie only as a bargaining 
chip among rival forces.325 
Furthermore, television, in particular the two news channels TVOne and 
MetroTV which broadcast live from the Bank Century inquiry hearings, built up the 
perception that Sri Mulyani was guilty (Witoelar 2010; Harap, 6 May 2010). Given 
that both stations were owned by Golkar politicians, Sri Mulyani’s opportunities to 
benefit from coverage on either station were limited. Due to her personal feud with 
                                                          
323 “Tiga usaha Bakrie diduga memanipulasi pajak Rp 2,1 triliun. Setiap peseteru masing-masing punya 
kartu truf”. 
324 In February 2010, when the case re-entered the media Kompas only covered the Bakrie tax issue in 
the context of the tension in the ruling coalition and in relation to lobbying efforts by the government. 
325 Kompas stance will be discussed and explained in detail in section 5.2 of this thesis. 
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Aburizal Bakrie she could not risk appearing on the Bakrie-group owned TVOne.326 
The reasons were twofold: first, Sri Mulyani’s camp did not want to give TVOne 
credibility by showing up to their shows; second because of concerns that TVOne 
might edit the information provided.327 However, in early January and February 
2010 Sri Mulyani gave two exclusive interviews to MetroTV that she used as a 
platform to defend herself.328 
 
Boediono 
Vice-President Boediono, who due to his role as Bank Indonesia governor at the 
time of the bailout had also come under increasing media scrutiny and had become 
the subject of headlines as the Bank Century case unfolded, instead chose to 
‘stonewall’ (Tiffen 1999: 124-5) in the hope allegations would disappear. Boediono 
might have feared that any comment in his defence would stoke the controversy in 
undesired ways, so he tried to reduce media coverage by not making any comments 
and replying only with a smile to journalists’ questions (Detikfinance, 4 September 
2009). Boediono had no special staff to manage the media at the time the bailout 
came to light. It was only on 21 October 2009 that Yopie Hidayat, former editor of 
the business newspaper Kontan, became his spokesperson (Kompas.com, 21 October 
2009). 
                                                          
326 Shanti Ruwyastuti, Deputy News Director, MetroTV during a Q&A session in the context of an open 
forum held by The United States-Indonesia Society (USINDOBrief, 31 March 2010). 
327 Interview with Yopie Hidayat, vice-presidential spokesman, Jakarta, 19 May 2010. 
328 The exclusive interview was divided in to two parts broadcasted on 3 and 4 January 2010 
respectively. Both interviews were broadcasted in the Program Metro Hari Ini. The 3 January 2010 
interview had a duration of 14 minutes. The 4 January 2010 interview had a duration of 31 minutes. As 
shown in a study by Alderina (2010) MetroTV presented Sri Mulyani as knowing those involved in and 
saved by the Bank Century bailout, as being responsible for the bailout, and as putting the blame for 
bailout decision on the president, vice-president and DPR. 
224 
 In early November 2009 Boediono gave an interview to Tempo magazine. 
When asked what really happened in the Bank Century case, Boediono explained 
that the economic situation at that time resembled the conditions during the 1997-
1998 period and that Bank Century was rescued in order to avoid a domino effect 
within the banking system. He argued that not all the bailout funds had been lost 
and that if Bank Century had been closed down, the cost would still have been 
almost Rp 6 trillion (Tempo, 9 November 2009). Being the centre of media attention 
over this matter was obviously an uncomfortable situation for Boediono 
(Detiknews, 12 December 2009). 
In mid-December 2009 Boediono criticised the press for not being balanced. 
During an event marking the 72nd anniversary of the state news agency Antara, 
Boediono argued in a speech that media coverage by privately owned media 
companies was unbalanced and dictated by the market. Although the Vice President 
did not make any direct references to the Bank Century case it was widely assumed 
that he was alluding to coverage of that as unbalanced. He also suggested that the 
government-owned media, RRI, TVRI, and Antara, should cooperate with one 
another to counterbalance coverage by private media (The Jakarta Globe, 15 
December 2009). 
 
Yudhoyono and the Democratic Party 
The following section discusses how the government, particularly President 
Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party, interacted with the media in order to counter 
allegations of misconduct in the Bank Century bailout. 
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Following Centurygate’s initial disclosure President Yudhoyono distanced 
himself from the controversy arguing that such issues were not in the president’s 
domain since it was the Financial System Stability Committee and Bank Indonesia 
that control and supervise the banking sector (The Jakarta Post, 3 September 2009; 
Koran Tempo, 28 August 2009). However, he defended the bailout as a correct 
decision to save the banking sector and stated that legal action should be taken 
against all those alleged to have committed criminal acts in the scandal (The Jakarta 
Post, 27 September 2009). Furthermore, President Yudhoyono and the Democratic 
Party repeatedly denied allegations that Bank Century was saved to protect 
depositors who were major financiers of Yudhoyono's recent presidential campaign 
(The Jakarta Post, 29 September 2009) or that any of the bailout funds had been 
channelled to the Democratic Party to finance Yudhoyono’s 2009 election campaign. 
Only in late November 2009, following the BPK’s audit into the bailout that 
had revealed irregularities and indications of legal violations, did President 
Yudhoyono express his support for an inquiry to “gain clarity as well as well as to 
determine whether the measures taken were wrong and improper”329 (Pidato 
Presiden, 23 November 2009). He ordered the Democratic Party to follow his 
example. This indicated that the government had shifted its emphasis from 
countering the establishment of an inquiry towards influencing its direction and 
outcome. This became evident in the Democratic Party’s support for coalition 
partner Golkar to chair the committee. However, during the course of the inquiry it 
became evident that the coalition parties did not defend the government’s position 
                                                          
329 “mendapatkan kejelasan serta sekaligus untuk mengetahui apakah ada tindakan-tindakan yang 
keliru dan tidak tepat”. 
226 
in the bailout but were pursuing their own agendas instead. Furthermore, 
allegations that Yudhoyono’s inner circle had benefited from the bailout funds did 
not cease.330 
In mid-January 2010 the pressure on the government increased when 
committee members from the opposition insisted that Yudhoyono be summoned 
(Koran Tempo, 15 January 2010, The Jakarta Post, 16 January 2010) and voiced the 
possibility of launching impeachment proceedings through the inquiry (The Jakarta 
Post, 28 January 2010; Koran Tempo, 5 February 2010). Furthermore, with 
committee members from Golkar and PKS directing harsh questions and 
accusations at Vice-President Boediono and Finance Minister Sri Mulyani during the 
committee's hearings (The Jakarta Post, 17 January 2010) it became evident that both 
parties would defect from the coalition. To counter those moves and to prevent the 
inquiry from concluding that the bailout was wrong and from calling for legal 
measures against those responsible for the bailout, the Palace and the Democratic 
Party applied various strategies. 
Here, the media played an important role. Wanting to clarify their actions in 
the Bank Century bailout and to refute allegations against the government that it 
had benefited from the bailout, some of the institutions accused – notably Bank 
Indonesia and the Finance Ministry – released explanations in the form of ‘White 
                                                          
330 For example, on a press conference, held on 30 November 2009, Bendera (People's Bastion of 
Democracy), a ultranationalist youth group, raised that several members of his Yudhoyono’s inner 
circle, including his son Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, and the Democratic Party’s presidential campaign 
team, had received a total of Rp 1.8 trillion from the Bank Century bailout money (Republika, 4 
December 2009). This was further accelerated due to the publication of a controversial book claiming 
that the bailout money was channelled through several foundations and Bank Century depositors with 
close links to the President's family in order to financially support his re-election campaign (Aditjondro 
2009). 
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Papers’ (Buku Putih).331 Besides promoting these white papers through the media, 
the government also funded a television advertisement that explained the issue of 
bank restructuring as a way to save the economy from the monetary crisis. This 
mechanism was used to assert that the government’s decision to bail out Bank 
Century was correct and based on rational analysis (Metro TV, January 2010).332 
Following the inquiry’s conclusion that declared Vice-President Boediono 
and Sri Mulyani to be responsible for the ‘illegal’ bailout (The Jakarta Post, 28 
February 2010), Yudhoyono sent two of his special staff to lobby several political 
leaders, community leaders and public figures regarded as critical of the President 
and the bailout decision.333 The presidential special staff emphasised that the 
allegations that Yudhoyono and his inner circle had profited from the bailout 
money could not be proved since the inquiry failed to trace the flow of money. They 
further emphasised that the bailout should be viewed in the context of the global 
economic crisis, namely that the government was rescuing a banking system that 
                                                          
331 In early January 2010, the Department of Finance published a white paper to explain the 
government’s effort to save the Bank Century. The paper elaborated the process of decision making of 
the Committee for Financial Sector Stability (KSSK) to grant the bailout for Century Bank and 
emphasised the government's success in avoiding having the Indonesian economy drawn into the 
global financial crisis. The paper drew heavily upon newspaper clippings or supporting data, such as 
that from the IMF, World Bank, or Bank Indonesia (For a summary of the book see Kompas.com, 13 
January 2010; Media Indonesia, 13 January 2010). Soon afterwards Bank Indonesia launched a white 
paper giving its version of the bailout. Bank Indonesia, which had been accused of weak supervision of 
the banking sector, sought to dismiss these accusations. The White Paper outlined the quality of bank 
supervision, the handling of the troubled bank, Bank Century’s failures, systemic category 
consideration of a bank, then the softening of the rules providing Short Term Financing Facility 
(Pemberian Fasilitas Pendanaan Jangka Pendek, FPJP), until the final evaluation of the cost-benefit 
analysis of a rescue package (Jairis, 20 January 2010). 
332 The advertisement was produced by Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM) Peduli (Metro TV, 
January 2010). 
333 Namely, Priyo Budi Santoso (Golkar, DPR deputy speaker) and Akbar Tandjung (Golkar), Amien 
Rais (PAN and former MPR chairman), Pramono Anung (PDI-P secretary-general), Syafi’i Ma’arif 
(former chairman of Muhammadiyah), chairman of the People's Conscience Party (Hanura), Wiranto, 
and chairman of the National Democrat organization, Surya Paloh (The Jakarta Globe, 1 March 2010; 
The Jakarta Post, 27 February 2010). 
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was affected by the crisis (Jawa Pos National Network, 28 February 2010). Most 
importantly, however, the media were also used to attack political parties and 
legislators opposed to the bailout. The following section discusses this in detail. 
 
Pressure and threats against political parties and legislators critical of the bailout 
While the Democratic Party’s secretary-general used the media to propose a Cabinet 
reshuffle to President Yudhoyono to replace ministers from those coalition partners 
that faulted the bailout, Yudhoyono began to politicise the issue of tax evasion by 
publicly affirming his support for an offensive against tax evaders. He attributed the 
problem of tax evasion to, among other causes, politico-business collusion (Koran 
Tempo, 12 February 2010), and called upon tax authorities and the police to take 
firm action against businesspeople who had avoided their taxes (Koran Tempo, 9 
February 2010; The Jakarta Post, 24 February 2010b). 
Further indications that the President and the Democratic Party were 
attacking Golkar Chairman Aburizal Bakrie through allegations of tax evasion 
derived from the following statements. For example, a committee member of the 
Democratic Party accused Golkar of having a hidden agenda in the committee, 
namely to replace Sri Mulyani due to Bakrie’s conflict with her regarding tax issues 
(Detiknews, 21 January 2010; Koran Tempo, 1 February 2010). In a similar vein, 
albeit without mentioning any names, Denny Indrayana, a legal adviser to 
Yudhoyono, claimed:  
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Anti-corruption fighters the calibre of Boediono and Sri Mulyani are even 
criminalized. Yet, it is quite possible that those who orchestrated their take 
down are those who have legal issues, like not paying their taxes regularly . . . 
In other words, the criminalization of Boediono and Sri Mulyani is, for the 
umpteenth time, an effort by the corruptors to fight back  (corruptors fight back 
[sic]).334 
 
Although Yudhoyono and Indrayani did not mention any specific names, the media 
interpreted those statements as directed to Aburizal Bakrie and brought the alleged 
tax evasion of Bakrie-owned companies back in the headlines. However, above all, 
those statements suggest that the government utilized the media to discredit the 
inquiry through creating the impression that those critical of the bailout had 
politicised the inquiry in order to pursue particular interests and to increase their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the government instead of thoroughly investing the case 
as a means to control the government. Indeed, allegations that Bakrie was utilising 
the inquiry as a means to exert pressure upon the president to remove Sri Mulyani 
can be seen as an effort to reduce the inquiry to a personal conflict between Bakrie 
and Sri Mulyani. 
 
Counter-attacks 
With the political battle surrounding the Bank Century case intensifying, corruption 
allegations against legislators, particularly committee members, opposing the 
government’s stance suddenly appeared in the media. Since those attacks only 
                                                          
334 Pejuang antikorupsi selevel Boediono dan Sri Mulyani justru dikriminalkan. Padahal, amat 
mungkin yang mendesain justru adalah kelompok-kelompok yang punya masalah hukum, tidak taat 
membayar pajak . . . Dengan kata lain, kriminalisasi terhadap Boediono dan Sri Mulyani adalah bentuk 
kesekian dan upaya para pelaku korupsi menyerang balik (corruptors fight back)” (Kabarnet, 8 
February 2010). 
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focused on PDI-P, Golkar, and PKS legislators, it was widely regarded that the 
government and its supporters, as well as the Democratic Party, were behind those 
sudden revelations and were using them to intervene in the Bank Century 
investigation process.335 More precisely, the attacks seemed designed to undermine 
individual committee members’ credibility, to divert or stop the Bank Century 
inquiry committee’s work, to influence the committee’s final conclusion on the 
bailout, and the political parties’ subsequent vote on this during the DPR’s 
forthcoming plenary session on 3 March 2010. 
Committee members Andi Rahmat (PKS) and Ganjar Pranowo (PDI-P), for 
example, were accused of having accepted a gratuity from Bank Indonesia in the 
form of funded travel to London in 2006. The trip took place when both were sitting 
on the DPR’s Commission XI during the 2004 to 2009 legislature, and details had 
already been made public in 2008. However, the case re-entered the headlines in 
January 2010 following the KPK’s announcement that it was re-checking the case. 
Soon news that the chairman of the Bank Century inquiry committee, Idrus 
Marham, and legislator Setya Novanto, both from the Golkar, were reported to the 
National Police for corruption and unresolved tax cases appeared in the media.336 
Then allegations against PDI-P337 senior politician Emir Moeis also hit the 
media. A document anonymously distributed to journalists and published on 
Facebook suggested that Moeis made several suspicious transactions with Bank 
                                                          
335 See for example: Media Indonesia, 16 February 2010; Media Indonesia, 18 February 2010; Tempo, 22 
 February 2010; The Jakarta Post, 23 February 2010; Republika, 23 February 2010. 
336 Both were reported to the National Police by the Association of Village Unit Cooperatives (Inkud) 
on graft allegations surrounding the procurement of transportation for 60,000 tons of rice from the 
customs office in 2003 (Rakyat Merdeka Online, 18 February 2010). 
337 As an opposition party, the PDI-P had been among the most vocal parties opposing the bailout and 
had promoted the DPR’s right of inquiry (hak angket) into the case. 
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Century. Among other assertions, the document claimed that in 2007-08 Moeis had 
routinely received foreign-currency deposits in his Bank Century account, and that 
more than Rp 10 billion in cash had been deposited into one of his accounts in 2008 
(The Jakarta Globe, 16 February 2010; Koran Tempo, 16 February 2010). Around the 
same time the wealth report of BPK chairman Hadi Purnomo, who had been 
dismissed by Sri Mulyani from his position as tax chief for alleged corruption in 
early 2006 (McLeod, 19 May 2010), was leaked to the media. The report revealed 
that Hadi had accumulated enormous assets and properties in the form of grants 
(Koran Tempo, 17 February 2010). 
On 22 February 2010, PKS' Mukhammad Misbakhun, one of the initiators of 
the bailout inquiry, found himself in the media over allegations he held a fictitious 
letter of credit from Bank Century. Andi Arief, President Yudhoyono’s special staff 
for social affairs and natural disasters, picked up on the allegations implicating 
Misbakhun in the Bank Century scandal during a press conference by revealing 
evidence allegedly showing that Misbakhun had provided a fictitious letter of credit 
in order to obtain a loan amounting to $22.5 million from Bank Century (Koran 
Tempo, 22 February 2010). A few days later Arief reported the case to the police 
accusing Misbakhun of money laundering and bank fraud (Detiknews, 1 March 
2010; VIVAnews, 28 February 2010).338 
In another effort to disparage disloyal coalition partners, Denny Indrayana, 
Yudhoyono's special adviser for legal affairs, claimed that some coalition parties 
had offered to the president that they would change their stance on the Century case 
                                                          
338 “According to the Supreme Audit Agency's (BPK) audit into Bank Century, Misbakhun's company, 
PT Selalang Prima International (SPI), was one of ten companies that allegedly received loans from 
Bank Century by using fictitious letters of credit” (The Jakarta Post, 2 March 2010).  
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if legal cases against their party members were dropped (The Jakarta Post, 28 
February 2010). While refusing to disclose the parties or the particular legal cases, 
Indrayana emphasised that Yudhoyono would never intervene in legal matters. As 
an example, he referred to the fact that the father of Yudhoyono's daughter-in-law, 
former Bank Indonesia deputy governor Aulia Pohan was sentenced to 4.5 years 
prison for corruption in 2009 (The Jakarta Post, 17 June 2009).339 
However, the presidential aide’s strategies can also be interpreted as an 
attempt to defame those political parties who were opposed to the bailout decision. 
The coalition parties were quick to deny the allegations publicly and emphasised 
that they would not change their opinion on the bailout despite the government’s 
various threats. Overall, the Democratic Party’s and the Palace’s strategies were 
viewed by their opponents as attempts to undermine the inquiry team's efforts to 
reveal the truth, and thus as a confirmation that the government had something to 
hide. This impression was further enforced by the fact that the majority of the major 




We have seen in this chapter that the Bank Century scandal was an intra-elite power 
struggle over key positions and access to political resources, and how those 
involved in the Bank Century scandal and its investigation both skilfully utilized the 
media to pursue their causes. 
                                                          
339 However, in August 2010 Aulia Pohan was released on parole (The Jakarta Globe, 20 August 2010). 
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Using the DPR as a forum, Yudhoyono’s opponents progressively pushed 
the controversy from questioning the bailout cost to allegations of the 
misappropriation of state funds by those who had authorized the bailout and by 
Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party. The establishment of a parliamentary inquiry was a 
milestone in keeping the scandal alive since it enabled the opposition and coalition 
parties to promote their interests under the guise of exercising their duty to oversee 
government. While the opposition aimed to undermine government’s credibility in 
corruption eradication, the disaffected coalition parties aimed to undermine 
Yudhoyono’s reform agenda by attacking Sri Mulyani and Boediono. 
That the parliamentary inquiry mainly served as a bargaining chip to gain 
concessions from the government became increasingly evident when legislators and 
government actors incorporated the media in their power struggles through various 
means. Those included attacking each other by leaking damaging information to the 
press. These leaks included, for example, the tax ministry making public its 
investigation into alleged tax evasion allegations against Bakrie-owned companies, 
and Golkar legislator Bambang Soesatyo leaking a transcript suggesting that Sri 
Mulyani had conspired with Bank Century’s owner. Entering 2010 those efforts 
increased. 
While the parliamentary inquiry and government coalition parties 
intensively used the media to disseminate their position on the bailout, in so doing 
putting pressure on the government, the government counter-attacked. The 
Democratic Party started to contemplate publicly the reshuffling of Cabinet 
ministers from disloyal coalition parties, while President Yudhoyono used the 
media as a platform to promote stricter measures against tax evaders. The latter was 
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particularly aimed at Aburizal Bakrie in order to encourage him to soften Golkar’s 
position towards the bailout and efforts to topple Sri Mulyani. Other government-
initiated attacks included the sudden disclosure of corruption and tax evasion 
allegations against critical committee members from PKS, PDI-P and Golkar. 
In sum, this chapter has reinforced the argument that the contesting elite has 
integrated the media as a means to redistribute power among themselves. That is, in 
this case, to change the composition of government by removing a Finance Minister 
who, due to her profound anti-corruption stance and reform drive, endangered 
predatory elite interests deeply rooted in Indonesia’s political economy. Similar to 
the findings of the first case study (in chapter two) those interests benefited from the 
parliament’s and the media’s shared watchdog-function towards the government. In 
addition, the government’s opportunities to utilize the media were limited since the 
majority of the commercial mainstream news media were either owned or 
influenced by elite interests opposed to the bailout. 
Having focused on how the elite integrated the media in their power 
struggle, the following chapter examines the positions and interests of particular 
publications in Centurygate. 
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5 The media’s role in the Bank Century scandal 
Introduction 
Following the analysis in the previous chapter of how the elite integrated the media 
in their power struggle over the Bank Century scandal, this chapter analyses the 
interests and contrasting positions of particular media organisations in the scandal 
by examining editorial commentary in four national news publications. It is argued 
that their positions in the Bank Century scandal can be best explained through the 
politico-economic interests and ideological affiliations of their owner or prominent 
editors. 
The selection of the three daily newspapers Media Indonesia, Kompas, Koran 
Tempo and the weekly Tempo is based on the following considerations: During the 
time of the Bank Century scandal, Media Indonesia’s owner, Surya Paloh, cherished 
political ambitions. Having chaired Golkar’s advisory board since 2004, Surya Paloh 
lost the battle for Golkar chairmanship in October 2009 against Aburizal Bakrie who 
was supported in this challenge by President Yudhoyono. Subsequently, in 
February 2010, Surya Paloh, established the mass organisation National Demokrat 
(Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem) that aimed to ‘restore’ Indonesia.340 Furthermore, in 
contrast to the 2004 presidential elections, Surya Paloh did not support Yudhoyono. 
Instead he coordinated the advisory board of the Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto campaign 
                                                          
340 According to the movement’s own website “RESTORATION Indonesia is a movement to recover, 
restore, and promote the functions of the Indonesian government to the ideals of the Proclamation of 
1945, which protects the whole Indonesian nation, promotes public welfare, the intellectual life of the 
nation, and participates in the establishment of a new world order.”(“RESTORASI Indonesia adalah 
gerakan memulihkan, mengembalikan, serta memajukan fungsi pemerintahan Indonesia kepada cita-
cita Proklamasi 1945, yaitu melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia, memajukan kesejahteraan umum, 
mencerdaskan kehidupan berbangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia.”) (Nasdem n.d.). 
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team during the 2009 presidential elections (Pemilu Indonesia, 3 June 2009; 
Okezone, 2 June 2009) and used his media empire to support Golkar and its 
presidential candidate. This was partly due to his close relationship with Jusuf Kalla 
and his disappointment with the 2004-2009 Yudhoyono government (Hisyam 2014). 
It is argued in this chapter that Media Indonesia’s editorial coverage of Centurygate 
was determined by the political ambitions of its owner and his personal relations to 
some of the decisive actors in the Bank Century scandal and its investigation. 
Kompas is generally accepted as maintaining a relatively neutral political 
position and being non-partisan and non-party political. However, its owner Jakob 
Oetama, as well as Tempo’s Goenawan Mohamad and Fikri Jufri, were part of the so-
called ‘liberal epistemic community’341 that, in conjunction with the technocrats, had 
pushed the New Order state since the 1980s to liberalise the economy through 
deregulation. Kompas and Tempo were crucial in this process since they provided the 
platform for disseminating and promoting liberal economic ideas (Mallarangeng 
2000: 136-172).  
Koran Tempo and Tempo are closely affiliated and share the same publisher, 
PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk. It is argued in this chapter that the stance of both 
publications in the Bank Century scandal was influenced by the Tempo Media 
Group’s affinity towards the broad values of the technocrats and the ideological 
affiliations of its prominent personnel. Furthermore, Goenawan Mohamad, co-
founder and former chief editor of Tempo, did support Boediono’s candidacy during 
                                                          
341 Rizal Mallarangeng calls this group ‘Komunitas Epistemis Liberal’. Its members are outside of the 
government and include among others economists that have been educated in the US, intellectuals and 
leading/prominent editors. For a listing of the group’s members and their respective affiliation see 
Mallarangeng 2000: 129-30 (Table 4.1.). 
237 
the 2009 elections (Mohamad, 18 May 2009) and Bambang Harymurti, Koran Tempo’s 
corporate chief editor, supported the bailout of Bank Century in an opinion column 
published in Tempo (Harymurti, 7 September 2009). 
In order to explain how and why those factors influenced the position of the 
four publications under scrutiny this chapter analyses their editorial commentary on 
key issues in the Bank Century scandal. The editorial material selected for analysis 
covers the period from the Bank Century scandal’s disclosure in late August 2009 
until the editorial following the DPR’s acceptance of the Bank Century committee’s 
final report on 4 March 2010. Every editorial that mentions the words ‘Century’ in 
the context of the Bank Century scandal (Centurygate) was selected for analysis, 
even if the editorial might not be directly on the scandal itself.342 This rather broad 
analysis is done in an attempt to avoid missing a comment crucial to the respective 
newspaper’s point of view on the issue and in order to show that the media kept the 
Bank Century scandal alive by incorporating it as an example when discussing 
other broader concerns like corruption eradication or law enforcement. Selected in 
that way, the following numbers of editorials were identified: Kompas 42, Media 
Indonesia 52, Koran Tempo 28 and Tempo 27.343 With regard to the readership and 
                                                          
342 The Bank Century scandal was most prominent in editorials from December 2009 to March 2010. 
This reflects the period from the parliamentary investigation committee’s establishment until its final 
conclusion and the DPR’s vote on the committee’s report. However, as the accompanying table in 
Appendix F illustrates, the Bank Century case was also sporadically discussed in editorials from late 
August to November 2009. 
343 Of Media Indonesia’s 52 editorials on the Bank Century controversy, 18 have the word ‘Century’ in 
the title. Of Kompas’ 42 editorials on the Bank Century controversy, five have the word ‘Century’ in the 
title. Of Koran Tempo’s 28 editorials on the Bank Century controversy six have the word ‘Century’ in the 
title. Tempo magazine published a total of 27 editorials on the Bank Century controversy, of which nine 
have the word ‘Century’ in the title. See a list of all the editorials in Appendix G.  
In this context it should be mentioned that Tempo’s editorial is called ‘opini’. Stretched over three pages 
there are four editorial articles per edition. The first editorial stretches over one page and refers to the 
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popularity of the various publications, in 2009, when Centurygate was disclosed, 
Kompas had a readership of 1,611,000; whereas Media Indonesia and Koran Tempo had 
a readership of 275,000 and 193,000 respectively.344 The weekly Tempo had an 
estimated readership of 640,000 in mid-2008 (Silaban 2012: 329). 
Following this introduction, section 5.1 and 5.2 examine and explain Media 
Indonesia’s and Kompas’ editorial coverage of Centurygate respectively. Section 5.3 
and 5.4 examine Koran Tempo’s and Tempo’s coverage respectively, while Section 5.5 
explains the coverage of both these latter publications. 
 
 
5.1 Media Indonesia: Anti-bailout and anti-Yudhoyono 
Overview of Media Indonesia’s position 
In summary, Media Indonesia’s editorial position was anti-bailout and anti-
government. Media Indonesia does not agree with the government’s justification for 
the bailout. Instead, Media Indonesia supports the view of those who faulted the 
bailout, namely Jusuf Kalla, the opposition and the initiators of the parliamentary 
inquiry into the bailout (Team 9). Media Indonesia argues that the Democratic Party 
and Yudhoyono are trying to hamper a proper investigation into the case and have 
something to hide. Media Indonesia sees the decision by Sri Mulyani and Boediono to 
bail out Bank Century as enforced by an ‘invisible hand’ pursuing a hidden agenda 
(Media Indonesia, 8 December 2009). In so doing Media Indonesia implicitly targets 
                                                                                                                                                                    
cover story. The remaining three editorials are distributed over two pages and inform the reader about 
other important issues. 
344 All quoted from Asril and Hudrasyah 2013: 891. 
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the president. Media Indonesia is critical of the inquiry and depicts it as hijacked by 
the Democratic Party. Its view only changes following the inquiry’s preliminary 
conclusion that criticises the bailout. Consequently, Media Indonesia welcomes the 
DPR’s decision to criticise the bailout. The following sections will elaborate on those 
findings in detail. 
 
Editorial analysis 
In its first editorial following the scandal’s disclosure Media Indonesia (1 September 
2009) raises doubts about the government’s assertion that Bank Century’s failure 
would have posed a systemic threat to the national economy, that the bailout was 
legal, and that the bailout money was not state money.345 Media Indonesia’s critical 
stance towards the bailout is enforced by interpreting Jusuf Kalla’s comment that he 
had not been informed about the bailout decision, as follows: 
It is strange, that a vice-president who is known as a driving force [sic] in 
economic policy did not know and was not informed. The nescience of the vice-
president is proof that transparency is a serious problem that must be resolved 
in this bailout issue.346  
 
Media Indonesia (5 September 2009) accuses government authorities and bank 
supervisors of negligence by referring to the police findings that Bank Century was 
already bankrupt before the government decision to rescue it. However, the paper’s 
                                                          
345 In subsequent editorials it becomes clear that Media Indonesia does not accept this position as the 
paper refers to the bailout money as “uang negara” [state money] (29 October 2009, 2 March 2010) or 
“duit negara”[state cash] (25 November 2009, 11 December 2009, 11 January 2010). 
346 “Adalah aneh, seorang wakil presiden yang selama ini dikenal sebagai driving force dalam 
kebijakan ekonomi tidak mengetahui dan tidak dilapori. Ketidaktahuan Wapres menjadi bukti bahwa 
transparansi menjadi persoalan serius yang harus dituntaskan dalam isu bailout ini” (Media 
Indonesia, 1 September 2009). 
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main concern is the large amount of bailout money and where that Rp 6.7 trillion 
ended up. In order to avoid speculations that this money “was just poured into the 
pockets of ‘big fish’ depositors”347 Media Indonesia (5 September 2009) promotes the 
Supreme Audit Agency’s (Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, BPK) investigative audit 
while simultaneously raising concerns about the BPK’s impartiality. Furthermore, 
Media Indonesia suspects the government of being involved in the Bank Century 
scandal: 
Again, the case of Century shows us that the dark room game is still going on in 
the banking world. That space is very fertile for the emergence of an affair 
between power and money.348 
 
Media Indonesia’s (25 November 2009) stance emerges more clearly following the 
BPK’s audit: 
The Bank Century – a small and ailing bank – was engineered to exploit state 
money of Rp 6.7 trillion in the interest of its customers and its owner through 
the hands of the holders of authority within the government, especially the 
Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia.349 
 
Those suspicions further crystallize during the scandal when Media Indonesia 
advances the view that the Democratic Party and Yudhoyono had benefited from 
the Bank Century bailout. This is evident in Media Indonesia’s (26 November 2009) 
call upon the PPATK to disclose its data on the flow of the Bank Century funds: 
                                                          
347 “hanya mengalir deras ke kantong deposan kakap” (Media Indonesia, 5 September 2009). 
348 “Sekali lagi, kasus Century menunjukkan kepada kita bahwa ruang gelap permainan di dunia 
perbankan masih terjadi. Itulah ruang yang amat subur bagi munculnya perselingkuhan antara 
kekuasaan dan uang” (Media Indonesia, 5 September 2009). 
349 “Adapun Bank Century – sebuah bank kecil dan sedang sakit – direkayasa untuk mengeruk duit 
negara Rp 6,7 triliun demi kepentingan para nasabah dan pemilik melalui tangan-tangan pemegang 
otoritas di dalam pemerintahan, terutama Bank Indonesia dan Departemen Keuangan”(Media 
Indonesia, 25 November 2009). 
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Disclose in order to confirm the issue that is already circulating widely in the 
community, namely that the flow of funds from Bank Century entered the 
Democratic Party’s campaign fund.350 
 
In linking the bailout funds to Yudhoyono, Media Indonesia (3 February 2010) is less 
direct and only points out that "long before the special committee was formed, 
information had circulated that the bailout was flowing to various parties, even 
mentioned also into the pockets of a presidential candidate's campaign team.”351  
Media Indonesia implies that the Democratic Party and Yudhoyono were trying to 
hamper a proper investigation into the case and have something to hide. 
Consequently, Media Indonesia (7 December 2009) doubts the will of the government 
and pro-government parties to investigate thoroughly the Bank Century case, and 
the flow of the bailout money. 
Why? That is because of the appearance of covert efforts by the power holders 
to not settle the Bank Century case.352  
 
For Media Indonesia those ‘covert efforts’ are evident in Yudhoyono’s publicly 
voiced affirmation to support a thorough investigation while simultaneously trying 
to hamper such an investigation by not forcing the PPATK to reveal the flow of the 
Bank Century bailout funds (26 November 2009; 7 December 2009). In addition, the 
paper suspects the Democratic Party’s moves to control the investigation and its 
                                                          
350 “Dibuka agar bisa memberi konfirmasi isu yang telanjur beredar luas di tengah masyarakat bahwa 
aliran dana dari Bank Century masuk dana kampanye Partai Demokrat”(Media Indonesia, 26 
November 2009). 
351 “jauh hari sebelum pansus dibentuk sudah beredar informasi bahwa dana talangan itu mengalir ke 
berbagai pihak, bahkan disebut-sebut pula masuk ke kantong tim sukses calon presiden”(Media 
Indonesia, 3 February 2010). 
352 “Mengapa? Hal itu karena muncul upaya-upaya terselumbung dari tangan-tangan kekuasaan untuk 
membuat kasus Bank Century tidak tuntas” (Media Indonesia, 7 December 2009). 
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outcome by endorsing Golkar secretary general Idrus Marham to chair the 
committee. Besides highlighting coalition hegemony (5 December 2009), Media 
Indonesia (17 December 2009) also highlights that, due to Idrus Marham’s closeness 
to Yudhoyono, there are suspicions that “under the leadership of Idrus, the special 
committee investigation only stops at Finance Minister Sri Mulyani or at Vice-
President Boediono at the highest.”353 In short, based on the assumption that the 
committee was chaired by a legislator from the government coalition, that the 
majority of committee members were from government coalition parties, and that 
the government coalition also held the majority in the DPR, Media Indonesia 
proposed the view that first, Yudhoyono would be safe; and that, second, the 
inquiry would automatically support the government’s stance on the bailout instead 
of being objective in finding the truth. 
Distrust, scepticism, and bias towards the Bank Century inquiry in particular 
and parliamentary inquiries in general were evident in Media Indonesia editorials.354 
Though supporting a parliamentary inquiry Media Indonesia (29 October 2009) raises 
strong doubts about whether the DPR will do it properly due to “its longstanding 
habit of turning the right to question into a forum for bargaining and an arena for 
idle threats.”355 In the course of the investigation Media Indonesia continues to 
                                                          
353 “di bawah kepemimpinan Idrus, penyelidikan pansus hanya berhenti pada Menteri Keuangan Sri 
Mulyani atau paling tinggi pada Wakil Presiden Boediono” (Media Indonesia, 17 December 2009). 
354 In the course of the investigation Media Indonesia continues to scrutinize the committee. For example, 
by criticising the behaviour of its individual members (15 December 2009; 9 January 2010), describing it 
as reality show (3 February 2010), by pointing out its lacking of focus (15 December 2009; 22 December 
2009; 20 January 2010; 3 February 2010), particularly in investigating where the money went (26 
January 2010; 3 February 2010; 12 February 2010), and raising concerns that coalition interests blur the 
inquiry’s objectivity (26 January 2010). 
355 “kebiasaan lama menjadikan angket sebagai wadah tawar-menawar dan arena gertak 
sambal”(Media Indonesia, 29 October 2009). 
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scrutinize the committee. For example, by criticising the behaviour of individual 
committee members (15 December 2009; 9 January 2010), describing it as reality 
show (3 February 2010), by pointing out its lacking of focus,356 particularly in 
investigating where the money went (26 January 2010, 3 February 2010, 12 February 
2010), and raising concerns that coalition interests blur the inquiry’s objectivity (26 
January 2010). 
Media Indonesia implicitly supports the inquiry’s calls to suspend Sri Mulyani 
and Boediono (22 December 2009). Furthermore, in contrast to Kompas, Media 
Indonesia describes Yudhoyono’s comment that there was no legal basis to suspend 
Sri Mulyani and Boediono as suspicious by asking why there was no fuss when 
others were suspended during ongoing investigations. However, Media Indonesia 
does not want the investigation to stop with Sri Mulyani and Boediono. Media 
Indonesia (8 December 2009) suggests that there was an “invisible hand” that made 
both implement the bailout: 
[T]he flow of funds was enforced by an invisible hand . . . This invisible hand 
caused people like Boediono, then Governor of Bank Indonesia, to dispense 
with caution and approve the bailout. This invisible hand also caused people 
like Sri Mulyani to feel to have no other choice but to disburse the Rp 6.7 trillion 
in funds.357 
 
Media Indonesia argues the bailout is wrong and those related to this case must be 
investigated further. However, as the main person responsible Media Indonesia does 
                                                          
356 See for example the Media Indonesia editorials of 15 December 2009; 22 December 2009; 20 January 
2010; and 3 February 2010. 
357 “kucuran dana itu dipaksakan oleh tangan yang tidak kelihatan . . . Tangan yang tidak terlihat 
itulah yang menyebabkan orang seperti Boediono yang waktu itu menjadi Gubernur Bank Indonesia 
kehilangan kehati-hatian sehingga menyetujui bailout. Tangan yang tidak terlihat itu juga yang 
menyebabkan orang seperti Sri Mulyani merasa tidak memiliki pilihan lain kecuali menggelontorkan 
dana Rp 6,7 triliun” (Media Indonesia, 8 December 2009). 
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not identify Sri Mulyani and Boediono, but rather the president. Thus, Media 
Indonesia (24 February 2010) wants Sri Mulyani and Boediono to be named as those 
responsible in the committee’s final report in order to be able to take the matter 
further, right to the president:  
[I]f the majority of factions state Sri Mulyani and Boediono are allegedly guilty, 
the hot ball will pass on to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 
presidential systems, the vice-president and the minister are servants carrying 
out the orders of their boss. Presidential impeachment will be a hot agenda as a 
consequence.358 
 
Media Indonesia’s disagreement with the government’s position that Bank Century 
had to be bailed out because of a systemic threat and that the bailout was conducted 
according to the law is evident in its frequent and unquestioning reference to Jusuf 
Kalla. In contrast to the government, Kalla criticised the bailout, saying there was no 
danger of a systemic impact should the government let the bank default, and that 
the bank was robbed by its owners. From the very beginning Media Indonesia uses 
Kalla to express its criticisms of the bailout and to point to the ambiguity. For 
example, by interpreting the fact that Jusuf Kalla was not informed about the bailout 
decision as “strange”359 and pointing to a lack of transparency in the bailout (1 
September 2009).360 
                                                          
358 “kalau mayoritas fraksi menyebut Sri Mulyani dan Boediono sebagai pihak yang diduga kuat 
bersalah, bola panas akan mengalir ke Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Dalam sistem 
presidensial, wakil presiden dan menteri adalah pembantu yang melaksanakan perintah atasan 
mereka. Pemakzulan presiden akan menjadi agenda panas sebagai konse-kuensinya” (Media 
Indonesia, 24 February 2010). 
359 “aneh” 
360 See section 4.2 of this thesis. 
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Furthermore, by heading an editorial with the question “Will the Century 
inquiry block JK [Jusuf Kalla] …?”361 Media Indonesia (8 December 2009) raises 
concerns that the committee (under the leadership of Idrus Marham) might not 
invite Jusuf Kalla to give testimony since “[a]s vice president in charge of the 
economy and as a person who has the experience and instincts of trading, JK might 
know about the game of the invisible hand”362 (8 December 2009). 
However, Media Indonesia’s anti-bailout and anti-government stance is most 
profoundly exemplified during the period between the announcement of the 
parliamentary inquiry’s preliminary conclusion on 8 February 2010 and the DPR’s 
vote on the inquiry’s final report on 3 March 2010. When it became apparent that the 
PKS and the Golkar deviated from the government’s stance, Media Indonesia praises 
both parties for advancing a contrary view to the government’s despite being a 
coalition member. Consequently, Media Indonesia condemns the Democratic Party’s 
suggestion of a cabinet reshuffle as a means to change the stance of the PKS and the 
Golkar on the bailout. Following the committee’s preliminary conclusion revealing 
that the majority of political parties – including coalition partners Golkar and PKS – 
opposed the bailout, Media Indonesia (10 February 2010) is critical of whether the 
political parties only deviated from the government’s stance in order to increase 
their “bargaining power”363 or whether they will maintain their stance. 
                                                          
361 “Angket Century mencekal JK [Jusuf Kalla]…?” 
362 “Sebagai wakil presiden yang menangani bidang ekonomi dan sebagai orang yang memiliki 
pengalaman dan naluri per dagangan, JK mungkin tahu tentang permainan tangan yang tidak terlihat 
itu.” 
363 “menaikkan posisi tawar”(Media Indonesia, 10 February 2010). 
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Can they maintain consistency in their stance towards the Bank Century 
scandal or will they, in the end, rather be subdued by the swift seduction to 
political compromise?364  
 
Will they [the parties] be consistent with their final view in the plenary meeting 
of the committee or bought by lobbying? 365  
 
That implies that Media Indonesia supports the preliminary conclusion of the 
committee to fault the bailout. Furthermore, Media Indonesia pictures any deviation 
from the committee’s preliminary conclusion as a foul compromise enforced by 
threats from the Democratic Party and the government. Consequently, Media 
Indonesia pushes the political factions to condemn the bailout. Simultaneously, 
Media Indonesia (16 February 2010) pictures Yudhoyono’s and the Democratic 
Party’s efforts to pull the coalition parties onto their side prior to the committee’s 
final conclusion as measures to put pressure on the coalition members.  
From threats of a cabinet reshuffle to the order to investigate tax offenders that 
are detrimental to the country . . . The political interest of the Democrats is that 
the committee will come to a conclusion that is pleasing the government of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 366 
 
By encouraging the factions to maintain their preliminary stance while 
simultaneously condemning the government’s and the Democratic Party’s lobbying 
efforts to change those stances, Media Indonesia reveals its position as being anti-
bailout and anti-government. Consequently, Media Indonesia (25 February 2010) 
                                                          
364 “Bisakah mereka tetap menjaga konsistensi sikap terhadap skandal Bank Century itu atau malah 
pada akhirnya takluk oleh rayuan derasnya politik kompromi?” (Media Indonesia, 25 February 2010). 
365 “Apakah mereka konsisten dengan pandangan akhir di rapat pleno pansus atau terbeli oleh lobi?” 
(Media Indonesia, 2 March 2010). 
366 “Dari ancaman reshuffle kabinet sampai perintah mengusut para pengemplang pajak yang 
merugikan negara  . . .  Kepentingan politik Demokrat adalah pansus menghasilkan kesimpulan yang 
ramah bagi pemerintahan Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono” (Media Indonesia, 16 February 2010). 
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welcomes the committee’s final conclusion that “there are irregularities and 
violations both before and after the bailout process.”367 
Following the DPR’s vote that condemns the bailout, Media Indonesia’s (5 
March 2010) scepticism towards the legislature vanishes and it now speaks highly of 
the parliamentary inquiry and the DPR:  
The Century inquiry committee which ended on Wednesday (3/3) evening 
reversed all the bad assumptions about the DPR . . . The majority of the factions 
showed consistency. They gave a lesson that the voice of the people is above all 
and cannot be bartered with ministerial seats or offers of money. The coalition 
must be a meaningful repository to stand up for truth and justice, not a 
conspiracy to conceal decay. The Century inquiry committee raised our 
optimism that a new generation has been born in the DPR.368  
 
Explaining Media Indonesia’s coverage 
As previously discussed Media Indonesia’s editorial stance is intrinsically tied to its 
owner’s interests and personal relationships. In order to explain Media Indonesia’s 
stance the following paragraphs focus on Surya Paloh’s political ambitions and his 
relationship to Jusuf Kalla, President Yudhoyono, and Golkar since 2004. 
Surya Paloh had utilized his media empire to campaign for Golkar during 
the 2004 legislative elections (Luwarso 2004: 144-6), but did not support the 
campaign of Golkar’s presidential candidate Wiranto. Instead, he supported the 
campaign of Jusuf Kalla who had paired with Yudhoyono as the latter’s vice-
                                                          
367 “ada penyimpangan dan pelanggaran baik sebelum maupun sesudah proses bailout” (Media 
Indonesia, 25 February 2010). 
368 “Pansus Angket Century yang berakhir Rabu (3/3) malam membalikkan semua anggapan buruk 
tentang DPR . . . Mayoritas fraksi menunjukkan konsistensi. Mereka memberi pelajaran bahwa suara 
rakyat di atas segalanya dan tidak bisa dibarter dengan kursi menteri ataupun tawaran fulus. Koalisi 
haruslah bermakna berhimpunan untuk membela kebenaran dan keadilan, bukan persekongkolan 
untuk menyembunyikan kebusukan. Pansus Angket Century membangkitkan optimisme kita bahwa 
sebuah generasi baru telah lahir di DPR.” (Media Indonesia, 5 March 2010). 
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presidential candidate. Some of the reasons for Paloh’s stance on this were related to 
his failure to be nominated as Golkar’s presidential candidate through the party’s 
convention in April 2004, and his close relationship to Kalla. He had also been 
approached by former Media Indonesia journalist and then PR-manager of 
Yudhoyono’s campaign team, Usamah Hisyam, with the request to support 
Yudhoyono’s election campaign through his media empire (AJI 2004: 27). 
Reportedly, Yudhoyono had offered Paloh the position as Minister of 
Communications and Information Technology in return for his media support. 
Paloh, however, had no intention to become minister and Yudhoyono agreed to 
promise him the position of Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Council instead 
(Hisyam 2014: 101-14). 
Paloh’s support for the Yudhoyono-Kalla government was not limited to 
mobilising his media empire. He also tried to change Golkar’s oppositional stance 
towards the Yudhoyono-Kalla government into a position of loyal support. When 
perceived too weak to win the Golkar chairmanship Paloh dropped out of the 
competition to pave the way for his close confidant Kalla who was more likely to 
outmanoeuvre incumbent party chairman Akbar Tandjung.369 Following Kalla’s 
election as Golkar chairman, Paloh became chairman of Golkar’s advisory board 
and his media company was given the exclusive right to advertise all the 
government’s procurement projects.370  
                                                          
369 Weakening the opposition and strengthening their support in the DPR was crucial for the 
Yudhoyono-Kalla government since even though Yudhoyono had overwhelmingly won the 
presidency in October 2004, his political vehicle PD was too weak to contend with the legislative power 
of Golkar and PDI-P which intended to play the role of a serious opposition (Hadi 2011: 193). 
370 Interview with Rendi A. Witular, journalist, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 24 June 2009. 
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Meanwhile, the relationship between Yudhoyono and Paloh deteriorated 
when Yudhoyono broke his promises to make Paloh chairman of the Presidential 
Advisory Council, to award him a service medal for his humanitarian aid for Aceh 
tsunami victims, and to implement Paloh’s concept of a ‘National Restoration’371 
program for a better Indonesia. The latter concept particularly had reportedly been 
the decisive factor in getting Paloh to back Yudhoyono’s 2004 presidential campaign 
(Hisyam 2014: 160). 
During the 2009 elections Paloh threw his support behind Golkar and its 
presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla (Saptono 2010: 36, 39-42) who had decided not to 
continue his partnership with Yudhoyono but to run for the presidency himself. 
Thus, Surya Paloh has been consistent in utilizing his media empire to support 
Golkar and Jusuf Kalla in all his presidential and vice-presidential ambitions 
(Kompas.com, 22 September 2015; Hisyam 2014: 170-9). However, following Kalla’s 
defeat Paloh lost access to lucrative government resources since the new 
Yudhoyono-Boediono government wanted to adopt open tendering rather than 
giving exclusive rights to certain media. Therefore, Media Indonesia would loose an 
effective monopoly of advertising for government procurement projects and thus an 
income source.372 Furthermore, Surya Paloh was upset that during the 2009 Golkar 
                                                          
371 According to the movement’s own website “RESTORATION Indonesia is a movement to recover, 
restore, and promote the functions of the Indonesian government to the ideals of the Proclamation of 
1945, which protects the whole Indonesian nation, promotes public welfare, the intellectual life of the 
nation, and participates in the establishment of a new world order.”(“RESTORASI Indonesia adalah 
gerakan memulihkan, mengembalikan, serta memajukan fungsi pemerintahan Indonesia kepada cita-
cita Proklamasi 1945, yaitu melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia, memajukan kesejahteraan umum, 
mencerdaskan kehidupan berbangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia.”) (Nasdem n.d.). 
372 Interview with Rendi A. Witular, journalist, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 24 June 2009. 
250 
chairmanship elections Yudhoyono supported Aburizal Bakrie as new Golkar 
chairman rather than him.373 
Those factors contribute to explaining why Surya Paloh had an interest in 
ousting Yudhoyono and to explain why MetroTV took aim at the president and vice-
president over the Bank Century scandal, and (unlike the Bakrie-owned TVOne, for 
example) did not only target Sri Mulyani.374 Media Indonesia also covers the alleged 
Bakrie-group tax evasion on its cover page,375 but solely in order to attack Bakrie to 
whom Paloh had lost the Golkar's chairmanship in October 2009, and not (as Koran 
Tempo does) also to support Sri Mulyani. Indeed, Media Indonesia describes Sri 
Mulyani’s public disclosure of her personal conflict with Bakrie as inappropriate (12 
December 2009) and warns against using the Bakrie tax evasion issue for political 
bargaining (5 January 2010; 11 February 2010). During Centurygate Paloh even 
redefined his stance on the scandal and used his power and influence to support Sri 
Mulyani (Witoelar, 3 February 2010).376 Another factor that contributes to Media 
Indonesia’s anti-government stance is Paloh’s long standing friendship with Kalla 
who openly faulted the bailout. 
Media Indonesia’s depiction of the parliament, political parties, the 
government, and the political process gives the overall impression that the whole 
system is corrupt. In so doing, Media Indonesia lays the ground for Surya Paloh’s 
political ambitions, namely the establishment of his social movement – National 
Democrats (Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem) – that aims to ‘restore’ Indonesia. 
                                                          
373 Interview with Rendi A. Witular, journalist, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 24 June 2009. 
374 Interview with Rendi A. Witular, journalist, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 24 June 2009. 
375 14-17 December 2009; 9-12 February 2010. 
376 Paloh’s rift with Bakrie might have also played a role in his decision to support Mulyani.  
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5.2 Kompas: Avoiding conflict and prioritizing stability 
Overview of Kompas’ position 
In summary, Kompas wanted Centurygate to be solved but not at the expense of 
destroying the government. Kompas hoped the case would be solved quickly so it 
would not affect the new government’s performance. From the outset, Kompas took 
the view that a parliamentary investigation would attract unwarranted attention to 
the case. This fear becomes particularly true when the coalition seems to fall apart 
over the fiasco. For Kompas it is not only the performance of the government that 
was at stake but democracy in general. Kompas repeatedly emphasised that 
Indonesia has a presidential system and that Yudhoyono and Boediono were elected 
democratically and with a majority. Within this context it is also understandable 
that Kompas supports calls for Yudhoyono to step in and resolve the issue. 
In conformity with its generally cautious editorial policy, Kompas avoids 
taking a clear position on the Bank Century controversy. However, since its main 
concern is to resolve the case as soon as possible and to keep the government stable 
and functioning effectively, Kompas criticises everything – for example, the 
parliamentary inquiry and renegade coalition partners – that endangers this 
stability. Kompas does not support Yudhoyono, Boediono or Sri Mulyani because the 
paper shares their assertions about the bailout but rather because Kompas wants a 




Following the scandal’s disclosure, Kompas (29 August 2009) writes “the 
government and BI are placed in a position that should be held accountable because 
they decided to rescue Bank Century”377 and deems Bank Indonesia to have been 
“negligent and indecisive since the beginning”378 in overseeing Bank Century. In 
respect to the bailout money Kompas disagrees with the government’s assertion: 
Although the Finance Minister said the funds that were used were not state 
funds, LPS funds are nonetheless government or state funds, and therefore 
must be accountable to the public.379 
 
When the Bank Century case had widened, Kompas’ position becomes more 
apparent. Kompas (7 September 2009) supports the government’s assertion that it 
had to bail out Bank Century in order to avoid a systemic threat to the banking 
sector. This becomes clear when Kompas attributes Yudhoyono’s and Boediono’s 
election victory to the public’s confidence in the pair’s ability to lead the 
government and by pointing out the Yudhoyono government’s success in 
overcoming the global economic crisis. Additionally, Kompas offers Sri Mulyani’s 
justification: 
[T]ime and the context of the crisis that hit Bank Century coincided with the 
global economic crisis. Viewed in such a context, measures to help a bank in 
trouble are assessed to prevent the collapse of other banks.380  
                                                          
377 “Pemerintah dan BI ditempatkan dalam posisi yang harus bertanggung jawab karena mereka dulu 
yang memutuskan melakukan penyelamatan Bank Century” (Kompas, 29 August 2009). 
378 “lalai dan tidak tegas sejak awal“ (Kompas, 29 August 2009). 
379 “Meski Menkeu mengatakan dana yang dipakai bukan dana APBN, tetap saja dana LPS adalah 
dana pemerintah atau negara, karena itu harus dipertanggungjawabkan kepada masyarakat” 
(Kompas, 29 August 2009). 
380 “waktu dan konteks terjadinya krisis yang menimpa Bank Century bersamaan dengan munculnya 
krisis ekonomi dunia. Dipandang dalam konteks seperti itu, langkah membantu bank yang tertimpa 
masalah dinilai bisa mencegah jatuhnya bank lain” (Kompas, 7 September 2009). 
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Although writing in the next paragraph that “the Bank Century leadership acted 
against the law,”381 Kompas focusses on the need to take legal action against the 
bank’s owners, and deflects attention from the government. 
Kompas is not in favour of a parliamentary inquiry. This is because Kompas 
(30 November 2009) sees the Bank Century case first and foremost as a disruption to 
the government’s performance and urges against any measures that might prolong 
the case:  
There is no other way; the Bank Century matter should be clarified, fairly and 
properly. Pursued through the use of the right of inquiry by the DPR in 
accordance with its authority . . . Meanwhile, it is sensible and easy to 
understand that the case itself and the issues surrounding Bank Century are 
sensitive, even complicated, because it involves the names of high-ranking 
officials. It is understandable that the impact of this complicated issue will also 
have some impact upon the government’s performance. In fact, the people's 
expectations of the new government are high and pressing. The situation we 
may encounter could become crisis-prone.382 
 
Kompas does not state explicitly that it is against a parliamentary inquiry. However, 
it argues that  “[w]e would take a long sigh . . . if this case is to be made clearer, for 
example through the parliamentary inquiry initiative”383 (30 November 2009), and 
notes that the case gained in complexity following the DPR’s manoeuvre to propose 
an inquiry (3 December 2009). Further, it supports Vice-President Boediono’s 
                                                          
381 “pimpinan Bank Century melakukan tindakan melanggar hokum” (Kompas, 7 September 2009). 
382 “Tidak bisa lain, masalah Bank Century harus dibuat jelas, adil, dan benar. Ditempuh jalur 
penggunaan hak angket oleh DPR sesuai dengan wewenangnya . . . Sementara itu, masuk akal dan 
juga segera bisa kita tangkap bahwa kasus dan masalah sekitar Bank Century ini masalah yang peka, 
bahkan masalah rumit karena disebutnya nama-nama pejabat tinggi. Masuk akal jika pengaruh yang 
rumit itu sedikit banyak akan menerpa pula kinerja pemerintah. Padahal, harapan masyarakat pada 
pemerintahan baru tinggi dan mendesak. Suatu situasi yang bisa rawan akan kita hadapi”(Kompas, 30 
November 2009). 
383 “Keluhan panjang perlu kita . . . jika kasus itu dibuat jelas di antaranya lewat prakarsa angket DPR” 
(Kompas, 30 November 2009). 
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suggestion that the case should be settled as soon as possible through legal 
proceedings without waiting for the result of a parliamentary investigation (3 
December 2009; 4 December 2009). By adopting such a stance, Kompas clearly 
opposes establishing a parliamentary inquiry. Kompas’ (3 December 2009) support 
for the government’s preference to resolve the Bank Century case quickly, and its 
efforts to deflect attention away from the case is also evident in the paper’s 
observation that the Yudhoyono has already publicly denied any involvement in the 
case: 
The president explicitly and clearly assessed the news [that the Bank Century 
bailout funds assisted his campaign in the last presidential election] as a slander 
that does not hold any truth.384  
 
Consequently Kompas does not call upon the PPATK to disclose its data on the flow 
of the Bank Century bailout funds in order to quash those rumours but places its 
trust in the president by regarding his denial as sufficient. Overall, Kompas indicates 
it will trust the government and leave it up to the government and the courts to 
solve the case.  
Although disenchanted with the personnel in the committee and the election 
of Idrus Marham as its chairman (7 December 2009) Kompas’ main concern is the 
very existence of the committee. More specifically, Kompas fears that a 
parliamentary inquiry would politicise the issue and guarantee prolonged attention 
while simultaneously deflecting the government’s attention from more important 
policy matters. 
                                                          
384 “Secara tegas dan gamblang Presiden menilai kabar itu [kabar tentang aliran dana talangan Bank 
Century untuk kebutuhan tim kampanyenya dalam pemilihan presiden lalu] sebagai fitnah yang tak 
mengandung kebenaran” (Kompas.com, 3 December 2009). 
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During the course of the investigation it becomes clearer that Kompas’ main 
concern is the desire to get beyond the scandal as soon as possible in order to keep 
the government and the economy running optimally. Consequently, Kompas 
constantly criticizes the parliamentary inquiry over its handling of the case385 and 
emphasises that the Bank Century case is distracting the government from other 
more important issues. The paper urges the political elite to settle the case quickly. 
Editorial headlines386 as well as the following quotes show the prominence of this 
demand by Kompas, and manifest its negative stance towards the committee: 
Without people realising, the Bank Century bailout case has broken the 
concentration on implementing various important nation-building agendas. 
The polemic of the Bank Century case has taken a lot of attention, and set back 
the work program of the nation, including the 100-day program of the Cabinet . 
. . So, once again, the Bank Century case that is so complex and sensitive needs 
urgently to be solved openly, quickly, accurately, and wisely, always referring 
to and prioritizing the much larger interests of the nation.387  
 
Increasingly the question is heard, how far might the Bank Century case disrupt 
or threaten the existence of Indonesian democracy? . . . The settlement of the 
Bank Century case is still unclear despite much wasted time and energy . . . An 
immediate settlement of the Bank Century case will certainly help to ease the 
                                                          
385 For example, Kompas is critical of the disclosure of non-verified information (15 December 2009), 
argues the style of questioning the witnesses is impolite, lacks focus and gives the impression that the 
“special committee has become a courtroom” (“Pansus telah menjadi ruang pengadilan”) (14 January 
2010).  
386 For example, ‘Concentration is indispensable’ (‘Konsentrasi sangat diperlukan’) (14 December 2009), 
‘Get this into proportion’ (‘Kembali ke proporsi’) (28 December 2009). 
387 “Tanpa banyak disadari, kasus dana talangan Bank Century telah memecah konsentrasi 
pelaksanaan berbagai agenda penting pembangunan bangsa. Polemik kasus Bank Century telah 
menyita banyak perhatian, mendesak jauh ke belakang program kerja bangsa, termasuk Program 100 
Hari Kabinet . . . Maka, sekali lagi, kasus Bank Century yang begitu kompleks dan sensitif sungguh 
mendesak untuk segera diselesaikan secara terbuka, cepat, cermat, dan arif dengan selalu mengacu 
dan mendahulukan kepentingan bangsa yang jauh lebih besar” (14 December 2014). 
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tasks and responsibilities of government, and society can then settle other 
complicated issues, such as poverty, social inequality, and unemployment.388  
We are included among those concerned at the effect of the inquiry upon the 
ability of the government to concentrate on implementing programs such as 
improving the economy of the people and democratic governance processes 
that are effective and efficient.389  
 
The direction of the Special Committee is not yet clear, but it has distracted the 
government from carrying out its work program.390  
 
The Bank Century case has become loose cannon that has destabilized the 
cohesiveness of the coalition.391  
 
Kompas’ main concern is to keep the government running. Consequently, it also 
objects to the DPR’s call to suspend Boediono and Sri Mulyani during the ongoing 
parliamentary inquiry. Furthermore, Kompas (21 December 2009) praises 
Yudhoyono’s statement that there is no legal basis to suspend the vice-president or 
finance minister as strengthening his leadership. Kompas (28 December 2009) also 
supports Boediono and Sri Mulyani by describing them positively (30 November 
2009) and by emphasizing that the inquiry’s “approach should not be accompanied 
                                                          
388 “Semakin terdengar pertanyaan, seberapa jauh kasus Bank Century berpotensi mengganggu atau 
mengancam kehidupan demokrasi Indonesia . . . Arah penyelesaian kasus Bank Century masih belum 
jelas sekalipun sudah banyak membuang-buang waktu dan energi . . . Penyelesaian segera kasus Bank 
Century sudah pasti akan turut membantu meringankan tugas dan tanggung jawab pemerintah dan 
masyarakat membereskan berbagai persoalan rumit lainnya, seperti kemiskinan, kesenjangan sosial, 
dan pengangguran” (Kompas, 5 January 2010). 
389 “Kita termasuk yang risau atas pengaruh proses angket terhadap konsentrasi pelaksanaan program 
pemerintah seperti memajukan ekonomi rakyat serta proses pemerintahan demokrasi yang efektif dan 
efisien” (Kompas, 18 January 2010). 
390 “Arah Pansus belum begitu jelas, tetapi telah mengganggu konsentrasi pemerintah dalam 
menjalankan program kerjanya” (Kompas, 1 February 2010). 
391 “Kasus Bank Century memang telah menjadi bola liar dan juga panas, yang menggoyahkan 
kekompakan koalisi” (Kompas, 24 February 2010). 
257 
by prejudice against key officials in the government, who apparently also have a 
reputation, a history of integrity, and credibility”392. 
A further indication of Kompas’ support of Sri Mulyani and Boediono is 
evident in an editorial published in mid-January 2010. Framed in a general 
discussion about ‘Legalism and Leadership’393 Kompas (16 January 2010) argues: 
In dealing with various problems and crises, leaders can no longer simply act 
normatively, based on the norms or rules, but must dare to be circuit-breakers 
albeit with occasional risks. Leaders who are not willing to take risks will tend 
to play it safe. If a leader is not willing to take responsibility, the process of 
development and change will only be slowed down naturally. The expression 
of courage is not primarily presented in words, but in the policy, which is 
needed to overcome a critical situation or to spur progress . . . So the Bank 
Century case must not only be seen from its legal aspects, but needs to be 
assessed from the aspects of leadership management that refer to the ethics of 
responsibility.394 
 
Kompas (1 March 2010) argues that the bailout decision and the legal violations that 
followed need to be differentiated, and that Sri Mulyani and Boediono cannot be 
held responsible for what happened after the bailout policy decision. 
In early 2010, when it becomes clear that the Bank Century crisis has not 
only compromised the Yudhoyono-Boediono government but also endangers its 
                                                          
392 “Pendekatannya tidak disertai sikap prasangka terhadap pejabat-pejabat kunci yang duduk dalam 
pemerintahan, yang ternyata juga punya reputasi, riwayat integritas, dan kredibilitas”(Kompas, 28 
December 2009). 
393 ‘Legalistik dan Kemimpinan’ (Kompas, 16 January 2010). 
394 “Dalam menghadapi berbagai persoalan dan krisis, pemimpin tidak bisa lagi hanya bertindak 
normatif, berdasarkan norma atau aturan saja, tetapi berani melakukan terobosan yang terkadang 
penuh risiko. Pemimpin yang tidak mau mengambil risiko akan cenderung bermain aman. Jika 
seorang pemimpin tidak berani mengambil tanggung jawab, proses perkembangan dan perubahan 
hanya akan berjalan pelan secara alamiah . . . Maka kasus Bank Century tidak boleh hanya dilihat dari 
aspek hukum, tetapi perlu dikaji dari aspek manajemen kepemimpinan yang mengacu pada etika 
tanggung jawab” (Kompas, 16 January 2010). 
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existence Kompas intensifies its calls to end the matter. For Kompas, the Bank Century 
case threatens Indonesian democracy because it destabilises the democratically 
elected Yudhoyono-Boediono government (5 January 2010). Kompas urges both the 
government and the legislators to end the case. In its editorial ‘Needs to be solved 
immediately’,395 Kompas (20 January 2010) urges the parliamentary inquiry to 
“immediately come to a conclusion.”396 The editorial ‘Let the president take over’397 
(18 January 2010) is a plea for Yudhoyono to take control of the Bank Century case. 
More specifically: 
We also argue that if the president intervenes, the attitude of the coalition 
parties, including its representatives in the DPR, would be more unified. The 
Bank Century case must be clarified, focusing on its main issue and the 
question of responsibility. At the same time, do not let its handling 
unintentionally affect the performance of a government that is backed by a 
majority coalition. This opinion is expressed as we – as well as expert observers 
– see the possibility that the handling of the Bank Century is spinning out of 
control, without any direction.398 
 
Kompas (4 January 2010) wants the Yudhoyono-Boediono coalition 
government to continue in its current form. In order to achieve that and prevent it 
fracturing over the Bank Century case Kompas simultaneously calls upon the 
president to show leadership and upon the coalition parties to “uphold truth and 
                                                          
395 ‘Perlu segera diselesaikan’ (Kompas, 20 January 2010). 
396 “segera mengambil kesimpulan” (Kompas, 18 January 2010). 
397 ‘Presiden agar ambil alih’ (Kompas, 18 January 2010). 
398 “Kita juga berpendapat, jika Presiden turun tangan, sikap partai-partai anggota koalisi termasuk 
wakilnya di DPR bisa lebih kompak. Kasus Bank Century harus dibuat jelas duduk perkaranya dan 
pertanggungjawabannya. Pada waktu yang sama, jangan sampai penanganannya tanpa sengaja 
memengaruhi kinerja pemerintah yang didukung koalisi besar. Pendapat itu dikemukakan ketika kita 
seperti halnya para pengamat ahli melihat kemungkinan penanganan kasus Bank Century berputar-
putar tanpa arah dan tak terkendali” (Kompas, 18 January 2010). 
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justice, but also deal with other existing challenges, namely the continuation of the 
government that needs the coalition.”399 
Kompas (29 January 2010) repeats its call to urge the president to intervene and 
unify the government in late January 2010 by demanding  
[s]trong and solid leadership of President Yudhoyono as the head of 
government in a presidential system is needed to localize the case in order that 
it does not widen . . . Constitutional political steps need to be taken by the 
president to find solutions so that we can get out of the entanglement of the 
Bank Century case.400  
 
In Kompas’ (27 February 2010) point of view, Yudhoyono should take responsibility 
for the bailout: 
Our Constitution affirms the presidential system of government . . . In a 
presidential system, the responsibility of government is in the hands of the 
president. Vice-president and the minister are assistants to the president.401  
 
Consequently, Kompas (1 March 2010) welcomes Yudhoyono’s announcement to 
take responsibility for the bailout decision. Besides emphasizing that Indonesia has 
a presidential system402  Kompas also repeatedly emphasizes that Yudhoyono and 
Boediono have been elected “in accordance with the provisions of the 
                                                          
399 “tetap berpegang pada kebenaran dan keadilan, tetapi tetap pula disertai tantangan lain yang 
dihadapi, yakni berlanjutnya pemerintahan yang memerlukan berlanjutnya koalisi” (Kompas, 4 
January 2010). 
400 “Kepemimpinan kukuh dan solid Presiden Yudhoyono sebagai kepala pemerintahan dalam sistem 
presidensial dibutuhkan untuk melokalisasi kasus agar tidak melebar . . . Langkah politik 
konstitusional perlu diambil Presiden untuk mencari solusi agar kita bisa keluar dari belitan kasus 
Bank Century”(Kompas, 29 January 2010). 
401 “Konstitusi kita menegaskan sistem pemerintahan presidensial . . . Dalam sistem presidensial, 
tanggung jawab pemerintahan ada di tangan presiden. Wakil presiden dan menteri adalah pembantu 
presiden” (Kompas, 27 February 2010). 
402 See for example the editorials of 18 January 2010; 23 January 2010; 29 January 2010; 27 February 
2010. 
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constitution”403 (21 December 2009) and with a majority (7 September 2009; 30 
November 2009). 
Based on its support for the Yudhoyono-Boediono government Kompas (21 
December 2009) encourages the coalition parties to follow their agreement: 
The coalition of parties that support and participate in the United Indonesia 
Cabinet II holds a majority vote in the DPR. From that standpoint, it would be 
strange, if, for example, in the case of Bank Century the government would be 
under pressure in the ballot.404  
 
In late February 2010 when it became apparent that the coalition parties would 
deviate from the government’s stance in the Bank Century case, Kompas (24 
February 2010) calls upon the coalition to reach an agreement and work together for 
the greater good instead of engaging in political bargaining. 
Kompas sees the lobbying efforts as a means to find a “collective solution”405 
(27 February 2010). Since Kompas wants the coalition to continue, it implicitly 
supports a reshuffle in order to enable the coalition government to work effectively 
and efficiently. The coalition should work together because it supports the 
government: 
Presumably it would be better if the government continues in accordance of the 
constitutional term. Personnel improvement within the cabinet is considered 
because the ability of some ministers is less convincing. However, the 
continuity of the coalition remains necessary . . . To achieve a coalition, 
moreover to strengthen and make it more effective, cohesiveness and a 
leadership that is confident, effective and efficient are needed. It is the 
                                                          
403 “sesuai dengan ketentuan konstitusi”(Kompas, 21 December 2009). 
404 “Koalisi partai-partai yang mendukung dan berpartisipasi dalam Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II 
menguasai mayoritas suara di DPR. Dari sudut pandang itu, aneh jika misalnya dalam kasus Bank 
Century pemerintahannya terdesak dalam pemungutan suara” (Kompas, 21 December 2009). 
405 “solusi bersama”(Kompas, 27 February 2010). 
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coalition’s duty to support and to carry out the implementation of governance 
that is united and authoritative.406  
 
Kompas (4 March 2010) sees the committee’s final vote as the result of the 
Yudhoyono-Boediono government camp’s failure “to ensure cohesiveness among 
coalition parties”407 and criticizes the coalition parties for deserting the coalition. As 
the consequence, Kompas suggests those parties resign from the coalition. Following 
the DPR’s vote on the committee’s report Kompas (5 March 2010) highlights that the 
Bank Century case is far from resolved and raises concerns of further political and 
economic complications. 
 
Explaining Kompas’ coverage 
The characteristics of Kompas and of its owner, Jakob Oetama, have been discussed 
in detail in the introduction to this thesis. Kompas’ reluctance to take a clear position 
in the Bank Century scandal may be explained by its non-confrontational style of 
journalism. Kompas managing editor Budiman Tanuredjo (interview, Jakarta, 16 
June 2009) stated that Kompas’ main emphasis was on keeping a neutral position in 
the Bank Century scandal and to cover both sides. In this context, he admits that 
people involved in the Bank Century case and its investigation tried unsuccessfully 
to influence Kompas’ editorial policy in their favour. For example, Sri Mulyani, 
                                                          
406 “Kiranya lebih baik jika pemerintahan ini berlangsung terus sesuai periode konstitusionalnya. 
Perbaikan personalia dalam kabinet dipertimbangkan karena sejumlah menteri memang kurang 
meyakinkan kemampuannya. Akan tetapi, koalisi tetap diperlukan kelanjutannya . . . Untuk 
mendapatkan koalisi, apalagi memperkuat dan membuatnya lebih efektif, diperlukan kekompakan 
dan kepemimpinan yang percaya diri, efektif, dan efisien. Koalisi bertugas untuk mendukung dan 
membuat terselenggaranya pemerintahan yang kompak dan berwibawa itu”(Kompas, 8 February 
2010). 
407 “menggalang kekompakan di kalangan partai-partai koalisi” (Kompas, 4 March 2010). 
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President Yudhoyono, and legislators of Team 9 all met with members of Kompas 
editorial staff to promote and elaborate on their view. Sri Mulyani, for example, 
complained to a Kompas journalist that Kompas was always allocating too much 
space to Team Nine and the Bank Century inquiry. 408  
However, the editorial analysis has shown that Kompas’ main concern was to 
resolve Centurygate quickly and to keep the government stable and working 
effectively. Consequently, Kompas criticises any action or behaviour – for example 
the parliamentary inquiry and renegade coalition partners – that endangers this 
stability. Kompas does not support Yudhoyono, Boediono or Sri Mulyani, because it 
shares their belief that the bailout was essential. Rather it took this stance because it 
supports Sri Mulyani’s policies which were threatened by the attacks made against 
her.409  
Kompas support for, and promotion of, a liberal economic policy dates back 
to the 1980s when it established a strategic linkageswith economic technocrats 
through housing periodic economic discussion panels, which continued to be 
convened after the fall of Suharto (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005: 43), with reports of 
these panel discussions appearing periodically on the paper’s front page. In 
addition, Kompas disseminated and promoted market-orientated policy reforms and 
de-regulation through its editorials, and its intensive coverage of, for example, the 
visits of IMF and World Bank officials (Mallarangeng 2000: 144, 161, 166-7). The 
                                                          
408 Interview with Budiman Tanuredjo, managing editor, Kompas, Jakarta, 16 June 2009. 
Tanuredjo elaborated that in order to uphold its neutral position, Kompas closely monitored its 
coverage of the Bank Century scandal. Its in-house Research and Development department (Pusat 
Informasi Kompas, Litbang Kompas) conducted a daily content analysis of Kompas’ coverage on the 
Bank Century case and compared it with several national newspapers.  
409 Personal communication with Vedi Hadiz, Perth, 24 September 2015. 
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Kompas Gramedia Group (KGG) itself profited from this policy to increase the role 
of private business since this allowed it to expand and to develop into Indonesia’s 
biggest conglomerate. A market-orientated and prosperous economy is crucial for 
the KGG and its diversified business interests. This explains why Kompas’ main 
emphasis was on ensuring a stable government that is able to function effectively 
and maintain a sound economy.  
Finally, it should also be mentioned that Kompas did not mix up the Bank 
Century scandal with the longstanding tensions between Sri Mulyani and Bakrie, 
nor did it raise the tax evasion allegations against Bakrie as a means to discredit the 
Golkar chairman or to pressure him to soften Golkar’s stance in the Bank Century 
inquiry. 
However, Kompas’ neutrality in the Bank Century scandal and its decision to 
not pick up on the tax evasion allegations against Bakrie also attracted criticism.410 
For example, Yopie Hidayat (interview, Jakarta, 19 May 2010), spokesperson for 
Boediono and former chief editor of Kontan, a business newspaper in the KKG, 
argues “if Kompas had defended Sri Mulyani from the beginning, there wouldn’t 
have been a Bank Century case,” and adds:  
I complained to Jakob Oetama that Kompas didn’t carry a word about the Bakrie 
tax… Nobody argues with Jakob Oetama, he is like a god…Jakob Oetama said 
he doesn’t want to stir up the conflict, making it worse, doesn’t want to give it a 
personal touch between Ical [Aburizal Bakrie] and Sri Mulyani… Even though 
                                                          
410 In contrast to Media Indonesia and Koran Tempo, Kompas did not prominently report on the alleged tax 
evasion against the three Bakrie owned coal mining companies. Kompas only made a comment on the 
issue in its satirical corner (‘pojok’) on its opinion page: “Tiga usaha Bakrie diduga memanipulasi 
pajak Rp 2,1 triliun. Setiap peseteru masing-masing punya kartu truf“(Kompas, 16 December 2009). In 
February 2010 Kompas only covered the Bakrie tax issue in the context of the tension in the ruling 
coalition and in relation to lobbying efforts by the government in the Bank Century scandal. 
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the tax investigation was already a legal case and covered in all other media 
Jakob Oetama said “no”. 
 
Budiman Tanuredjo (interview, Jakarta, 16 June 2009), Kompas managing editor, 
admits that many people including Tempo staff, sent him text messages, asking why 
Kompas did not report Bakrie’s alleged tax fraud. He explained that the issue was 
discussed in the Kompas newsroom. For Kompas the question was first, if Bakrie has 
a tax problem why don’t the police or the director general of taxation resolve it, and 
why do the media need to be involved? Second, Kompas regarded the playing out of 
the tax issue to be part of a political manoeuvre, in contrast to the conflict between 
Bakrie and Sri Mulyani which the paper regarded as essentially a private issue. 
 
 
5.3 Koran Tempo: Pro-bailout, pro-Boediono and pro-Sri Mulyani 
Overview of Koran Tempo’s position 
Koran Tempo’s editorial position is pro-bailout and protective of Sri Mulyani and 
Boediono. Koran Tempo supports the government’s position on the bailout and is 
convinced of Sri Mulyani’s and Boediono’s innocence. Koran Tempo links the Bank 
Century scandal to intra-elite rivalry between Boediono and Sri Mulyani on the one 
hand and the group around Jusuf Kalla on the other. Koran Tempo projects the 
Democratic Party and Yudhoyono as having something to hide by emphasizing 
their efforts to hamper an investigation into the Bank Century case. Koran Tempo 
calls upon the president to take responsibility for the bailout and to defend his aides 
whose ouster has become the aim of the parliamentary inquiry. Koran Tempo does 
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not fault the government’s bailout policy and those deemed most responsible for it 
but is critical of Bank Indonesia’s chaotic oversight of Bank Century. Consequently, 
Koran Tempo condemns the DPR’s decision to fault the bailout.  
 
Editorial analysis 
In contrast to Kompas which headed its first editorial on the issue ‘Bank Century 
Scandal’,411 Koran Tempo (1 September 2009) is calling it “the controversy of the 
injection of Rp 6.7 trillion by the LPS to that bank [Bank Century].”412 Koran Tempo 
emphasises that the controversy around Bank Century cannot be separated from an 
intra-elite conflict, namely “the sharp rivalry between the group of Jusuf Kalla and 
the Boediono camp, including Sri Mulyani”413 and also wonders why the DPR is 
putting the issue in the spotlight only after the bailout money had been transferred. 
Overall, Koran Tempo avoids recriminations and urges patience until the BKP’s audit 
result is available. By stating that the “Rp 6.7 trillion money came from funds 
collected through LPS from banks, and not from the state budget”414 Koran Tempo 
shares the government’s assertion regarding the bailout money.415  
As evident in the following excerpts, Koran Tempo clearly supports the 
government’s assertion that Bank Century posed a systemic threat to the banking 
                                                          
411 ‘Skandal Bank Century’ (Kompas, 29 August 2009). 
412 “kontroversi pemberian suntikan dana Rp 6,7 triliun oleh Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan kepada 
bank itu” (Koran Tempo, 1 September 2009). 
413 “persaingan sengit kelompok Jusuf Kalla dan kubu Boediono, termasuk di dalamnya Menteri 
Keuangan Sri Mulyani” (Koran Tempo, 1 September 2009). 
414 “uang Rp 6,7 triliun itu berasal dari dana yang dikumpulkan LPS dari kalangan perbankan, dan 
bukan dari anggaran negara” (Koran Tempo, 1 September 2009). 
415 Whereas Kompas and Media Indonesia wrote two editorials following the scandal’s initial disclosure, 
Koran Tempo only picks up the Bank Century case again in mid-October 2009. 
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sector, making it eligible for Rp 6.7 trillion from the Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(LPS). 
Former Bank Indonesia Governor Boediono (now vice-president), Finance 
Minister Sri Mulyani, and a series of other officials explained at great length the 
reason for the rescue. However, most members of the committee do not believe 
or do not agree that a failed Century Bank would have had a systemic impact if 
not rescued.416  
Members of the inquiry committee may just say pertinently that the systemic 
effects would not have emerged if the bank had not been saved. But this 
argument is very weak and contrary to the opinion of the banking community 
who experienced the events themselves.417  
 
Koran Tempo nevertheless supports the DPR’s call to conduct an investigative audit 
of Bank Century to resolve the obscurities surrounding its bailout. This support is 
based on the assumption that its result will disprove any alleged wrongdoing or 
shortcomings on behalf of the government in the Bank Century controversy (11 
November 2009) as well as uncover allegations of conspiracy related to it (15 
November 2009). However, once the audit was published and those hopes were not 
fulfilled, Koran Tempo (26 November 2009) identifies the BPK’s findings as “still 
hollow here and there”418 and supports the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry 
for the following reasons: 
                                                          
416 “Mantan Gubernur Bank Indonesia Boediono (kini wakil presiden), Menteri Keuangan Sri Mulyani, 
dan sederet pejabat lain berupaya sekuat tenaga menjelaskan alasan penyelamatan itu. Tapi umumnya 
anggota Panitia tetap tidak percaya atau tidak setuju bahwa Bank Century yang gagal akan 
berdampak sistemik jika tidak diselamatkan” (Koran Tempo, 19 January 2010). 
417 “Anggota Panitia Angket boleh saja ngotot menyatakan bahwa dampak sistemik tidak akan muncul 
andaikata bank ini tak diselamatkan. Tapi argumen ini amat lemah dan bertentangan dengan 
pendapat kalangan perbankan yang mengalami sendiri kejadian itu” (Koran Tempo, 27 February 
2010). 
418 “masih bolong di sana-sini”(Koran Tempo,  26 November 2009). 
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The public needs to be provided with information that is as clear as possible on 
whether or not there was a shady deal behind the rescue of Bank Century, 
which cost Rp 6.7 trillion. That is why it is important that the House of 
Representatives investigate this case through an inquiry. A parliamentary 
inquiry committee can uncover and verify the findings of the BPK. The 
government and the Central Bank also have a good opportunity to lay out all 
their arguments. Moreover, both are of the view that there are a number of fatal 
mistakes underlying the BPK’s audit results . . . Only with the serious 
investigation into the case, either by an inquiry or by law enforcement agencies, 
can government credibility be restored.419  
 
Thus Koran Tempo sees an inquiry into Bank Century first and foremost as a means 
for the government and Bank Indonesia to outline their position which contrasts 
with the BPK’s findings, and to reassert the government’s credibility. 
Koran Tempo becomes suspicious of the committee’s motives following its 
calls to suspend Sri Mulyani and Boediono during the parliamentary investigation. 
Koran Tempo’s critique of the committee’s work and the behaviour of its members 
sharpened in the course of time.420 Editorial headings like ‘Slapstick Century 
inquiry’421 (15 January 2010) and ‘Lousy Century inquiry’422 (27 February 2010) 
exemplify Koran Tempo’s attitude towards committee.  
                                                          
419 “Publik perlu mendapat informasi sejernih mungkin soal ada-tidaknya patgulipat di balik 
penyelamatan Century, yang menelan dana Rp 6,7 triliun. Inilah pentingnya Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat mengusut kasus ini lewat angket. Panitia angket DPR bisa mengungkap dan memverifikasi 
berbagai temuan BPK. Pemerintah dan bank sentral pun punya kesempatan bagus untuk 
membeberkan semua argumennya. Apalagi keduanya menilai ada sejumlah kekeliruan fatal yang 
mendasari hasil audit BPK . . . Hanya dengan proses pengusutan yang serius terhadap kasus ini, baik 
oleh panitia angket maupun institusi penegak hukum, kredibilitas pemerintah bisa dipulihkan” 
(Koran Tempo, 26 November 2009). 
420 See, for example, Koran Tempo, 15 January 2010; Koran Tempo, 28 January 2010; Koran Tempo, 1 
February 2010; Koran Tempo, 27 February 2010. 
421 ‘Dagelan Angket Century’ (Koran Tempo, 15 January 2010). 
422 ‘Amburadulnya Angket Century’ (Koran Tempo, 27 February 2010). 
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Koran Tempo (19 December 2009) describes the committee’s call for Sri 
Mulyani’s and Boediono’s resignations as “strange”423 and “truly odd”,424 and asks 
“whether the DPR’s politicians are really serious about investigating the Century 
case, or simply creating a political sensation?”425 Koran Tempo emphasises that there 
was no legal basis for such a call and that it is irrelevant since “[i]t cannot be stated 
yet whether Boediono and Sri Mulyani actually collided with the law, let alone 
engaged in a criminal act in the Century case.”426 
Koran Tempo (11 December 2009) interprets demands that Sri Mulyani and 
Boediono resign temporarily as a political manoeuvre that indicates the Bank 
Century case is being manipulated in a struggle over the positions of the finance 
minister and the vice-president. In this context, Koran Tempo (11 December 2009) 
urges Yudhoyono to not let “ministers or parties supporting the government utilize 
the issue to target crucial posts in the cabinet, and even the post of the vice-
president”427 and to focus not only on denying allegations that his family or the 
Democratic Party had been beneficiaries of the bailout money but also to stand up 
for Sri Mulyani and Boediono: 
Although both [Sri Mulyani and Boediono] were praised internationally for 
saving Indonesia from the storm of crisis and for bolstering the performance of 
the SBY administration they seem left to fight alone. Hopefully this does not 
                                                          
423 “aneh”. 
424 “sungguh ganjil”. 
425 “apakah politikus DPR benar-benar serius mengusut kasus Century atau sekadar membuat sensasi 
politik?” (Koran Tempo, 19 December 2009). 
426 “Boediono dan Sri Mulyani belum bisa dikatakan benar-benar menabrak undang-undang, apalagi 
terlibat dalam tindak pidana kasus Century” (Koran Tempo, 19 December 2009). 
427 “para menteri atau partai pendukung pemerintah memanfaatkan isu ini untuk mengincar pos 
penting di kabinet, bahkan jabatan wakil presiden” (Koran Tempo, 11 December 2009). 
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become a signal that paralyses the technocrats and lets the politician to emerge 
victorious in the cabinet.428  
 
This excerpt exemplifies Koran Tempo’s support for both bureaucrats and technocrats 
in government. Consequently, Koran Tempo (1 March 2010) neither faults the 
government’s bailout policy nor those deemed most responsible for its execution. 
Instead it criticises Bank Indonesia’s ineffectiveness in overseeing Bank Century and 
raises suspicions as to whether this indicates negligence or whether Bank Indonesia 
had intentionally turned a blind eye to the malpractices of Bank Century’s owners 
and management. 
Koran Tempo views the Democratic Party and Yudhoyono as having 
something to hide by emphasizing their efforts to hamper an investigation. For 
example, through an editorial (19 November 2009) critical of the attempts of DPR 
speaker Mazurki Alie to hinder legislators to propose a motion to inquire Bank 
Century:  
Marzuki’s attitude may reflect his dismay as the representative of the 
Democratic Party, the party supporting President Yudhoyono. They seem 
worried that the inquiry will affect the image of the SBY government. However, 
it would be more elegant if Marzuki would fight the submission for an inquiry 
through the jockeying between factions in parliament rather than by blocking it 
administratively.429 
  
                                                          
428 “Meski keduanya [Sri Mulyani and Boediono] dipuji dunia internasional karena berhasil 
menyelamatkan Indonesia dari badai krisis dan telah lama menopang kinerja pemerintah SBY, mereka 
terkesan dibiarkan bertarung sendirian. Mudah-mudahan ini tak menjadi sinyal lumpuhnya kaum 
teknokrat dan berjayanya kaum politikus di kabinet" (Koran Tempo, 11 December 2009). 
429 “Sikap Marzuki mungkin refleksi kegundahannya sebagai wakil dari Partai Demokrat, partai 
pendukung Presiden Yudhoyono. Mereka agaknya khawatir angket itu akan mempengaruhi citra 
pemerintah SBY. Namun, akan lebih elegan jika Marzuki melawan pengajuan angket lewat 
pertarungan fraksi di DPR, dan bukannya dengan menghambatnya secara administratif” (Koran 
Tempo, 19 November 2009). 
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Koran Tempo (9 December 2009) also criticized Yudhoyono's statement that the mass 
demonstrations scheduled for the International Anti-Corruption Day on 9 December 
2009 were politically charged and therefore could lead to unrest, as scare tactics that 
only aim to dissuade the population from participating in the demonstrations which 
were to demand a thorough investigation of the Bank Century case. In short, Koran 
Tempo interprets Yudhoyono’s statement as an effort to silence public demands to 
investigate the Bank Century case thoroughly.  
Whereas Koran Tempo clearly supports Boediono and Sri Mulyani and is 
convinced by their innocence, its stance towards Yudhoyono is more critical. For 
example, Koran Tempo does not regard Yudhoyono’s denial of the rumours that his 
Democratic Party had benefited from the Bank Century bailout money as sufficient 
and calls upon the president to take action. Namely, the paper wants the president 
to encourage the PPATK to disclose its data on the flow of the bailout funds for 
Bank Century in order to extinguish those suspicions (26 December 2009) and to 
“uncover allegations of power abuse and conspiracy in the rescue of Bank 
Century”430 (9 December 2009). 
Koran Tempo repeatedly urges Yudhoyono to take action to solve the Bank 
Century case. Those calls are often in relation to attempts to defend Sri Mulyani and 
Boediono.431 In mid-January 2010 Koran Tempo (19 January 2010) becomes more 
explicit by demanding through its editorial headlined ‘The President should not be 
silent’432:  
                                                          
430 “mengungkap dugaan adanya penyalahgunaan wewenang dan kongkalikong penyelamatan Bank 
Century” (Koran Tempo, 9 December 2009). 
431 For example, as previously discussed in the context of the calls for their suspension. 
432 ‘Presiden jangan diam’ (Koran Tempo, 19 January 2010). 
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President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should not just be a spectator when the 
Bank Century case is dismantled by the inquiry committee . . . The president 
must state publicly that he indeed had knowledge about the policy and agreed 
at that time . . . President Yudhoyono's reticence gives the impression that he 
did not know anything or did not approve the policy . . . It is also difficult to 
consider that the president did not agree with the policy because he actually 
picked Sri Mulyani again for the position of Minister of Finance for the next 
term. Even Boediono was then asked by Yudhoyono to remain with him as 
vice-president.433 
 
This clearly shows that Koran Tempo is convinced that Yudhoyono knew about the 
bailout and supported it. Interestingly, as the following excerpt shows, Koran Tempo 
(19 January 2010) not only demands that Yudhoyono state this publicly in order to 
defend Sri Mulyani and Boediono but also that he explain the rescue policy in order 
to address the rumours surrounding it, by arguing 
from the very beginning the investigation of the Century case is based on the 
suspicion that this policy benefited the party or the people supportive of 
Yudhoyono. That is why it is important that the president takes responsibility 
and does not allow the examination of the Century case to run unfairly. 
Whether requested by the inquiry committee or not, he needs to explain the 
Bank Century rescue policy. If not, it is Boediono and Sri Mulyani, who become 
easy targets, even victims. It has certainly hurt the public sense of justice. 
Because, so far there is no evidence that they gained any benefit from the 
policy.434 
                                                          
433 “Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tidak semestinya hanya menjadi penonton ketika kasus Bank 
Century dibongkar oleh Panitia Angket . . . Presiden mesti menyatakan secara terbuka bahwa 
kebijakan itu memang sepengetahuan dirinya dan saat itu ia menyetujuinya . . . Sikap diam Presiden 
Yudhoyono memberi kesan seolah-olah ia tak tahu-menahu atau tidak menyetujui kebijakan itu . . . 
Sulit pula menganggap Presiden tidak setuju terhadap kebijakan itu karena ia justru mengangkat Sri 
Mulyani lagi menjadi Menteri Keuangan untuk periode berikutnya. Bahkan Boediono kemudian 
diminta oleh Yudhoyono untuk mendampinginya sebagai wakil presiden” (Koran Tempo, 19 January 
2010). 
434 “sejak semula penyelidikan kasus Century didasarkan pada kecurigaan bahwa kebijakan ini 
menguntungkan partai atau orang-orang yang mendukung Yudhoyono. Itulah pentingnya Presiden 
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In late January 2010 Koran Tempo (30 January 2010) emphasises again that 
Yudhoyono should have stepped in earlier: 
If the president had taken responsibility for the rescue of Bank Century, 
perhaps the issue would not be so widespread. He should have given an 
assurance that the decision was taken to save the economy, so that was beyond 
doubt. The president should not allow his aides to be attacked by the DPR.435 
 
This shows that Koran Tempo blames Yudhoyono for the prolongation of the Bank 
Century case and for making Sri Mulyani and Boediono targets of the inquiry. 
Koran Tempo (27 February 2010) is frustrated by the committee’s conclusion 
and sees it first and foremost as the basis to initiate the ousting of Sri Mulyani and 
Boediono.  
It is not that the DPR should not be allowed to stage an inquiry . . . The problem 
is that Senayan’s politicians from the outset, were less accurate in assessing the 
Century issue. Some of them were more motivated by political desires to oust 
Vice-President Boediono and Finance Minister Sri Mulyani.436  
 
Following the DPR's decision to fault the rescue of Bank Century, Koran Tempo (4 
March 2010) raises concerns that this decision “has serious consequences, which 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mengambil alih tanggung jawab dan tidak membiarkan pemeriksaan kasus Century berjalan secara 
tidak fair. Diminta atau tidak oleh Panitia Angket, ia perlu menjelaskan seputar kebijakan 
penyelamatan Century. Jika tidak, Boediono dan Sri Mulyani yang menjadi sasaran empuk, bahkan 
korban. Ini tentu melukai rasa keadilan masyarakat. Soalnya, sejauh ini tak ada bukti bahwa mereka 
mendapatkan keuntungan apa pun dari kebijakan itu” (Koran Tempo, 19 January 2010). 
435 “Seandainya Presiden mengambil tanggung jawab atas penyelamatan Bank Century, barangkali 
persoalan tak semakin luas. Semestinya diyakini bahwa keputusan itu diambil demi menyelamatkan 
ekonomi, sehingga tak perlu ada keraguan mengambil alih. Presiden tak patut membiarkan para 
pembantunya menjadi bulan-bulanan serangan anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat” (Koran Tempo, 30 
January 2010). 
436 “DPR bukannya tidak boleh menggelar angket . . . Masalahnya, para politikus Senayan sejak awal 
kurang cermat menakar persoalan Century. Sebagian dari mereka lebih terdorong oleh nafsu politik 
untuk melengserkan Wakil Presiden Boediono dan Menteri Keuangan Sri Mulyani” (Koran Tempo, 27 
February 2010). 
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open the possibility of Vice-President Boediono being impeached”437 and warns that 
this could endanger the country’s political stability and democracy (4 March 2010). 
Koran Tempo’s (5 March 2010) support for the government becomes evident in the 
next editorial, which demands from the president “There must be concrete steps to 
ensure that this government will survive until 2014”.438 More specifically, the paper 
urges the president either to repair the current coalition or, if that is not possible, to 
form a new coalition that guarantees a stable government.  
If the president wants to maintain the existing coalition, he must verify the 
commitment of the parties, especially Golkar, PKS and PPP . . . If restoring the 
coalition is difficult, there is no need to strive too desperately. There is nothing 
wrong if the president builds a new coalition if this will ensure a healthier 
democracy as well as a more stable government.439  
 
 
5.4 Tempo: Pro-bailout, pro-Boediono and pro-Sri Mulyani  
Overview of Tempo’s position 
The following editorial analysis will show that the editorial position of Tempo was 
pro-bailout. Consequently, Tempo defends Sri Mulyani and Boediono who are 
regarded as those primarily responsible for the bailout decision. Tempo links the 
Bank Century scandal to the feud between Sri Mulyani and Aburizal Bakrie, and 
                                                          
437“memiliki konsekuensi serius, yakni membuka kemungkinan Wakil Presiden Boediono 
dimakzulkan”(Koran Tempo, 5 March 2010). 
438 “Harus ada langkah konkret untuk memastikan bahwa pemerintah ini bertahan hingga 2014” 
(Koran Tempo, 5 March 2010). 
439 “Jika Presiden ingin mempertahankan koalisi yang ada, ia harus memastikan lagi komitmen partai-
partai, terutama Golkar, PKS, dan PPP . . . Bila koalisi memang sulit diperbaiki, tak perlu pula mati-
matian dipertahankan. Tidak ada salahnya Presiden membangun koalisi baru jika memang akan 
menjamin demokrasi yang lebih sehat sekaligus pemerintah yang lebih stabil” (Koran Tempo, 5 March 
2010). 
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implies that Bakrie will use his position as Golkar chairman to oust Sri Mulyani over 
the Bank Century scandal. Tempo strongly criticizes Yudhoyono’s handling of the 
Bank Century scandal. The magazine is particularly critical of the president’s 
emphasis on political bargaining and his efforts to secure his position instead of 
standing behind his two aides and taking the responsibility for the bailout. For 
Tempo, it was not the bailout policy that was wrong but rather that Bank Indonesia 
failed to oversee Bank Century. Consequently, Tempo criticises the DPR’s decision to 
fault the Bank Century bailout and points out that Bank Indonesia’s failure in 
overseeing Bank Century could have been prevented if the DPR had fulfilled its 




Tempo’s first editorial following the disclosure of the Bank Century scandal reveals 
its pro-bailout stance. Tempo justifies the bailout by, among other things, arguing 
that the bank’s closure would have been more costly than its rescue; that the bank’s 
owner and its directors have already been arrested for alleged fraud; that the 
economic situation at the time of the bailout decision resembled the situation of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997/98; and that, since the bailout, Bank Century has 
already managed to make a profit. Tempo also does not mention that the bailout 
costs increased to Rp 6.7 trillion. Instead, it only contrasts the amount of Rp 6.4 
trillion that should have been paid out by the LPS in the event of the Bank Century’s 
closure with the much lesser estimated amount of Rp 632 billion for the rescue. 
Tempo supports the BPK audit in order to bring transparency to the Bank Century 
275 
case. However, Tempo particularly hopes that the audit will show that bailing out 
Bank Century was the right decision and that there was no embezzlement involved. 
The people need to be convinced that the rescue of Bank Century can be 
justified. The audit that will be conducted by the Supreme Audit Agency may 
be one way of creating that transparency.440 
 
The audit investigation currently underway by the Supreme Audit Agency is 
important to ensure that there are no irregularities behind the massive flow of 
funds.441 
 
Tempo supported the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry from the very 
beginning (16 November 2009, 1 December 2009) and strongly criticised the 
Democratic Party’s attempts to hamper its establishment. This is clearly expressed 
in the editorial’s headline ‘The right of inquiry should not be suppressed‘442 (16 
November 2009). Tempo supports the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry in 
order to clarify the policy of the bailout fund, to trace the flow of the bailout funds 
and to shed light on Bank Indonesia’s “special treatment”443 of Bank Century. 
However, following the public disclosure of the feud between Sri Mulyani 
and Bakrie, the election of a Golkar legislator as committee chairman and calls for 
Sri Mulyani and Boediono to step down temporarily, Tempo takes the position that 
Golkar chairman Bakrie is using the committee to oust Sri Mulyani. This becomes 
evident in Tempo’s editorial (20 December 2009) following the exposure of the long-
                                                          
440 “Rakyat perlu diyakinkan bahwa penyelamatan Century bisa dipertanggungjawabkan. Audit yang 
akan dilakukan oleh Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan barangkali merupakan salah satu cara menciptakan 
keterbukaan itu” (Tempo, 13 September 2009). 
441 “Audit investigasi yang sedang dirancang Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan penting sekali untuk 
memastikan tak ada penyimpangan di balik grojogan dana besar itu” (Tempo, 20 September 2009). 
442 ’Hak angket diredam jangan’ (Tempo, 16 November 2009). 
443 “perlakukan khusus” (Tempo, 16 November 2009). 
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standing feud between Mulyani and Bakrie in the context of the Bank Century 
scandal. Tempo sees the Bank Century case as part of the protracted conflict between 
Sri Mulyani and Bakrie that had erupted during Yudhoyono’s first term, when both 
held ministerial posts and disagreed on issues involving the Bakrie group. 
Consequently, Tempo (20 December 2009) interprets Bakrie’s announcement to 
support the suspension of all officials linked to the Bank Century case during the 
committee’s working period, while simultaneously supporting the Yudhoyono-
Boediono government, as evidence that Bakrie is only targeting Sri Mulyani. 
In arguing that the “committee should also not become the political tool of 
whomever”444 Tempo expresses its concern that the inquiry will lose its objectivity 
and could be dragged into the dispute between Sri Mulyani and Bakrie.445 These 
concerns over the inquiry’s objective are profoundly expressed in an editorial 
headline that questions ‘An inquiry on Bank Century or Sri Mulyani?’446 (20 
December 2009) and declares “The inquiry must focus on investigating Century’s 
bailout policy and the flow of funds. Search for truth, not for ousting state 
officials.”447 
Tempo also criticises other aspects of the committee. For example, the 
magazine argues that the parliamentarians are impolite, unethical, and interrogate 
                                                          
444 “Panitia hendaknya juga tidak menjadi alat politik siapa pun” (Tempo, 27 December 2009). 
445 Tempo also raises the possibility that – despite the fact that Golkar has joined the pro-government 
coalition with three of its party members currently holding ministerial post – Bakrie in his position as 
Golkar chairman could take a stance opposing the government. In this editorial Tempo also points out 
Yudhoyono’s dilemma in the conflict between Sri Mulyani and Aburizal, criticising Yudhoyono for not 
having resolved the conflict already during its first administration and siding with one of them; Tempo 
pictures Sri Mulyani in a positive way and Bakrie in a negative. 
446 ‘Angket Century atau Sri Mulyani?’ (Tempo, 27 December 2009). 
447 “Panitia Angket harus berfokus menelisik beleid penyelamatan dan aliran dana Century. Cari 
kebenaran, bukan mendongkel petinggi negeri” (Tempo, 27 December 2009). 
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rather than question the witnesses (24 January 2010, 9 February 2010). It says the 
sessions resemble a reality show (9 February 2010). It is critical of the committee’s 
decision to not invite the president to testify (7 February 2010a) and of the inquiry’s 
lack of focus (21 February 2010a). Nonetheless, Tempo’s main concern is that 
Boediono and Sri Mulyani will be made scapegoats: 
Oddly enough, even the majority of the members of the Special Committee 
have not deemed it necessary to invite the president to come to Senayan. This 
means, the real target is not the president. After the chairman of the Golkar 
Party – one of whose members became leader of the Special Committee – said 
Vice-President Boediono does not need to be impeached, we know that the 
target is Finance Minister Sri Mulyani.448  
 
Instead of seriously dissecting the alleged misappropriation of funds, the 
Special Committee more often performs political stunts and tries to find a 
scapegoat for the Century scandal. Vice-President Boediono and Finance 
Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati are the two government officials who are most 
widely accused of wrongdoing by the Special Committee – even though 
evidence or proof of wrongdoing by those two officials has not been 
substantiated by convincing data and arguments.449  
 
Tempo is critical of the Yudhoyono’s and the Democratic Party’s lobbying 
efforts towards its defecting coalition parties. For example, Tempo (21 February 
2010c) describes the Democratic Party’s suggestion of a cabinet reshuffle to 
                                                          
448 “Anehnya, justru mayoritas anggota Panitia Khusus belum memandang perlu mengundang 
Presiden datang ke Senayan. Artinya, sasaran sesungguhnya bukanlah Presiden. Setelah Ketua Umum 
Partai Golkar – yang anggotanya menjadi pimpinan Panitia Khusus-mengatakan Wakil Presiden 
Boediono tidak perlu dimakzulkan, kita tahu sasaran tembak adalah Menteri Keuangan Sri Mulyani” 
(Tempo, 7 February 2010a). 
449 “Bukannya serius membongkar dugaan penyelewengan dana, Pansus terlihat semakin sering 
melakukan akrobat politik dan mencoba mencari kambing hitam dari skandal Century. Wakil Presiden 
Boediono dan Menteri Keuangan Sri Mulyani Indrawati merupakan dua pejabat yang paling banyak 
dituduh bersalah oleh Pansus – meskipun pembuktian kesalahan dua pejabat ini belum disokong data 
dan argument yang menyakinkan” (Tempo, 21February 2010a). 
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encourage the coalition parties to join its stance as an “empty threat”450 and a 
“[c]hildish political move”451 that ultimately only benefits the coalition parties in 
increasing their bargaining power. In late February 2010, shortly before the 
committee’s final report, Tempo (28 February 2010) also implies that the recently 
disclosed scandals involving legislators attacking the government’s decision to 
bailout Bank Century are a political manoeuvre by the Palace and pro-government 
parties to facilitate “under-the-table compromises”452 and emphasises 
[a]ll cases uncovered by these political disputes should be resolved through 
legal channels. Whatever recommendations will be issued by the Bank Century 
Special Committee, for example, law enforcement agencies must resolve the 
alleged tax evasion by the Bakrie group . . . Admittedly, politics cannot be 
separated from bargaining and granting concessions. Yet it cannot be justified if 
the various cases that have appeared recently only turned out to be the weapon 
of those in power seeking to win the battle and maintain the coalition. 
Perpetuating a coalition by covering up cases, especially those already in the 
public domain, would be an unforgiveable political mistake.453 
 
Here, Tempo’s main concern is that the alleged tax evasion by Bakrie’s company will 
only be used as a bargaining tool to persuade the Golkar to take the government’s 
stance on the bailout in the committee’s final report, instead of resulting in a proper 
                                                          
450 “gertak sambal” (Tempo, 21 February 2010c). 
451 “Langkah politik kekanak-kanakan” (Tempo, 21 February 2010c). 
452 “kompromi di bawah meja” (Tempo, 22 February 2010). 
453 “Semua kasus yang terbongkar dari pertikaian politik ini semestinya dituntaskan lewat jalur 
hukum. Apa pun rekomendasi yang akan dikeluarkan oleh Panitia Khusus Angket Kasus Bank 
Century, misalnya, penegak hukum harus menyelesaikan kasus dugaan penggelapan pajak oleh 
kelompok usaha Bakrie . . . Politik memang tak bisa lepas dari tawar-menawar dan pemberian konsesi. 
Namun tak bisa dibenarkan bila aneka kasus yang sekarang muncul ternyata hanya menjadi senjata 
penguasa untuk memenangi pertarungan dan menjaga koalisi. Melanggengkan koalisi dengan cara 
menutupi berbagai kasus, apalagi yang sudah terbuka di depan publik, merupakan kesalahan politik 
yang tak termaafkan” (Tempo, 22 February 2010). 
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investigation and resolution of the tax evasion allegations by law enforcement 
agencies. 
In this context Tempo (28 February 2010) elaborates on the change of 
relationship from friend to foe between Yudhoyono and Bakrie over the Bank 
Century case. Having received support from the Palace in his election as Golkar 
chairman in October 2009, the relationship between Yudhoyono and Bakrie turned 
sour during the course of the parliamentary investigation into the Bank Century 
case when Golkar opposed Bank Century’s rescue. The Palace countered Golkar’s 
opposition by disclosing information on the alleged tax fraud by Bakrie-owned 
companies, and Yudhoyono himself publicly ordered that measures be taken 
against tax evaders. Thus, Tempo relates the Bank Century scandal and the question 
of whether Golkar will leave the coalition to a personal conflict between Yudhoyono 
and Bakrie. This is particularly important since Tempo also points out Yudhoyono’s 
role in the conflict between Sri Mulyani and Bakrie. Tempo magazine is critical of the 
fact that, during his first term – when the conflict erupted between his two ministers 
– Yudhoyono allowed the friction to continue by neither siding with Bakrie or Sri 
Mulyani. The following quote points to Yudhoyono’s indecisiveness and clearly 
shows whom Tempo (20 December 2009) favours: 
We know that Bakrie is a party leader who has extensive political influence. He 
is also a tycoon with extraordinary financial capability. Meanwhile Sri Mulyani 
is a minister with a good reputation and internationally well-regarded.454 
  
                                                          
454 “Kita tahu, Aburizal Bakrie tokoh partai yang memiliki pengaruh politik luas. Ia juga konglomerat 
dengan kemampuan finansial luar biasa. Sementara Sri Mulyani adalah menteri dengan reputasi bagus 
dan diperhitungkan dunia internasional” (Tempo, 20 December 2009). 
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Tempo criticises Yudhoyono’s handling of the Bank Century case. Tempo argues that 
Yudhoyono could have prevented the Bank Century case from becoming protracted 
and his aides from being attacked by the DPR through taking swift action from the 
outset. More precisely, the case would have been resolved rapidly if Yudhoyono 
had taken responsibility for the rescue of Bank Century, had testified before the 
Bank Century parliamentary committee (although not invited), confirmed that the 
decision was taken to save the economy, publicly stated that he approved the 
bailout policy and that he shared his aide’s argumentation (25 January 2010, 7 
February 2010a, 3 March 2010). Tempo (7 February 2010a) implicitly demands the 
president take full responsibility for the bailout decision in order to prevent Sri 
Mulyani and Boediono from becoming political scapegoats instead of seeking to 
keep himself in power. 
However, it is only in early March 2010, shortly before the DPR’s vote on the 
committee’s report, that Tempo becomes more specific and directly addresses the 
president instead of only highlighting what he should have done. Based on the 
argument that, in the presidential system, the ministers merely assist the president 
in carrying out executive policies, Tempo (7 March 2010a) demands that the 
president take responsibility for the decision to rescue Bank Century. 
Tempo (7 March 2010a) further emphasizes that Yudhoyono should affirm 
the bailout decision instead of securing his power through political bargaining. 
Thus, Tempo clearly shows that it wants Sri Mulyani and Boediono to keep their 
positions and that it would condemn Yudhoyono’s decision should he do otherwise. 
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The president’s affirmation is important to underline that his aide’s decision to 
rescue the failed bank was correct to prevent systemic impact and that he was 
well aware of that. The political arena is not free of various short-term interests. 
Certainly, there are political forces that are considering toppling the president 
over the Century case. However, if, for the sake of maintaining his presidential 
powers, innocent aides have to be sacrificed – through a cabinet reshuffle or a 
trade-off or an exchange of any kind – it should be appreciated that the 
“undermining” by political opponents will not stop there. The next target will 
surely be the seat that is occupied by the president himself. Therefore, the 
president must publicly state that the doors for bargaining are closed. If 
Yudhoyono asserts that he will not remove Boediono and Sri Mulyani, this will 
inevitably undermine attempts by some of the members of the Special 
Committee who seemed more intent on bringing down those two people than 
seeking the truth.455 
 
Tempo attributes the responsibility in the Bank Century scandal to institutions and 
not to individual actors such as Boediono or Sri Mulyani. This is evident in its focus 
on Bank Indonesia’s shortcomings and how Tempo (7 March 2010a) depicts Sri 
Mulyani and Boediono, namely by stating “so far no criminal violation – such as 
receiving illegal funds or enriching themselves or others through rescuing Bank 
Century – been proven against the aides.”456 
                                                          
455 “Penegasan Presiden ini penting untuk menggarisbawahi bahwa kebijakan menyelamatkan bank 
gagal berdampak sistemik oleh pembantunya itu sudah benar dan atas sepengetahuannya. Ranah 
politik memang tidak steril dari pelbagai kepentingan jangka pendek. Pasti ada kekuatan politik yang 
sedang berpikir untuk menjatuhkan Presiden dalam kasus Century ini. Tapi, bila demi kekuasaan 
Presiden harus mengorbankan pembantunya yang tak bersalah-melalui reshuffle kabinet atau barter 
atau pertukaran bentuk apa pun-perlu disadari bahwa "rongrongan" lawan politik itu tak akan 
berhenti sampai di situ. Target berikutnya pastilah kursi yang sedang diduduki Presiden sendiri. 
Karena itu, Presiden harus secara terbuka menyatakan tutup pintu untuk tawar-menawar ini. Bila 
Yudhoyono menegaskan tak akan mencopot Boediono dan Sri Mulyani, posisi itu niscaya akan 
merontokkan upaya sebagian anggota Panitia Khusus yang terkesan ngebet menjatuhkan dua orang 
itu ketimbang mencari kebenaran” (Tempo, 7 March 2010a). 
456 “sejauh ini tak ada pelanggaran pidana-misalnya menerima aliran dana haram atau memperkaya 
diri atau orang lain lewat penyelamatan Century-ditemukan atas para pembantunya” (Tempo, 7 
March 2010a). 
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Already in early December 2009, following the BPK audit’s conclusion that 
Bank Indonesia should have already shut down Bank Century in 2005, a year after 
its establishment when it experienced an acute liquidity crisis, Tempo (30 November 
2009) calls upon the committee to shed light on Bank Indonesia’s “special 
treatment”457 of Bank Century and focus on the shortcomings of Bank Indonesia’s 
oversight function. Later, following the committee’s finding that Bank Indonesia 
had been ineffective in overseeing Bank Century, Tempo (7 March 2010b) questions 
whether this indicates negligence or whether Bank Indonesia had intentionally 
turned a blind eye to the malpractices of Bank Century’s owners and management. 
For Tempo, it was not the bailout policy that was wrong but rather Bank Indonesia’s 
failure to oversee Bank Century. For Tempo, it was the failure of Bank Indonesia’s 
oversight that allowed Bank Century to degenerate into such a mess. Tempo then 
hits back at the DPR by pointing out that Bank Indonesia’s failure in overseeing 
Bank Century could have been prevented if the DPR had fulfilled its oversight 
function of Bank Indonesia. 
Law No. 23/1999 on Bank Indonesia, which was amended by Act No. 3/2004, 
defines Bank Indonesia as an independent institution that reports its work to 
the DPR. In addition to annual and quarterly reports, the DPR may ask for 
clarification at any time if it finds anything suspicious. The failure of the Central 
Bank’s oversight in turn, must be sent back to the DPR’s oversight function of 
the monetary system management institutions – as mandated by law. 
Considering that the Bank Century case was not without warning, it needs to be 
asked to what extent the DPR carried out its oversight function before elevating 
“Centurygate” to the stage of national politics.458 
                                                          
457 “perlakuan khusus” (Tempo, 6 December 2009). 
458 “Undang-undang No. 23/1999 tentang Bank Indonesia, yang diubah dengan Undang-Undang No. 
3/2004, menentukan Bank Indonesia sebagai lembaga independen yang melaporkan kerjanya kepada 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Selain laporan tahunan dan triwulanan, Dewan bisa meminta penjelasan 
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Ultimately, Tempo (14 March 2010b) criticises the DPR’s decision to fault the 
decision to rescue Bank Century: 
Admittedly, there is something wrong in the haphazard way in which the bank 
was managed. But putting the blame on the rescue policy mistakes amid the 
threat of a crisis is unfair. Especially now, since it is evident that the economic 
crisis could be circumvented.459 
 
 
5.5 Explaining Koran Tempo’s and Tempo’s coverage 
Due to the fact that Tempo magazine is a weekly, and Koran Tempo a daily, there are 
differences in coverage. However, Tempo and Koran Tempo share the same 
newsroom, exchange information and staff, and conduct joint weekly editorial 
meetings for both publications. Their content is intertwined. For example, some 
editorials460 on the Bank Century scandal have been published in both publications 
and in 2001 Tempo’s chief editor, Bambang Harymurti, also became chief editor of 
the newly established Koran Tempo. During the Bank Century scandal, different 
people held those positions. Namely, Bambang Harymurti was chief editor of Koran 
                                                                                                                                                                    
sewaktu-waktu jika menemukan hal mencurigakan. Kegagalan pengawasan oleh bank sentral, pada 
gilirannya, harus dipulangkan kepada fungsi pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat terhadap 
lembaga pengelola sistem moneter itu – seperti amanat undang-undang. Mengingat kasus Bank 
Century bukan kasus mendadak sontak, patut dipertanyakan sejauh mana Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
melaksanakan fungsi pengawasannya, sebelum mengangkat “Centurygate’ ke panggung politik 
nasional (Tempo, 14 March 2010b). 
459 “Harus diakui, ada sesuatu yang salah dalam perjalanan bank yang dikelola dengan cara 
serampangan ini. Tapi membebankan kesalahan terhadap kebijakan penyelamatan di tengah ancaman 
krisis merupakan tindakan tidak adil. Apalagi kini terbukti bahwa krisis ekonomi bisa dielakkan” (14 
March 2010). 
460 These are: Nonaktifkan Susno Duadji (Koran Tempo, 11 October 2009; Tempo, 5 October 2009); 
Musim Mengurus Nama Baik (Koran Tempo, 7 December 2009; Tempo, 13 December 2009b); Seratus 
Hari Tak Bergigi (Koran Tempo, 30 January 2010; Tempo, 31 January 2010); Sang Kerbau Masuk Istana 
(Koran Tempo, 8 February 2010; Tempo, 8 February 2010); Skandal Century: Alpa atau Sengaja (Koran 
Tempo, 1 March 2010; Tempo, 7 March 2010) 
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Tempo while Toriq Hadad was chief editor of Tempo. Before becoming chief editor of 
Tempo in 2006, Toriq Hadad was chief editor of Koran Tempo for one year. 
Furthermore, Toriq Hadad and Bambang Harymurti also hold positions in the 
Tempo Media Group’s (PT.Tempo Inti Media Tbk) board of directors, as director 
and president director respectively (Tempo Media Group n.d.). Interestingly, both 
disagreed on Bank Century. 
In order to explain Tempo’s stance in the bailout this section also elaborates 
on the role of Goenawan Mohammad, who although inactive in Tempo magazine’s 
daily operations at the time of the Bank Century scandal nevertheless had, as will be 
shown, a significant personal influence over Tempo and the Tempo Media Group. 
The following paragraphs aim to explain Koran Tempo’s and Tempo’s pro-bailout and 
pro-Sri Mulyani coverage. 
 
Individual factors 
Two of the Tempo Media Group’s most influential and well-known staffers or 
associates supported the bailout. Namely, Bambang Harymurti, corporate chief 
editor of Koran Tempo and chief director of the Tempo Media Group, and Tempo co-
founder Goenawan Mohamed. In its 13 September 2009 edition Tempo magazine 
published a column with the title ‘Century: Allah forgive me or Thank God?’461 
written by Bambang Harymurti. Since published as a column, the article mirrored 
Bambang Harymurti’s personal opinion and not Tempo’s. The whole article supports 
the bailout. This is most evident in the statement that no public funds were used for 
the bailout and in the article’s closing sentence: 
                                                          
461 Bambang Harymurti. 2009. “Century: Astagfirullah atau Alhamdulillah?” Tempo, 13 September. 
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That’s why, after observing the Bank Century case, I concluded that we do not 
need to beg for forgiveness, but say Thank God instead.462 
 
Bambang Harymurti’s article was heavily criticised by journalists and media 
observers.463 However, Bambang Harymurti’s opinion does not reflect the stance of 
all Tempo magazine personnel in the Bank Century case (Laksono, 16 January 2010). 
An article464 written by Toriq Hadad, chief editor of Tempo, on his Facebook account 
around the same point in time showed that Tempo’s staff had a range of different 
opinions regarding the bailout.465 
That Bambang Harymurti and Toriq Hadad had different opinions of the 
Bank Century case was well known among Tempo’s staff.466 Yet Toriq Hadad’s 
opinion was not published in the magazine. This is particularly interesting since a 
pro-bailout article by Koran Tempo’s executive editor Metta Dharmasaputra’s was 
published in Koran Tempo’s opinion section (Dharmasaputra, 9 September 2009). 
Koran Tempo staffer, Grace Gandhi, felt Toriq Hadad’s article was not published in 
Tempo because it was Toriq Hadad’s personal view and did not mirror Tempo’s 
position as an institution, which shared the government’s assertion that Bank 
Century had to be rescued.467 There were indeed heated discussions among the 
                                                          
462 “Itu sebabnya, setelah mencermati kasus Bank Century, saya berkesimpulan kita tak perlu 
beristigfar, tapi malah mengucapkan: alhamdulillah”(Harymurti, 13 September 2009). 
463 Interview with Metta Dharmasaputra, journalist, Koran Tempo, Jakarta, 7 June 2009; Interview with 
Grace Gandhi, journalist, Koran Tempo, Jakarta, 4 May 2010; Piliang, 13 September 2009; Laksono, 16 
January 2010; Gunawan, 12 September 2009. 
464 Siapa senang Century diselamatkan? 
465 The article, ‘Siapa Senang Century Diselamatkan’ originally posted on Toriq Hadat’s Facebook 
account (http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=129675303373&id=1346466814&ref=nf) has been 
re-posted by Sulistiono Kertawanca on the Yahoo group page of Asosiasi Konsultan Hukum Indonesia 
on 6 September 2009 (Kertawanca 2009). 
466 Interview with Grace Gandhi, journalist, Koran Tempo, Jakarta, 4 May 2010. 
467 Conversation with Grace Gandhi via Facebook, 22 November 2011. 
286 
magazine’s and newspaper’s editorial staff on the standpoint of the Tempo Media 
Group in the Bank Century case. However, once the decision was made that the 
Tempo Media Group supports the bailout, both publications had to follow. 
Goenawan Mohamed was not active in Tempo’s daily operations at the time 
of the Bank Century scandal; however, he holds shares, writes a column called ‘A 
Note from the Sideline’468 in the magazine, is chief commissioner of the Tempo 
Media Group469 and as Tempo co-founder has a strong residual influence over the 
magazine.470 
Goenawan Mohamed also defended the bailout and Sri Mulyani, albeit not 
directly through Tempo. Indeed, Goenawan Mohamed has a close relationship with 
Boediono and Sri Mulyani. For example, he was a strong supporter of Boediono’s 
vice- presidential campaign (Kompas.com, 15 May 2009). In May 2009, shortly after 
Yudhoyono named Boediono as his vice-presidential running mate, Goenawan 
Mohammed used his column ‘Sidelines’ in Tempo to praise Boediono and to support 
his candidature (Mohamad, 18 May 2010). His support for Sri Mulyani was most 
obvious in the speech ‘Try to split up with Sri Mulyani’471, given at Sri Mulyani’s 
farewell ceremony on 19 May 2010 at the Financial Club, Graha Niaga, Jakarta.472 
                                                          
468 ‘catatan pinggir’  
469 Tempo Media Group.n.d. Tentang Kami. Dewan Komisaris 
470 Indeed, as pointed out by Liddle (1996: 161) the history of Tempo cannot be separated from 
Goenawan Mohamed and his name, “ideas, and activities are well known through to the newspaper 
and magazine reading public, in Jakarta and throughout the country“. 
471 “Mencoba Berpisah dari Sri Mulyani.”  
472 Sri Mulyani’s farewell ceremony on 19 May 2010 at the Financial Club, Graha Niaga, Jakarta 
Many high profile people attended the event. For example, Mari Elka Pangestu (Minister of Trade), 
Mar’ie Muhammad (former finance minister and popularly known as ‘Mr. Clean’ because of his 
struggle against corruption), Erry Riyana Harjapamekas (KPK chairman vice-chairman 2003-2007, 
holder of the ‘Bung Hatta Anti Corruption Award’ in 2003), Marsilam Simanjunak, Todung Mulya 
Lubis (lawyer and legal experts, Goenawan Muhammad, Jakob Oetama (CEO Kompas Gramedia), 
Anis Baswedan, Jusuf Wanandi, Wimar Witoelar, Arifin Panigoro, Franz Magnis-Suseno, Yopie 
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Stating that “[t]hrough well-controlled media, the campaign against Sri Mulyani 
(and Boediono) intensified”473 Goenawan Mohamad partly blames the media for Sri 
Mulyani’s resignation. The speech, that was subsequently published in Tempo (30 
May 2009) as a column also clearly shows Goenawan Mohamad’s dislike for 
Aburizal Bakrie. By using the term ‘political thuggery’474 in the context of the Bank 
Century scandal – and more specifically by seeing Sri Mulyani as the target of 
political thuggery – Goenawan Mohamad indirectly labels Golkar and Aburizal 
Bakrie ‘thugs’. As is evident in this column, Goenawan Mohamad depicts Sri 
Mulyani’s resignation and the establishment of the Joint Secretariat (Setgab) headed 
by Aburizal Bakrie as the price Yudhoyono had to pay in order to regain political 
stability (Mohamad, 24 May 2009). 
Furthermore, in June 2010 Goenawan Mohamad returned his 2004 Bakrie 
Award, along with the Rp 100 million prize money plus interest, to the Freedom 
Institute (Detiknews, 22 June 2010). The awards are sponsored and prizes for each 
recipient are sponsored by the Bakrie family. As stated by Goenawan Mohamad 
during a press conference the reason he returned the award was because of Bakrie's 
role in the Bank Century scandal investigation: 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Hidayat (Spokesperson of Vice-President Boediono), some senior Tempo journalists, a number of public 
figures, scholars, professors, activists, and of course Sri Mulyani’s fellow colleagues,  and the 
facebookers who established and are joined through ‘Kami Percaya Integritas - Sri Mulyani Indarwati 
(KPI-SMI)’ (Financial Club, Graha Niaga, Jakarta 19 May 2010 (I attended as an eye witness); See also 
Hapsoro, 20 May 2010. 
473 “Melalui media yang dikuasai dengan baik, kampanye anti Sri Mulyani (dan Boediono) 
digencarkan”. 
474 premanisme politik. 
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To me, the peak was during the issue with Sri Mulyani and Boediono, when 
they were attacked and manipulated. It's not about their positions but because I 
know they're innocent. They were punished and sacrificed and I know Bakrie 
was behind all of that.475 
 
Goenawan Mohamad’s move to return the award sparked the media’s interest.  A 
press conference conducted at Utan Kayu, East Jakarta, provided the platform for 
Goenawan Mohamad to accuse Bakrie of manufacturing a ‘political drama’ with the 
Bank Century case and being responsible for Sri Mulyani’s resignation.  
The cases of Bambang Harymurti and Goenawan Mohamed highlight the 
difficulty in analysing media motivation. On the hand, they are private individuals 
with personal point of views, but, on the other, they are very influential in the 
Tempo Media Group which makes it unlikely that Tempo Media Group 
publications will take a diametrically opposed position to them. 
 
Values and ideologies  
The pro-bailout stance of the Tempo Media Group (i.e. Tempo and Koran Tempo) and 
its support for Sri Mulyani was not only rooted in personal preferences and 
convictions. It extends to a value system and affinity towards technocracy within 
Tempo. Sri Mulyani and Boediono are both technocrats without a political base. In 
post-Suharto Indonesia their names are associated with rational economic planning, 
bureaucratic reform, and liberal economic policy. As argued by McCargo (1999) 
“Early Tempo was broadly aligned with the technocratic policies of the original 
                                                          
475 “Bagi saya memuncaknya itu waktu persoalan Sri Mulyani dan Boediono. Di mana mereka diserang 
dan dimanipulasi sedemikian rupa. Bukan masalah jabatan mereka tapi karena saya tahu mereka tidak 
bersalah, mereka dihukum dan dikorbankan dan saya tahu Bakrie ada di belakang itu semua” 
(Detiknews, 22 June 2010). 
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New Order and its ‘Berkeley mafia’476 which emphasized the rational management 
of economic issues.” More specifically, Fikri Jufri and Goenawan Mohamad, Tempo’s 
co-founders and former editors, were part of a group that supported economic 
liberalism through de-regulation since the 1980s (Mallarangeng 2000: 136, 140). 
Although having “some reservations about the capitalist system in general” 
(Mallarangeng 2000: 151) Goenawan Mohamad saw deregulation and expansion of 
the market as a means to overcome the incompetent and corrupt state bureaucracy 
(Mallarangeng 2000: 151-54). As Kompas did, Tempo also conducted a regular 
discussion with key economists.477 The issues discussed were not directly reported 
in Tempo, but aimed to provide its reporters and editors with background and in-
depth information (Mallarangeng 2000: 144-6). 
Since the industrialisation and deregulation of the press in the mid-1980s 
Tempo had a sophisticated in-house training and career planning system, and, as 
emphasised by Steele (2005: 200), “Alongside the more professional model of 
journalism also came a more rational system of management”. Thus, the Tempo 
Media Group supported Sri Mulyani and Boediono because they articulated the 
broad values of the technocrats, so their support was not for the individual 
bureaucrats but for the value system. 
For the Tempo Media Group the Bank Century scandal was a conflict 
between two opposing forces. On the one hand were Sri Mulyani and Boediono – 
known for their corruption eradication efforts and incorruptibility –, and those who 
                                                          
476 ‘Berkeley mafia’ is a term often used for a group of key economic ministers from the early period of 
the New Order. Many held doctorates from the University of California, Berkeley. 
477 In 1988 Tempo formalized its regular discussion group of economists through the establishment of 
‘Tempo's Economic Forum’ (Forum Ekonomi Tempo). 
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supported them. The other forces, in particular those who wanted Sri Mulyani out, 
“include political parties in the opposition, as well as parties in the ruling coalition 
trying to increase their bargaining power, businesspeople whose interests are 
threatened by Mulyani's position at the Finance Ministry, and even crooked 
bureaucrats and public officials close to crooked businesspeople who are 
uncomfortable with Mulyani“ (The Jakarta Post, 7 December 2009). For the Tempo 
Media Group, this was first and foremost Aburizal Bakrie who, in his position as 
Golkar chairman, used the Bank Century scandal and the parliamentary inquiry to 
oust Sri Mulyani. The Tempo Media Group, particularly through Koran Tempo, also 
utilized the alleged Bakrie-group tax evasion to discredit Bakrie.478 The Tempo 
Media Group’s aversion towards Aburizal Bakrie is well known and dates back to 
the Lapindo mudflow disaster in 2006. At that time Bakrie complained over a series 
of articles published in Tempo’s 17 November 2008 edition that carried an image of 
Bakrie constructed of numbers on its cover, including the figures 666 (regarded as 
symbolising the devil), superimposed on his temple. In its report Tempo identifies 
                                                          
478 Following the tax office’s disclosure that it was investigating three Bakrie owned coal minig 
companies – PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC), PTArutmin Indonesia and parent company PT Bumi 
Resources – for possible tax evasion totalling around Rp 2,1 trillion Koran Tempo (12 December 2009) 
run a cover story with on the issue. Neither Media Indonesia nor Kompas covered that issue on that day. 
Metta Dharmasaputra (interview, journalist, Koran Tempo, Jakarta, 7 June 2010), editor of Koran 
Tempo’s business section, admits that Tempo was the only media organisation that had information on 
the Bakrie tax case and thus was able to run it with a front page headline. Metta Dharmasaputra’s 
knowledge of the Bakrie tax issue dated back to 2007, but respecting the sources’ request and taking 
into account the lack of political support behind Sri Mulyani, Koran Tempo decided not to publish its 
information at that time. By December 2009 the situation had changed and Sri Mulyani’s interview in 
the Wall Street Journal in which she talked openly about her troubled relationship with Bakrie provided 
the trigger to publish a cover story on accusations that Bakrie companies had committed tax fraud 
(Metta Dharmasaputra, interview, journalist, Koran Tempo, Jakarta, 7 June 2010). Thus, Koran Tempo’s 
disclosure of the Bakrie tax evasion scandal clearly aimed to discredit Aburizal Bakrie and to point out 
that he himself has blotted his copybook. Indeed, the money Bakrie allegedly owes the state in taxes 
exceeds the cost of the Bank Century bailout. Adding royalty debts and fines for tax evasion, the 
amount Bakrie owes the state may well exceed Rp 10 trillion. 
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Bakrie as one of the biggest sponsors of Yudhoyono’s 2004 presidential campaign 
and suggested that this financial support earned him the position of Coordinating 
Minister for Economy in Yudhoyono’s first cabinet. Tempo also alleges that Bakrie’s 
position influenced the government's decision to rescue the Bakrie group owned PT 
Bumi Resources.479 
Following the preceding discussion of the various factors that have 
influenced the Tempo Media Group’s position in the Bank Century scandal, the next 




This chapter has explained the contrasting positions of particular news publications 
in the Bank Century scandal by examining editorial commentary. It establishes that 
the positions of Kompas, Media Indonesia, Koran Tempo and Tempo in the Bank 
Century scandal can be best explained through the politico-economic interests and 
ideological affiliations of their respective owner or prominent editors. 
The analysis has shown that Media Indonesia’s faulting of the bailout and its 
opposition towards the government was determined by its owner’s political 
interests and personal relations to some of the decisive actors in the Bank Century 
scandal and its investigation. Media Indonesia’s anti-bailout and anti-government 
                                                          
479 Bakrie accused Tempo of damaging his reputation by publishing an investigative report on the 
plight of the Bakrie Group's plummeting shares, the allegations that he had earned his cabinet post 
through huge contribution to the Yudhoyono-Kalla presidential campaign and depicting the figures 
"666" – regarded as the demon's number – on his temple (Wicaksono, 2 December 2008). Bakrie, who 
had initially threatened to sue the magazine for libel, finally filed a complaint to the press council (The 
Jakarta Post, 29 November 2008).  
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stance can be explained through Surya Paloh’s longstanding friendship and support 
of fellow Golkar politician Jusuf Kalla, who faulted the bailout from the very 
beginning. Equally important might have been his disrupted personal relationship 
with President Yudhoyono. This also explains why Media Indonesia was aiming at 
the President and not solely on Sri Mulyani and Boediono. Media Indonesia’s 
criticism, however, goes beyond the government. In the way Media Indonesia depicts 
the parliament, political parties, the government, and the political process it gives 
the overall impression that the whole system is rotten. Furthermore, by aiming at 
the president, and by encouraging and welcoming coalition disunity, Media 
Indonesia aims to create political instability. In so doing, Media Indonesia lays the 
ground for Surya Paloh’s political ambitions, which was subsequently manifested in 
the establishment of his political party – National Democrats (Nasional Demokrat, 
Nasdem) – that aims to ‘restore’ Indonesia. 
Kompas, despite its support for liberal economic policy, did not back 
individuals but implicitly supported the Yudhoyono-Boediono government for the 
sake of political and economic stability. This can be explained by Kompas’s economic 
interests as well on its long-standing cautiously neutral editorial policy, and its 
principle of not engaging in personal conflicts, as in the case of Sri Mulyani and 
Bakrie. 
The analysis of Koran Tempo’s and Tempo’s editorial content has 
demonstrated that both publications, while showing differences in detail, did 
promote a pro-bailout, pro-Sri Mulyani and pro-Boediono stance. The Tempo Media 
Group publications did not support Sri Mulyani and Boediono as individuals but 
because of the broad values they embodied as technocrats, namely bureaucratic 
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reform and corruption eradication. By appointing Sri Mulyani as finance minister 
and Boediono as vice-president, Yudhoyono had shown his commitment to this 
value system. Consequently, these Tempo Media Group publications supported the 
Yudhoyono government, while being critical of the president’s actions and 
behaviour during the inquiry. Since Tempo and Koran Tempo are not owned by a 
single individual (unlike Media Indonesia and Kompas) their stance had to be 
negotiated among its decisive actors. Here, as the discussion has shown, the 
personal views of Koran Tempo’s corporate chief editor, Bambang Harymurti, and 
Tempo co-founder Goenawan Mohamad played a role. Another factor that played a 
role was Tempo’s, particularly Goenawan Mohamad’s, animosity towards Aburizal 
Bakrie, that resulted in the Tempo Media Group exploiting Bakrie’s alleged tax 
evasion and framing Centurygate as a conflict between those promoting reform and 
those hindering it.  
In sum, this chapter has reinforced the argument that the contrasting 
positions of particular media organisations in a scandal are contingent upon the 
extent to which the interests of their respective owners or prominent editors 
coincide with the interests of particular elite factions embroiled in, or seeking to 
benefit from, the scandal. Those coinciding interests, as shown in this chapter and in 
chapter three, lead to the formation of temporary mutually beneficial collations 




In order to shed light on how, why, and for whose benefit media freedoms are 
compromised this dissertation has focused on the significance of press freedom for 
elite politics by investigating media-elite interactions in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia. Challenging the liberal notion that the media reinforces democratic 
structures and values through its scrutiny of political and economic actors, this 
dissertation has argued that the Indonesian commercial mainstream news media is 
deeply embedded in power struggles between competing elites. Indeed, instead of 
fighting against the media the politico-business elite has, to differing degrees, 
harnessed the concept of press freedom by incorporating the media (as  an arena 
and weapon) into its power struggles over key positions in political institutions and 
political resources. 
As argued in the first chapter, the preponderance of private media 
ownership in the hands of the politico-business elite along with a high level of 
conglomeration has led to interdependency between the media and the elite. This is 
due to the structural and personal linkages between the Indonesian mainstream 
media and the politico-business elite, and their shared location within capitalist 
markets. However, since neither the media nor the elite are a monolithic entity, the 
media play a crucial role on issues that concern the distribution of power among the 
political elite. Indeed, the empirical part of this study has shown that the free media 
have become an integral part of intra-elite power struggles and that scandal has 
become a weapon of choice in the elite’s competition over key positions in political 
institutions and access to political resources beyond election times. 
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The prominence of mediated allegations of misconduct, often related to 
corruption and directly aimed at specific political leaders, demonstrates that the 
elite is revealing information on others’ wrongdoing out of self-interest, or in other 
words, employs scandal in order to gain political advantage. This was clearly 
evident in Bulog- and Centurygate where those political parties that had limited 
access to government resources following the 1999 and 2009 post-election political 
bargaining processes respectively exploited scandal to boost their power. A decisive 
factor in both scandals’ political impact was the media’s and the parliament’s shared 
motivation to investigate and publicize alleged misconduct by the president and his 
administration, combined with strong incentives for multiple parties to escalate the 
allegations as opportunities for “doing politics by other means”. Revealing others’ 
wrongdoings was also employed by those government actors under scrutiny in 
Bulog- and Centurygate respectively as a means of counter attack. Corruption 
allegations against Golkar and its individual members by Wahid’s electoral vehicle 
PKB, allegations of misconduct against those legislators critical of the Bank Century 
bailout, as well as allegations of tax evasion against Aburizal Bakrie, all variously 
aimed to discredit and question the motives of those legislators eager to accuse the 
government of misconduct.  
By dominating the political agenda Bulog- and Centurygate each escalated 
into a political crisis that threatened the legitimacy and stability of the government. 
Ultimately Bulog- and Centurygate served “as an extraordinary, nonstatutory 
catalyst for irregular political change” (Yanai 1990: 185).480 Indeed, Buloggate was 
the prelude to establish impeachment proceedings against President Wahid. 
                                                          
480 Yanai (1990: 185) calls political scandals that generate political crises “political affairs.” 
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Centurygate resulted in Sri Mulyani’s resignation as Finance Minister and the 
restructuring of the cabinet to Golkar’s advantage.  
It is a paradox, though, that those branded in the scandal as most 
responsible for the alleged misconduct – namely President Wahid and Finance 
Minister Sri Mulyani – were widely known as opponents to corruption and 
promoters of reform. By contrast, those pushing for their removal, particularly 
Golkar and its politicians, were demonstrably linked to the New Order regime’s 
KKN-culture and commonly known to be resisting political and economic reforms. 
As this thesis has also shown, this paradox can be explained by the fact that 
those who exploited Bulog- and Centurygate were more successful in employing the 
media to their advantage than those who had to defend themselves. By establishing 
a parliamentary inquiry, opposed legislators were not only successful in providing a 
continuous news supply on the scandal, but were also able to promote their 
interests under the disguise of exercising their duty to oversee the government. As 
shown in chapter three, Wahid’s ability to engage the media positively during 
Buloggate was thwarted by the parliament’s and the media’s ability to disguise their 
multiple interests behind the veneer of exercising their commonly perceived 
watchdog-function towards the government. This enabled Wahid’s opponents to 
use the jargon of press freedom and democracy successfully against Wahid. At the 
time of Buloggate, democratisation had only just begun and the public discourse 
was strongly driven by the need for good governance and democratic reform. The 
newly liberated media was a key arena of this discourse, making it easy indeed for 
political elites to exploit this context for their interests. In contrast, arguments and 
actions made by Wahid and his supporters – like questioning the legality and the 
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authority of the parliamentary inquiry into Buloggate, NU-Banser’s occupation of 
the Jawa Pos office, and Wahid’s repeated criticism of the media combined with 
allegations that there was a conspiracy to oust him – were interpreted by his 
opponents as signs that Wahid was slipping towards authoritarianism and 
attempting to restrict press freedom. This had the effect of aligning the media, 
consciously or otherwise, more closely with Wahid’s opponents. In the context of 
Centurygate, the government’s opportunities were equally limited. For example, the 
media interpreted President Yudhoyono’s publicly voiced statements to take 
tougher measures against tax evaders, the Democratic Party’s suggestion of a 
cabinet reshuffle, and corruption allegations against individual legislators critical of 
the bailout, as threats to force the parliament to come to a conclusion in their inquiry 
that favoured the government. 
Given the involvement of government actors and the suspiciously secretive 
nature of the financial transactions, the media had to report on President Wahid’s 
alleged involvement in the embezzlement of Rp 35 billion from Bulog and the 
alleged misuse of public funds amounting to Rp 6.7 trillion in the Bank Century 
bailout. Nevertheless, in order to fulfil their professional obligations, some media 
were also critical of those exploiting the scandal. As the editorial analysis in 
chapters three and five has shown, the media were well aware of the vested 
interests behind the Bulog- and Centurygate inquiry and were willing to point them 
out and voice criticism. 
Thus, as this thesis has shown, the media did not become a mere pawn in the 
hands of contesting members of the elite. Rather, the diverse and privately owned 
media had their own interests in the scandal and withstood external interference 
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that did not coincide with their own interests. Finance Minister Sri Mulyani and 
presidential spokesperson Yopie Hidayat, for example, were not successful in 
applying their power resources – in the case of the former, allegedly her knowledge 
of the Kompas Gramedia Group’s tax payments and, in the case of the latter, his 
personal and professional relationship with Jakob Oetama due to his former 
position as chief editor of Kontan (a business newspaper belonging to the Kompas 
Gramedia Group) – to influence Kompas’ coverage in their favour. Also the threat of 
physical force against the media, as shown in Buloggate, did not hamper media 
scrutiny. 
As shown in chapters three and five the media had multiple interests in 
Aryanti-, Bulog- and Bruneigate. The fact that the media – albeit intertwined with 
the elite – do have their own vested interests in those intra-elite power struggles that 
develop into scandal results in the dissemination of different viewpoints through 
the media and thus shows the media’s heterogeneity. 
Editorial analysis has shown that, for example, while not taking sides with 
either of the conflicting parties during Bulog- and Centurygate, Kompas implicitly 
supported the government in order to maintain economic and political stability. 
This can be partly explained by the Kompas Gramedia Group’s various business 
interests and Kompas’ non-confrontational style of journalism, under the influence of 
Jakob Oetama.  
In contrast to Kompas, Media Indonesia took different stances in Bulog- and 
Centurygate. Whereas in Buloggate Media Indonesia sought to maintain an aura of 
neutrality while simultaneously criticising President Wahid, it opposed the bailout, 
the government and President Yudhoyono during Centurygate. This can be 
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explained through the shifting interests of its owner, politico-businessman Surya 
Paloh, in the outcome of the respective scandals and his various political ambitions 
at that time. As the analysis in chapter three has shown, Surya Paloh did not hold an 
executive position in Golkar nor did he have political ambitions during Buloggate. 
During Centurygate, as discussed in detail in section 5.1, Surya Paloh was politically 
active in Golkar and advanced his political ambitions with the establishment of a 
political movement that aimed to ‘restore’ Indonesia. Additionally, Surya Paloh had 
close relations with Jusuf Kalla who strongly condemned the Bank Century bailout. 
His relationship with Yudhoyono however, whom he had assisted during the 2004 
elections by mobilising the support of his media empire, had deteriorated for 
multiple reasons, and thus resulted in Paloh transferring his media empire’s 
support to Jusuf Kalla’s presidential candidature during the 2009 elections. 
The examples of Republika and Tempo show that personal relationships and 
ideological congruency, or opposition, also play a decisive role in a newspaper’s 
editorial stance. As discussed in chapter three Republika’s ideological affiliation with 
ICMI as well as its association with Habibie and the poros tengah, made it a part of 
the group opposed to President Wahid. Thus it is understandable that Republika’s 
stance advanced the opinion of poros tengah leader and PAN chairman Amien Rais 
who had turned his back on Wahid to become one of the president’s staunchest 
critics. Rais even declared publicly his regret at having supported Wahid’s 
presidential election. Another factor that might explain Republika’s stance is the 
troubled personal relationship between its ex-chief editor Parni Hadi and Wahid. In 
sum, Republika’s negative stance towards President Wahid can be explained through 
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personal and ideological reasons. Ideological reasons are also most likely to explain 
Panji Masyarakat’s coverage of Aryantigate. 
In contrast to all the other publications under scrutiny, Tempo is regarded as 
having the most independent ownership (Saptono 2009: 37). This is generally 
attributed to the fact that Tempo is not owned by a single owner, unlike Kompas and 
Media Indonesia, but by multiple shareholders. However, as evident in the Bank 
Century case, there are personal relationships and ideological similarities between 
prominent Tempo staff and the scandal’s main protagonists Sri Mulyani and 
Boediono. This encouraged Tempo to support those protagonists. Besides their 
shared values and convictions, another reason the Tempo Group publications 
supported them was that the editors involved felt it was necessary to provide a 
countervailing source of information, to balance the opinion which dominated TV 
coverage, particularly by the two news channels MetroTV and TVOne, which was 
highly critical of  Sri Mulyani. Additionally, Tempo’s animosity towards Bakrie was 
a decisive factor. Ultimately, the case of Koran Tempo and Tempo also exemplifies 
that a publication that is not owned by a single owner, but by a diverse group of 
shareholders, can take sides. Indeed, it seems that both publications, albeit Tempo to 
a lesser extent than Koran Tempo, reflected the support that several of the Tempo 
Group’s prominent personnel had for Sri Mulyani and Boediono. Yet the Tempo 
Group’s position in the Bank Century scandal cannot be explained solely by 
personal relations among those actors and their shared animosity towards the 
denouncers. It extends to Tempo’s history of support for the kind of technocratic 
solutions to economic problems that Sri Mulyani and Boediono represent. Thus, 
Tempo’s position in the Bank Century scandal was principled, and based on values 
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that the magazine has endorsed since its founding. To a lesser extent the same might 
be said of Kompas, which has always endorsed both liberal economic policies and 
political stability. However, as the previous editorial analysis has shown, none of 
the publications under scrutiny sacrificed their watchdog role. Rather, they had 
vested interests which were embedded in this watchdog role. 
In summary, this thesis has shown that press freedom has enabled the elite 
in Indonesia to incorporate the media into their power struggles over key positions 
in political institutions and the control and allocation of political and other 
resources, and in so doing to utilize scandal as an opportunity to do “politics by 
other means”. 
It established that, in their role as actors, the owners or editors of the media 
have their own vested interests that go beyond the media’s democratic functions 
assigned to it according to the liberal view. Indeed, during Bulog- and Centurygate, 
the owners and practitioners of particular media organisations, either consciously or 
otherwise, did form temporary mutually beneficial coalitions with particular elite 
factions based on shared interests defined by structural conditions and personal 
interrelations. This is due to the fact that neither the elite nor the media constitute a 
monolithic entity, and as such can – depending on the issue at stake – reinforce or 
contradict each other’s interests during times of intra-elite power struggles. 
Importantly, this thesis has shown that despite being dominated by elite interests, 
the media nevertheless provide  a variety of viewpoints during times of intra-elite 
contestations, and that the elite, in turn, has successfully applied the media as an 
actor and a weapon within times of intra-elite contestation. The evidence has clearly 
demonstrated that the media did play a watchdog role by exposing and reporting 
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on political and economic misconduct but its motivations to do so were – given the 
media’s structural and personal relation with the elite – not the public interest, even 
though they used this rhetoric. This resonates with Herman and Chomsky’s (1988: 
xii) argument that the media are not unified on all issues and that elite 
disagreements (which do not question the system’s overall existence) are reflected in 
media content.  
Unlike existing literature on media and democratisation (Blankson and 
Murphy 2007; Guerrero and Márquez-Ram rez 2014; Gunther and Mughan 2000; 
Hallin and Mancini 2012; McCargo 2003; McConnell and Becker 2002; Norris 2010; 
Pasek 2006; Romano and Bromley 2005; Sen and Hill 2011; Sen and Lee 2008; 
Voltmer 2006, 2013), this thesis has placed its analytical focus explicitly on the 
interaction between the commercial mainstream news media and the politico-
business elite in intra-elite power struggles fought out in the public sphere. Building 
on aspects of C. Wright Mills’ elite theory and Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda 
model this thesis has conceptualised the (Indonesian commercial mainstream news) 
media and the politico-business elite as being intertwined through structural and 
personal relations that ensure the status quo of the existing power structure and the 
prevalence of elite interests. Crucially, the Indonesian politico-business elite is not a 
cohesive group but similar to Mills’ power elite divided by a diversity of interests 
that leads to periodic struggles among this elite. This notion of a heterogeneous 
elite, as well as Mills’ argument that the elite can move between institutions or 
simultaneously occupy key positions in various institutions, illustrates that 
Indonesia’s politico-business elite and the people who run the country’s commercial 
mainstream media are neither natural enemies nor inevitably aligned. Indeed, in 
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their role as actors the owners or practitioners of these mostly private owned media 
conglomerates have their own strategic objectives that might reinforce or contradict 
– depending the context and the issues at stake – the objectives of particular 
members of the contesting elite. In short, as empirically shown with the focus on 
media-elite interactions in the context of scandal, elite relationships are contingent, 
complex and dynamic.  
Although this study is limited to an analysis of media-elite interactions in 
Indonesia it may therefore provide an analytical framework for examining those 
dynamics in other post-authoritarian regimes where similar factors are at work. 
Indeed, in contrast to other studies that have applied or suggested models of hybrid 
media systems (Guerrero 2014; Voltmer 2012) in an attempt to gain insights on the 
media in so-called ‘third wave democracies,’ the approach taken in this thesis is not 
constrained by unstated assumptions about ideal typical institutional attributes of 
the media. Instead it offers an understanding of why the media that are now free 
from government repression operate in the way they do. This insight is informed by 








 Kompas Koran Tempo Media Indonesia Republika 
2000 507,000 - 170,000 160,000 
2001 507,000 - 190,000 165,000 
2002 509,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 
2003 506,000 200,000 284,745 200,000 
2004 509,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 
2006 509,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 
2007 518,000 180,000 352,000 315,000 
2008 519,000 - 315,000 180,000 
2010 600,000 240,000 250,000 325,000 





 Kompas Koran Tempo Media Indonesia Republika 
2000 1,598 000 - 396,000 335,000 
2005 1,692,000 282,000 463,000 - 
2006 1,646,000 166,000 341,000 - 
2007 1,611,000 199,000 396,000 - 
2008 1,420,000 233,000 262,000 193,000 
2009 1,611,000 275,000 193,000 - 
2010 1,090,000 187,000 211,000 - 
AVERAGE 1,524,000 223,667 323,143 264,000 
                                                          
481 From various sources: 2000 (WAN 2001: 120 quoted from Press Reference Indonesia); 2001 – 2004 
(WAN 2002 – 2005 quoted from Keller 2009: 43); 2006 (WAN 2007: 381); 2007 (WAN 2008: 450); 2008 
(WAN 2009: 500); 2010 (quoted from Lim 2012: 6). 
482 From various sources: 2000: Kompas, Media Indonesia, Republika ( Media Index AC Nielsen 1990-
2000, quoted from Nainggolan 2003: 102, 215, 267); 2008 Republika (WAN 2009: 500); 2005-2010: 
Kompas, Koran Tempo, Media Indonesia (Asril and Hudrasyah 2013: 891). 
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Appendix B 
Scandal disclosure (May 2000) until the first editorial following the DPR’s decision. Kompas (K), Media Indonesia (M), Republika (R). 
 2000 2001 
 May June July August September October November December January February 
 K M R K M R K M R K M R K M R K M R K M R K M R K M R K M R 
1             x          x     x   
2      x                x      x  x 
3     x   x                     x  
4                               
5    x  x                x         
6                               
7      x     x                    
8    x                  x         
9    x x                          
10                               
11     x                          
12    x x                    x      
13              x         x    x    
14    x                           
15   x                            
16    x              x x            
17                               
18                               
19                 x        x      
20                               
21                               
22                     x x   x      
23           x                    
24                         x      
25  x x                            
26 x     x                   x      
27 x                        x x     
28  x   x                     x     
29 x   x               x      x  x    
30            x         x    x  x    




Listing of all the editorials included in the analysis. Includes all editorials that mention 
the Bulog Yanatera scandal. 
 
Kompas  
26 May 2000 Skandal Bulog Bisa Jadi Batu Sandungan Pemerintahan 
Abdurrahman 
27 May 2000  Mari Kita Simak lagi, Apa Saja yang Beruntun Terjadi Pekan Ini 
29 May 2000 Ada-ada Saja Persoalan yang Menerpa Pemerintah Gus Dur-
Megawati 
31 May 2000 Sanggupkah Kita Menanggung Krisis Kedua? Rasanya akan  
Kelewat Berat! 
5 June 2000 Dana dan Kepercayaan IMF akan Kita Mubazirkan atau Kita 
Manfaatkan!  
8 June 2000 Memang Seru Persoalan Presiden, Jaksa Agung, dan Gubernur 
BI, tetapi Akibatnya? 
9 June 2000 Maling Ayam yang Mengembalikan Barang Curiannya Tetap 
Diproses Hukum 
12 June 2000 Bagaimana Duduk Perkara Konflik Elite Politik, Presiden dan 
Lain-lain? 
14 June 2000 Kita Harus Peduli terhadap Maraknya Massa Main Hakim 
Sendiri! 
16 June 2000 Keamanan, Hukum dan Politiklah yang Membuat Ekonomi 
Terpuruk 
29 June 2000  Momentum Pemulihan Ekonomi Itu Jangan Dilewatkan Lagi 
1 September 2000 Kabinet yang Langsung Bekerja, Seharusnya Indikasi yang Baik  
16 November 2000 Sampai Kapan Energi dan Perhatian Kita Disandera oleh Kasus 
Tommy 
29 November2000 Lewat Bencana, Langit Memberikan Pesan dan Isyarat secara 
Dramatis 
2 December 2000 Pelanggaran UU atau Lebih Cara Presiden Memahami dan 
Menyikapi Persoalan! 
5 December 2000 Pansus DPR Ternyata Bersisi Dua, Sisi Hukum dan Sisi 
Substansi 
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8 December 2000 Bertugas Kembalinya Syahril Sabirin Jangan Membuat Ekonomi 
Semakin Terpuruk 
22 December 2000 Betapa Pentingnya Kita Segera Memiliki Sistem Perbankan yang 
Sehat 
12 January 2001 Aneh! Kenapa 15 Januari Ditanggapi Seperti Dunia Akan 
Kiamat? 
19 January 2001 Ketika Kita Melanggar Komitmen Anti-KKN, Kita Mengingkari 
Reformasi 
22 January 2001 Betapapun Penting, Kini Ada Prioritas Lain Lebih Mendesak 
dari Perubahan UUD 
24 January 2001 Satu Nol untuk Abdurrahman Wahid, tetapi Selanjutnya 
Bagaimana? 
26 January 2001 Mengapa Politik Polarisasi yang Melibatkan Massa Bangkit Lagi    
27 January 2001 Pers Dinilai Parsial, tetapi Pemerintah Pun Bersudut Pandang 
Parsial 
29 January 2001 Belum Lenyap Dag-dig-dug 15 Januari, Kini Dihadang 29 
Januari 
30 January 2001 Konflik Di Atas dan Di Bawah Jangan Sampai Mengucurkan 
Darah 
31 January 2001 Benarkah Kita Berada dalam Keadaan Semakin Tidak Pasti? 
1 February 2001 Pencairan Pinjaman IMF Bukanlah Sesuatu yang Gratisan 
2 February 2001a Kita Berharap Agar Pertentangan Ini Tidak Berkepanjangan 
2 February 2001b Menjelang dan Pada Pleno DPR Terjadi Perkembangan Politik 
Besar 
3 February 2001 Kita Ciptakam Ikllim untuk Dipilihnya Langkah-langkah Bijak 
 
Media Indonesia  
25 May 2000  Menanti Teladan Keluarga Presiden 
28 May 2000  Wabah Paradoks 
31 May 2000  Kita Mengidap Kleptomania? 
3 June 2000  Bodoh-bodoh Pintar 
9 June 2000  Ritual Suwondo 
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11 June 2000  Kuruwetan Baru Tuan Presiden 
12 June 2000  Impor Kemauan 
28 June 2000  Sebuah Ritus Bernama Korupsi 
3 July 2000  Kejarlah Daku, Kau Kutangkap 
7 August 2000  Meresensi Presiden, bukan Menjatuhkan 
23 August 2000 Pengadilan yang Menggelikan 
13 September 2000 Sandiwara Keberanian 
19 October 2000 Misteri Soewondo 
1 December 2000 Rapat Tertutup Kehilangan Relevansi 
13 December 2000 Rimba Kebohongan 
27 January 2001 Ketakutan Terjadwal 
28 January 2001 Negeri tanpa Komandan 
3 February 2001 Maaf dan Janji 
 
Republika   
15 May 2000  Langkah Politik, bukan Hukum 
25 May 2000  Mengingatkan, bukan Menjatuhkan 
31 May 2000  Bondan dan Buloggate 
02 June 2000  Jangan 'Jual' Aceh 
05 June 2000  Hak Interpelasi Wakil Rakyat 
07 June 2000  Kisah Seorang Syahril 
26 June 2000  Abdurrahman Wahid sudah diperiksa 
30 August 2000 Hak Angket, Sejarah Politik Penting 
16 October 2000 Suwondo Tertangkap 
22 November 2000 Bukti Keterlibatan Presiden 
30 November 2000 Menunggu Arah Buloggate 
13 January 2001 Presiden dan Wapres soal Calon Ketua MA 
29 January 2001 Hari-hari Menentukan 
30 January 2001 Reformasi Kembali Digaungkan 
02 February 2001 Serahkan pada Mekanisme Demokrasi 
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Appendix D 
Listing of all the magazine articles analysed in the Aryantigate case study. 
 
Gatra (28 August 2000) 
Nada konspirasi di balik nyanyian Aryanti 
Tak perlu diladeni 
Honor sebuah pengakuan 
 
Panji Masyarakat (6 September 2000) 
Dari foto intim ke gosip politik 
Perjalanan kisah kasih Aryanti-Gus Dur 
Gus Dur bilang 'nanti kita tobat' 
Foto itu perlu diperiksa 
Pelajaran dari negeri seberang 
 
Forum Keadilan (10 September 2000)  
ARYANTI Sengaja menghina Presiden? (Cover page title) 
Pasal karet siap menjerat Aryanti (main report) 
K. H. Abdullah Faqih: “Kalau sampai ada fotonya, ya bagaimana...” 

























Scandal disclosure (August 2009) until the first editorial following the DPR’s decision (4 March 2010). Kompas (K), Media Indonesia (M), Koran Tempo (KT), Tempo mag (T) 
 2009 2010 
 August September October November December January February March 
 K M KT T K M KT T K M KT T K M KT T K M KT T K M KT T K M KT T K M KT T 
1      x x           x       x  x x x  x x 
2                  x        x    x   
3                 x         x   x x x  
4                 x x   x        x x x  
5      x     x x      x   x x x  x        
6          x     x          x        
7     x   x     x    x x x x       x      
8           x       x       x x      x 
9               x x  x x   x    x       
10                 x        x x       
11                  x x  x x  x  x       
12            x      x        x       
13                                 
14     x   x   x      x   x x x      x     
15           x      x x    x x          
16                  x x  x     x       
17       x           x       x x       
18                     x   x  x       
19     x          x    x  x  x  x        
20                     x x           
21        x         x   x x  x          
22                  x    x   x   x     
23                x x x   x x    x       
24              x           x x       
25              x          x  x       
26              x x   x    x           
27                         x  x      
28        x         x   x   x          
29 x     x    x        x x  x            
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Listing of all the editorials included in the analysis. This list includes all editorials 
that mention the Bank Century scandal over the period from the end of August 2009 
until 4 March 2010 (the editorial following the DPR’s vote). 
 
Kompas 
29 August 2009 Skandal Bank Century 
7 September 2009 Antusiasme dan Kepercayaan 
14 September 2009 Substansi atau Ambisi? 
19 September 2009 Cinta Tuhan Itu Cinta Sesama 
7 November 2009 Program 100 Hari Kabinet 
30 November 2009 Ujian Kita Belum Selesai 
3 December 2009 Komunikasi Politik 
4 December 2009 Anjuran Wapres Boediono 
7 December 2009 Adil, tetapi Juga Perlu Bijak 
10 December 2009 Antara Antikorupsi dan HAM 
14 December 2009 Konsentrasi Sangat Diperlukan 
15 December 2009 Kontroversi Sebelum Kerja 
21 December 2009 Keputusan Presiden Tegas 
23 December 2009 Sistemik atau Tidak Sistemik? 
28 December 2009 Kembali ke Proporsi 
30 December 2009 Menyikapi Buku MGC 
31 December 2009 Sirnanya Peluang Emas 
4 January 2010 Kepemimpinan dan Koalisi Diuji 
5 January 2010 Banyak Masalah, Sedikit Pilihan 
11 January 2010 Terpilihnya Hatta Rajasa 
14 January 2010 Soal Kesantunan Politik 
16 January 2010 Legalistik dan Kepemimpinan 
18 January 2010 Presiden agar Ambil Alih 
19 January 2010 Kejahatan di Sekitar Kita 
20 January 2010 Perlu Segera Diselesaikan 
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21 January 2010 Kewajiban Lapor Kekayaan 
23 January 2010 Makna Pertemuan Bogor 
29 January 2010 Pesan dari Pengunjuk Rasa 
30 January 2010 Gaduhnya Negeri Ini 
1 February 2010 Wapres Ingatkan Cara Elegan 
5 February 2010 Pesan dari Cipanas 
6 February 2010 Wacana Kepentingan Publik  
8 February 2010 Buruk dan Kurang Buruk 
10 February 2010 Kesimpulan Awal Pansus 
17 February 2010 Komplikasi Kasus Bank Century 
19 February 2010 Penjiplakan dan Plagiat 
22 February 2010 Tantangan dan Jawaban 
24 February 2010 Hiruk-pikuk Lobi 
27 February 2010 Solusi Berdasar Konstitusi 
1 March 2010  Tanggung Jawab Kebijakan Century 
3 March 2010  Kericuhan Jadi Tontonan 
4 March 2010  Jebakan Bank Century 
 
Media Indonesia  
1 September 2009 Transparansi dalam Kasus Bank Century 
5 September 2009 Independensi BPK di Kasus Century 
9 September 2009 Netralitas Polisi 
6 October 2009 Agenda Mendesak untuk DPR Baru 
29 October 2009 Angket Century Jangan Mati Suri 
30 October 2009 Demi Apa Keduanya Ditahan? 
24 November 2009 Pidato Antiklimaks 
25 November 2009 Memburu Duit Century 
26 November 2009 Misteri Century di Saku PPATK 
30 November 2009 Awas Tengkulak di Angket Century 
1 December 2009 Angket yang Mulus? 
2 December 2009 Century Mendekati Jantung Kekuasaan 
314 
 
4 December 2009 Melindungi Kewenangan KPK untuk Menyadap 
5 December 2009 Pansus Century yang Merisaukan 
7 December 2009 Persoalan Hari ini yang Menentukan 
8 December 2009 Angket Century Mencekal JK...? 
9 December 2009 Demonstrasi dan SBY  
11 December 2009 Tumpuan Harapan Pindah ke KPK 
12 December 2009 Ani versus Ical 
15 December 2009 Meluruskan Pansus Angket Century 
16 December 2009 Skandal Century Luas dan Lama 
17 December 2009 Menuntut Keterbukaan Pansus Angket Century 
22 December 2009 Berisik soal Nonaktif 
23 December 2009 Nikmatnya Keterbukaan 
26 December 2009 Si Artis Luna di Dunia Maya 
29 December 2009 Kegaduhan Gurita Cikeas 
30 December 2009 Koalisi Mulai Goyah 
5 January 2010 Kejahatan Perpajakan focus on Bakrie and pajak 
9 January 2010 Ruhut Vs Gayus focus on language and behaviour 
11 January 2010 Century dan Borok di BI 
14 January 2010 Kata Evaluasi di Mata Koalisi 
15 January 2010 Keterbukaan JK 
20 January 2010 Misteri Rapat 20 November 2008 
22 January 2010 Pengawasan BI yang Amatiran 
23 January 2010 Cincai dan Pemakzulan 
26 January 2010 Pansus Century semakin Kabur 
2 February 2010 Kerisauan Wapres 
3 February 2010 Menembus Rahasia Bank 
8 February 2010 Menuju Negara Seolah-olah 
9 February 2010 Angket Century Goyang Koalisi 
10 February 2010 Akhir Century 
11 February 2010 Pengemplang Pajak 
12 February 2010 Follow the Money 
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16 February 2010 Akrobat Pansus 
17 February 2010 Ramai-Ramai Jarah Century 
18 February 2010 Bendera Perang Mulai Dikibarkan 
23 February 2010 Skandal Anonim 
24 February 2010 Pansus Bodong 
25 February 2010 Drama Century di Paripurna 
2 March 2010  Konsistensi Partai Diuji 
3 March 2010  Diktator Palu Marzuki Alie 
4 March 2010  Sidang Paripurna DPR yang Ribet 
 
Koran Tempo 
1 September 2009 Mengaudit Suntikan Dana Century 
17 September 2009 Selamatkan Komisi Antikorupsi 
5 October 2009 Nonaktifkan Susno Duadji 
8 October 2009 Lolosnya Jenderal Susno 
14 October 2009 Kini Giliran Aktivis Antikorupsi 
15 October 2009 Anwar dan Kasus Century 
6 November 2009 Kerisauan Tim Delapan 
9 November 2009 Menanti Tindakan Presiden 
19 November 2009 Ketua DPR dan Angket Century 
26 November 2009 Bolong Audit Kasus Century 
7 December 2009 Musim Mengurus Nama Baik 
9 December 2009 Ribut soal Demo 9 Desember 
11 December 2009 Ketika Kabinet Mulai Retak 
16 December 2009 Jika Boediono Mengkritik Pers 
19 December 2009 Seruan Aneh Panitia Angket 
29 December 2009 Kontroversi Buku Aditjondro 
5 January 2010 KPK Jangan Lamban 
15 January 2010 Dagelan Angket Century 
19 January 2010 Presiden Jangan Diam 
21 January 2010 Gratifikasi buat Anggota DPR 
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28 January 2010 Jika Politikus Main Todong 
30 January 2010 Seratus Hari Tak Bergigi 
1 February 2010 Superioritas yang Tiba-tiba Kempis 
8 January 2010 Sang Kerbau Masuk Istana 
27 January 2010 Amburadulnya Angket Century 
1 March 2010  Skandal Century: Alpa atau Sengaja ‘ 
3 March 2010  Tepercik ke Politikus Sendiri 
4 March 2010  Setelah Drama Senayan 
 
Tempo  
7 September 2009 Heboh dana talangan Century 
14 September 2009 Aksi Susno di Century 
21 September 2009 Ricuh Komisi Antikorupsi dan Polisi 
28 September 2009 KPK di Ujung Tanduk 
5 October 2009 Nonaktifkan Susno Duadji 
12 October 2009 Periksa lagi Susno Duadji 
9 November 2009 Setelah rekaman Anggoda dibuka 
23 November 2009 Hak angket diredam janagn 
30 November 2009 Melacak penjarah Century 
7 December 2009a Terang-gelap audit Century 
7 December 2009b Musim mengurus nama baik 
14 December 2009 Lakon dua seteru 
21 December 2009 Angket Century atau Sri Mulyani? 
28 December 2009 Mengungkap juru selamat Century 
11 January 2010 Mengapa BI berkali terperosok 
18 January 2010 Di mana etika anggota Pansus 
25 January 2010 Seratus hari tidak bergigi 
1 February 2010a Siapa jadi korban 
1 February 2010b Superioritas yang tiba-tiba kempis 
14 February 2010a Aliran duit Boedi Sampoerna 
14 February 2010b Sang kerbau masuk istana 
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14 February 2010c Gertak sambal reshuffle kabinet 
22 February 2010 Sekutu dan seteru dalam konflik Century 
1 March 2010a  Sikap Presiden dalam episode akhir Century 
1 March 2010b  Skandal Century: Alpa atau Sengaja 
8 March 2010a  Pertemuan besar lepas kendali 
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